Charles S. Murphy Oral History Interview, July 25, 1969

Notice
This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted for the Harry S. Truman Library. A draft of this transcript was edited by the interviewee but only minor emendations were made; therefore, the reader should remember that this is essentially a transcript of the spoken, rather than the written word.

Numbers appearing in square brackets (ex. [45]) within the transcript indicate the pagination in the original, hardcopy version of the oral history interview.

RESTRICTIONS
This oral history transcript may be read, quoted from, cited, and reproduced for purposes of research. It may not be published in full except by permission of the Harry S. Truman Library.

Opened May, 1971
Harry S. Truman Library
Independence, Missouri

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HESS: All right, we’re recording, sir. You have shown me a couple of memoranda here that I believe that we should discuss. They bear on what we were talking about last time. The first says, "written in longhand April the 16th of 1950," which is a statement by Mr. Truman. And the second that you showed me is a memorandum to the President from yourself dated...

MURPHY: It’s a letter.

HESS: A letter, from yourself to Mr. Truman dated November the 23rd, 1951. Could you tell me about those two?

MURPHY: Yes, this has to do with President Truman’s decision not to run, not to be available, for reelection in 1952. The first is a typewritten copy of a memorandum which he wrote in longhand

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dated April the 16th, 1950, saying that he is not a candidate for nomination by the Democratic convention and going on telling something about why. Then in November 1951 he read this memorandum to those of us on his staff who were with him at Key West. The text of his memorandum is included in his Memoirs, and his Memoirs tell about his reading this memorandum to his staff at Key West.

I think perhaps, I’m not sure, about the date in his Memoirs, the date on which he says the memorandum was read to the staff, I think that may be in error. But actually it was read to the staff in November 1951 [See Appendix B]. And the other paper to which you referred is a copy of a letter that I wrote to the President on November 23rd, 1951, telling him some of my thoughts about the memorandum he had read to us and about his telling us in effect that he would not run for re-election. I wrote the letter in

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longhand and I made a copy for my files, which is also in longhand, and this is what I am giving you now, a photostatic copy of my longhand file copy [See AppendixC].

HESS: Fine. We’ll include these in the appendicies to our transcript.

One question on the date that it states that the President wrote this, April the 16th, 1950. Do you know between that date and the occasion in Key West in November of ‘51 that the President had made up his mind not to run?

MURPHY: I did not.

HESS: Is it a little surprising to you, or is it--it is to me, to note that he had made up his mind so far in advance.

MURPHY: Well, it’s somewhat surprising but it’s not uncharacteristic. And the reasons he gives I think are very revealing reasons, revealing

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just what kind of man he was, his character and his beliefs about the Government. I think when you put the whole thing in character and keeping with his attitude and beliefs, that it all fits together quite well.

HESS: At the conclusion of our last interview, of course, we were discussing the events of 1952 and one question on that. What do you recall about the meeting at the White House in August of that year that is referred to by Cabell Phillips on page 425 of his book The Truman Presidency? I’ll read just a little bit here of what he has to say about it:

In August Stevenson paid a visit to the President in the White House in the hope of working out a modus vivendi by which the President would remain in the background until the last couple of weeks of the campaign, while Stevenson created a public image and program of his own. The conference was held in the Cabinet room with the President and key members of his staff lined up on one side of the vast coffin shaped table and, on the other side, Stevenson and picked members of ‘the

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Springfield crowd’--like representatives of sovereign powers at a treaty conference. It was stiff, painfully uncomfortable, and largely inconclusive.

MURPHY: Well, there was such a meeting. I don’t remember a great deal about the details. I would have been there, and I am sure that I was there. I think, perhaps, Mr. Phillips overstates it a little when he talks about the crowd being drawn up like representatives of sovereign powers at a treaty conference. Other than that, why, and when he says it was stiff and painfully uncomfortable, perhaps that is something of an overstatement. But, other than that, I think his statement is probably about right. President Truman and Governor Stevenson never did develop a really cordial, personal relationship. They acted quite friendly toward each other but they were just not particularly compatible. The members of their respective staffs, there was some prior acquaintance between them. The relationship

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between the staffs was good, on the whole. It was not intimate but there was nothing painfully stiff and uncomfortable.

HESS: Did you feel that Governor Stevenson’s visit was in the nature of trying to get the President to remain in the background as Phillips has stated?

MURPHY: I wouldn’t think of it as primarily for that purpose. It was shortly after the Democratic National Convention where Stevenson was nominated and the normal and natural thing for him to do was to be to pay a visit to the President and talk about the campaign. I think it is true, Stevenson did hope that President Truman would remain in the background, and this was a sensitive, difficult kind of question for him to bring up. And, so while this would have been one of the things that he would have liked to accomplish, and this

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meeting would have had something to do with it, I think to talk about that as being the primary, or sole purpose of the meeting, again is out of balance.

HESS: Did he infer, or imply, in any way that he would like the President to hold down his participation?

MURPHY: Whether he did at that meeting, I don’t know. I know that that was his general attitude.

HESS: All right.

What were your functions during the 1952 campaign?

MURPHY: Well, I had my regular functions as the President’s Special Counsel having to deal with staff assistance to him in running the Government and there were some problems and some activities the President had to continue to work on and handle, during the campaign, in

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addition to the campaign itself.

HESS: What comes to mind?

MURPHY: Oh, well, nothing comes to mind. But anybody, I think, with a little research can look back and see what the United States was involved in during the fall of 1952 and whatever it was involved in, the President was involved in too. In addition to that he did take a very active part in the campaign. He did a lot of speaking. And I was in charge of the staff work in connection with the preparation of his speeches, the research for them, and helping him in drafting speeches.

HESS: Were the procedures in ‘52 any different than they were in ‘48?

MURPHY: Well, they were basically the same, I guess. They were much better organized in ‘52 than they were in 1948. We had, by that time, an experienced

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and very capable group at the White House that had worked with President Truman for a number of years by then in connection with his speeches and other activities and they were quite familiar with his manner of speech as well as his thoughts on various and sundry subjects and had a lot of experience in the mechanical side of preparing speeches and so it was a much more smoothly functioning operation than in 1948.

HESS: Were most, or all, of the speeches written on the train in 1952? As I recall, in 1948 you were back there in the White House.

MURPHY: Well, that is true. A much larger part of it was done on the train in 1952. Now, the regular pattern was to try to get a draft of a speech on different subjects from experts in the field, including people both inside and outside of the Government, Government departments and agencies. I’m sure that practice was

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followed in 1952 in an effort to get first drafts and to get some substantive material and content within speeches. The drafting that was done by the President’s staff was done mainly wherever he was in 1952. If he was at the White House, the whole group was at the White House, and if he was on the train, the whole group was on the train. Jim Sundquist was with us, Dave Lloyd, Ken Hechler, and I expect Dick Neustadt. Among us, we were quite capable of giving the President such assistance as he wanted with almost any number of speeches that he wanted to make.

HESS: Were you in charge of the speechwriting team in ‘52?

MURPHY: I was, yes.

HESS: Who else was aboard the train in ‘52 who might not have been as instrumental in working on the

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speeches as the men you have mentioned, but who had other duties?

MURPHY: Well, Matt Connelly would have been there and I think Dave Stowe was there. I just don’t remember the others. I expect Donald Dawson was on the train at least part of the time.

HESS: What were their duties?

MURPHY: David Stowe and Donald Dawson’s duties would have been mostly to handle the distinguished visitors who boarded the train and frequently rode for some distance on the train.

HESS: How was it decided who should come aboard the train and who should ride from one stop to the next, sort of the high priority people, as opposed to the walk across kind or type of invitation that was given out to people who just walked across the back platform?

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MURPHY: Well, I don’t know a great deal about that. It was not in my area of responsibility. Dave Stowe could probably tell you more about that than I can. But it was done, I expect, mainly by the local people following guidelines which were given to them by the Democratic National Committee advance man. Now, there would have been advance men who go to places before the President and his group get there and work with the local people in making the arrangements and this was part of the thing that they are supposed to do, is to sort these people out for this kind of purpose.

HESS: Do you recall who acted as advance man or men in ‘52?

MURPHY: No, I expect Marty [Martin L.] Friedman did some of this. He is in this building by the way. If you haven’t talked to Marty, why, you might be interested in doing that.

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HESS: I believe he’s been interviewed. Now whether this particular subject came up, it slips my mind right now.

MURPHY: Oscar Chapman was the, I suppose, the principal advance man in 1948. I have no clear recollection, I would guess he was likely an advance man for Stevenson in ‘52. He was quite expert in this field, very, very good.

HESS: How were the itineraries for the President’s trips determined?

MURPHY: I don’t know. He and Matt Connelly did that very largely I guess.

This relates to the question you’ve raised earlier, I guess, about Governor Stevenson wanting President Truman to stay in the background. President Truman made a trip of several days, Labor Day 1952, and he, and certainly his staff, did not make particular

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efforts to avoid attention. It was quite the contrary. And the trip attracted a good deal of attention, and this did give Governor Stevenson some concern.

I heard from some member of his staff after that, I don’t remember at the moment who it was, but some member of his staff told me that Governor Stevenson was concerned about the question of how prominent a part President Truman was going to play in the campaign, and whether he would attract too much attention away from Governor Stevenson. As the fall passed, and the campaign developed, I expect that President Truman and those of us who worked for him had the feeling that Governor Stevenson was not campaigning as vigorously as he might and not attracting as much attention as would be desirable. And President Truman, in his eagerness to be helpful, worked at it pretty hard. And I think, quite probably, that in general,

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during the fall, he did do more speaking and spoke in somewhat more vigorous terms than Governor Stevenson would have wished him to. And, on the other hand, I’m quite sure that Governor Stevenson spoke in somewhat less vigorous terms than President Truman would have wished him to. And there was that element all during the fall.

HESS: Did you convey the message to President Truman that you had heard from a staff member of Governor Stevenson’s in the nature that the President was a little too active than what Governor Stevenson would have liked?

MURPHY: I don’t have any actual recollection but, I assume that I did. It’s the kind of thing that I would have told him about just...

HESS: Do you recall his reaction when being told this?

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MURPHY: No, since I don’t remember telling him, I don’t remember his reaction.

HESS: I thought one would lead to the other.

MURPHY: No. I know of his attitude generally during the fall and it was shared by his staff, shared by me as a matter of fact. That the campaign was developing so that he had ought to speak frequently and vigorously even though Governor Stevenson was not urging him to.

HESS: Did you feel that there was a need for improving liaison or relations between the two staffs? Between your staff and Governor Stevenson’s?

MURPHY: Well, I suppose there was always a need for improving liaison and relations. I don’t have any recollection of having a particularly acute feeling about that. Now one thing that was done and this was done at my suggestion as I

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recall. David Bell, who was an Administrative Assistant to the President, an extremely able man, was assigned to Governor Stevenson’s staff and went out to Springfield. Now the principal thing that he was to do out there was to provide just general expertise and knowledge about the Government, and he had a vast store of expertise and knowledge about the Government. He had been quite largely responsible for the preparation of budget messages for several years before that, and that’s the best way to learn about the Government of the United States. He had been on the White House staff since 1947, I guess, and he did do a great deal of very valuable work at Springfield. Those of us who were left on the White House staff did not keep particularly close touch with him. My recollection is that the man that I called, usually on Governor Stevenson’s staff at that time was Willard Wirtz, who has since

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then been Secretary of Labor under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.

HESS: I understand that Clayton Fritchey also went to Springfield about that time. Is that right?

MURPHY: I think that’s true. Clayton Fritchey, I guess, was technically an Administrative Assistant to the President. He was never a part of the regular White House staff,

HESS: What was his role?

MURPHY: I don’t think he ever had any role except to be assigned to Stevenson.

HESS: Was he brought into and placed as an Administrative Assistant on the White House staff with this in mind?

MURPHY: I don’t know about that. I don’t think I participated in that. I think that’s the

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way it worked out. He never performed any substantial function on the White House staff of President Truman to the best of my recollection about it. I had actually forgotten he was there.

HESS: What did he do? Do you recall?

MURPHY: No. Except that he was with Governor Stevenson.

HESS: Do you know what he did in Springfield?

MURPHY: No. I probably did know at the time, in a general way, but I don’t know now.

HESS: When David Bell was assigned to Springfield, was this at the direction of the White House or was his presence requested by Governor Stevenson?

MURPHY: My recollection is that I suggested it to Governor Stevenson and the President and they

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both agreed.

HESS: At about what time did you suggest this? It wasn’t the meeting in August was it?

MURPHY: It would have been about that time.

HESS: Do you recall if itineraries between the President’s trips and the Governor’s trips were coordinated?

MURPHY: There was some degree of coordination, yes. This might very well have been through the Democratic National Committee. President Truman’s general practice has always been, at least his statement of his general practice, in political campaigns, to do whatever the Democratic National Committee tells him to do and I think that has relevance to your earlier question about how itineraries were worked out also. I’m sure that the Democratic National Committee would have been involved in that.

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The normal way for this to work is for people in cities who want speakers to make their wishes known to the Democratic National Committee and the Democratic National Committee does what it can about arranging for speakers to go to different cities and to avoid conflicts between different speakers. So, this should have been, and I expect was, by and large, the central coordinating mechanism for the itineraries of Governor Stevenson and President Truman in the campaign. And I also expect that the--well, now I started to say that the national committee would have been encouraging President Truman to speak. I have a second thought about that.

The chairman of the Democratic National Committee at that time was Steve Mitchell. Before the convention the chairman had been Frank McKinney. President Truman thought that Frank McKinney was an extremely able and

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efficient chairman and did a very good job as chairman of the national committee and he has always thought that Governor Stevenson made a mistake to replace him as chairman of the committee with Steve Mitchell. And I think his view has been, that there was enough difference so if it had not happened Stevenson would have won the election. I’m sure that he felt very strongly that it was a serious mistake.

Now, Steve Mitchell came to see President Truman and was most courteous and polite and there was no friction between them. They were not particularly compatible and the relationship was not very cordial because, partly I suppose, maybe largely, because of President Truman’s strong feeling that Steve Mitchell shouldn’t be there in the first place. Not that he had anything against him, but he just thought it should have been

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Frank McKinney. But notwithstanding that, he would have worked through the Democratic National Committee, because he thought that was the way these things should be done.

HESS: In your opinion, why was that change made. Why was Mitchell brought in and McKinney replaced?

MURPHY: Oh, I have no opinion about that. I suppose it was part of Stevenson’s feeling that he wanted to create a different image, which I think just from the standpoint of political tactics, was a mistake.

HESS: They had been law partners had they not?

MURPHY: I think they had. I have always believed and believe until this day that if Stevenson had run on the Truman record he might have very well have been elected. But he didn’t, he ran away from the Truman record and he just

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didn’t have a chance on that basis.

HESS: Why, in your opinion, did Governor Stevenson leave his principal headquarters in Springfield?

MURPHY: Well, again this is something that I would not know a great deal about. Certainly a part of it was that he was still Governor of Illinois, and he thought he should continue to perform the duties of the Governor of Illinois and this he could do best if he had his campaign headquarters at the same place he had his gubernatorial headquarters. And, in addition to that, he had his staff arrangements and working arrangements there. And, I would guess, that part of it was a matter of wanting to create in the public mind the picture and the image of a man coming from the Middle West. After all that’s where Abraham Lincoln came from. The people in Illinois very properly make

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a great deal of being Abraham Lincoln’s State and in a political campaign this would be a very timely thing to do.

HESS: One question back on the itineraries and where President Truman made his speech. As I recall, the southernmost point in the President’s trip was West Virginia. Is there any significance in that that there were no trips taken into the South on speaking trips in ‘52?

MURPHY: I don’t recall anything about it. In fact I’m a little surprised to hear you say that. I don’t have a definite recollection to the contrary. I remember southern speeches in the 1948 and 1960 and in other years. I just don’t happen to remember any in 1952.

HESS: They were rather scarce in 1948 even. What do you recall about these that were made in ‘48 in the South?

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MURPHY: I remember he made two, three, I think in Raleigh, North Carolina one day.

HESS: What was the occasion?

MURPHY: He made one in the Capital Square, where the State Capitol Building was located, dedicating a statue as I recall of three North Carolinians, Andrew Johnson, and I don’t remember who else and then on the same day he made a speech at the North Carolina State Fair at the State Fair Grounds outside of Raleigh and at that one he talked about Hoovercarts. This was an idea that I brought up, a subject I brought up, and I found that Hoovercarts seemed to be a phenomenon that was peculiar to North Carolina. Nobody else knew about them. But the people in North Carolina knew about them and as soon as President Truman said something about Hoovercarts at the State Fair, why, this was very well received.

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HESS: For the record, what is a Hoovercart?

MURPHY: This is a cart made out of parts of an automobile chassis converted to a cart or a wagon. This was done by a good many people in North Carolina in the depression and they, not being able to keep their automobiles operating, and buy gas for them, why, they converted them into carts.

HESS: Towed by mules?

MURPHY: Towed by mules or horses. They would have a parade. They would have Hoovercart parades.

HESS: Competition to see who had done the best job?

MURPHY: That’s right.

HESS: All right.

Well, we have discussed the staff on President Truman and Governor Stevenson’s

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staffs? Do you feel that there was a workable relationship between the staffs?

MURPHY: There was not a very close relationship. There was...

HESS: Even after Dave Bell and Clayton Fritchey went to Springfield?

MURPHY: Yes. I think you think of them, at least I would think of them as, for that time and for that purpose, as being part of Governor Stevenson’s staff or operating as if they were part of his staff, and there was no particular reason for us to have, us on President Truman’s staff, to have a great deal of communication with Dave Bell. We had whatever was felt necessary from either end. I’m sure that if he wanted help or information from us he would call for it and if we had anything to say to him, we would have said it. But, he was, by and large, quite capable of operating his independent,

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fully contained, self contained unit. There were times when it seemed to be desirable to communicate with Dave. Stevenson’s staff had traveled with him. Dave Bell did not travel with Stevenson, as I recall. He always stayed in Springfield, I think, all the time. I did call the people on Stevenson’s staff and as I remember, the man that I called the most was Willard Wirtz, as I said earlier.

HESS: Did you have pretty good contact with him? Pretty good liaison relationship with him?

MURPHY: Yes. And this was true again in 1956 I guess, to the extent that I was involved in the campaign in ‘56, and I was involved in it to some extent, and so was President Truman.

HESS: Was Mr. Wirtz still helping Governor Stevenson at that time?

MURPHY: He was, yes, it was still or again.

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HESS: We have mentioned two of the men who have held the position of chairman of the Democratic National Committee but just what was the relationship between Mr. Truman and the other men who held that position at an earlier date? The first: Robert Hannegan. What was his relationship between President Truman and Robert Hannegan?

MURPHY: I don’t know much about that. He inherited Robert Hannegan, and Hannegan was involved in the nomination for Vice President in 1944 and I just have no personal knowledge about the relationship between Hannegan and President Truman.

HESS: How about the next gentleman, J. Howard McGrath?

MURPHY: Well, he was, I think, actually selected by President Truman to be chairman of the national committee. The relationship between

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them was very good. At that time McGrath was in the Senate I guess, Senator from Rhode Island, and he was chairman of the national committee in 1948 and he was an extremely able person. There was some question, I think, about how hard he worked at some of his jobs sometimes, but certainly President Truman’s relationship to him was very close and very good.

In 1948 Bill Boyle, who later became chairman of the national committee, was, I suppose, on the staff of the Democratic National Committee. At any rate, he was involved in a major way in the campaign and was assigned especially to President Truman. He traveled a good deal on the train with President Truman. He and I were roommates on the train. We had the same bedroom, or compartment, whatever you have on trains. He kept in close touch with political leaders in the states throughout

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the country by telephone. He knew more about what was going on than anyone else, to my knowledge, before or since. He knew more what was going on in that campaign. He was one of those who said President Truman was going to win, and his information and forecasts were very close and relatively accurate in detail state by state. And I’m sure that he also, in that connection, was involved in President Truman’s itinerary and determining who he would meet with at different places and things of that kind. It was largely because of that working experience, I guess, that he was made chairman of the national committee later on. My recollection is that after that election in 1948 President Truman did appoint McGrath as Attorney General and I believe they both had the feeling that it would not be appropriate for the Attorney General to also be chairman of the Democratic

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National Committee. And having the need for a new chairman, I’m sure that Bill Boyle was chosen at President Truman’s suggestion. He came from Missouri, Kansas City as I recall. Bill Boyle was a grand person and so that relationship was very close indeed all the time that he was chairman of the national committee. I think Bill Boyle resigned as chairman of the national committee because of some--well, I don’t know that it was because of, but certainly it was partly because of, some questions that were raised about the propriety of his practicing law as a Washington lawyer and being chairman of the Democratic National Committee. That was not the kind of thing which, according to my best recollection had been thought of as improper before. I think that this was a new invention, that it was not proper for a Washington lawyer to be chairman of the national

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committee, and it was largely the work of the Republicans, I suppose, and you can’t fault them for that. If they could do that and get away with it, I suppose, they are entitled to but they were aided and abetted, I’m sure by some Democrats in that connection. One of my favorite recollections is Bill Boyle being invited to testify before some Senate committee, on that subject, at that time, and one member of the committee asked him, "Mr. Boyle, what kind of law do you practice?"

And he sputtered for a little bit and said, "Well, well, legal law, of course."

HESS: The best kind of law.

MURPHY: Yes. And along about the same time I guess there was a question raised about someone else, whose name I don’t remember, that had been thought of as more or less a protege of Bill Boyle’s whose name was in the

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news.

Frank McKinney. I said something earlier as to what President Truman thought about Frank McKinney as chairman of the national committee. How he ever selected Frank McKinney as chairman of the committee I haven’t the faintest idea. I just don’t know how he got to know Frank McKinney or got to know about him. I assume that he was the man who selected him, because it is a practical matter that the President in office can, and normally does, actually make the selection of the chairman of the national political committee, although, technically he is elected by the committee. Frank McKinney’s a very able business man, a very orderly person and he organized the national committee in a very orderly fashion and did a great deal of preliminary work for the 1952 campaign, very little of which was used, as I recall.

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news.

The relationship between McKinney and President Truman continued to be close and friendly after that and is up till this day I guess. McKinney is not in very good health now but he is still active in business in Indianapolis. He’s chairman of the board of a bank, Fletcher Trust Company, or something of that sort in Indianapolis. A member of the board of directors of the Indianapolis Power and Light Company. I don’t know what other activities he is in, a capitalist in general I guess. At an earlier time you mentioned his coming to Key West and he came I think just as a part of a boat trip. He came on his yacht which had come down, I’m not sure that he made the whole trip, came down the Mississippi River as I understand, around to Key West. And he left on his yacht coming on up the Atlantic coast. A Chris-Craft of, oh, sixty-odd feet, I suppose.

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HESS: He sounds like a pretty good capitalist. Doesn’t he?

MURPHY: Yep, yep. Yep, fine fellow, Frank.

HESS: Well, taking the men who held that job into consideration, Hannegan, McGrath, Boyle, McKinney and Mitchell, who would you rate as the best politician?

MURPHY: Oh, I don’t know. I wouldn’t rate Hannegan, I just didn’t know enough about him. I don’t think Steve Mitchell was a very good politician. Steve was a good lawyer and a fine fellow but I don’t think he was a very good politician. I think McGrath, Boyle, McKinney were all good politicians. I think McGrath and Boyle I would think of as really professional politicians, and I would think of Frank McKinney as a businessman who did quite well in his stint in politics.

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HESS: At the time that they were head of the Democratic National Committee, did you personally have very much business with them?

MURPHY: Yes, as a matter of fact Steven Mitchell continued to be chairman of the national committee for two years after that and I was his special assistant, or special counsel. I was retained by the national committee and worked with him and for him. Not full-time. I was practicing law and one of my regular jobs, clients as it were, was the Democratic National Committee. I worked with and for Steve Mitchell and, as I say, he was a fine fellow. I was very fond of him. A very able lawyer. I don’t think he was particularly a natural politician. Also I arranged for him to employ as his full-time assistant Jim Sundquist. My relationships with Frank McKinney were not very close. My relationships with Bill Boyle

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were pretty close on a personal basis although I did not do a great deal of work with him. I had some dealings with Howard McGrath while he was chairman of the national committee and later, of course, when he was Attorney General, and was present, but not involved, in the considerations relating to his resignation as Attorney General.

HESS: What do you recall about that?

MURPHY: Well, this will need to be sealed I guess.

HESS: All right.

MURPHY: President Truman eventually requested McGrath’s resignation as Attorney General. There was a lot of talk, public comment about scandal in the Truman administration. This involved Lamar Caudle, about whom we have spoken sometime earlier, I guess, who was then an Assistant Attorney General. It involved

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some several collectors of Internal Revenue. Some of whom turned out quite badly. My recollection is, that every one of them was appointed by President Roosevelt, and not one of them by President Truman. However, this rubbed off on him and his administration and there were some other things that were not terribly bad, but on the other hand they were, I think, subject to some adverse criticism. Well, at any rate, this led President Truman to feel that it would be necessary and appropriate to have some independent investigation made of this problem in the executive branch of the Government and to do something about it, find out what needed to be done about it. And he tried, undertook to set up a group, I think a commission to--at any rate, at one point he tried--I know he tried--there was a Federal Judge in New York State named Murphy--still

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there I think. President Truman asked him to take charge of this activity and Judge Murphy came down to see him about it. And I remember this because he came to see him at the White House and the President had left his office and had gone over to Blair House and I took Judge Murphy over to Blair House to see the President. And at that time Judge Murphy told him he would do it. Then he went back to New York and changed his mind and called up and said he wouldn’t do it. My recollection is, and this is not just clear, that he also asked the then Dean of the Harvard Law School to do this. A man who is now the Solicitor General of the United States, what’s his name? I think he asked him to do it and he declined. But at any rate, he finally did ask the man from New York City whose name was Newbold Morris, a Republican who had acquired quite a reputation as clean-up man in New York City

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to come down and work on this and by this time the setup for the project, I think, had changed somewhat from the original concept.

HESS: Who first mentioned Mr. Morris as a prospect?

MURPHY: Now, that I don’t know. I don’t think it would have been me because I don’t think I’d ever heard of him before. Quite possibly Howard McGrath. I won’t say Howard; frankly I don’t know, let’s stick with that. But, at any rate he was brought down here and physically put into the Department of Justice Building and I think named Special Assistant to the Attorney General. But one of the ground rules was that he was to be completely independent of everybody except the President and to report directly to the President. And in this connection, he worked some with me as a member of the President’s staff and did some of his reporting to the President through me. He had done something

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of this same kind in New York City as I recall, and working with him was a man in the Bureau of the Budget whose name I don’t remember. It may have been Harold Seidman, I’m not sure, who had had experience in this same kind of thing possibly working with Newbold Morris. But between them they developed a questionnaire that all Government officials were supposed to fill out and sign. This questionnaire was personally approved by President Truman. I don’t think you’ll find this in the records anywhere. It was personally approved by President Truman. I was the man who carried it to him and he did it. Now, after it was approved by President Truman, Howard McGrath took strong and violent exceptions to it and, as a result of that, why, President Truman finally, I think, decided two things, one, not to use the questionnaire and two to get rid of Newbold Morris. But in this whole tangled business

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there for some time the question was raised as to whether or not Howard McGrath, as Attorney General, was vigorous enough in pursuing matters of this kind. And at one point, President Truman decided, without my participation, that he would like for McGrath to resign and would like to replace him. And it arrived at this point before he or anyone had said anything to me about it. And at that point they were looking for someone to replace him and asked me if I had any suggestions and I did have a suggestion. My suggestion was Justin Miller who had been the Dean of my law school when I was in law school, and left there and came up here as Special Assistant to the Attorney General in the Department of Justice. Then he had been made Judge of the Court of Appeals here in the District of Columbia where he served some years and resigned from that to become president

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of the National Association of Broadcasters, which position he held at the time in question. And President Truman was interested in him and inquired about him from me as well as others, and said that he would like to talk to him about this and asked me to get him to come in and I called him. He had gone to California for his Christmas vacation--Justin Miller had. He had come from California originally. I called him and told him President Truman would like to talk to him and he cut short his Christmas vacation and came back for that purpose. He went to see President Truman and President Truman asked him if he would accept the position of Attorney General and Miller said that he would and they reached a firm agreement on it. And Miller said he would like to have a little time quietly to make arrangements to leave his present job where he had contractual obligations. And he went to

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the executive committee, or the appropriate body, governing body, of the National Association of Broadcasters and got permission from them to leave that job before termination of his contract and when it was in that stage and state somebody persuaded President Truman to change his mind and...

HESS: Who persuaded him?

MURPHY: Howard McGrath was involved. Let’s see, Theodore Francis Green was involved in it I guess, the Senator from Rhode Island, and J. Edgar Hoover, in some fashion. At some earlier time Justin Miller had made a speech, a public statement, the exact words of which I don’t recall, but the general sense of it was, as I recall that after all the FBI was a law enforcement agency and they should be regarded as such, as a policeman. This apparently was offensive to J. Edgar Hoover

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and somehow Hoover’s view on this was transmitted to President Truman. I don’t know how. He called me, President Truman called me, not to discuss the question but to tell me he was not going to appoint that man and he couldn’t appoint a man that had made a statement like that. It seemed to me to be a quite reasonable statement as a matter of fact. The thing that he had said about the FBI, I couldn’t see anything wrong in it. But at any rate, the President did withdraw the appointment, or the offer to appoint, and I got the assignment of breaking the news to Justin Miller and he took it very gracefully. He says, "Charlie, don’t you worry about it, these things happen all the time. I know just how it is. You just go and forget it." That, I think was the only time that I ever seriously considered just quitting. I thought I was very badly treated about that, as well as Justin Miller being badly treated.

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I felt pretty badly about it, I must say.

Well, at any rate, he did not at that time replace Howard McGrath and sometime, not very long after that, a few weeks, or maybe a few months, this question never did die down. It just kept simmering and I don’t remember now just what brought it to a point. But, I do remember when he made the decision, he was in his office with his staff and I think it was perhaps his regular staff meeting and when this question was discussed I said nothing on the subject one way or another. He decided then and there that he would ask for McGrath’s resignation and called him up on the telephone and asked him right then. I think McGrath always felt that I was one of those who was responsible for the President asking for his resignation but I must say I never did. I was involved in a good many of these dealings with McGrath in conversations with him about this problem

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in general, about the Newbold Morris matter and so, I think it more or less natural that he might infer from that that I was recommending to the President that he should be asked to resign.

HESS: Well, back in 1952 and the events of the campaign. What brought about the break between President Truman and General Eisenhower?

MURPHY: Well, the particular thing was General Eisenhower’s what would you say, abandonment, desertion, of General Marshall. I think, naturally, the setting was such that General Eisenhower was presidential candidate for the Republican Party, which sort of lent itself to a cooling or deterioration of relations. But President Truman did have a great deal of respect and I think a real affection for General Eisenhower. But during the campaign, and it must have been

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fairly early in the campaign, General Eisenhower went somewhere to make a speech and Senator Bill Jenner from Indiana was involved in this somehow and I guess Senator McCarthy from Wisconsin. And I think it was Jenner who, at that time, or just before that, had flatly accused General Marshall of being a traitor. Well, President Truman greatly admired General Marshall. He just thought that General Eisenhower should have taken strong exception to this but instead of taking strong exception to this, General Eisenhower went and appeared in public with Bill Jenner and threw his arms around him. And in addition to that, in the prepared text of one of General Eisenhower’s speeches, as I recall, there had been some complimentary remarks about General Marshall either by way of defense or otherwise, but anyhow nice statements about General Marshall, and it appeared from this that he deliberately

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made a decision not to stand up for General Marshall. I think this made President Truman as mad as anything that I know of ever. And I think the more he thought of that the madder he got and the less he thought of General Eisenhower.

HESS: In reading the speeches it seems to me that President Truman spoke out far more often, and in stronger tones, against General Eisenhower than did Governor Stevenson. Do you think...

MURPHY: That’s my recollection.

HESS: Okay.

One other point on this. On October the 3rd the President led off the day with the regular prepared address which he delivered at 9 o’clock in the morning at Kalamath Falls, Oregon. In writing about that address, and others given later in the day, Anthony Leviero

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said in the New York Times, "President Truman softened up his anti-Ike crusade yesterday." Was that so-called softening up on Eisenhower a result of a decision between the President and his advisers?

MURPHY: Well, I don’t know that there was any softening up. That’s what Tony Leviero said, I don’t know whether it happened that way or not.

HESS: Do you recall anything of this nature?

MURPHY: No. I don’t remember the dates and places. The principal speech--I’d have to say again my recollection is not clear, it’s very hazy. But, such as it is, my recollection is that his itinerary carried him in a westward direction across the northern tier of states and south and then back through Colorado. But the principal speech he made

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on this subject was in Colorado and at Colorado Springs, as I recall. And if that was after Kalamath Falls, why, I think you will find that there was no softening up. There was certainly no change in President Truman’s feelings about this. There may have been a change in the amount that he talked about it in public speeches. I think you talk about these things, it’s just natural you talk about them less as time went on. But I would not recall that there was any decision to soften up.

HESS: In my research on this question I noticed that there was a prepared address early in the morning, which was sort of unusual because usually at that time of the morning they normally just had the whistlestop speeches and then the prepared address later on in the day. But this particular one was the first thing in the morning, and it did seem to be a

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softening of what he had been saying up to that point.

MURPHY: Well, I’d have to check the different speeches and the itinerary and so forth to comment about this more intelligently, I guess. But, I have a fairly definite recollection that the major speech he made on this subject was at Colorado Springs. If you haven’t checked that one, you might.

HESS: That’s right, and that was after this period in time because they went down through Oregon into California and then eastward and back through Colorado. That was after his address in Kalamath Falls.

Do you recall anything said to the President or any of his staff members on the train in response to General Eisenhower’s "I will go to Korea" statement?

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MURPHY: Not specifically or definitely, no. I do recall the telegram he sent to General Eisenhower after the election. It was if you still want to go to Korea, the Independence is available.

HESS: Did he get an answer to that?

MURPHY: Yes, I think so. But it was not a very cordial answer and General Eisenhower said he’d rather go in some other airplane. And did go in some other airplane.

HESS: There are those that have said that Mr. Stevenson’s speeches were too intellectual and not aimed at the understanding of the average voter. What would you say about that?

MURPHY: I don’t know, I guess I would have a tendency to agree. I think the average voter enjoyed Governor Stevenson’s speeches and admired them greatly. I’m not sure how effective they

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were in leaving ideas and thoughts in their minds. I am not sure that my views on this subject are right, generally speaking, but I have some, and my views are you are in the business of persuading people and not entertaining them or amazing them, you want to leave them thinking something, I believe.

HESS: Is that a policy that you tried to follow when you were writing speeches for Mr. Truman?

MURPHY: Yes, sir. And one that he tried to follow when he was making speeches and one that he told us to try to follow when we were writing speeches.

HESS: Where were you on election night?

MURPHY: I don’t remember. This was in 1952?

HESS: 1952.

MURPHY: I remember where I was in 1948. In the

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Stevens Hotel in Chicago trying to get--no, on election night I was at home. It was the night before election I was at the Stevens Hotel. I suppose that I was at home on election night in Silver Spring, Maryland.

HESS: Did you think that the Governor was going to win in 1952?

MURPHY: Yes, I did. Just before election, I don’t remember, either Sunday or Monday night, I was in Kansas City and had a meal, breakfast or possibly dinner, with Congressman Richard Bolling of Kansas City and I remember our conversation. This is why I remember the views we had. That we both felt quite definitely that Governor Stevenson was going to win. I remember our saying this to each other and I’m certain he was sincere and certain that I was sincere, mistaken though it turned out to be.

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HESS: After he lost in ‘52 did you think that he would win when he ran in ‘56?

MURPHY: I don’t much think so. I don’t have a clear recollection of my views at that time. I think I would have been much less optimistic in ‘56.

HESS: Do you have any other thoughts dealing with 1952, the events in 1952 before we move on?

Dealing with the convention, campaign, Governor Stevenson in general?

MURPHY: No.

HESS: Okay.

Now, I’d like for you to help me and clarify one aspect of the staffing pattern of the White House if you would, and that deals with Dr. John R. Steelman. Just what was your official relationship to Dr. Steelman, who, as you know, held the title

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The Assistant to the President. Was your position as Special Counsel considered to be equal to his rank or standing?

MURPHY: It was considered to be equal in rank or standing but the second among equals, I guess. Just as the Secretary of Commerce is equal in rank or standing as the Secretary of Agriculture but he comes after, when you line up, because the Department of Agriculture is older. But these were two jobs of equal rank and standing and equal salary. But as between the two, the one that was considered to have seniority, was the job of The Assistant to the President.

HESS: Would you describe your working relationship to Dr. Steelman?

MURPHY: Well, my working relationship with him was rather cordial. When I first went to the

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White House as Administrative Assistant, Dr. Steelman had just become The Assistant to the President and he had, at that time, a fairly sizeable professional staff. This was a phasing out of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion. I believe that Dr. Steelman had been the last director of that office. And the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, as such, was terminated or abolished and Dr. Steelman inherited to a considerable extent, the functions of that office and some of the staff. He had regular daily staff meetings attended by six or eight or ten people on the professional level. When I went to the White House as an Administrative Assistant in 1947 I learned about these staff meetings and I learned that they talked about things that I was interested in and that they did things that I was interested in and I asked Dr. Steelman if I could come to his staff meetings and he

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said that he would be very glad to have me. I did go to the staff meetings and I think out of that there developed a close working relationship with Dr. Steelman personally, and with members of his staff which continued as long as I stayed at the White House. And after I became a Special Counsel why I did a great deal of work with members of his staff. I never had formal staff meetings, but I had a good many conferences in my office with staff people and on a free and easy basis and Dr. Steelman’s staff people came over there as freely as my own assistants and with his complete approval.

HESS: Who were some of his assistants that worked with you more often?

MURPHY: Dave Stowe was an assistant to Dr. Steelman before he was Administrative Assistant to the President. John Thurston was on

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Steelman’s staff, Don Kingsley. They left fairly early along and went over to Federal Security Agency with Oscar Ewing. I’m afraid I’d have to refresh my--Bob Turner was one who later was made a member of the Council of Economic Advisers and after that taught economics out at the University of Indiana and in the Kennedy administration, came back here as Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget, I guess. And I’d have to refresh my recollection on some of the others.

HESS: Just what were the duties that Dr. Steelman’s office and his assistants performed? What was their job?

MURPHY: Well, I think it would be hard to say this with any precision and certainly I might not be the one most competent to say. But I think of it as generally the President’s principal staff

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man in connection with the regular on-going operations of the Government. And with particular specialization in the field of labor relations and labor disputes. Dr. Steelman’s background and experience was as a labor mediator where he’d done very well. And I don’t mean done very well in a financial sense. He was a Government servant, the head of the Mediation Service where he accomplished a great deal. People on both the management and the labor side knew him and had a lot of confidence in him and so he was personally, I think, particularly well suited to be helpful to the President in the field, and fairly frequently in major labor disputes, became directly involved in them. At that time I was rather doubtful as to whether it was wise for the White House staff, and in turn the President, to be so deeply involved in labor disputes, whether it wouldn’t be best handled through the Department of Labor.

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Since that time, to the extent I have observed it, I haven’t seen anything else that worked as well. Maybe I should say everything else since seems to have been even worse. So, looking back on it, I think that was as good a way to approach that problem as any. So, I think of those two things, the day to day operation of the Government, and particularly in connection with labor disputes.

HESS: Did there appear to be any undue friction or competition perhaps between Dr. Steelman and the Department of Labor?

MURPHY: I don’t think so. I think their relationships were good and that the then Secretary of Labor understood what the relationships were and I think we got along very well. Most of the time, as I recall, during this period, the Secretary of Labor was Maurice Tobin from Massachusetts.

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HESS: Were there times when Dr. Steelman might have tried to assert his authority as The Assistant to the President and encroach upon areas of responsibility that you felt were properly assigned to you?

MURPHY: No. On the contrary I would say that he had something of a tendency to let his business drift over my way. I ended up with more and more of it as time went on.

HESS: What duties would those be?

MURPHY: The only one that I remember particularly was the matter of quotas, I guess, on watches and clocks, and tariff matters normally were handled in Dr. Steelman’s office. This particular one was highly controversial and for some reason it got assigned to me.

HESS: Why? Did you ever find out?

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MURPHY: No. I didn’t duck it though.

HESS: What was the general nature of his personal and working relationship with your predecessor, Mr. Clifford?

MURPHY: Oh, they were, I suppose the words formal and correct occur to me.

HESS: Not quite as cordial as they were between you and Dr. Steelman?

MURPHY: That’s true. That’s true they were not so cordial.

HESS: Why?

MURPHY: I don’t know. No particular reason, they just didn’t start out the same way I guess.

HESS: Where did he get the title The Assistant to the President?

MURPHY: Well, technically the President gave it to

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him. I think, actually, it came from the Bureau of the Budget. I think that was part of the arrangement, understanding, for terminating the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion. I think the Bureau of the Budget took the initiative in getting that office terminated. This happened just before I got there to go to work as I recall. But it was recent enough so that I heard some comments about that, some feeling the attitude and my feeling--oh, I think the record is quite clear that the Bureau of the Budget recommended and persuaded the President to terminate the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion. After that it’s not as clear. I just sort of have the feeling that perhaps they regarded that office as something of a competitor or a rival in connection with some of the work they thought should better be done in the Bureau of the Budget and they’d like to cut it down to size.

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This was not, I’m sure, not aimed at Dr. Steelman personally. But, as I said earlier, he had a fairly sizeable professional staff at that point and the things that they would be concerned with would include Government organization and reorganization and these are things that the Bureau of the Budget is concerned with and I guess they don’t like people messing around in that field.

HESS: On the subject of the sizes of the staff. How large did your staff ever get? And would you name them, who was on your staff when it was probably the largest?

MURPHY: Well, David Bell, and David Lloyd and Dick Neustadt and Ken Hechler and Don Hansen, I guess. I don’t suppose that it ever got beyond five people. In the latter part of the Truman administration Dave Bell and Dave Lloyd were made Administrative Assistants to the

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President so that, technically, they were no longer on my staff but we continued to have a very close working relationship, which was essentially the same that it had been when they were my assistants. Jim Sundquist came over to the White House staff in the fall of 1952, about the time Dave Bell went to Springfield, or a little bit later. So, I think it would be about five people. Now, in addition to that I did a good deal of work regularly with Philleo Nash who had been an assistant to David Niles and remained on the White House staff after Dave Niles was gone and just informally he worked with and through me quite a lot. I did quite a lot of work with Milton Kayle, who, I guess, was on Dr. Steelman’s staff and did quite a lot of work with Marty Friedman who was on Donald Dawson’s staff.

HESS: Do you remember any of the particular chores that came up when you were working on these men?

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Take Dr. Nash first. He was the first one that you mentioned. Do you remember anything in particular that you worked on with him?

MURPHY: Not in particular and in the case of Philleo Nash it normally and naturally would have been in the field of civil rights and minority problems. I’m sure it was.

HESS: How effective was he in his endeavors?

MURPHY: I thought he was very effective, and very sensible, and very knowledgeable.

HESS: You mentioned the gentlemen that worked for you for a period of time and then were made Administrative Assistants. Just what was your official relationship with the Administrative Assistants on the staff?

MURPHY: Well, we both worked for President Truman.

HESS: Did you feel at times that they should

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report to you or not? Or did they just report directly to the President?

MURPHY: Well, those particular ones usually reported--well in both ways. Actually our relationship was so close, and so good, the question, as such, never came up. I suppose that normally I would report to the President for all of us. By that time I expect it was standard practice for Administrative Assistants to attend the President’s staff meetings so they had an opportunity to report to him each day, and when we had a speech conference, a full-dress speech conference, they both normally would have gone to the speech conferences. I frequently would go in to talk with the President about speeches or something else, alone. In these cases I would, frequently, I would have then reflected work that was being done by all three of us together but

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nobody ever raised any objection to communicating with the President in that fashion, through me. At least these two people didn’t. I suppose I must have said in one of these interviews earlier that when I first went to the White House, Administrative Assistants did not attend the President’s staff meetings and the practice at that time was to come only by invitation. And the invitation would be usually issued when the Administrative Assistant would tell Matt Connelly that he had something that he wanted to bring up at a staff meeting. And Matt would say come on over. As time went on, after I first went there, why, I had more and more business to take up in more and more staff meetings and Matt finally said, "Well, you come to so many of them you might as well come regularly." And so I began to go regularly to the staff meetings. Well, that raised the question about other Administrative

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Assistants and so other Administrative Assistants came to staff meetings too. That time there were not very many, I guess Donald Dawson was just coming on. He came in shortly after I did as Administrative Assistant in the personnel field. Dave Niles was there. Dave never did come to staff meetings regularly, though I think that was a matter of personal preference after the rule got established that it was appropriate that Administrative Assistants come to any and all staff meetings. I think he just preferred not to come, and I don’t remember if there were other Administrative Assistants at that particular time. Now later on there were others. I think there were five, six, at the end of the Truman administration. There was Dave Bell and Dave Lloyd, Donald Dawson and Joe Feeney and Charley Maylon and for a time as you pointed out, Clayton Fritchey. The staff meetings got a little larger as time went on.

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I suppose there was a tendency for that kind of thing to happen. In the beginning the Press Secretary came regularly, and while Joe Short was the Press Secretary, he began to bring one and finally both of his personal assistants to the regular...

HESS: Roger Tubby and Irving Perlmeter?

MURPHY: Right.

HESS: At the time that you were Administrative Assistant and Mr. Clifford was Special Counsel, did you feel that it was incumbent on you to report to him or, at this time, did you feel that you could report direct to the President?

MURPHY: Well, I knew I could report directly to the President. That happens to be the one question I asked when he asked me about coming up there to work. I said, "Who would I report to?"

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And he says, "To me."

So, that was the basis on which I began my work at the White House. So, I was always able to report to the President directly whenever I wanted to. And, since I was able to do that whenever I wanted to, why, it was frequently more convenient not to. This is--I’m rather a firm believer in the--I don’t know that this was the principle in operation, but this is the relationship that should exist between the President and the members of his Cabinet for example. They had ought to have an absolute right to report directly and when they have that right I think most of them will find that they prefer to do most of their business through staff people. And so, since I had the right to report to the President directly whenever I wanted to, I was very happy to work with Clifford voluntarily.

I was a volunteer in working with Clifford.

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He never undertook to give me any instructions or directions or anything of that kind, and he was, I guess, quite meticulous about this. This I suppose was a relationship more like that of a junior and senior partner than anything else, and a very close relationship.

Clifford and I got along just fine, George Elsey was Clifford’s assistant. We worked very intimately all together. I enjoyed the work and I liked the kind of work that Clifford was engaged in. I was glad to have an opportunity to participate in it and he was apparently quite willing to have me participate in it and we had no problems about the division of our functions and so on.

HESS: Did the other Administrative Assistants, at the time that you were Administrative Assistant, also work with Mr. Clifford in this voluntary unofficial manner?

MURPHY: No, not nearly to the same extent because

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they were in other fields.

Donald Dawson, for example, had quite a clearly defined field in personnel policies and in connection with the appointments to office by the President, the selection and screening of appointees and, for the most part, he reported directly to the President. He reported some through Matt Connelly and some through Dr. Steelman. As I recall not at all through Clifford. So, Dawson worked some through Steelman and some through Connelly and some directly. I think directly whenever he wanted to. And I think that he was the man who really reorganized that office and pretty much created the machinery and an orderly system for screening, checking persons under consideration for appointment by the President and while the processes have been, I think, perfected some since then, I don’t think there’s been any basic change since then.

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HESS: On what Donald Dawson did?

MURPHY: All on what Donald Dawson did.

HESS: Was he pretty effective?

MURPHY: I think he was very effective. And my recollection is that after he got the system started, there was not a bad one that got through. I don’t think that he could--you know we were talking earlier about the people who were involved in scandals and things of that kind? I don’t think that there was ever one that, when Donald Dawson set up this screening process which involved personnel investigations, FBI investigations, I guess, I don’t think any man who was ever appointed after he had been through the screening process turned out badly in the sense of misbehaving. I’m not sure about that, but that’s my recollection. I think that only

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a very few of President Truman’s appointees turned out bad and I don’t think that there were any who did of those who were appointed, selected, after that was set up by Donald Dawson.

HESS: While we are still on the subject of the White House staff what was your relationship with the people that held the position of Secretaries? The Appointments, Correspondence and Press?

MURPHY: Well, this again, the official relationship was that we both worked for the President on his staff. In terms of the seniority on the White House staff, the Secretaries came after The Assistant to the President and the Special Counsel and before the Administrative Assistants.

The staff operated rather informally, and it was a grand bunch of people, and there was

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extremely, almost unbelievably small amount of palace politics--there was some, but considering the place and the opportunities, the temptations, the amount was almost unbelievably small.

But, there were times and purposes for which an order had to be established. In particular at Key West when we ate with the President at the table, the Navy had place-cards set out in proper order, protocol-wise. Of course, when I went down there as junior Administrative Assistant, I always sat at the foot of the table below the Secretaries. And then when I was appointed Special Counsel, well, then I moved up, you see, ahead of everybody on the staff except John Steelman for this purpose. And I really felt kind of bad because some of these gentlemen were older than I and certainly far wiser and more distinguished; Charlie Ross and Bill Hassett in particular, but they were

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all grand people. And if I needed help in their field, why, I would ask for it and they always responded generously and gladly and vice versa. And they did--incidentally, in connection with speech conferences, the President’s Press Secretary was a regular participant and Bill Hassett was a regular participant. And Matt Connelly was sort of in and out. These were the more formal conferences that involved the last, or almost the last, draft. The President would have a meeting of the group that met on the speeches. This would include Dr. Steelman and the--Bill Hassett and Charlie Ross and later Joe Short, and Matt Connelly if he cared to attend, then Clifford and his group and later my group and as many as we saw fit to bring. If the speech or message under consideration involved particularly the work of some department or agency, why, the head of that department or agency would have been there.

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HESS: What type of assistance did Charles Ross and William Hassett offer at this particular stage when the speech was this far along? Was it mainly editing?

MURPHY: Mainly editing, yes. And if they had major problems, why, the major problems maybe would be brought up. Sometimes it would require major revisions.

I don’t think I’ve told you, I told Bill Hopkins’ son who is interested particularly in speeches about one experience that this brings to mind. This was in 1948, the campaign train, the last part of the campaign and had to do with a speech that the President made in Madison Square Garden in New York City that last week before election. And we came into New York from Boston and those of us that had been working on speeches had, from time to time, included some material and suggestions that we

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thought were humorous. And we thought this would be effective. We thought people would enjoy this. And the problem we had was that the press would pay no attention to them and these little choice tidbits that we thought would be so nice to get into the paper and that people would like it and that they would like President Truman who talked about things of this kind.

Well, we hatched up a plan that we would prepare for him, a draft of a speech that did not include anything else and if they were going to write about it at all they would have to put in some of it. And this was the speech that we put together for Madison Square Garden. And on the train coming from Boston to New York the day before, I guess, the speech was to be delivered, the speech was mimeographed and distributed to the press and a good many of the reporters began to come to Charlie Ross,

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and later to Matt Connelly and, just as friends, advise very strongly against the President making this kind of speech and so they were concerned about it and so the President called a staff meeting. We had a big powwow on the subject and serious consideration was given to pulling this speech back and not using it. But the President did decide not to pull it back and did decide to use it and I think it was a great success.

There was one little couplet in there that I guess that they took out that was kind of a favorite of mine and I fussed about it until he finally used it in an off-the-cuff speech somewhere in New York City later on, and he came back home and dutifully reported that I could relax.

HESS: What was that?

MURPHY: I don’t remember precisely. I remember the

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original you know, "Yesterday upon the stair, I saw a man who wasn't there. He wasn't there again today, I wish to gosh he'd go away."

HESS: But he finally did use that a little later on?

MURPHY: Yes, yes, he, off-the-cuff, when not many people would hear it, you see, where it would not be formally written.

HESS: It's a little after 12 and we're about out of the reel of tape. Shall we quit for the day?

MURPHY: Yes, sir.

HESS: Okay.