Reminiscence of William Sanders

Notice
These are transcripts of tape-recorded interviews conducted for the Harry S. Truman Library. A draft of each transcript was edited by the interviewee but only minor emendations were made; therefore, the reader should remember that these are essentially transcripts of the spoken, rather than the written word.

Numbers appearing in square brackets (ex. [45]) within the transcript indicate the pagination in the original, hardcopy version of the oral history interview.

RESTRICTIONS
This oral history transcript may be read, quoted from, cited, and reproduced for purposes of research. It may not be published in full except by permission of the Harry S. Truman Library.

Opened March, 1977
Harry S. Truman Library
Independence, Missouri

PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S TRIP TO RIO DE JANEIRO ON THE "MIGHTY MO"

The background of President Truman's visit to Rio de Janeiro in September 1947 was:

1) The Mexico City Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace held in 1945 adopted Resolution VIII on "Reciprocal Assistance and American Solidarity," known as the "Act of Chapultepec." This document consolidated and extended the Declaration of the Havana Meeting of Foreign Ministers (adopted some seventeen months

[2]
before Pearl Harbor) which provided that any act of aggression by a non-American State against an American State would be considered an act of aggression against all the American States.

In a very real sense the Act of Chapultepec was a response to the provisions of the Dumbarton Oaks draft of the U.N. Charter of the five big powers allied in World War II. Copies of this document were in the hands of the delegations at the Conference. The Act provided "that for the purpose of meeting threats or acts of aggression against any American Republic following the establishment of peace..." the governments should consider the conclusion of a treaty establishing procedures whereby such threats or acts might be met by the use, by all or some of the signatories of the treaty, of a series of specified measures. The Act was, in effect, an

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implicit assertion of regional autonomy in security matters vis-a-vis the upcoming World Organization.

2) This issue came to the fore early at the San Francisco U.N. Conference later the same year. It became one of the most difficult problems facing the U.S. delegation. There were Latin-American proposals that the Act of Chapultepec be mentioned specifically in the Charter as constituting a regional arrangement exempt from the veto of the big powers. After much soul searching and with the approval of President Truman, the delegation made two proposals, one part of the conference proceedings and one not. The first was the introduction of Article 51 in the Charter, on individual or collective self defense in the case of an armed attack; the other was an assurance, made by the Secretary of State to the Latin-Americans, that the U.S. was prepared to proceed with the agreement in the

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Act of Chapultepec to negotiate an inter-American treaty on reciprocal defense.

3) The inter-American Conference to negotiate the second part of the U.S. formula was postponed twice for known reasons, and almost a third time, not known publicly. The first two reasons related to U.S. objections to have Argentina participate in the Conference, because of its failure to take necessary action against the Axis powers after its last minute break of diplomatic relations with them.

As to the third reason, on the eve of Dean Acheson's departure in 1947 as Under Secretary of State and Robert Lovett's assumption of that post, I was informed that a decision was imminent to request a further postponement of the Conference. The reason was the uncertainty as to the outcome of the Conference. In view of the President's plan

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to visit Rio on the "Mighty Mo" to celebrate the conclusion of the treaty on reciprocal defense to be signed there, some clear assurance was needed that the meeting would be a success, otherwise the President would find himself in an untenable position. Time was needed, it was argued, for further preliminary negotiations in the Governing Board of the Pan American Union to ensure that the Conference outcome would justify the President's visit.

I requested an opportunity to discuss the issue with Messrs. Acheson and Lovett. A meeting was held with them, attended also by the Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs (now at the Assistant Secretary level), the Director of the Division of Regional Political Affairs of that Office, and the chief of the Secretary's staff.

The discussion was prolonged. Mr. Acheson remained unconvinced by my arguments that we

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could not ask for a third postponement after being responsible for two of them. At the end I said that, as I saw the possible outcome, there were three possibilities: a maximum success, a middle possibility, and a minimum one. I said that even the latter outcome would justify the President's visit, although I thought the other two were more likely. Mr. Lovett at last turned to Mr. Acheson and said he thought the U.S. should go ahead with the Conference. Mr. Acheson reluctantly agreed.

As we left the office, the Director of Latin-American Affairs turned to me and said, "Bill, I hope to God that you are right."

The Conference was a great success, as was President Truman's visit on September 2, 1947, to celebrate the conclusion of the treaty -- fortunately for the Western Hemisphere, and for me.

An important factor that made for success was the agreement, authorized by President Truman and

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announced by Secretary Marshall at the Conference, that the U.S. would accept a decision, by a two-thirds vote of the American States, to impose measures short of the use of armed force against any country, American or otherwise, found to be guilty of threats of aggression or of acts of aggression against any of them. This was unprecedented and totally unexpected by the Latin-Americans. The then Director General of the Pan American Union and later President of Columbia, and an outstanding statesman on all counts, Alberto Lieres Camargo, invited me to have a drink with him to celebrate the U.S. announcement. He found it hard to believe that the U.S. could put so much of its "sovereign prerogatives" in the hands of its neighbors.

WITH GEORGE C. MARSHALL AT THE INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY (RIO 1947) AND THE NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN STATES (BOGOTA 1948).

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President Truman's judgment in the selection of men for high posts in his administration may, as some hold, not have been flawless, but in the case of George Marshall and Dean Acheson, two very different personalities, he was faultless. The former he considered "one of the great men of his time." I agree. To illustrate:

I was with General Marshall at the Rio Conference of 1947 and the Bogota Conference of 1948 as an advisor on the U.S. delegation.

1) At the Rio Conference the Mexican delegation unexpectedly proposed that the treaty being negotiated limit the obligations of the parties to assist in meeting an armed attack against any one of them to an area three hundred miles from the coasts of the Western Hemisphere, and that in the case of an act of aggression not an armed attack, or of an extra or intra continental conflict or other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the treaty provide for consultation on the measure to be taken.

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The morning after the proposal was presented I entered the office where the staff was preparing for the committee meetings. With my back to the entrance door, I held forth on why the U.S. should oppose the proposal. Suddenly I heard the voice of Senator Vandenberg behind me (he was the U.S. spokesman on the committee to consider the proposal) asking: "Bill, are you sure we should oppose? I have already told the Mexicans that we will support." I said that, in my opinion, we should oppose the proposal. The Senator then said that we should have at once, that same Sunday afternoon, a meeting of the delegation to discuss the issue. He then spoke with General Marshall, who immediately agreed to have the meeting. Since the Conference was held at Quintandinha, in Petropolis, some miles from Rio, where most of the U.S. delegates were taking advantage of the day of rest to relax and

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sightsee, the call for the meeting meant that they had to abandon Rio and hurry back to the site of the Conference. I was sure I would become thoroughly unpopular.

At the meeting* Senator Vandenberg spoke at some length on why the U.S. should support the Mexican proposal. After he had finished, the Secretary looked around the room for the views of the other delegates. None spoke up. The Senator then said, as I recall, "Bill Sanders has other views and should make them known." I then took out of my pocket a piece of paper on which I had scribbled several points on why we should oppose. One, and the major one, was that the proposal would have the psychological and political, if not legal, effect of limiting the obligations for the maintenance of peace and security which the parties had assumed in the Charter of the

*Attended by General Marshall, William D. Pauley, Arthur H. Vandenberg, Tom Connally, Sol Bloom, Warren R. Austin, two generals and an admiral, and the top level advisers.

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United Nations. This would undermine the concept of the World Organization of collective responsibility for world peace. At this point the Secretary reached over for my piece of paper. That is the last I saw of it.

Senator Connally, at whose side I sat, asked me if I was sure of my grounds. I replied that I was. He was the only one who supported me. There was some further discussion, and Ambassador Austin said that my qualms could be taken care of by an article in the treaty providing that none of its provisions would impair the rights and obligations of the parties under the Charter of the U.N. The Secretary summarized the discussion in a few apt words and said the U.S. would support the Mexican proposal. I assume that that evening he consulted President Truman.

I have detailed this episode because it highlights

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lights George Marshall's readiness to hear opposing views, even from lower echelons, on emerging policy issues before taking a decision.

In retrospect, I think the decision in this instance was right. The demise of collective responsibility for world peace, so hopefully incorporated in the U.N. Charter, was inevitable in the political realities of the postwar period. The Roosevelt and early Truman vision of an organized world relationship was doomed to failure, as had been the similar Wilson vision. The regionalization of that responsibility exemplified by the Mexican proposal was manifest in the feeble support the U.S. received from Latin America (except for Columbia) in the Korean war, and more recently in the attitude assumed by the European NATO countries in the last armed conflict in the Middle East. A spin off of the Rio decision has been the position

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of some Latin-American countries which have referred to the 300 mile security zone as a precedent supporting their claims to a 200 mile maritime jurisdiction or fishing rights, as they have to the Truman continental Platform proclamation. But this has been only sugarcoating; they would have embarked on this course regardless.

2) At the Bogota Conference of 1948, following the outbreak of bloody violence triggered by the assassination of the Liberal leader Gaitan, George Marshall was housed in the home of a prominent family, which had been made available to him in a suburb of the capital. Staying with him were his aide Marshall Carter, Ambassador Norman Armour, his assistant Cecil Lyon, and myself.

The house was near a normal school where the heads of delegations had decided to meet, after abandoning the imposing Congressional Palace, to

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decide on major issues before they were referred to the committees for final drafting. The decision to continue the Conference in Bogota rather than move to some other country was the result of the strong stand taken by Marshall not to be intimidated by the "Communist" threat. The story of these events has been told by others, including the amusing one by Robert A. Lovett, then Under Secretary of State, in an address in 1960 when he received the first George C. Marshall medal of the Association of the United States Army. His account provides background information on the incisive action taken by President Truman to insure the safety of the U.S. and other delegations at a crucial stage of the "Bogotazo."

At the meetings of the heads of delegations I sat immediately behind the Secretary and was able to witness at first hand the imperturbable

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composure and sagacity of this most unusual man.

It was, however, the impression I had of him while we stayed secluded when the conference was not in session that left the most lasting memories of a side of the soldier-statesman not well-known. Aside from the informal official business meetings at the house, we had opportunities at dinner, which he invariably had with us, to get to know his very human side. Contrary to the general impression, he was a great and amusing conversationalist. For example:

On one occasion he gave a delightful account of how his wife had virtually brow-beaten him one Sunday to leave the relaxation of their Washington home to explore the possibility of buying a place in Leesburg, Virginia. After a series of amusing incidents, one of which was during attendance at church, they went to a drugstore for a sandwich.

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A man at the store was holding forth about fascism. Suddenly, while listening and busy with my soup, I said, louder than I was aware: "He sounds like Marshall Rust." I became aware that my companions at the table had frozen into immobility and that Marshall had stopped his recital and was looking fixedly at me with his commanding blue eyes. He shot at me the question: "What did you say?" I was disconcerted, sure that I had committed lese majesty. I repeated that I thought the speaker at the lunch counter could have been Marshall Rust; at which point he pointed a finger at me across the table and said with emphasis: "That was the man." There was an immediate relaxation of the tension around the table. With a chuckle, the diners resumed attention to the soup.

I recount this small episode because it reveals, to me, the very human side of General

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Marshall, a side of him that few knew. There were, of course, other reasons for admiring him, in particular his character; he had a highly developed moral quality, of "a habit long continued."

By way of a footnote, I did not agree with those, including General Marshall, who held that the "Bogotazo" was the result of a Communist conspiracy against the Conference. The Conference was held at a very tense stage in the pre-electoral campaign between the Liberal and Conservative parties. The spark that touched off the explosion was the assassination of Gaitan. I am inclined to the view, held by many Columbians of the time, that his death was the act of a lunatic fringe of the Conservative Party. The then head of the CIA testified before a Senate committee that his agency had warned the Department of State of possible Communist action against the Conference. I was the coordinator

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of U.S. preparations for the Conference and I can recall no clear warning of this kind. The reports were that there would be protest demonstrations, but nothing that can be said to justify CIA's version. This is not to say that the Communists, as usual, did not attempt to take advantage of the situation as it developed.

A SMALL EPISODE IN "BIPARTNERSHIP" DURING THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION

Prior to 1948 the member states of the Pan American Union were assessed quotas for the maintenance of the organization on the basis of population. This meant that the U.S. contributed half of its budget. Under the Charter of the OAS signed in Bogota in that year, the Council of the Organization was charged with the task of fixing the quotas (which became binding on the governments upon

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receiving a two-thirds vote of the members) "taking into account the ability to pay of the respective countries and their determination to contribute in an equitable manner."

In the negotiations that followed in the Council, I represented the U.S. The Latin-Americans took the position that the language of the Bogota Charter fully justified the application to the OAS of the formula the U.N. General Assembly had recently adopted at Lake Success. Some of the representatives calculated that this would mean that the U.S. should contribute over 90 percent of the OAS budget. After prolonged negotiations, I agreed ad referendum that the U.S. would pay 66 percent.

Before final acceptance of this formula, it was agreed in the Department of State that an effort should be made to obtain the support of congressional leadership. These were the days of

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the "bipartnership" policy that prevailed during the Truman administration and made for a united national foreign policy during the early and difficult years of the so-called "cold war." It was thus natural for us to think of Senator Vandenberg, the former isolationist who personified that policy. I had worked with him at the San Francisco U.N. Conference in 1945, the U.N. General Assembly at Lake Success, and the Rio de Janeiro Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace and Security in 1947.

Ambassador Norman Armour, the then only Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and I went to discuss the matter with the Senator. I had been asked by Ambassador Armour to present the case to the Senator. I was tense and not at all sure that he would be favorable. I had fresh in mind the struggle he had made to reduce the U.S.

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quota to the U.N. at Lake Success from the proposed 40 percent plus to 33 percent.

As we sat down in the Senator's office I became suddenly aware of a placard facing us on his imposing desk which read "This too Will Pass," I took this as an invitation to relax.

At the end of our discussion, Senator Vandenberg said that although he could give no assurances, he would do all in his power to obtain approval by the Senate. That approval was soon forthcoming.

I mention this small episode because it illustrates the case, and informality and at what different levels, we were able to practice "bipartisanship" during the Truman administration. It also attests to a now not well-known aspect of that policy: consultation with and participation by congressional leaders in decisions prior to their adoption by the Executive.

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THE BIRTH OF ISRAEL

One morning Robert McClintock and I were waiting in Mr. Lovett's outer office to discuss with him a problem on which we needed his guidance. Along one side of the room there were shelves of books, one of which I discovered was the Old Testament in Hebrew. I took it down and read aloud the first sentence of Genesis. McClintock appeared impressed. I did not tell him that that sentence was all I remembered from my course in Hebrew at Stanford University. I did say that there was a reading of the Bible which holds that the end of the world will begin in the Middle East. He was non-committal.

Shortly thereafter I became deeply involved in 1948 in the Department of State on the thorny question of the U.S. position on the Israel problem in the forthcoming debates in the General Assembly of the United Nations. After weeks of

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fruitless discussion in the Department -- lateral and horizontal -- the U.S. delegation in New York was without instructions. The discussions continued in New York and on the eve of the debates in the First Committee, Mr. Warren Austin, the Chief of the delegation, had before him two draft resolutions, one prepared by Ambassador Loy Henderson and the other by me. Henderson's version called for recognition of the State of Israel; mine for postponement of a decision. Mr. Austin preferred the Henderson draft and his opening speech in the committee was prepared accordingly. He was at the final paragraphs of the speech when we received instructions from the Department that represented a position more in accord with the draft I had prepared. I thrust the telegram from the Department on the table before him; he paused in his speech to read it, and then quickly ended his

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remarks and submitted my draft resolution. The delegates looked somewhat mystified, since the speech had been pointed in a different direction.

However, my triumph was short lived. Soon thereafter we received firm instructions to support the recognition of the State of Israel. What had happened in the interval is of record -- President Truman intervened and reversed the course on which we had so awkwardly launched ourselves.

I should add that the position I took was not based on fear that a nuclear holocaust engulfing the world could eventually originate in the Middle East as a result of the recognition of Israel. My basic concern, having in mind the torturous meanderings by which we had arrived in New York without high level instructions, was to gain time for a more careful determination of policy in reaching a final decision.

THE KOREAN WAR

I had a marginal part in the discussions in the Department of State leading to the recommendations to President Truman that the U.S. intervene in the Korean conflict in June, 1950.

There were two basic issues involved that followed in sequence:

1) The first had to do with the decision to abandon the initial U.S. stance that its military aircraft were sent into Korea only to provide air cover for the withdrawal of U.S. personnel from the country and instead to face up to the very difficult options of sending in ground troops in an all out support of its government against North Korean aggression as reported by the U.N. Observer Commission.

I recall leaving the Department late one evening after the recommendation had been forwarded

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to the President. Despite my inner qualms as to the consequences, in terms of the loss of American lives and the possibility of the conflict spreading to China and even Russia, I was convinced we had no alternative. I had serious doubts, however, that he would approve the recommendation. I had an image of President Truman I shared with so many in the country as a man who had reached the top of the ladder by default and was not of the caliber to face up to such a tough decision. The next morning on reaching the office I was told by Jack Hickerson, the Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs, that the President had promptly given his approval.

This was the beginning for me of a complete reappraisal of the President, which subsequent events confirmed in the fullest possible measure. I came to consider him one of our great Presidents.

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2) The second issue posed an early test of the support the U.S. was prepared to give, when the chips were down, the concept and institutions embodied in the fledgling United Nations.

The questions debated in the Department between June 25 (after approval by the U.N. Security Council of the U.S. resolution calling for a cessation of hostilities and North Korean withdrawal to the 38th parallel) and June 27 (when the second U.S. resolution was presented) was whether the U.S. should justify its intervention in the conflict solely on Article 51 of the U.N. Charter or seek to obtain the approval of the organization for collective action under Article 39. Article 51 recognizes the inherent right of individual or collective self defense in the case of an armed attack against a member, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international

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peace and security. Article 39 provides the Security Council with the overall responsibility for taking the measures required to maintain or restore international peace and security. Specifically, the choice for the U.S. was to intervene unilaterally or to obtain a U.N. umbrella for the operation, which would include the military and material support of other members, and give practical support to the U.N. approach to the maintenance of peace and security.

The initial preference in the Department was in favor of Article 51. Indicative of this was the change we introduced in the resolution of June 25, by which reference to North Korean "armed invasion" became "armed attack." This did not reflect a preference for "going it alone" but rather the uncertainty of obtaining a U.N. sponsored effort, because of the Soviet presence in the Security Council.

As a result of the two day discussions in the Department, the decision was reached to risk a move to the second position. The resolution proposed by

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the U.S. and approved by the Security Council the night of June 27, reflected that position. I have no doubt that this approval was nearer to the course favored by President Truman from the beginning.

Approval of the U.S. resolution by the Security Council was made possible by the very opportune prior "walk out" of the Soviet representative in the protest against the representative of the Government of Formosa occupying the seat of China.

The morning of the 28th cables went out from the Department to members of the U.N. asking for assistance for South Korea under the terms of the Security Council resolution. That noon I received an irritated telephone call from one of the geographic assistant secretaries asking by what authority governments in his area had been approached. I replied, "By authority of the President." He subsided, muttering. It was not, I am sure, that

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he opposed the decision, but that he had a legitimate grievance in not having had an opportunity to clear the cables to the U.S. embassies in his region.

There was an aftermath to the Korean conflict during the Eisenhower administration which may be of peripheral interest, considering the slogans about "the Truman war" in the political campaign of 1952. I was appointed by President Eisenhower as Alternate Representative to the General Assembly session of March 1953, and was the U.S. spokesman in the First Committee and Plenary on the items dealing with the development of the collective security capabilities of the U.N. The item was designed to carry forward the programs of the Uniting for Peace resolution. This resolution drew on the experience in the Korean conflict, particularly on the lessons acquired to the effect that the "temporary incapacity" of the Security Council

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to fulfill its charter obligations should not be allowed to incapacitate the whole U.N. The resolution was adopted by the General Assembly at the initiative of the U.S. after the Soviet representative returned to the Security Council.

• Acheson, Dean, 4, 5-6, 8
  Act of Chapultepec, 1, 2-4
  Argentina, 4
  Armour, Norman, 13, 20
  Article 39 of the United Nations Charter, 27, 28
  Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 27, 28
  Austin, Warren R., 10, 11, 23

  Bipartisanship in the Truman administration, 18-21
  Bloom, Sot, 10
  Bogota, Colombia, 18
  Bogota Charter, 19
  Bogota Conference, 7, 8, 13-15, 17
  Bogotazo, 14, 17

  Camargo, Alberto Lieres, 7
  Carter, Marshall, 13
  Central Intelligence Agency, 17, 18
  Chapultepec Conference, 1, 2-4, 6-7
  China, 26, 29
  Colombia, 7, 12, 17
  Connally, Tom, 10, 11

  Declaration of the Havana Meeting of Foreign Ministers, 1-2
  Dumbarton Oaks Conference, 2

  Eisenhower, Dwight D., 30

  Formosa, 29

  Gaitan, Mr., 13, 17

  Henderson, Loy, 23
  Hickerson, Jack, 28

  Inter-American Conference, 4
  Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace and Security, 7
  Israel, recognition of, 22-24

  Korean war, 12, 25-31

  Lake Success, New York, 19, 20, 21
  Leesburg, Virginia, 15
  Lovett, Robert A., 4, 5, 6, 14, 22
  Lyon, Cecil, 13

  McClintock, Robert, 22
  Marshall, George C., 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14-17
  Mexico, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12
  Mexico City Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, 1
  Middle East, 12, 24

  New York, New York, 23, 24
  Ninth International Conference of American States, 7
  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 12

  Office of American Republic Affairs, 5
  Old Testament, 22
  Organization of American States, 18-19

  Pan American Union, 5, 7, 18
  Pauley, William D., 10
  Pearl Harbor, 2

  Quintandinha, Brazil, 9

  Regional Political Affairs Division of the Office of American Republic Affairs, Department of State, 6
  Resolution VIII on Reciprocal Assistance and American Solidarity, 1
  Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 1, 5
  Rio de Janeiro Conference, 6-7, 8-13
  Rio de Janeiro Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace and Security, 20
  Roosevelt, Franklin D., 12
  Rust, Marshall, 16

  San Francisco, California, 3

  • United Nations Conference at, 20
  Sanders, William:
  • arid Israel, 22-24
    and Korea, 25-31
    and the Rio de Janeiro Conference, 8-11
  Stanford University, 22
  State Department, 17, 19, 25, 27

  Truman, Harry S., 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 20, 24

  • bipartisanship in the administration of, 18-21
    and Korea, 25, 26, 29, 30

  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 26, 28, 31
  United Nations, 11, 12, 20, 21, 22

  • charter of, 2
    General Assembly of, 19
    and Korea, 25, 26, 27-29, 30-31
    and the San Francisco Conference, 3, 20
  United States, 3, 4, 8, 9, 14, 18, 19, 21
  • and Korea, 25, 26, 27, 30
    and the U.S.S. Missouri, 1, 5

  Vandenberg, Arthur H., 9, 10, 20, 21

  Wilson, Woodrow, 12