David A. Morse Oral History Interview, August 3, 1977

Notice
This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted for the Harry S. Truman Library. A draft of this transcript was edited by the interviewee but only minor emendations were made; therefore, the reader should remember that this is essentially a transcript of the spoken, rather than the written word.

Numbers appearing in square brackets (ex. [45]) within the transcript indicate the pagination in the original, hardcopy version of the oral history interview.

RESTRICTIONS
This oral history transcript may be read, quoted from, cited, and reproduced for purposes of research. It may not be published in full except by permission of the Harry S. Truman Library.

Opened October, 1980
Harry S. Truman Library
Independence, Missouri

[122]

FUCHS: Mr. Morse, we are now down to 1948 when you left the Department of Labor. I thought you might begin by telling us how you came to be nominated for election as the Director-General of the International Labor Organization -- by whom and so forth, at the conference in San Francisco?

MORSE: Well, what happened, Mr. Fuchs, before the election I think was interesting. It started back in the end of '47. The representatives of industry and labor in the United States contacted me. At that time, the head of the employer delegation of the ILO from the United States was a fellow from San Francisco named J. David Zellerbach. He was Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of Crown, Zellerbach Corporation, and labor was represented

[123]

at that time by a delegate, name of Frank Fenton. He represented William Green, then president of AF of L. These two chaps, speaking on behalf of U.S. industry and labor, were very insistent that I stand for election as Director-General. The term of office of my predecessor, who was an Irishman who had been in the British Civil Service, and after that acted as Director General when John Winant left, was coming to an end. The election was to be in June, 1948. I had reservations about standing for election because there are a number of things that happened at that time. In the first place, I had been asked to come back to practice law in Newark, New Jersey by a great friend of mine, Bernie Shanley. Shanley was later the legal counsel to General Eisenhower when he was President of the United States. We'd been in the Army together. We came from the same part of New Jersey; he wanted me to come

[124]

back home. I actually had agreed with Bernie that I would do that, but I hadn't announced anything. We were waiting for sometime in late '48 for me to make that announcement. At the same time I was asked to be the candidate for the United States Senate in the State of New Jersey. This I was requested to do by the leaders of the trade union movement: Carl Holderman who was then head of the CIO in New Jersey; Al Barkan who was with the textile workers in New Jersey and is now head of COPE, the AFL-CIO's political action group; and a man called Stetton who was then president of the Textile Workers Union and is now one of the officers in the Amalgamated Clothing Workers -- they have merged his union with that. They all came to see me. They said that they had had a long talk with Frank Hague who was then the political boss in Jersey City and they insisted that someone run for the U.S. Senate in '48 who

[125]

would be clean and honest; otherwise, they were going to split the Democratic Party. Hague said to them, “Fine, if you can find a candidate to fit those terms, I’ll agree to go along with it.” So they came to see me when I was Under Secretary of Labor and asked me if I would stand.

I said, “I would be glad to consider it.”

So all these things happened at the same time and the President, President Truman, spoke to me and said, “I think, Dave, I’d like you to be the candidate for the ILO. It’s important. I’ve had talks with Ernie Bevin, the Foreign Minister of the United Kingdon, and they can get the United Kingdom candidate to stand down in your favor if you’ll be prepared to stand. Ernie Bevin would also like you to stand; and we think it’s important to our world relations, East-West situation, that you do.”

FUCHS: Where did you talk with the President?

[126]

MORSE: In the White House.

FUCHS: You had an appointment for that discussion?

MORSE: I had an appointment for that discussion; it was right there. Then I said, "Well, I'll think about that," and I did and I consulted Dean Acheson.

Dean said, "Well, it's a great thing, but I'd like you to stay in national life. I think you ought not get yourself lost abroad."

I talked with Dean Rusk who was Assistant Secretary of State in charge of International Organizations, and Dean thought I ought to stay home and not become Director-General. One of his reasons was that it would be better for the Director-General not to be an American.

FUCHS: Why was that?

MORSE: Well, he just thought we had a lot of Americans then as heads of international organizations which

[127]

is 100 percent the opposite right now. The Director-General, I think, of FAO was, and so on. He thought maybe it would be too many, and I said, “Well, I think I’d better do what the President wants. The President thinks it ought to be an American; that it ought to be me. I’ll abandon the option of running for the U.S. Senate, which was a nomination without contest. I’ll withdraw from going into law practice with Shanley and I’ll do this.”

I talked to my wife and I remember saying, “Well, we won’t do it for long. I think we might do it just to satisfy the President and see what it’s like. Let’s say two years.”

Well, we went, got elected -- and that was in San Francisco in June of 1948 -- nd I served five terms. I had been there 22 years when I finally resigned to come back in May of 1970.

FUCHS: What is the normal term?

[128]

MORSE: Well, the normal term, when I was elected, was 10 years, interestingly enough. But you couldn't succeed yourself.

FUCHS: Had Mr. Phelan had ten years?

MORSE: No, he was never elected Director-General. He was Acting Director-General. They just kept him as acting through the war years till the time of my election. But a few months before I was elected the Governing Body decided to call him Director-General so he could retire with that title. None of them served that long. I think they made it ten years because the first Director-General, Albert Thomas, served ten years before he died. The staff regulations were for ten years, but they changed the regulations when my ten years were finished because they wanted me to stay for another term and I said, "All right, let's do it on the basis of five year terms, hereafter." Which means you stay for five years,

[129]

then another five depending upon the will of the electorate, and that's the way the changes were made. So, my first term was ten years and I got three more terms of five years but during my last term, as I say, I resigned. So I served 22 years total. Interestingly, all my elections were unanimous except my first one. In the first one it was unanimous except for Poland who voted against me. The Pole came to me privately afterwards, a man named Hoffman; I'll never forget him, a nice old fellow. He said, "I'm sorry but you know how it is. My Government was no way going to support somebody from the United States at this date, but if you'll excuse me, I had to vote that way."

I said, "Of course, that's all right."

Then there was a Communist worker from Mexico whose name was Toledino; otherwise it would have been unanimous. Thereafter as I said, my elections were all unanimous.

[130]

Interestingly enough, the last time I was elected I was not proposed as a candidate of the United States but of Africa, which is just a little interesting sidelight.

So, that's the story and it was difficult because just the night before my election in San Francisco the Secretary of Labor died and the next day I had to stand for election while I was Acting Secretary of Labor. At the same time Mr. Truman and his group were coming to San Francisco as part of their campaign and they had agreed that they would accept an invitation of Mrs. Morse and myself for a breakfast to meet the members of the Governing Body of this international organization. So we arranged a breakfast at the hotel; I forget the name of the hotel.

MRS. MORSE: St. Francis.

MORSE: St. Francis, it's up on the hill there in

[131]

San Francisco. In any event, we invited all these chaps to come to breakfast and they didn't know it was to meet the President.

FUCHS: It wasn't the Mark Hopkins?

MORSE: Mark Hopkins. They thought these Americans were funny. Here he's just been elected Director-General and the next day he's having us all for breakfast; that's funny. So they all came at 8 o'clock in the morning and my wife and I went up to see the President. While I was going up, Clark Clifford was with me, and Clark said, "You know Dave, you're my candidate for Secretary of Labor."

I said, "No, Clark, we've been all through that, the President and myself, and my election has now taken place and I think this is it." We went upstairs and sat in the President's suite. He received us and he said to my wife, "Mildred, you seem a little nervous."

[132]

She said, "I am nervous, Mr. President. After all we're going to go down to this room with all these people for breakfast; you being the President of the United States, it's a long piece to walk with the President and I just don't know how I'm going to do it."

He said, "Well, I'll tell you, Mildred, I'll give you some advice. My mother always used to say to me, 'Just do the best you can and you'll be all right."'

That made her feel better and we went down and, of course, those in the breakfast room rose to their feet with great excitement when they saw the President come in. He spoke to the group; it was a wonderful talk.

He said, "You know, it's Sunday," (it was a Sunday). "I don't like to make speeches on Sunday so let's call this a prayer meeting." He made a delightful speech.

[133]

FUCHS: Evidently the other Communist bloc nations voted for you, except Poland. I guess they were all in the ILO then?

MORSE: No. At that time Poland was in, Czechoslovakia was in, and some of the other Eastern European countries; Russia was not.

FUCHS: Russia was not in.

MORSE: No, Russia came in in 1954. But the other Eastern European countries by and large were in. But the Governing Body does the electing and on the Governing Body the Polish member was the representative of all the Communist states. So he spoke on behalf of them. Although when my time came around after '54 and I was reelected, Russia was then a member of the Governing Body and they supported me.

A rather nice thing happened when we returned to Washington. I was then, as I say,

[134]

Acting Secretary of Labor, which I continued to be until I left for Geneva in September to take up my duties, but a nice thing happened when we came back in June from San Francisco. Most of the members of the delegation of the Governing Body came to Washington, especially Leon Jouhoux and all those French personalities -- he was then the head of the French Force Ouvrier -- CGT. All the Ministers and the Secretary of State, Marshall, had talked to the President, and they had agreed that the Secretary should give me a reception at the Blair House in honor of my election and invite all these foreign people who were going home by way of Washington, as well as members of the diplomatic corps in Washington; and they did that. This was a very meaningful gesture which was greatly appreciated by the delegates from all over the world and their governments. Then Mildred and I left for Geneva in late August, 1948 to pick up our

[135]

duties in September there.

FUCHS: The ILO had moved from Montreal, when?

MORSE: Well, John Winant moved the ILO -- he was then Director-General -- just as it appeared war was going to break out after the invasion of Europe by Hitler. He moved the ILO from Geneva to Montreal and it stayed there through the war years and I was the one that brought it back to Geneva after my election, after consultation with our Government.

FUCHS: You never held forth in Montreal then yourself?

MORSE: Well, I did. I went there to Governing Body meetings when I was representing our Government but I never sat there as Director-General. I went there after I was elected but I took up my post in Geneva.

[136]

One thing I think I should add, because it reflects the atmosphere of that period, is that you must remember during all this time the CIO was always trying to get the place as delegate but it didn’t have it. It was the AF of L that had the place. But I was really drafted into this candidature by President Truman, by William Green and by the Chamber of Commerce and David Zellerbach. So, with industry, labor and the President, I accepted.

FUCHS: Mrs. Morse recalled, while you were talking just now on the phone, Mr. Morse, that the night before your election, which I believe was a Thursday night, that you had a call from President Truman informing you that the Secretary of Labor had died. Do you recall that?

MORSE: Yes, I did have that call. We were to see each other the next day or two before this breakfast that was part of the campaign and we

[137]

expressed our sorrow about the passing of Schwellenbach, and we agreed at the time that I should stick to my plans.

FUCHS: He did at this time, however, propose the Secretary of Labor position to you.

MORSE: He did. He said to me that, "You know it's going to be a tough one Dave; you are Acting Secretary of Labor and it's for you to decide." He was really decent about what I should do. I said, "Well, Mr. President, it seems to me that having made these commitments to everyone all over the world -- and we had worked out the arrangements with the United Kingdom Government -- having been elected, actually, it would be extremely difficult to go back on it." He said, "Well, I agree."

FUCHS: Did it also occur to you at the time, perhaps, that your tenure as Secretary of Labor might have

[138]

been somewhat shortened by the election in '48?

MORSE: Well, not really, it didn't; it wasn't a big factor with me because, well first of all, the thing that struck me as important was this particular challenge. Because if I had been thinking about myself I would have accepted the nomination to the United States Senate. Because, win, lose, or draw, getting a candidacy like that without opposition by the Democratic party, it meant that, at least, even if you lost you would easily be the leader of your party in the state. I think if I had accepted that, of course, my life would have been an extremely interesting one in my state and maybe nationally. So, that was not really a factor because I had too many other options at that time.

FUCHS: Did you ever regret your decision that evening?

[139]

MORSE: Sometimes I've regretted it and sometimes I've regretted not running for the Senate. But now that I'm sitting here talking in this microphone, upon reflection, I must say I don't think anything could have offered me greater satisfaction than what I had in that particular position. But you know that reminds me of something a little different and that is -- we were talking about Thacher Winslow earlier in one of our sessions, and about Philip Kaiser -- just to complete the record. After I was elected Director-General, and while was still Acting Secretary of Labor, I went over to Geneva and one of the first things I did was to make Thacher Winslow my representative in the United States, head of the ILO office in Washington. Right after that, Phil Kaiser was appointed Assistant Secretary of Labor.

FUCHS: Do you remember Charles Straub?

[140]

MORSE: Charles Straub was in the Labor Department.

FUCHS: He was Special Assistant to the Secretary.

MORSE: He was there I remember, but nothing in particular.

FUCHS: There was also an executive assistant to Secretary Tobin in 1949, Stanley Wilson?

MORSE: Yes, I remember but nothing stands out about him. The man who stands out in my mind through the whole Labor Department's history of post Second World War is this chap Millard Cass. The fellow that came over to the Labor Department with me from my post as General Counsel of the NLRB. Because when I left he stayed on. He served as the Assistant to every Secretary of Labor after I left and finally finished his career in the U.S. Government at the highest level a civil servant can hold in the Labor Department. That is as Deputy

[141]

Under Secretary of Labor for Administration. He's now practicing law here in Washington. No one has a better insight on the whole postwar history of the ILO than Millard Cass.

FUCHS: I talked to him the other day after you recommended I do so and we weren't able to work out a date now. He's quite busy, but he said he would be interviewed when I got back in town the next time.

When you became Director-General, you've been quoted as saying, "The ILO was the greatest living governmental vehicle for world peace." How did you feel about that after you served your time there?

MORSE: If I said "governmental," I should have said "inter-governmental." That's what I meant. Well, I felt that more when I left than when I came in, and I suppose nothing would underscore that more than the fact that the ILO got the

[142]

Nobel Peace Prize in 1969 and I went to Norway to receive it on behalf of the organization and to give the Nobel Peace Prize lecture. So, it isn't just me talking, it's the Nobel Peace Prize talking.

FUCHS: Around 1949 you proposed that technical assistance be an expanded function of the ILO and I was wondering, with whom did you consult within the United States about this, if you did?

MORSE: Well, that's a very good and interesting question, because up to that point, 1949, the ILO had been an international standards setting organization and advisory body. During the period, I believe, of the Point IV program I'd been consulted by Willard Thorp, who was then I think Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. He came over to talk to me in Geneva to find out how I would feel about the Point IV program and how it ought to work, get

[143]

my advice. I told him that I thought it was a tremendous thing and as far as I was concerned he could be sure that I was going to remold the entire program of the ILO so it would achieve a tradition of standard setting and operational programs to implement the standards. You know, vocational training, management training, occupational health, say, the training of people and the training of officials and administrators for social security systems; training, training, training in all areas that had to do with the labor and social side. Starting from that point on I began, and the ILO has become and, I think, is among the specialized agencies of the United Nations a leader in that area. Now, I consulted from the start with Willard Thorp, I consulted with the President when I came back and had my usual meetings with him. I consulted with the labor movement in this country, with William Green, and later with

[144]

George Meany. As for industry, I got the full agreement for our country behind that as I did the full agreement of all other countries behind it. They didn't want to sacrifice standards, but they understood standards are no good unless they are implemented and implemented by trained people, and so on.

Now, to get it started was a problem because we needed money and, interestingly enough, the first money for a private project to implement this concept came to me from the ECA [Economic Cooperation Administration]. The office that was set up in Europe for the Marshall plan. They came to me and offered me a million dollars to start a model project for implementing this concept in the field of manpower training -- training people to become instructors in vocational training centers and so on.

FUCHS: Did you work with Harriman and Milton Katz?

[145]

MORSE: Averell was there, Milton Katz was there. We got the million dollars. I had a very difficult time getting agreement in my Governing Body that I should take this million dollars. I remember Leon Jouhoux, particularly, the French worker, who was afraid that if I took that million dollars as a special grant from what was actually the United States, for training, it would place the organization under the control of the United States. He had my assurance that that wouldn't happen, plus the fact that it was our Governing Body that would have to decide the program to implement the use of that money. Later he became one of the supporters of this program. Well, from that point it came in from various sources; our regular budget, bilateral sources; the Swedes gave money, the Germans gave money, other countries gave money, and then we began to get money from the United Nations special fund. Paul Hoffman himself

[146]

later made a lot of money available for these purposes.

FUCHS: Of course, you as an international servant were neutral, I guess you'd say, but did you find pressures brought at various times by some of our nationals?

MORSE: Yes, I was under pressure all the time by the United States. I was under pressure by a lot of people, a lot of countries, that's normal. But there was pressure plenty from my own country, for staffing, for changing of policy, for implementation of policies that would be more congenial to the United States vis-a-vis Eastern Europe, etc. But I just took that as the normal part of my job. I got it from Russians, I got it from everybody. But I sure got it from the United States. But I was able to withstand it; they were always decent about it. As a matter of fact, I had a

[147]

very happy experience with practically all the countries in absorbing this kind of punishment and resisting these pressures. Because if you didn't do that you were finished. Once you compromised with them on this, you really were finished. So you had to take a stand. You had to be understood by them just what it was and why you were doing it. If you were doing it just for political purposes, you were finished, because you not only lost your self-respect but they lost their respect of you. I couldn't let that happen.

FUCHS: Were there ever any charges that you had shown favoritism?

MORSE: No, as I say, I was elected everytime unanimously. I guess that would have been the time when they could have said, "Brother, we've had enough of you."

FUCHS: In the series of lectures you gave at

[148]

Cornell, which was later published as a book* you noted that the OEEC [Organization of European Economic Cooperation] had helped finance immigration to Latin America in 1950. Now were these Marshall funds or was it paid out of counterpart funds, or do you recall?

MORSE: That was U.S. money.

FUCHS: How did you provide technical training in the non-industrialized countries, let's say Africa or Asia or Latin America or the Middle East?

MORSE: There were larger demands than I could fill. But there were demands mainly for the development of skills. They were going into a beginning period of change as a result of independence. Most of this occurred in 1960 on. That was the big wave because most of them became independent about that time, particularly in

*David A. Morse, Origin and Evolution of the I.L.O. and Its Role in the World Community, Cornell Univ., Ithaca, New York, 1969.

[149]

Africa. Before that it would be people in normally developing countries in South America, etc. But the big bulge was in the late fifties or the early sixties and was mainly for training -- make a fellow a plumber or a carpenter, or train people so they could train those kinds of people. Training that would be relevant to the implementation of the nation's industrialization plans, whatever they might be. Also skills in management because these developing countries recognized that the genius of this country and of other industrialized countries lay in the development of skills and management and organization, techniques of production. These were the things that we were transferring through experts to developing countries.

FUCHS: When you began to redirect the ILO from setting standards into technical cooperation did you meet resistance?

[150]

MORSE: I met resistance from many people in the labor movement to start with and from employers. Not from the governments. The labor movement was afraid at the start although a little later they became great supporters of it. But you had to be educated to it. They'd been accustomed to the ILO fixing world social policies, world standards, laws, legislation -- laws that could be adopted by different countries on the elimination of diseases and certain other hazards -- in mines for example; or relative health hazards or laws to set up social security systems.

Now the employers generally didn't want to go beyond legislation to start with, because they felt that this might activate the labor movement too much into getting into the picture nationally, because to make technical cooperation work you've got to get workers and employers to cooperate together with governments. They were rather resistant to that. It was really an

[151]

educational job that had to be done on them to get them to recognize the need for change, and this was done. They became great supporters of it. You've got to remember, to do this I had to train my own staff, had to get new programs of my own, had to get a different kind of budget. I set up an international center for labor study so that the world's leading experts could be brought to a central place in Geneva to study the social implications of change in developing countries. I got a big endowment for that from Konrad Adenauer of Germany and from DeGaulle, who was President of France, and from other countries. I used the interest on that endowment fund to set up a permanent institute which is still going very strong and is very important. This is so that the leadership in the world will understand the social implications of change and bring their people to this place for that purpose. This is an educational affair. I did the same thing in training; I set up an international center for advanced training for

[152]

vocational training, for training instructors for skills and also for management training. That’s going on now in a very big way in Turin, Italy where people come from developing countries -- foremen, middle management men, trade union leaders, industrial leaders, to take courses everywhere from bookkeeping to mechanical skills, from auditing to how to manage an operation, from accounting to techniques for production. So, these new institutional dimensions were built autonomously into the structure of the ILO as a result of the decision to move into the field of technical cooperation and help developing countries. Without these dimensions for education, for the training of people who train others, you could never trigger any accomplishments. We wouldn’t have been very successful, unless this had been carried out.

FUCHS: This is a slight regression but, as Assistant Secretary of Labor, you acted in the capacity of an adviser to John Winant, I believe. Does

[153]

anything stand out in your memory about that, and also, did Winant have something to do with your nomination?

MORSE: No, that was interesting. John Winant came back after serving as Ambassador to the Court of St. James while I was still Under Secretary of Labor and Acting Secretary of Labor. This was right after the war. Ed Phelan was acting as Director-General. Ed Phelan was this Irish gentleman I talked to you about. Winant was nominated by the President to be the Ambassador -- Representative to the Economic and Social Council of the U.N. Maybe I was Assistant Secretary of Labor then instead of Under Secretary, but know that an interdepartmental group was put together to advise him on social policies and economic policies, and I worked with John Winant to help him complete them. I met with him on a number of occasions. I never thought

[154]

it was very effective because it was difficult to have a dialogue. He was a very inarticulate gentleman, although a very highly motivated one. So most of my work with him was by memorandum.

FUCHS: The AF of L of course, as you indicated, was the representative in the ILO, and the CIO, starting back in the forties, I believe, was fighting to get delegate representation, which they didn’t get then. Eventually, there was a renewal of their efforts. Is there anything that stands out about George Meany and his efforts against the CIO and also his efforts regarding the problem of Communists in the ILO?

MORSE: Nothing special. I think the merger naturally came along so that the American labor movement came into the ILO with one voice and that was sometime after I took over.

FUCHS: That was ’55, I guess, when they merged.

[155]

MORSE: I think it was something like that; I don't know the exact date. Before that though there were some beginnings of cooperation. I remember Mike Ross was the international representative of the CIO and he worked very closely with the international representative of the AF of L. So that when the AF of L came to the Governing Body or to the Conference, they had his input and there is the point, I believe, that the CIO usually sent some advisers over as part of the labor delegation of the AF of L before the merger. What helped very much in that was this Interdepartmental International Labor Advisory Committee, that I have talked about, that was set up where the AFL and CIO could meet together to discuss problems. Well, Meany's position, as you know, is always a very fixed one. He was very concerned at the time he came into the ILO's activities as President of the AFL-CIO about the Communist participation

[156]

in work in the ILO.

FUCHS: You think he was overly concerned about the Communist domination?

MORSE: Oh, I think he was very much overly concerned because he had the feeling, I think, that the Secretariat of the ILO was being infiltrated by staff from East European and that they would have too large a voice in the creation of policy by the Director-General. Of course, that just never happened. But he thought it was going to happen; he thought it was happening, and that was one of his preoccupations. I often wondered what his advisers were telling him or dreaming up to tell him. I always respected George and he and I talked about this at great length on many occasions. I think he certainly respected my position as Director-General and respected what I'd said to him, but he always had that overriding concern. He still has to

[157]

this day. But I'm away from it now.

FUCHS: This is a bit beyond the Truman period, but in the late fifties some of the employer representatives became quite concerned about the fact that the Communist nations' employer delegates weren't true representatives.

MORSE: Well, that's right. The employers felt that way, from the United States particularly, and the employers felt that way and the workers felt that way. George Meany, at least, from the United States, felt that way. The fact of the matter is that there are very few trade union or employer organizations in the world that are free of their governments. Whether they're from Eastern Europe, Communist countries, or other countries. You could put in your two hands the true independent trade unions or employer organizations. Nothing in the ILO constitution says that trade unions that work

[158]

through the ILO have to be free and independent of the government. Freedom is an objective but not a condition, and also, if you’ll remember, the ILO is not a trade union movement.

FUCHS: As I said, in the fifties -- I believe until around ‘56-’57 -- the employer delegate was always nominated by the NAM [National Association of Manufacturers] and the Chamber of Commerce. Did something occur at that time or did that just die out?

MORSE: You’ve really done your homework because what you say is true and [William L.] McGrath was there. He ran a small company out here in Ohio. He was a delegate of the NAM and the Chamber and I think as a result of his efforts the NAM finally withdrew from the ILO and that left the Chamber of Commerce as the representative. McGrath was a rather interesting fellow. He was certainly one of the most isolationist

[159]

men I ever knew. I remember many times when we were in Geneva. He said, "I want to see you, Dave, and to have a talk with you." (We always had quite a dialogue, always very friendly.) He said, "You know, what's happening back in the United States?"

I said, "What's happening?"

He said, "Something terrible is happening in New York. They're flying the U.N. flag with Old Glory."

"Well," I said, "the U.N. has a flag."

He said, "Yes, but they shouldn't put it on the same pole as Old Glory."

I said, "Well, I don't know; I've got enough problems here running the ILO in Geneva without running the flagpole. Take it up with the Mayor or the President."

Then, he would do that kind of thing. He just didn't believe in international cooperation. It didn't make any difference about ILO or anything,

[160]

and I don't know why they ever sent him in to represent the employers unless they wanted to sabotage the organization; I don't think they wanted to do that. But it was difficult to make any sense out of it. He also, I think, was affected by this period of McCarthy. It was in that atmosphere -- a terrible period that we all lived through, where everybody was considered to be a Communist even if you were a Republican but didn't agree with someone from the camp of Joe McCarthy. So, that atmosphere was very special. He, like you say, didn't make a very great contribution to international cooperation. But as soon as NAM left, the Chamber of Commerce picked up the ball and filled the vacuum.

FUCHS: I believe in that same year, 1956, they were saying the Soviets were using, to our disadvantage, the fact that we had failed to support a convention

[161]

on slave labor. Do you recall anything about that?

MORSE: Yes, I do and I never have understood it to this day. The Soviets were saying that we didn't support a convention on slave labor. Was that a question?

FUCHS: Saying, therefore, we were for slavery.

MORSE: Well, that's a rather interesting point because we were accusing the Russians of slave labor. Actually, I sent a commission in to make a study of the forced labor situation in the U.S.S.R. and make a report to my Governing Body. But what I've never understood is that while the ILO has enacted the most important international conventions ever in the field of human rights, supported at the conference by the United States, the Russians would ratify them, but the U.S. has never yet ratified one. Yet all our rhetoric is in favor of human rights.

[162]

That's still true as of through August, 1977, when we are reporting this. Jimmy Carter is making all these great speeches about human rights. Well, the ILO has the only bundle of human rights laws on the international books. There's the convention against forced labor that you referred to, there was a convention against child labor, there's a convention against discrimination in employment on the grounds of sex, race, color and so on. There's a convention which guarantees the right of equal pay for equal work. There are these conventions. They are human rights conventions so recognized. None of those conventions have ever been ratified by this country. They've all been ratified by the Communist countries, by Western European countries, by practically all the countries of the world, and yet we are the leaders by rhetoric and I think by practice in our own country in the field of human rights. But it makes us so vulnerable to

[163]

attack because we use rhetoric and these people say, "All right, if you've got the rhetoric, why don't you enact these laws, why don't you ratify these conventions. You'd be in a much stronger international position if you did, and if you did you'd also be able to invoke the machinery of the ILO for the investigation of violations of other countries which you can't do now. If you haven't ratified, you can't invoke that machinery and the ILO has the only international machinery for that purpose."

It was very interesting. I've never understood it. I talked with Secretary Dulles about it; I talked with others, and they would say, "Well, we'll get around to this," or "why should we do it; our standards are way above the standards of this legislation."

Then there was the Bricker amendment which didn't permit us to do it and nothing's yet been done. I gather now that the administration is

[164]

beginning to look at the problem. I hope they do because if we want to effectively lead in the field of human rights we'll have to ratify human rights conventions.

FUCHS: I realize that some of the conventions, a great many of them apparently, are not ratified because of our Federal system and we feel some things are reserved for the states. But I couldn't see what the objection was to our ratifying a convention on slave labor?

MORSE: Well, that's it or forced labor. And they say, "Well, because the procedure bypasses the normal processes of the Congress. If it was done just by senatorial endorsement."

Well, that's true of any treaty and if you say, "Well, it's not a Federal matter but a state," okay, then bring in your state labor commissions and get them to move on it. Or don't endorse it at the international conferences,

[165]

which we do.

FUCHS: The reaffiliation of the Russians in 1954, is there anything important about that that comes to mind immediately?

MORSE: Yes, there's one very important thing about that I think ought to be stressed. You see the Russians were out and I had discussions with Mr. Molotov who was then the Foreign Minister. These were all secret discussions. They wanted to come back in. I met with him in Geneva and I explained to them what they had to do if they wanted to come in. To come back into the ILO, a member of the U.N. would automatically become a member of the ILO, if they sent a letter to the Director-General informing the Director-General that they were coming back in and that they would accept the constitutional provisions of the organization, pay their dues, etc. Well, I got a letter from Molotov and he said that

[166]

Russia was now a member of the ILO by virtue of this letter to me and that they accepted the constitutional provisions of the ILO except for the jurisdiction of the international Court of Justice.

Well, I looked at this and I figured that I was the trustee of the constitution. I didn't consult anybody but I wrote Mr. Molotov saying that the ILO could not accept U.S.S.R. membership on the basis of a conditional acceptance of constitutional obligations. I rejected their coming back into the ILO. I was criticized by many people for that action. They thought that I shouldn't have done it without consulting the organization, the Governing Body or the officers. They thought that it was against the principle of universality and I said to them, "Well, I'm the Director-General and I think I have that right. It's clear that you cannot have this kind of acceptance." While we were still arguing

[167]

about it the Russians came back with another letter saying, "We accept the constitution without reservation."

FUCHS: In '48 I have also read that the Russians, although they were not a member, were demanding, in meetings I guess, that labor’s representatives be increased from a third to a half. Do you recall that?

MORSE: Yes, they were doing that. They wanted to have the organization come under their complete control, to change it from the kind of organization that it is now, which would have been a very bad thing. It would have been for all practical purposes an intergovernmental organization. We fought that very bitterly and won out. Before that, you know, they tried in the WFTU to abolish the ILO. They suggested the ILO be abolished and labor problems be dealt with by the U.N. We fought that, too, the free

[168]

world did. So the Russians have never worked very comfortably with the ILO and they are still not comfortable with it. They're still always under attack and they have great difficulty squaring their system with the ILO; but they stay in and keep working. I would hope we would do the same.

FUCHS: In 1951, when you conferred with Trygve Lie of the U.N. about the study of forced labor, what kind of a man did you find Mr. Lie to be?

MORSE: Oh, I liked Lie. He was a very comfortable man. He was a down to earth fellow, social democrat, socialist orientation, trade union orientation, ideologically conservative, interestingly enough, great believer in human rights, very concerned that we build our relations prudently and solidly, anxious that the boat not be rocked internationally in any way. So that when we talked about moving in the

[169]

area of forced labor, he'd say, "You know Dave, I believe in all this but please be careful." But we went ahead with it.

FUCHS: In 1950, consultative status was granted to the International Federation for Free Trade Unions. Just what does that mean?

MORSE: Well, consultative status means that you have an official access to meetings, unless the executive body says you can't come; you have access to the documents of the Governing Body. On special occasions, depending upon the Governing Body, you have a right to speak on a given subject.

FUCHS: Is there anything you recall about your trip to India in 1950 that stands out?

MORSE: Yes, one thing very much. My wife and I were there and Nehru made a great speech on that occasion to the regional conference of the ILO and said what I've heard since then, what I

[170]

heard then for the first time, that it's a terrible mistake for a politician to raise expectations of people beyond the possibility of their realization.

FUCHS: Isador Lubin was representing the United States in 1950 and '51. Did you have any dealings with him?

MORSE: Very good, close dealings. He was a very positive constructive man, committed to international cooperation, very high marks, did his homework, made a great impression. I think he was a fine representative.

FUCHS: He's still living, isn't he?

MORSE: Yes, he's still living up in New York. His present wife used to work at the ILO. She was on my staff.

FUCHS: Is there anything you could say about Leo

[171]

Werts, who was Associate Director of the Office of International Labor Affairs in 1949 and 1950?

MORSE: I can't say too much about Leo. He was a good man and a very hard worker, conscientious. He'd gotten his experience, I think, on the international side through his military government association in Germany. He was not particularly dramatic; I can't add much more to that. He was always reliable.

FUCHS: What about the present situation? As I understand it, Mr. Kissinger has served a two year notice that we will drop out of the ILO.

MORSE: Well, if what I have been informed is true, I think it's a colossal mistake our Government will make if it leaves the ILO. I think the way it's been handled has been bad and I think if our Government leaves it will be of great damage to the international community and to the United Nations

[172]

system. I understand that John Dunlop was the person who had proposed to the Cabinet that this letter be sent, and Kissinger resisted it but finally accepted it. I think if the U.S. leaves we will have abandoned the field in the area of human rights; that is Jimmy Carter's first priority right now, to the Communist world. It would be a very great mistake and we would be delivered a very serious blow by the opposition in the international field. So I'm still hoping.