H. Graham Morison Oral History Interview, August 4, 1972

Notice
This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted for the Harry S. Truman Library. A draft of this transcript was edited by the interviewee but only minor emendations were made; therefore, the reader should remember that this is essentially a transcript of the spoken, rather than the written word.

Numbers appearing in square brackets (ex. [45]) within the transcript indicate the pagination in the original, hardcopy version of the Morison oral history interview.

RESTRICTIONS
This oral history transcript may be read, quoted from, cited, and reproduced for purposes of research. It may not be published in full except by permission of the Harry S. Truman Library.

Opened 1978
Harry S. Truman Library
Independence, Missouri

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HESS: A11 right, to begin this afternoon, Mr. Morison, would you tell me some involvement that you may have had with John L. Lewis and his coal strikes?

MORISON: Yes. I think it important to here state that what I have said and what I will relate are not based on documentation, but upon my memory and recollection -- aided by the modest number of notations made at various times and which I found in my files. I felt it improper when I resigned from the Department of Justice to take any official papers with me, and all that I have to refresh my recollection is sketchy -- as to date and time. The dates may be out of order, but the events are reasonably clear in my mind.

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Concerning John L. Lewis and the first national emergency coal strike which occurred, if I recall correctly, in 1946 -- this strike of the United Mine Workers Union was prior to the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act. Thus, the Government's legal action was by injunction to end the strike because of its devastating impact upon the economy created by the lack of coal. It was based upon the broadest principals of constitutional law as to the duty and authority of the Chief Executive to take appropriate action to end any threat to the welfare and security of the Nation and its citizens.

John Sonnett was then the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Division of the Department of Justice and responsible for such legal actions. I was the Executive Assistant of the Attorney General,

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Tom Clark. He asked me to participate with Sonnett in the framing of the pleadings and brief in support of this legal position for injunctive relief. I worked with him very closely. We had some disagreements, but they were not basic ones. I attended the argument of the case, but did not participate in the argument. The injunction was eventually sustained by the U.S. Supreme Court.

After my nomination and the Senate confirmation as Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Division, in 1948, the so-called "Taft-Hartley Act" was enacted by reason of the prior strike by the United Mine Workers. Thus the second "national emergency" coal strike by the Mine Workers Union required that I apply and enforce this new act.

The difficulties we faced were as grave as those involved in the Department's first

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injunction action, for we had to interpret and apply this new law with a "scanty" legislative history, since the act was passed by the Congress with great speed. Thus we had to construct, persuant to the terms of this law, a sound legal and factual approach that we deemed to conform with the terms of the law, including the provision for a temporary injunction for ninety days to permit mediation by a board established by President Truman -- seeking an agreement to end the strike, and if no agreement was reached -- as was the case -- to then seek a permanent injunction from the U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C., at which time we were required to introduce evidence to establish that a continuation of the strike endangered the public health, safety, and welfare of the Nation.

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This responsibility was a grave one. I slept many nights on the couch in my office. I was blessed in having a group of very able lawyers in the Division who worked with me "around the clock" in drafting pleadings, affidavits for execution by members of the Cabinet and others, the drafting of outlines for the presentation and examination of Government witnesses, as well as outlines of expected objections in and cross-examination of witnesses.

The matter was heard by the late U.S. District Judge Allan Goldsborough, who was a wise and able Federal Judge -- who had been an outstanding trial lawyer in Maryland before he was made a Judge.

Again I quietly sought mediation through Welly Hopkins, the General Counsel of the United Mine Workers, but my efforts were fruitless.

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In order to avoid the press, I asked Hopkins to meet me at an agreed place in Rock Creek Park. We met and took a walk in the woods to discuss the matter. I said to him, "I have no authority to do this, but I think anybody who has any responsibility on your side or the Government's side should think about our country, not as adversaries, but as men of principal. I think there should be a reasonable basis on which this strike and the Government's suit can be properly ended without the turmoil and damage to the Nation, its people, and the economy."

Hopkins, in general vein, said that he felt the same way, but he didn't know how Mr. Lewis felt for he was a fighter. I have thought many times that if John Lewis had not been a descendant of a Welsh immigrant, born and raised in poverty and following his father,

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became a miner in Montana and then by his leadership qualities become interested in union affairs and ended up as head of the United Mine Workers, but had been recommended by a Senator to attend the Military Academy at West Point, that he would have made Napoleon really look like a corporal! John Lewis was the greatest strategist that I have every known, and to try to "out-guess" his strategy was just an impossibility. So, in time, Hopkins advised that John Lewis wanted the action to be decided by the Court.

I recall most vividly that the case was heard in the old U.S. District Court building here in Washington. The courtroom was packed. When I came in with two of my assistants, a man handed me a telegram which I didn't read until I got up to the counsel table. The telegram was sent from Canada, was unsigned

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and said about as follows (I may have it somewhere in my files): "You should be advised that if you appear in court against John Lewis today you will be shot." I just stuffed it in my pocket and no one knew about the telegram until later. Then I advised the principal members of my trial staff, but bound them not to reveal this to anyone because I was convinced it was sent in the belief that I would give it to the press.

In any event, the proceedings began and Welly Hopkins, who was trying to please his boss, John Lewis, who sat with him in the bar of the court and in front of Judge Goldsborough, made a "Texas-style" emotional appeal to the court to uphold this great man who had courageously carried the standard of labor with such fortitude. He spoke of the plight of the dirty and lung-infected coal miners and their

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right to organize and to demand of the coal operators the wages and terms and conditions of their dangerous work. Hopkins ended his argument against the issuance of an injunction with about a ten-minute eulogy of John L. Lewis. As Welly sat down, John Lewis stood up and turned to him and said, "Mr. Hopkins, I wish you to know that I associate myself completely with all that you have said." There was some laughter and even Judge Goldsborough smiled.

HESS: He liked to hear all that praise!

MORISON: I then made my opening address to the court, formally referring to all of the documents filed and steps taken by the Government in keeping with the provisions of the Taft-Hartley law, and stated that I was prepared to introduce the evidence of the serious effect of this coal strike upon the industry

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and commerce of the Nation and the unemployment it had created in other sectors of our economy. I then offered the Government's several exhibits, including affidavits of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of War, the Secretary of Commerce and others and they were admitted and marked for identification. My argument was very brief and to the point. I stated that each and every requirement of the Taft-Hartley Act under which the Government sought injunctive relief enacted after plenary hearings and which was designed to prevent such damaging economic consequences occasioned by labor strikes of any kind which would place the Nation's economy in peril, etc. had been carefully followed by the Government and that the Government was prepared to present evidence in keeping with the terms of the act establishing the serious effect to the

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Nation if the miners did not return to work.

In summation, I moved that the temporary injunction that had been previously granted be made permanent and that a civil penalty, as provided by the act, be imposed both upon the president of the union as well as the union itself.

Welly Hopkins then replied, saying that such an injunction would be monstrous and that it would have the effect of denying poor miners just compensation and compelling them to work for the coal operators under the terms of an unjust contract. He stated that the Government did not have the constitutional right to so deny the rights of working men to use the only weapon they possessed to obtain a fair contract and that this Act of Congress was unconstitutional on its face and should

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be dismissed forthwith.

Judge Goldsborough interrupted Hopkins' "speech" and said: "I would say Mr. Hopkins from what I've heard as to your defense of the action of the United Mine Workers and its president, Mr. Lewis, that from the time of Hammurabi until this date, no one has asserted such an absurdity as you have made here in defense of the Union's action. So, I now need nothing more to determine the issue: the unchallenged evidence of the peril this strike poses to the Nation if continued is clear and unequivocable, and I hereby grant the permanent injunction requested by the Government."

Well, this early disposition of the proceedings was more than we had expected, but it posed the question whether John L. Lewis and the Miner's Union would appeal. We worked "around the clock" in preparation

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of the Government's position if the Union and John Lewis filed their appeal, and were prepared. However, no appeal was made and the District Court levied a modest fine against Lewis and levied a fine against the Union, of about a million two hundred thousand dollars. These fines were paid to the District of Columbia Treasury. The Government of the District of Columbia hoped they'd have one of these national emergency strikes every year because it substantially enhanced the District's treasury.

The next and the last national emergency strike by the United Mine Workers occurred in early '49 (1 believe that's right). This strike presented a great number of difficulties, for the Union had learned its lesson from the prior action. When the strike was imminent, President Truman invited John Lewis to meet with him and John Steelman, his economic advisor, for

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a discussion of the Union's grievance. Lewis went to the White House, and as a part of his strategy, when he came out of the White House and met the press, he mumbled something to the effect that "That insensitive man doesn't deserve to be President. He doesn't understand the grueling plight of labor, and the brutality of this law that is being used against the United Mine Workers. I will not be 'wheedled' into making compromises."

With this pronouncement the strike was "on," and I worked with Cyrus Ching, chief of the Mediation Service, who was a great and magnificent man. He was named as the head of the commission appointed by the President to seek to mediate this "dispute" and obtain an agreement from the Union and the major coal companies to end the strike during the 90 day "cooling off" period as provided by the act. We kept in constant touch with each other

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about the matter, but Ching and I agreed that what had occurred was a part of Lewis' strategy and that Lewis would lose face if he did not go through with the strike. In this case, having learned a lesson from the errors the Union had made in the first case, which was that in the prior case the Government had evidence that communications by telegram and personal communications by telephone, made by Union officials to district and local offices of the Union, most of which the Government obtained by subpoena, had gone out from the United Mine Workers Headquarters in Washington to the various union districts and from the districts to the locals, which in effect instructed the members what to do in defiance of the "cooling off period;" and this resulted in coal mine tipples being burned and coal bunker cars being damaged at the mines -- a

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a considerable amount of violence at many coal mines in the Nation.

So, in the second case, when the temporary injunction was issued, Lewis, who had as before ordered every member of the union through the district officials to the members of the locals, to convene the members of the locals and advise all members of the teams of the court order. (Lewis had failed to do this in the previous case.) Thus, Lewis sent out telegrams reciting verbatim the provisions of the temporary injunction to each and every district with an order that they convey this to all members of every local at meetings to be called immediately and send back to him affidavits stating that each local had seen to it that the members of each local had read the injunction or that it was ready by the president of each local and understood by the members.

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This was tried before an old friend of mine, Judge Richmond Keech, a Washington lawyer, who was a very close friend of my wife's brother, Warrick Keegin, now deceased.

HESS: Judge Keech was a former counsel and administrative assistant to Mr. Truman.

MORISON: Yes, Keech had been made administrative assistant to President Truman, and from that position he was nominated and confirmed as a U.S. District Judge in the District of Columbia. We tried the case before Keech and he determined that the Government had not made its case and that the strike was the independent act of each union member and not the act of the Union. This was, of course, the result of the Union's strategum.

During the course of this trial. and the presentation of the evidence as to the

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concerted action of union members, the Union's lawyers were saying, "This is just the act of outraged coal miners. The Union had nothing to do with the independent action o£ the members of each local. We didn't order this." Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, whom I had never met, but who introduced the Taft-Hartley bill on the Senate side, had in his state many constituents who were coal operators. He called me on the telephone and just "blew his top!" He said, "I have a group of coal mining company officials from Ohio who are meeting with me and they have sent you affidavits stating what the members of the Union's locals have done to destroy their companies' mine tipples, overturn and damage railroad coal cars, and in setting fires to tipples and buildings at the mines. They say that you have stated you would not introduce their

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affidavits in the proceedings. And I tell you that I'm going to raise this matter with the Attorney General and the White House, for you are refusing to use evidence that should be presented to the court."

At that time, I was "up to my ears" and working until 3 or 4 o'clock in the morning on the case. I asked him if he would give me time to come up and meet with him, and he said he would. I went to the Senator's office and sat down with him to discuss the matter. I said, "Senator, your standing as an able lawyer is well-known, but I'm sure you haven't thought through the objections you made to me in our telephone conversation about the strike. If I were to introduce these affidavits, it would give John Lewis' lawyers the evidence they need to win. The Union's lawyers will state, 'Well, this proves the assertion we have made that the

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United Mine Workers Union and its president and officers at the national and district levels have had nothing to. do with the separate and independent acts of outraged individual miners. These acts were done by individual members of the locals, who have in outrage taken matters into their own hands. We've never sanctioned violence."'

I further reminded the Senator that the evidence of Union action was the error that Lewis made in the previous injunction case because he had not conveyed the court's order to the districts and the locals and ordered members to obey the court's order, as required. In addition the Government had evidence that similar acts of violence which had occurred then, had been suggested by officials from Lewis' office. "But this time, Senator, Lewis ordered every district

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local and every member of the locals to obey exactly what the court's injunction says they shall do."

Senator Taft listened carefully and did not interrupt me. He finally said, "You know, you're right and I'm sorry," which I thought was quite generous. And he got in touch with the coal operators who had complained to him and set them straight.

In any event, Judge Richmond Keech held against the Government. I was tired and to say the least, this order made me as "mad as a wet hen." The usual time required to take an appeal from the U.S. District Court to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit would have required 60 days. I consulted the Chief Justice, Justice Harold Stevens, however, and asked to be granted an emergency appeal. He agreed, but felt we could not perfect it in less than

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twenty days and prior to the Court's adjournment.

I was determined to get the appeal docketed and set for argument as quickly as possible. We worked day and night. We certified the record, prepared the brief and other papers required for the appeal, in four and a half days by working day and night. The appeal was before the Court en banc upon the Government's request, under the rules, for the Court to set an emergency hearing after the Union's response. Although the members of my staff and I were "dog tired," I was able to argue the appeal on the seventh day.

Welly Hopkins argued the case for the United Mine Workers. The argument lasted two and a half hours. At the end of that time, five members of the Court came down into the well of the Court, led by Chief Judge Stephens

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who said, "We have not heard an argument like this since we were young lawyers. The oral argument was -- as in earlier days -- in the old style of 'no quarter given.' Both of you have an ability to counter every assertion advanced by the other and 'hammer home' the points and authorities in support of your positions. This is the greatest interplay of appellate argument we've heard in many a day and we enjoyed it." He congratulated us both.

We hoped to have the Court's opinion on the appeal within ten days because of the national emergency, but it was not forthcoming. The Court, I am persuaded, held up any decision in order to give John L. Lewis a motive to end the strike, and within two weeks the coal operators and the United Nine Workers negotiated a new contract and the strike was ended!

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I talked to Stephens after that and he said, "Yes, that's exactly what we had in mind. We wanted to "sit" on the appeal to give sufficient time to Lewis to decide that he might lose the case and that he should end the strike.

After the first case, and particularly after the second case, President Truman, through, I guess, Charlie Murphy or Matt Connelly, asked me to come to the White House to discuss the case. When I met the President, he said, "Well, how'd you and old John get along?" I replied that we had no trouble and that Lewis did not attend the trial. He said, "This is an unusually fine piece of work. The country has suffered from the strike and I just want to congratulate you on what you've done and I know how long and hard you have worked on this important case."

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I replied, "Mr. President, I would love to accept all that, but," I said, "you don't understand that an Assistant Attorney General is often the figurehead. His staff lawyers are the people who are really doing the hard work. But, I will confess that I was working side by side with them, my shirtsleeves up, because this is the only way a trial lawyer can prepare himself and feel confident to take on a trial as grave as this one. I confess that I was shaken up by the responsibility it imposed on me."

"Well," he said, "that's the reason Tom Clark wanted you to be head of this thing." This was a great moment for me. He said, "You know, old John is the greatest actor since Edwin Booth. He is something!" He said, "He tries to make me mad, you know, I really really enjoy that old fellow. I know he's

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posing. If it wasn't for the fact that he was head of the United Mine Workers and I was the President of the United States, we'd get along just fine!"

And I said, "Well, I kind of feel that way myself." I told him of the relationship of my late uncle, A. Kyle Morison, Esq. with him.

HESS: One point I would like to clear up, if we could, deals with the comment that you made last time, about having knowledge of the dropping of the bomb at Hiroshima. Would you tell me about that? You were in the Marine Corps as an intelligence officer, but at what period were you out of the United States and how did you hear about the bomb?

MORISON: I shipped out in 1943 from San Francisco. I believe that's right.

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HESS: And how long did you stay in the Pacific?

MORISON: I was there until 1944 or '45. I'll have to get my Marine Corps file. Through a fluke, the Marine Corps found out that I was a lawyer and had been at the W.P.B. and when this occurred I was ordered back to Washington as an intelligence officer on the staff of the Commandant.

HESS: The war was over in '45 and I have it down from the Who's Who article that you were discharged from the Marine Corps during '45.

MORISON: Well, then it must have been then that I was shipped back, in early '45.

HESS: President Roosevelt died on April the 12th of 1945. Were you in the country when Roosevelt died?

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MORISON: Yes. I remember seeing the caissons go down Pennsylvania Avenue. I was at the offices of the Commandant near the Pentagon.

HESS: Was that where you were when you heard the news?

MORISON: Of his death?

HESS: Of his death.

MORISON: Yes. I don't need to elaborate. I've never, of course, said anything about this to anybody else, but as an intelligence officer I knew that a bomb of great destructive power was to be dropped in the Pacific, but I did not know when.

HESS: I believe the bomb was first tested down in the desert in July of 1945. Then Mr. Truman went to Potsdam that month and the

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first bomb was dropped on August the 6th of '45.

MORISON: '45.

HESS: That was Hiroshima, and then Nagasaki was three days later on August the 9th.

MORISON: Yes, that sounds right.

HESS: Just about how long before August the 6th did you hear about the bomb, do you recall?

MORISON: Oh, at least ten days before, and this was top, top secret. It was something that the intelligence people knew and which imposed on us the greatest secrecy. We had to handle it quite gingerly; there was a meeting of all of the various divisions of the Commandant's office. Some men, commanding generals, were called back I'm sure, either from Hawaii and other posts, wherein there

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had to be some -- this I had nothing to do with, but I was privy to the fact, I believe, that General [William Luke] McKittrick was sent to relay this information to certain commanding generals like "Howling Mad" [Holland M.] Smith and some of the others. But in any event...

HESS: Looking back on that event from this point in time, do you think those bombs should have been used? What's your opinion on the use of the atomic bomb at the end of the Second World War?

MORISON: Well, at the time we didn't know anything about the atomic bomb and its radiation effects. We knew that the Japanese were getting to the end of their rope on manpower, particularly their fleet and air power, which had been very effective in the early days, but that anything that would precipitate in a decisive way the

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necessity for Japan to "call quits," seemed to me to be worthwhile. Later on when I learned of the maiming and the absolute cruelty of that destruction, I -- really my stomach "crawled."

It unquestionably saved thousands of lives of our sailors and Marines and Army personnel, for if they had had to make that final assault, our losses would have been tremendous. I just felt that anything that would bring about an end of the war in the Pacific was worthwhile because prior to this the assault was made on Iwo Jima and I had been there, I would have taken part in that -- and, near half of my brother officers were killed at Iwo. You can understand my feelings, without having knowledge about atomic consequences of such a bomb. And, of course, the present generation just doesn't understand how we could have caused such

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destruction and the death and maiming of many human beings. It was a hard decision that had to be made and despite the consequences. It brought the war to an end and saved thousands of Japanese and American lives -- for the Japanese military fanatics might otherwise have continued the war indefinitely.

HESS: One other point. The President had a sign on his desk, "The Buck Stops Here." What do you recall about that sign?

MORISON: Well, I remember on the several occasions that I had an opportunity either at my initiative to call on the President with permission of the Attorney General, on various matters, or when he asked me to come over to discuss some case, that he said as to some matter that was very critical in another area, "You know, the unfortunate thing about

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this job is that I had to learn to make decisions the hard way. It's a lonely job. If the man is to measure up to being what the Constitution expects of a Chief Executive, he's got to be lonely and he's got to make up his own mind. He can seek counsel of others, but in the end 'the buck stops here."'

I mentioned this to Charlie Murphy and I mentioned it to Don Dawson and Marty [Martin] Friedman, and they all said, "Yes, sir, that's a favorite phrase of his and it really describes his attitude as to what is required of him." I don't think I was the initiator of it, but everybody that worked in the White House with President Truman had such a deep devotion for him; but anyway, his staff did their best to try to break up the heavy burdens of his responsibilities which made him work endlessly at the most difficult job

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in the world. They planned many things to get him away from these burdens and to give him a laugh.

The President read endlessly with his "flat eyes." He didn't rely on others to tell him what some document said, he would read it himself. He worked incessantly, but he had a discipline of going to bed early and getting up early, taking a brisk walk in the early morning to keep constitutionally fit. But he did this work himself. So, someone -- and it wasn't me, because I hadn't thought of it -- said, "Let's get a good sign and just slip it in there and put it on the desk."

HESS: Do you recall where they got the sign?

MORISON: No, I don't, but I think here in town. It was made of a piece of wood beveled into

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a triangle. The side containing the inscription was faced up and the inscription was a white inset on black plastic. "The Buck Stops Here."

HESS: Do you recall who bought the sign?

MORISON: No, I don't know, but I know that we all chipped in to get it.

HESS: One other point on that, do you recall just about when the sign was given to the President? Was it '46, '47, '48, '49?

MORISON: I think in '48. That is my best recollection. It was about that year. Then we had another present we gave him.

My affection for the President, which was almost as if he were a kinsman, was so profound that nothing he ever did I ever felt was wrong after I came to know him and to understand him.

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He did not know that I had served in the Marine Corps in the Pacific and that I was a devoted Marine and felt after having served this period of time that it was an "elite corps." Its traditions were never forgotten. It made ordinary men into men of courage and pride, and we, during the campaigns in the Pacific, comparing the Corps in times when the Army was in on an operation, with our own discipline, we were proud of how we, as a Marine company, or a division, or a brigade operated in contradiction to the "Chinese fire drill" of some Army Reserve units or others!

HESS: As it says on the memorial on top of Suribachi at Iwo Jima, "Uncommon valor was a common virtue."

MORISON: Well, that's right, and it took ordinary men and inspired them to achieve mental and physical courage to a degree that cannot be

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explained, except that the "mystique" of the tradition affects the performance of any man who has served in the Corps.

So, in 1950, and it probably was at the time the President had asked me to organize for the Korean war, the Office of Economic Stabilization, because he said I was the only one in "his family" that he knew who had the qualifications to do this since I had served as assistant to the General Counsel of the War Production Board, and knew what had to be done to help to stabilize the economy so that we could arm for the Korean conflict and at the same time not let the economy "go to pot." It had to be regulated.

In any event, sometime in 1950 a member of Congress, who was an ex-Marine, had, on the floor of the House, stated that he intended to introduce a bill requiring that the commandant

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of the Marine Corps be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And a letter, I believe, was sent to President Truman by this Congressman concerning this, pointing out the reasons that he believed this recognition should be given in the development of military strategy, that the Marines should not be left out. The president had replied to that, and it became public, that the Marine Corps had the best public relations machinery of any outfit that he knew!

Well, this enraged every Marine and, of course, the commandant of the Marine Corps, and all of the command of the Marine Corps here, could say nothing about it. But it was a matter which aroused all the Marines because it hadn't been long since World War II and the Marine Corps Reserve organizations were well-organized.

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At that point in order to try to leaven this "public issue," because I knew the President had not anticipated that this would be such a "hurrah," I called Don Dawson because Charlie Murphy was tied up, and I told him that I had made some arrangements.

I got in touch by telephone with the president of the Zippo cigarette lighter company in Pennsylvania, and told him that I needed his help to produce a rush order for a solid silver "Zippo" lighter because a "Zippo" lighter was what I and most other Marines carried all through the landings in the Pacific and they would always work. I asked that he put the Marine Corps emblem on the front of it in gold and inscribe below it; "To HST for bravery under fire, USMC." We assembled outside of the office, with Matt

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Connelly, Don Dawson, myself and maybe one other, and I led the procession in military order into the Oval Office. The President looked surprised for we all stood at attention and we saluted. I asked permission of the Commander-in-Chief to address him. He then stood up and said, "Why, I haven't been called that in a long time."

And I said, "We make this presentation to you, Mr. Truman," and I read it to him and handed it to him.

He smiled and laughed and said, "You know I don't smoke, but my brother does and I can give it to him:"

It alleviated the tension and he asked me to stay after the rest went out. He said, "I never intended this to happen. I popped off." He said, "As you know, I was an artillery officer in the Army. I didn't even know you

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were a Marine."

I said, "Yes sir, I was."

And he said, "Well, I've got to find some way to head this off. I was wrong. I 'popped off' when I should have said nothing." And I left with that.

He devised a strategem. I made no suggestions about it. The Marine Corps Reserve Officer's Association was having a national meeting of ex-Marines from all over the country here in Washington and I found out through Don Dawson what had happened. He showed up at the convention unannounced and uninvited. Apparently he had let the Commandant know that he was going to come in, but quietly, and he got up and made an apology, and that Marine Corps Association was ready to roast him. He just defused them because he praised the Marine Corps for their morale, for their

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spirit, and this to me is an index of that great man. Others, if they were possessed with false pride would have stood their ground as commander-in-chief and said, "Take it or leave it," but not President Truman. He was a human being, and a great human being.

HESS: Have we covered everything that we want to cover before you became Assistant Attorney General?

MORISON: You asked me whether when I came to the Department as a Special Assistant to the Attorney General and later when I became the Attorney General's Executive Assistant whether there was any office or assignment of responsibility to attorneys in the Department for the oversight of violation of civil rights of the citizens of the country. There was a section established by Attorney General Clark for this

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in the Criminal Division.

The man who headed this section at the request of the Attorney General was Turner L. Smith and Mrs. Eleanor Bontecou, a distinguished lady in her sixties, who I believe had been a professor of law at Georgetown University Law School. She had dedicated her career to the cause of civil rights. In addition, Fred G. Folsom, Richard Rodman, Abe Rosen and others served in this section.

Turner Smith, who recently died, was an able lawyer and a most remarkable man. He was born in Georgia, went to college and law school there and began his practice in Albany, his hometown, which was the center of a rural county. In time he was elected to the State Legislature and was the first legislator in the state to take a stand against the denial of the civil rights of Negro citizens.

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Before his election to the legislature and as a practicing attorney in Albany, when violations of the civil rights of Negroes occurred, he asked those responsible to meet with him. In most instances they were poor white men who were marginal farmers or sharecroppers. He talked to them without anger, described what they had done and made them ashamed of their actions, but this process was effective in most instances because Turner Smith with simplicity pointed out that such action by .them would lead to the denial of their rights.

Attorney General Clark had a strong feeling about the depredation of civil rights but he, as did Turner Smith, knew that the only Federal law concerning civil rights was the Voting Rights Acts enacted by the Congress after the Civil War in 1866, 1870, 1871 and 1875. They were enacted to make certain that

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the Negroes in the South, having been freed of slavery by Abraham Lincoln, be protected in the exercise of their right to vote in Federal elections. So, at that time, these acts provided a very modest basis for the United States to intervene in acts involving violations of a broad spectrum of other civil rights which legally were protected by the U.S. Constitution and that of most states, but not by statutes.

Turner Smith and his staff agreed that when they had a complaint made to the Attorney General or when they read newspaper accounts of violations of all types of civil rights, timely beginning action should be taken after obtaining full information. If such a violation was serious enough, he would go to the cities where these acts were done and ask the aid of the nearest U.S. Attorney in calling in those

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who had been alleged to have violated the civil rights of Negro citizens for a meeting with him at the U.S. Attorney's office. No threat of prosecution was made but he spoke to the issue in terms these people could understand. He also would have a frank talk with the county prosecutor and the state attorney general, pointing out that the Federal Government might have grounds to prosecute but pointing out that for all concerned, state action was preferred in keeping with the letter and spirit of their constitutions. He urged that they write letters to offenders and advise them of the laws of their states, which were copied after the Constitution of the United States and to see that these provisions be made effective.

I confess that the number of these violations at that time were minor in comparison with the deluge of violations that followed in

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the intervening years and resulted in the enactment in 1957 of the comprehensive Civil Rights Act.

This section of the Criminal Division had many meetings with the NAACP headed then by Justice Thurgood Marshall and other organizations such as the Civil Liberties Union, and Urban League and the National Conference of Christians and Jews.

From these beginnings and the reports made by this section, Attorney General Tom Clark recommended to President Truman that he appoint a representative group of knowledgeable citizens to hold hearings and inquire into all violations of the civil rights of citizens and to submit a full report with recommendations to the President. The President established this commission and the report made by the commission was the first definitive investigation and report

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in this area. It was submitted to President Truman in 1947 and is entitled "To Secure These Rights." I recall that Bob Carr of Dartmouth College was the Executive Secretary of the commission.

Looking back, it seems incredible that this small cadre of dedicated people in the Department were able to accomplish as much as they did.

So, in response to your question, Attorney General Clark did have a very strong feeling about the civil rights of the citizens of the Nation regardless of their race, creed or color. He initiated this beginning and took a special interest in the progress of that office.

I think that Attorney General Clark was shocked by his experience when he came to the Department just as the war was beginning

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and when he was sent by Attorney General Biddle to California to confer with General DeWitt. General DeWitt had accepted the assertion made by the owners of large tracts of agricultural land that the Japanese-American owners of farm lands, orchards and commercial flower tracts were "spies" sent there many years prior to the war to report to the Japanese military the status of troops of the U.S. military, the ships of the Navy and other military secrets. Thus, General DeWitt had exercised his military authority to intern thousands of Japanese-Americans without any evidence that they had done anything. It was a grievous violation of the rights of American citizens. Attorney General Clark, as a special assistant of necessity, could only make recommendations to the General as to the procedures which would provide a degree of due process as to such internments --

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even though exercised under the plenary powers of the War Powers Act. He strongly urged that General DeWitt provide a group of competent civilians to maintain a careful oversight and protection of the property and possessions of those who were to be interned and to protect all from bodily harm at the hands of hysterical citizens. Unfortunately, General DeWitt disregarded most of Tom Clark's advice and with a heavy hand interned thousands of these innocent citizens in desert camps all over :the West. These internees' personal and real properties were bought out at about ten cents on a dollar by native Americans on the West Coast, for these internees feared the destruction of their homes, farm and garden lands and offices if they did not sell them.

This experience outraged Tom Clark although I am certain that he never voiced his feelings

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at the time. After the war ended, however, there was a group of American citizens of Japanese ancestry -- many of them being decorated for numerous acts of bravery as soldiers in the war -- who organized a very strong and proper campaign to convince Congress that restitution should be made for the incredible property losses suffered by these Japanese-American citizens. This resulted in the enactment of the Japanese Claims Act. Attorney General Clark supported this legislation fully and when it was enacted, he charged me with the responsibility for setting up an office to administer this act, which I did when I became head of the Civil Division. As I have related, the section in the Criminal Division concerned with civil rights accomplished more than the public was aware in aid of rectifying violations of civil rights. The real turn-about came, however, when by

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unanimous opinion the Supreme Court decided the Brown case. I was in the bar of the Court and heard Chief Justice Warren read the unanimous opinion of the Court.

HESS: The case of Brown versus the Topeka Board of Education?

MORISON: Yes. Yes, the Topeka Board of Education. And I never will forget it. I was thinking of Turner, and I called him that day after I got back from court because I was waiting for a decision in a case I had argued. I said, "Turner, the long hope that you've had back in your beginning days in the Department, that something effective be done about the neglected areas of the violation of the civil rights of citizens has finally occurred. It's a shame that you couldn't have been in the Supreme Court to hear the Chief Justice read

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the Court's unanimous opinion."

Well he said, "I had been waiting for the Court's opinion, but I didn't know that it was going to be announced that day."

HESS: But during the Truman administration, here in Washington, D.C., there were segregated high schools...

MORISON: That's right.

HESS: ...there were segregated swimming pools...

MORISON: That's right.

HESS: ...colored people were not welcome in the restaurants.

MORISON: No.

HESS: What could the Truman administration have done to have forwarded the rights of the colored people more than it did?

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MORISON: This situation was one thing which never occurred to Turner Smith. I think if the President had been reminded about the situation in the Nations' capital, he would have called in the commission chairman and asked him to rectify the situation.

HESS: That was back during the days when Washington, D.C. had commissioners.

MORISON: Yes, commissioners. Jiggs [F. Joseph] Donohue in time became chairman. He was a local Democratic politician who was practicing law with [Milton S., Jr.] Kronheim. Judge Kronheim and he would have carried out such reforms if the President requested him to do so.

HESS: Well, two of the men at this time were named Young. One of the commissioners was always an Army engineer, and his name was Gordon Young,

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and John Russell Young was also a commissioner.

MORISON: That's right, but they would not have "bucked" the White House. Looking back at the beginnings of protest as to the violations of civil rights, there are so many things you realize that you could have done. The greatest terror, the greatest deprivations were being made public by Whitney Young and the Negro leader who was head of the National Association of Colored People.

HESS: Walter White.

MORISON: Walter White, yes.

HESS: Did they come in to see you often?

MORISON: They came in to see Turner Smith. I kept in touch with Turner wherever I was because I too was interested in doing more to end the growing violations, although I had no responsibility

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in this area.

Attorney General Clark also knew about what had happened in Texas. I told you about the events in New Braunsfel, where the German population was interned -- American citizens -- some who had been there for five generations. They had a German newspaper and the Army shut it down. It was bought out by another fellow who made a fortune on it.

HESS: The Justice Department entered -- or intervened in -- several cases in the role of amicus curiae. That action has been pointed out as being one of the things that the Justice Department did do affirmatively for civil rights during that time. Do you recall that?

MORISON: Yes, I do. This was inspired first by Turner Smith and this wonderful lady Miss Eleanor Bontecou that worked with him and by

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George Washington, who was Deputy Solicitor General. And he was most persuasive about taking action. This action was taken but it was at best a modest beginning. They were doing what they could with the limited power that the Federal Government had, which was only that one act of Congress which gave the Department of Justice authority to prosecute for a denial of a citizen's right to vote in Federal elections. They recognized that until the Congress accepted the fact that there existed wide-spread suppression of civil rights under the Constitution and this became a major issue, the Congress would not have enacted remedial legislation, for the major committees of Congress were dominated by southerners. It took a Martin Luther King to dramatize the suppression of these constitutional rights of Negro citizens.

HESS: Mr. Truman did ask for civil rights legislation

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at several times.

MORISON: Yes.

HESS: On February the 2nd of 1948, he sent his ten point message to Congress on what he would have liked to have done in the civil rights field, FEPC was one. I think fair housing was another, but there was a total of ten points. Just what was the difficulty in getting that legislation passed? Was it the Southern bloc?

MORISON: Yes, I recall that message. The Southern bloc dominated every committee of the Congress. My Lord, the House Rules Committee was presided over by old Judge Howard Smith, and you just couldn't get such legislation out of the key committees.

HESS: Did you ever discuss with President Truman his

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views on civil rights?

MORISON: I never did. I never did because I felt I should limit any conference with the President to matters I deemed urgent in my areas of responsibility in the Department or to respond to his request for me to talk with him about specific matters in which he had an interest and which were in my area of responsibility. I always felt I couldn't encroach on his time.

I never had a philosophical discussion with him about this, but you know as I think about it, I wish I had because I never forget when I went to New York, Governor Nathan Miller, who became my great friend, and who was the head of the firm I joined, thought he was going to have a joke on me. He knew I came from the South. He didn't know I was a mountaineer. So he invited me to a very elegant

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banquet which the association of the bar of the City of New York held annually. This was a great and impressive banquet. It cost about $50 a plate even in those days, and, of course, I couldn't buy a ticket. So he said, "I want you to attend the dinner and here's your ticket." Well, each ticket had a number, and he'd done this as a big joke on me for I was seated next to a municipal judge named page who was as black as the ace of spades. We became devoted friends as a result of that dinner. We talked about civil rights and about his experience in New York as a Negro lawyer.

HESS: Was he a native New Yorker?

MORISON: Yes, and had grown up in the ghettos in Harlem, but had made his way and had been elected as a municipal judge. Governor Miller was crestfallen to observe that Judge Page

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and I got along so well. Later he told me, "You know, as I look back on it, I should have known better. I should have known that your breadth of understanding, regardless of whether you came from south of the Mason-Dixon line, you're not conventional, you don't have any conventional "southernisms," and the old Confederacy feeling that all Negroes are to be kept in their place. That was a lesson to me. I thought I was going to have some fun with your discomfort, but it increased my respect for you."

HESS: To what extent did increasing Negro political power, particularly in the cities of the North -- Detroit and Chicago -- have on focusing the Nation's attention on civil rights matters?

MORISON: Jerry, I just can't comment about this. First, because I would be guessing and I don't

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know. I've given you all of the people that were involved in this. I do know one thing that I did. Detroit was a great area of difficulty.

HESS: There was a race riot there during the war.

MORISON: Yes. My great-grandfather bought slaves and brought them to Scott County, Virginia. As soon as they were purchased, however, he gave them a document declaring each of them to be free men and women and filed these in the clerk's office of Scott County. All of them were provided for by employment by the family. They requested and it was agreed that they take our name. They're all buried in the Morison plot in the Estilville Cemetery in Gate City, Virginia.

HESS: How many slaves did he have over the years?

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MORISON: I really don't know but I'd say about ten or twelve.

HESS: This was over a long period of time?

MORISON: Yes, this goes back into 1800 and their progeny after that. They were all freed. My great-great-grandfather, who resided in Tazewell, Tennessee, had 300 slaves and he also gave them their freedom immediately after purchasing them prior to 1800.

HESS: Now, wait a minute, you say he would buy them and free them, all in the same action?

MORISON: The same day.

HESS: Why?

MORISON: Because he (my great-great-grandfather Hugh Graham) did not believe in slavery. He

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thought it was -- he was a Scotsman and to him for people to be considered as slaves was just something that he couldn't tolerate. He built individual log homes for every one of the Negro families on this great tract of land that he had, solid log houses, installed chuck floors and fireplaces, outhouses and barns...

HESS: They stayed and worked the land after they had been freed, is that right?

MORISON: Absolutely, but they would do it for wages. He had the greatest library south of Philadelphia. People would come to Tazewell because they knew that they were welcome and could read his books and even newspapers he obtained from Philadelphia. They would stop off and visit. They'd come on the old postillion -- four and six-horse coaches. I

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now have a few of the volumes from his vast library. It included practical medicine, horticulture, science, etc. Hugh Graham's wife administered to the birth of every baby of their freed slaves if asked to do so. On Sunday they were all provided -- each family -- with a wagon and a mule to go to church, and he built a church for them -- no, he built three churches and often preached sermons in their churches.

I'm coming back to the last one I knew well. I remember some of them: H. Ransom Morison, his daughter "Aunt Charl" and Willie and Henry Morison and Warrick Morison. Warrick was encouraged by my grandfather, Judge H.S.K. Morison and after my grandfather's death by my father, to get an education and the family provided for him to get a full college education so he could achieve his goals to be a teacher

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and in time he was the superintendent of the Negro schools in the area of Scott County, Virginia. Later there was a kind of a boom time during World War II and he was invited to be a vice president of a Negro life insurance company because he was recognized by Negro businessmen as an educated man and well respected as an educator since he became the Superintendent of Negro schools in Scott County, Virginia.

Well, he invested what little money he had saved in the company and he borrowed some additional funds promised from friends -- including my father's family, but a depression came in the twenties and just wiped the company out. With a great deal of courage and after consulting with all the members of the family -- my father, my uncles and others -- he went to Detroit and obtained employment, first as a day laborer and later as a superintendent

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of the City's Water Department. In time he began to realize that there was a great need for a Negro real estate company to serve the growing Negro population and to build new homes for Negro families because Henry Ford had brought both Negroes and mountaineers from the South to work in the Ford plants there and provided good wages for that time. Thus, he established a real estate firm and began to prosper. Later he ran for Sheriff of Wayne County, Michigan as a Republican -- which "shook the family up" but he said, "Well, you've got to be on t'other side up there." He was elected and had an outstanding record.

HESS: About what time was this?

MORISON: This was in 1929 or '30, just about the time I was graduating from academic school at college. He then organized the Fort Lincoln

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Association, which in effect was the first strong Negro organization of intelligent Negroes who were small businessmen that had a constituency all the way down to the uneducated Negroes. The Association was, at that time, respected and it was able to confront the "power structure" in the Detroit area about discrimination grievances of Negro citizens. The power structure responded and worked with the Association because this was the first time that they had something tangible to deal with. This civic relationship accomplished much to resolve issues but the Association's effectiveness later deteriorated when Warrick resigned.

Well, this is a diversion. Let us go on now. What's the next question, Jerry.

HESS: Have we covered everything before you were nominated as Assistant Attorney General?

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I believe you went in to talk to Mr. Truman about that, is that right?

MORISON: Oh, yes...

HESS: Also, why were you selected for that position as Assistant Attorney General?

MORISON: Tom Clark had an unwarranted belief that I could do damn near anything, but it wasn't justified, but he did know that if I was given a task to do that I would work hard and long to get it done.

Wendell Berge, who was the successor of Thurman Arnold as head of the Antitrust Division had resigned as Assistant Attorney General. He was considered to be more in the "Biddle crowd." Yet Tom was always pleasant with him as he was with everybody. But, Tom in those days didn't have much real affinity for Wendell,

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so John Sonnett, who was an Irishman from New York and who was sponsored by John Cahill, the former U.S. Attorney in New York who headed a very large law firm in New York, "Cahill, Gordon, etc."

He was being pushed politically by Cahill to be made head of the Antitrust Division since John Sonnett was considered by Cahill to be a "comer" and he wished to have him in his firm after a term as head of the Antitrust Division in the Department of Justice. John had been made Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Division as I have said before, and then when Berge resigned, his mentor Cahill asked that Tom make him Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division. Looking back upon it,. there was method in Cahill's move to accomplish this, because his firm represented RCA, and the Department for a long period of

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time had been trying to get an antitrust suit "off the ground" for RCA's violation of the antitrust laws. He had successfully blocked such antitrust action in the past and while Biddle was Attorney General.

So, John was made head of the Antitrust Division leaving a vacancy in the office of Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Division. Tom Clark thus advised that he would request the President to nominate me for that vacancy.

I had never asked the Attorney General for anything because I had enough freedom and rapport with the Attorney General to enjoy what I was doing. I mean, I had a pittance of a salary when I got married in '48 and we lived on "grits and gravy," but that was all right, I truly didn't care. I was enjoying what I was doing. As I say, I went

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there to stay six months and stayed six years, and that was because of Tom Clark and Harry Truman. So this appointment was an unprecedented thing and I was kind of "shook up!"

In any event, the Attorney General said he was sending my name over to the President for approval and for forwarding to the Senate Judiciary Committee for confirmation of the appointment. I then asked the Attorney General that before forwarding, he arrange for me to go and see the President.

The Attorney General asked me why I wanted to see the President before the nomination was acted upon and I told him that when I was in New York with Governor Miller's law firm that I had become quite disturbed by the bid of Roosevelt for the third term. I had a great admiration for Franklin Roosevelt. As a matter of fact, you will see on the wall there,

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a letter from President Roosevelt, then Governor of New York State, to me in 1932 in which he had written me because of my interest in his candidacy.

Subsequently, at the request of Governor Max Gardner of North Carolina, who had conceived the idea of establishing "The Young Democrats," I came to Washington while I was still in law school and met with a group of contemporaries at the Mayflower Hotel. Ross Malone, a classmate, accompanied me. He is now General Counsel of General Motors. On the second day so many young Democrats were absent for the scheduled meetings that Congressman Wright Patman and I were left to write the first draft of the constitution of this organization!

In any event, I felt that a third term for any president -- and despite Roosevelt's great capacities for leadership, was a bad

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precedent. His "Fireside Chats" were the vehicle that helped to give confidence to this country from the agonies of the depression which I lived through. He offered hope to a Nation in despair. He had great capacities of leadership, but I felt that regardless of his past leadership, in my understanding of the Constitution, which requires that you read not only the proceedings at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, but also all of the thoughts expressed by members of the Convention and their writing about the issues concerning the Articles of Confederation, which was the predecessor of the Constitutional Convention, and Jefferson's view about the inclusion of the first ten amendments in the Constitution, etc., that under the concept of a tri-party system of government, separate and independent, as it related to individual

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liberties, I felt that a third term would deteriorate the office and the leadership of that office.

I knew that Roosevelt was sick. I knew that from Marvin McIntire (who was a friend of my father) when I asked him about getting out of the War Production Board and getting into the Marine Corps. So I wrote President Roosevelt a letter. I never got an answer. I don't think he could identify me. I stated that I felt that a "third term" in the office was wrong. I then organized "The Lawyers' Committee Against the Third Term," and I made speeches all over the country, as a young lawyer, stating my reasons as a lawyer why I felt the third term to be wrong. I made it clear, however, that I was a Democrat.

Arthur Vanderbilt, who later became the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey,

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was a great friend of mine and he too was quit interested in and concerned about this issue and worked in other areas on unwritten principles involved. This did not mean that I had given up my loyalty to the Democratic Party, my belief in it, but I felt that President Truman, because he had been reared in his political career, in the tradition of regularity of loyalty to the Democratic Party that he ought to know what I had done, and if he had any objections, I'd understand. I felt I should not let my nominations go to him "blind."

Tom said, "Well, if you want to see him I'll arrange it," and he did.

And I went over and I sat down and stated just about what I've said before here, but I felt that he should know this and that in view of this he might not want to send my name up.

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But he said, "Well, I don't know why you say that. When I was in the Senate I voted three times for a bill to amend the Constitution, to limit the term of the President to two terms." And he said, "You're absolutely right," and he said, "I have even a greater respect for you for coming to me and telling me. You and I think alike."

I relate this as I look back on the question we discussed before we started recording, "Why did he not run in 1952 since he had only a part of a term after Roosevelt's death and served only one term after that," and this is the reason I'm quite certain.

HESS: That's why his decision in 1952 was not to run again.

MORISON: Not to run again. It was not because he was afraid of being defeated, it was not for

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any reason, because he was a man who never backed away from a difficult situation. Even if things were tough for him to be elected, if he were urged to run, if he were the only candidate, he felt it was wrong.

HESS: All right, let's move on to February of 1948, which is getting into a very interesting period of time, the political events of 1948. As you will recall there were several moves afoot about this same time by certain elements of the Democratic Party to see that someone other than Mr. Truman was the Party's standard bearer that year. The ADA was trying to get General Eisenhower, various elements were trying to get Justice Douglas, but in your opinion, how difficult would it have been for the Party to have refused to give the nomination to Mr. Truman after he made it clear he wanted

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the nomination?

MORISON: I never discussed this with President Truman, but I've always felt that being a man of pride and courage and having been a man who came into that office with the most abject humility and shock, that he had grown in stature and responsibility, that he faced into the problem, we've referred to before as "The Buck Stops Here." He was in truth and in fact, the Chief Executive of the United States. He made decisions, sometimes in an early morning walk, after having thought, read everything pertaining to a particular issue of importance.

I don't think that would deter him, because that kind of indirect repudiation of his integrity, his filling to the "nth degree," the responsibilities that go with the office of Chief

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Executive. Above all things President Truman had plenty of sand and grit, and adversity was something he had lived with all of his life and he was not afraid of it.

I know a little bit about that, a little more about that for another reason. I, as executive assistant, had to deal with all other departments of the Executive Department. I had found that this was in many respects a kind of a "Chinese fire drill," because you would talk in the name of the Attorney General to this subofficial in Treasury, or in Commerce, or Labor or other departments of the Government, and you never were sure that you were getting a sense of cooperative working where two or more departments had a common problem and had to join together to efficiently accomplish necessary goals.

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HESS: Did you find any particular department that gave you more difficulty or seemed to be less cooperative than others?

MORISON: The Department of Commerce by far.

HESS: It didn't take you long to come up with that answer did it?

MORISON: No sir!

HESS: What seemed to be their attitude?

MORISON: Until we finally got Averell Harriman we didn't know what was going on. The subalterns underneath him said, "You know, we really run the Government. Don't be telling us what to do."

Well then I came up with an idea. When Bob Hannegan was Postmaster General, I came to know him quite well and he had a brilliant

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assistant, name was Gael Sullivan. Gael Sullivan had a master's degree in political science from the University of Chicago. He had been an innovator in the machine-ridden Democratic Party in Chicago (now presided over by [Mayor Richard J.] Daley), in saying, "you've got to reform," and he had accomplished reform, by learning and practical applications of good government. And Hannegan had found out about him and brought him down as special assistant. Well, he and I became very close friends, and I'd meet with him, I said, "In the old days we used to talk about the 'Kitchen Cabinet.' We ought to have the 'Little Cabinet.’" I said, "This thing of the common interests of one, two or three departments in a problem that must be executed in the executive department is damn important, because if it bogs down because some bureaucrat just

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will not take ahold of it, then you've wasted time, you've frustrated what the executive department ought to have done promptly." So I said, "How about you and I getting Bob to set up a dinner and let's invite the number two men of every department of Government."

He said, "That's a hell of an idea," and he said, "will you write up your concept of the first meeting as to what it's for?" And I did.

Well, as a result of that we met once a month, in rotation, one department and then another, all the way around. We got to know each other personally.

To give you an idea of how effective this was, when the question came up as when I was executive assistant, of how in hell we could grab the remaining German scientists that the Russians were systematically recruiting. How were we going to get them out of Germany.

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They wanted to come. You've got immigration, you've got all the bureaucratic things to do to do it promptly," and I said, "let me just handle it, Tom," I said, "I'll handle it."

So I called four members of the Little Cabinet. It was called "Operation Paperclip." I got the Air Force to get the planes. The Immigration Service is part of the Department of Justice, so I called the Commissioner of Immigration, over whom I exercised an oversight to come over and told him what to do. We were going to bring these people into a place certain, where we had housing for them, we didn't want any "hurrah" after we got them here. The main thing was to get them here promptly and before the Russians got them. This was done within 24 hours, that's how we got [Dr. Wernher] von Braun.

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HESS: Who were the Assistant Secretaries you called?

MORISON: There was Ed Foley...

HESS: From Treasury.

MORISON: ...from Treasury; there was Gael Sullivan, who was a good activist who joined with me to act as the whip; there was the Department of Defense, who of course wanted them...

HESS: Who did you call in the Department of Defense?

MORISON: Damn it. I'm trying to think, trying to think, trying to think. Damn, I can't think of the man's name because, you know, those -- ah damn it. He was the Assistant Secretary.

HESS: At that time it was the War Department.

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MORISON: Yes, War Department.

HESS: Patterson probably was the head of the Department at that time.

MORISON: Yes, well I knew Bob Patterson because he had been on the War Production Board. I called Bob Patterson, who knew who I was, and he told the man to call, plus he wanted these scientists, he knew we had to have them.

HESS: How many scientists did you get in that manner? Do you recall?

MORISON: I believe we got about twenty-seven.

HESS: Were there scientists whom you did not get, and the Russians took away from you?

MORISON: There were some that we lost because this thing had not come to a head quick enough for us to take action. And looking back on it,

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so many of the Secretaries didn't realize that this Little Cabinet with its monthly dinners, was not just a social group, but it was a method of getting things done promptly. Now later on, boy, they made great use of it, because things could be cleared just like that.

HESS: Can you think of any other illustrations that might show how the Little Cabinet set-up was used and how it functioned?

MORISON: Yes. A classmate of mine, with the authority of the Secretary of State, who was then head of the Latin-American desk, called me in desperation one day and said -- he didn't know about this set-up -- he said, "You're the last man I've called. I've called the FBI. I've called the Army. I've called everybody to help," He said, "We were dependent all during the war upon Venezuelan oil."

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[Romulo] Betancourt, who was then considered a wild Marxist radical, was the head of the government down there, and had been ousted by a military junta and the radicals in response were determined to blow up all of the pipelines and the oil wells in Maracaibo, the great oil center, and their intelligence people had picked this up and they made an appeal to the United States for help. And he said, "How in God's name can we get somebody down there to help these people out? I think it's important for our national defense."

We didn't know whether we were going to get another whop from the Russians or what in those days.

And I said, "Well, give me about an hour, Jim, and I'll see what I can do." I said, . "I'm not going to Edgar Hoover, because he .won't do anything. I know that he's got FBI agents

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down there, but -- I know him. I could go to the Attorney General and suggest that he order him to do it, but I'd have to do it in the end. Let me see what I can do."

So, I called the commandant of the Marine Corps, who was then General Cliff Cates, who had been my commanding general in the Pacific, and I said, "General, here is the situation," one, two, three, four. "Can you get together highly qualified retired Regulars who have had Latin-American experience and can speak Spanish?" You know the Marine Corps was there back in the Coolidge days.

HESS: The banana wars.

MORISON: Yes. They had some banana diplomacy, which was a blot on our "escutcheon."

I told him the situation. I said, "We will provide planes, somewhere in Texas,

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wherever you want it to be. But can you get me some top NCO's? I don't need any general officers, but they've got to speak Spanish and can you get them together, let them have their gear and we'll take it from there." I also told him the Venezuelan government would provide top pay for all of them.

He said, "Why, hell yes, I can get it."

By the next morning he had 116 men. The Air Force had provided unmarked planes down there. I called my counterpart in National Defense there, I can't recall his name, I'd have to look it up. I then asked Jim to let me talk to the Secretary of State and that...

HESS: What year was that? Who was Secretary of State at that time?

MORISON: Acheson I think.

HESS: That would have been Mr. Truman's second term.

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MORISON: Right. And I knew Dean (I’ll tell you why), and I called him and told him what I was doing, and told him that my friend Jim Espy had brought this to my attention, and I felt that I didn't want to embarrass Jim, that he'd done the right thing as I saw it.

He said, "He sure did." He said, "I know about it, but I didn't know that he knew you or had enough gumption to keep on inquiring about it." So, this was accomplished and hell, that damn thing was nipped in the bud.

And oh, there are any number...

HESS: What was the main thing that force accomplished in the Venezuelan matter?

MORISON: What they did was they policed that whole pipeline area. All spoke Spanish and many made friends of the natives who quietly advised them as to the movement of the radicals in the

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area.

HESS: They policed the pipelines.

MORISON: They spoke Spanish, they didn't wear uniforms, they just wore greens, you know, jungle greens. They were armed and they were made a part of the civil police of Venezuela.

HESS: Did Mr. Truman know that force had been sent down there?

MORISON: I finally told Matt -- I mean not Matt, I think I told Charlie...

HESS: Charles Murphy.

MORISON: Yes. I told him what had been accomplished. He said, "Well, that's the way to do, don't wait, asking somebody what ought to be done, do it. So, this went well. I'm leading to a point. From that association with Gael

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Sullivan, which I'm going to -- somebody, oh, Douglas McGregor, who was Deputy Attorney General for awhile, head of the tax division, lawyer, now retired down in Texas, sent me the other day a clipping from the Washington Star about the Little Cabinet, and maybe I can get my secretary Eleanor to give it to you.

But in any event, Bob Hannegan died after that. President Truman, through Don Dawson, asked Gael Sullivan and I to constitute a two-headed interim chairmanship of the Democratic National Committee. As you know, Hannegan had been head of the Democratic National Committee. In those days you could still be a Cabinet officer and head of the national committee, and nobody said anything about it. And so we did, we occupied the office for about seven months.

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HESS: This was after the death of Bob Hannegan.

MORISON: And any day Sullivan was tied up, I would stay over there as long as I could and Tom Clark would let me take that time, and we did our best to keep the party line nourished by telephone and otherwise.

We were doing a lot of things that ought to have been done after that. We tried to initiate what Charlie Murphy later did in establishing the Democratic study commission. We tried our best to revitalize our party. We knew we were going to be blocked by the Democrats in office on the Hill. They're saying, "You're trying to tell us what to do." But ideas have a way, if they're valid, of boiling up and being seized upon, in whole or in part. And that, in the interim, was what was needed to make the party cohesive and get ideas out for consideration about our

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legislative program.

We started that and Charlie Murphy decided to do the job later and was most successful from 1952 on. After Eisenhower was elected, Charlie Murphy came and worked with the Democratic Committee and got this study group established.

HESS: That's right, that was started right after the 1956 loss by Stevenson -- as the Democratic Advisory Council.

MORISON: That's right. He picked that up and he did one hell of a job.

HESS: How long did you and Mr. Sullivan run the committee there before J. Howard McGrath was appointed?

MORISON: No, it was Boyle.

HESS: Oh, this was after the '48 campaign?

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MORISON: Yes.

HESS: This was after '48.

MORISON: You see Boyle came in and he was a just -- he was the world's worst.

HESS: Yes, but this was after J. Howard McGrath?

MORISON: Right.

HESS: And before Boyle?

MORISON: Yes.

HESS: Why was Boyle appointed?’

MORISON: I don't have the slightest idea in the world, I've always wondered and Charlie doesn't know. I just don't know. He was the wrong man at the wrong time.

HESS: Was he appointed as more or less an interim Democratic National Chairman?

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MORISON: As I think back, that that was the intention of it. Whatever he did it was a grave era of passiveness when we should have been active and working hard.

HESS: Is that the major fault that you find with him?

MORISON: Oh hell, yes. For instance, I know Virginia like the palm of my hand, I know West Virginia, I know Tennessee, I know a good deal about New York, and I would try and come and tell Bill Boyle, "Bill, you've got to do this, this, this, and this. In Virginia if you try to rub elbows with the Byrd machine you're going to get skunked."

I helped form the Independent Democrats in Virginia while I was Assistant Attorney General of the civil division. Francis Pickens Miller came to me and said, "You're a Virginian, and

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I need your help and I'm going to run for Governor and buck this Byrd machine." He'd been in the House of Delegates, and he was a patrician. That was his great defect, he was an intellectual. He had been one of the group who had convinced Roosevelt to have the lend-lease of the destroyers to Britain.

HESS: The destroyer base deal?

MORISON: Right. He had been in intelligence in World War II and came out a colonel. And I helped form that with the late Bob Whitehead, one of the greatest leaders in the House of Delegates before the recent reform that we've ever had. He came from Lovettsville, Virginia.

HESS: What were the faults you found with the Byrd machine?

MORISON: Well, the Byrd machine was about like the

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southern loony bird. He flies backwards, doesn't care where he's going, he wants to see where he's been!

You know, it was one of complete conformity, and all of the social needs of the state, all of the economic needs of the state and its people were neglected. Virginia was the lowest on the "totem pole" in industrial productivity, in employment, in rates of pay for its workers, in manufacture of goods, in the social services to citizens, as to the adequacy of its prisons, state hospitals, and mental health and everything else. Out of the thirteen southern states there was only one that was lower than Virginia in modern public services to citizens and in economic growth.

HESS: I'll take a guess, was that Mississippi?

MORISON: Yes. That's it. And I made a speech down

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at Washington and Lee University on this thing which started, they say, this revolution, but which cost me the election as a trustee of my university, which I didn't give a damn about. But I think this is -- this was a great fault of the Byrd people. They wouldn't listen to the needs for change. But I also encountered this when John Kennedy ran. I had been floor leader for Adlai Stevenson, I'd been his floor manager, and took Adlai over to "make his manners to Kennedy." And Kennedy had asked the Governor, "I want you to have any position in my Cabinet that you want," I had met Kennedy because he had gone to Choate, and he said, "I hope that you'd come back into the Government, name what you want."

But I didn't want anything. But the disarray in Kennedy's campaign occasioned in this period of time was pretty marked.

HESS: When Boyle was chairman.

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MORISON: Yes.

HESS: One question about Gael Sullivan...

MORISON: He's dead you know.

HESS: Yes, that's right, but he worked for the Democratic National Committee before the 1948 campaign, and there was a period of time when he was under consideration for chairman of the Democratic committee.

MORISON: It could have been.

HESS: Did you ever hear why he did not get that job when McGrath was appointed?

MORISON: He was overruled by the Southern Democratic group, and it was a great disappointment in his life. Right after that you know, after I resigned, he was quite angry and he opened the office here in Washington for Estes Kefauver for Vice President

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and he asked me to come and help him. I was then practicing law. And I said, "Of course I will." So I went to the convention and became Estes' floor manager. He lost that time, and I'll tell you who else helped him; Paul Douglas was -- the two of us worked together, worked the floor. And the next time, why, we got him nominated as Vice President.

HESS: Yes, he was nominated in '56, but you worked for him in '52.

MORISON: In '52.

HESS: A few moments ago we mentioned the Department of Commerce and you mentioned that they were somewhat less cooperative than some of the other departments. What seemed to be the nature of the relationship between the Department of Commerce and the business community?

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MORISON: Well, a very tight relationship, because the Department of Commerce is a vast complex of bureaucracy. When Harriman was there, he made many wise and basic decisions. He is a man of considerable wisdom and liberal in his outlook on things, and believed that there must be a balance between what business wants and what is good for the people of the United States.

HESS: Harriman was there from October of '46 until April of '48 and then Charles Sawyer was there...

MORISON: Sawyer came and...

HESS: ...from May of '48 until the end of his administration.

MORISON: ...that's when the trouble came, that's where we locked horns.

HESS: Did you find him to be a rather conservative business-minded man?

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MORISON: Not only a conservative business-minded man, but an irascible one and I bucked him tooth and nail. He had joined with a very ambitious member of the Federal Trade Commission, his name was, oh, Lowell...

HESS: B. Mason.

MORISON: Lowell Mason was a very jocular guy, but aspired for power. Jim Mead was the chairman of the Commission and he was really a figurehead. We'd meet with Mead and staff people of the FTC at the Antitrust Division. They were dismayed because really the cases that got attention were those filed and tried by the Antitrust Division. In the record it appeared to us that they wanted to "toady up" to business, and were complaining about the Antitrust Division's vigorous prosecution of significant cases. The old saying -- among private antitrust lawyers -- was that if you've got

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an antitrust action by the Government against a client, a company, in the field of antitrust violation, go immediately to the Federal Trade Commission and ask it to take jurisdiction, because the investigation will bog down and nothing will ever happen.

HESS: And keep it out of the Department of Justice?

MORISON: Don't go to the Department of Justice because they will go after it, and they'll take time, but they'll finally get you in court and you'll get your answer.

So they -- Lowell Mason and Sawyer -- conceived the idea and they sat down with Tom Clark and explained it all to him. And of course, Tom was very polite and he said, "Well, you really," -- he passed the buck -- "you really should talk to my assistant Graham Morison about this." So they asked me over to have lunch with them.

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Their idea was that we ought to set up by interdepartmental agreement -- by law if necessary -- a committee composed of officials of Commerce, the Federal Trade Commission and public members. It was to be a kind of council so that any antitrust complaint in the field of antitrust and the Federal Trade areas, should first be considered by this "committee" for decision as to whether action should be taken at all, or if it was to be taken, whether it should be taken by the Federal Trade Commission, or by the Antitrust Division.

HESS: That was an idea being pushed by FTC.

MORISON: This was being pushed by Sawyer and Mason...

HESS: Oh. Commerce.

MORISON: ...in conjunction with Lowell Mason, he wanted to get this idea over. He was trying to

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sell it to President Truman. And I just refused to have the Antitrust Division participate. I later went to see President Truman about the plan and I said, "Mr. President, you know what such a provision would do, what they're trying to do is to take the teeth out of the Antitrust Division. Now the Antitrust Division has never been adequately staffed. It doesn't have enough attorneys, but the landmark cases that keep monopoly reasonably under control and permit free competition both in quality and price of goods and services for the American people is accomplished by the Antitrust Division." I said, "These slaps on the wrist by the Federal Trade Commission are meaningless." I said, "The Federal Trade Commission, as you know, sir, was a concept of Woodrow Wilson, which when World War I came on he had to abate."

But this concept was not to establish an

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administrative bureaucracy that Congress later enacted, but some intermediate and worthy basis by which you could call the business community together in areas outside of absolute violation of the Sherman Act, and the Clayton Act, and effect a governmental relationship of saying, "Now, under our auspices you may agree, that you will not do this, this and this, and once adopted such agreements could be enforced."

Well, that was never implemented as Wilson intended it to be, it became a great sprawling bureaucracy. So, thereafter [Philip L.] Graham, the head of the Washington Post, in the last year of my office, called me one day and said, "I've got an idea. There's a lot of complaint about the enforcement of the antitrust laws. It's too rigid, the business community believes it is being punished and are long in the courts and all the rest. So, don't you think it would

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be a wonderful stroke for you to suggest a convening of retired judges, able antitrust lawyers, and other lawyers of general competency in antitrust law, and make a full review of the antitrust laws and devise 'guide lines' by which the business community and the Antitrust Division can talk and achieve a sense of agreement?"

And I said, "Phil, you and I are friends, but I'm in antitrust and you're a lawyer yourself." I said, "The moment you give to inmates who are murderers, keys to the jail, the ball game's over, and I'll be darned if I'll do it." And I went right up to Tom Clark -- no I guess it was Howard McGrath who was Attorney General then, and told him. I said, "Look, this is what Philip Graham wants and I'm not going to do it."

He said, "I think you're right."

And Phil never forgave me for that. Later when Brownell came in as Attorney General, oh,

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the Department embraced this idea right away. And the results were "sound and fury meaning nothing."

Now, what's next?

HESS: Let's mention a couple of other people who were on the Federal Trade Commission. How about William A. Ayers?

MORISON: Bill Ayers, a man of reasonable ability. He never made many waves. In a couple of actions in which he did not carry the Commission, he was a kind of a forerunner in some of his opinions for subsequent Commission action.

The worst we ever had was an old friend, Paul Rand Dixon, who was Kefauver's counsel for the Senate Anti-monopoly Subcommittee, he was the worst, followed by the Congressman, what was his name, that became head of the Federal Trade Commission in the Republican administration? Oh, after Ed Howrey's short term, Congressman

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John W. Gwynne became chairman.

HESS: John J. Carson was there for a while, do you recall anything in particular about him?

MORISON: No, I never had any dealings with him.

HESS: All right. And then Stephen Spingarn was there.

MORISON: Oh, Steve I knew quite well. Steve was an activist, he was out of place on there, you know, they thought, "By God, somebody let a skunk in," because he wanted to make this damn bureaucracy work. That big burly bear of a man, he is a "pistol!" And the President had a great affection for Steve. He is a very earthy guy.

HESS: Yes. Did you ever hear why he was moved to the FTC from the White House staff?

MORISON: I haven't the slightest idea, but I was delighted and he at least put them through a

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mental exercise while he was there.

HESS: He shook them up a little bit did he?

Did you say that you did not think that an informal committee should be set up to review the antitrust laws?

MORISON: How can you do that with the Sherman Act dating back to its enactment in the 1890's, with all of the interpretive 'landmark" cases, and through the era following the Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC) in which there was an expose of the interlock of the major companies in price fixing, which was part and parcel of how our economy fell apart in the depression of '32, and agreements made by trade associations not to lower prices even though member companies had to dismiss their employees. And after the TNEC report was issued Judge Thurman Arnold was made head of the Antitrust Division and he didn't

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have to prosecute cases. They had been exposed by the TNEC. I came down here for U.S. Steel. Roger Blough and I represented U.S. Steel. He put on the case for U.S. Steel before the TNEC so I know that committee. But after that the businessmen. would line up outside of -- Judge Arnold told me this -- his office. He said, "They come in and said 'Show us a consent decree and we'll sign it."' But after that you had to fight.

If I can follow up on the subject of anti-trust -- shall I?

HESS: All right.

MORISON: I'll tell you some interesting things in my relationship with the President about it. First, before getting into that, did I relate my unhappy experience with Joe Kennedy?

HESS: No.

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MORISON: In the Civil Division, when I was the head of the Civil Division as Assistant Attorney General, we had the Dollar Steamship case.

President Roosevelt, because of the unwavering political support of Joe Kennedy, first rewarded him by making him one of the early chairmen of the Securities and Exchange Commission, in which he did a credible job. Then he made him head of the Maritime Commission.

While he was head of the Maritime Commission, before World War II, the Dollar Steamship Company, which had obtained all the subsidies from the Maritime Commission the law would allow, came to the Commission seeking further funds for the Company was in a considerable financial situation. They had an appointment with Chairman Kennedy who they believed would help them. And here is what the records show. Alben Barkley's son-in-law, now dead, Mack [Max O.] Truitt was a partner

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in Homer Cummings' law firm in Washington and I discussed this matter with him. In any event, he was general counsel of the Maritime Commission before joining Cummings' firm. So, the Dollar Steamship officials said to Joe Kennedy, "Since we can't get any more subsidy funds for the Dollar Steamship Line, it's going to go into bankruptcy, and this would be a great loss to the Nation's commerce. If we ever have a war, our ships will be needed, and the organization that we have will be needed. And here is what we will do. If you will loan us (I don't know the exact amount, let's say $10 or $20 million) 10 million dollars, we will give you a chattel mortgage on every ship, every bit of the repair equipment, docks and our stock of steel plate and all the supplies, everything we have. And if you give us a term of years (I think five years, it may have been longer), at the end of

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that term if we have not been able to pay it off, then under the terms of the mortgage, you can redeem all of the property of the Dollar Steamship Line, the stock of which is to be given as collateral for this loan along with the chattel mortgages."

Well, there was no specific provision of law under which that could be done, but Kennedy agreed to it. And he told Mack Truitt -- who then was general counsel of the Commission, to draw up the papers. Mack told me that he was shocked that Kennedy had made such an agreement for the Commission. Truitt said he was at a loss as to how to draft such an agreement under the act establishing the Commission. Finally, he said he drew up a straight chattel mortgage since Kennedy didn't ask if the Maritime Commission had the authority to accept such a deal (which Truitt thought it did not possess). Well, in any event, just prior to World War II, the mortgage became due and had not been paid. The successor in the chairmanship of the Maritime Commission then was -- I believe -- Admiral [Emory S.] Land, I believe that's who it was. Thus,

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the Commission foreclosed on the mortgage and took the Dollar Steamship Line over. And all of a sudden that steamship line was just a "bonanza!" I mean it was just making money "hand over fist" to a point that it had to turn shipping business away. So after the end of World War II, the "Dollar" people went to Senator Pat McCarran because they had been assured that he could help them get the company back for its coffers were full. I don't know the details, but I found out that they made a deal with McCarran that if he would press for this and have the stock returned to them, they'd pay off the mortgage and get the property back. Well, McCarran was heavily involved in this and as chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee had great power and he used it for the former Dollar stockholders.

In any event, they filed a suit against the United States for return of the stock. This suit was filed before a U.S. District Judge named

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Goodman on the West Coast, who McCarran had cleared in the Judiciary Committee despite the stout objections of the legal community in that district. He could do this as chairman of the Judiciary Committee. Thus, we had this case to defend in the Civil Division. Well, the most imperative thing I had to do first in defending was to get depositions from Joe Kennedy about what had happened when he granted the loan.

So, I wrote him a very polite letter and told him the situation and stated that from the records I was sure that he would recall and probably kept copies of the papers on this Dollar Steamship deal. I asked if he would please advise me when one o£ my deputies could come and get a full statement of this and then after we had gone over it and discussed it with him, we'd take his depositions. I waited two weeks and didn't get any answer. I called his office in Boston, and they'd say, "He's not here," and that they

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didn't know where he was. Well, I got mad and I called Edgar Hoover and said, "Edgar, find Joe Kennedy, and it's imperative." I told him he hadn't answered my letter. And I will say for Edgar, he did all right.

Hoover called back later and said, "He's gone to his home in Palm Beach."

So, with that -- oh, no, prior to that. I did call him, and got him once in Boston and I said, "Mr. Kennedy, you have a letter from me."

He said, "Yes."

Well, I said, "I haven't heard from you, and this is a matter of very considerable urgency and you are the key to this. I will send my men at your convenience to meet wherever you like, at your office or wherever, so that we can get the facts down, and then look to taking your depositions." I said, "I don't understand why you haven't answered my letter."

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He said, "Oh now, son, just don't get excited, now I've been busy."

Well, that made me mad and I said, "Well, Mr. Kennedy, I don't mean to be "uppity," but I've been busy too, and this is some business that you should remember and which is of concern to the Government of the United States. This is why I'm seeking the facts for you approved this mortgage."

And he said, "Well, don't lecture me."

And I said, "No, I had no intention of doing so, will you give me a date?"

He said, "I'll give you a call and let you know."

Well, I figured I'd let it go and I waited two days and he didn't call me and when I called him in Boston, they said they did not know where he was, etc. So then I called Edgar again, "Where is he?" He then advised me that Kennedy

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had jumped and gone down to his home in Palm Beach. By that time I was thoroughly mad. So, I called and got him on the phone. He said, "How did you find me?"

I said, "This makes no difference Mr. Kennedy. I'm in a hell of a hurry and I want to get your deposition very promptly. I'm putting two of my best men on the plane right now. They're going to be in Palm Beach in the morning at the Post Office Building there where I have their offices set up. They're going to take your deposition at 10 a.m. and I request most respectfully that you attend."

Well he said, "I -- uh -- ah," and he hummed you know, "well, do you have to go to all this trouble?"

I said, "Yes sir, it's got to be done." Then he hung up.

I sent my boys there and they called back

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the next day and said he wasn't there."

"Wasn't he at his home?"

"Nobody would tell us where he was."

So, I called Edgar again, I said, "Find Joe Kennedy."

Well, it took them about half a day and I didn't hear until the next morning. When I got in I called Edgar and he said, "We found him, he's at the docks in New York to board the Queen Mary and he's going to England."

I said, "Thank you very much."

So then without consulting anybody about it since I had been for a time acting head of Immigration I called Ed [Edward J.] Shaughnessy, who was head of the Immigration Division in New York. I said, "Ed, Joe Kennedy's on the docks getting ready to get on the Queen Mary. I'm instructing you and the FBI, through Edgar Hoover, to 'sequester' him, put him in one of your examination rooms and hold him, on my

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authority." And I said, "Blame me. It's on my authority."

He said, "Good God, Graham, you really want him to be locked up?"

I said, "Yes, sir, you fail and I'll have your hide." I called Edgar and told him the same thing.

He said, "You're really kind of worked up."

I said, "Edgar, I haven't got time to chat, now please do it."

So, they put him in there. By 10 o'clock I had a call from Joe Kennedy. He said, "Young man, I'm going to have your hide nailed on the wall."

I said, "That's most interesting, Mr. Kennedy, I have in mind hanging yours on the wall."

He said, "I'm calling the President of the United States right now and you'll be fired."

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I said, "That's just fine, you do that!"

And as soon as I hung up, I called Matt Connelly and I said, "I've got a matter of some little urgency I'd like to see the President about. Can you work me in?"

He said, "Yes, you come over in the next 30 minutes and I'll get you in."

So I went over to the White House. I was quite worked up but felt the President should know the facts. I told this entire story to the President and he started laughing! He said, "This is the thing that Joe Kennedy has needed all of his life and you're the first hard-rock that ever had the guts to do it." He said, "I'm on your side, I hope to hell he does call." He never called.

HESS: He didn't call.

MORISON: No sir. And we took Kennedy's statement

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which, at best, was vague. Then that went all the way through the courts, but after I left the Civil Division, I always felt "left out" because the Dollar lawyers put the Solicitor General, who was Phil Perlman, as Acting Attorney General, the acting head of the Civil Division who succeeded me (my deputy Newell Clapp) in contempt of court here for refusing to turn the stock over to the Dollar group. It was just the most outrageous damn thing that ever occurred. I just can't think of a man who had been given every accolade and high office in the Federal Government, for him to do this. And this is not generally known. Now where are we?

HESS: Well, we might sum up what happened to the Dollar Steamship Line.

MORISON: What happened to the daggone thing was that through McCarran, the subsequent administration,

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the Eisenhower administration, made the Department of Justice effect a withdrawal of the action, and by that it was a "giveaway." And I found out later after I left the Department when I went out and I was asked to come out to see the editor of the Las Vegas Times, [H.M.J Greenspun, who Senator McCarran had sued for libel -- that the way that he had found out that Pat McCarran was paid off, he would not go to Las Vegas, he would go to Reno. There would be on this occasion -- one table cleared, and he would play roulette, and would win maybe a hundred thousand dollars, and even though the Internal Revenue people were right there, that's how he got paid off.

HESS: All prearranged.

MORISON: Yes, and you know that libel suit finally caved in on him. But subsequently, I had my run-in with McCarran just before I resigned, and I'll

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tell you that in the end of this thing.

HESS: All right, we will keep matters in chronological order.

MORISON: Right.

HESS: One thing we might discuss for a few moments is what would you see as the landmark cases in antitrust during the years that you were head of the Division?

MORISON: The suit that had been long-pending, because John Cahill the head of the firm which prior to World War II was Cotton & Franklin, Cahill had been U.S. Attorney and later became a junior partner of that firm. Young Cotton, who was then head of the firm, had become a staff officer under General Patton in the war. When he got back and went to go in his office, here was this guy Cahill sitting on his desk. He'd just taken

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over, and he, Cotton, left the firm and all the old members of the firm joined him and formed a new firm. I mean it was that kind of a, you know, unscrupulous guy.

Now I told you about his walking the corridors of the Antitrust Division and was reported to say, "Well, what are you fellows doing about RCA," and of course, they, you know, smiled at him and laughed at him. They said, "Well, you know you're wasting your time. I suppose you're earning your pay, you'll never get it off of the ground, boy," because he'd been the man that put John Sonnett in as head of the Antitrust Division. And when Sonnett was there everything was quiet as to filing an antitrust suit against RCA. Nothing was done, and I found all of this out because as the head of the Civil Division I had a case where a brigadier general in the Signal Corps had resigned and he had secured

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patents which belonged to the Government for he had done this work on Government time. He was made a vice president of a division of RCA to bring those patents with him for transfer to RCA. They had to do with radar and high frequency modulation and the various other things involving electronics. And I tried to find some tool to bring a civil fraud suit against him and RCA, but there wasn't any way that such a suit could be entertained. So when I got to Antitrust, I called my staff together, and we got to know each other. I brought with me my partner Sam Abrams and Newell Clapp, who had been my deputy in the Civil Division. I said, "There's one job that's number one. I want that RCA case filed right now. I want the Economic Division and I want the two trial divisions in here by Monday to discuss the case in depth," -- this was on Tuesday - "with everything they have in their files

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on it, and I'll want a draft complaint drawn and filed as promptly as possible but I want it to be started with a Grand Jury investigation of all of the files of RCA."

Well, I initiated the Grand Jury and it caused quite a commotion, but it stuck. It stuck! They tried to have the Grand Jury dismissed and to be relieved from producing their files, but lost. I went up and was right on hand on every major move in the case, and they were penalized criminally. Thereafter, they consented to a civil decree to remedy their wrongs. After all their documents were finally delivered to the Grand Jury, we found all the evidence and they were enjoined in a separate civil action and compelled to withdraw their patent claims on many patents and were enjoined from continuing the many illegal practices established. For instance, they had cut off Commander MacDonald,

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the president of Zenith, who had patents on radio, high frequency and television which they had preempted. So, I had that RCA case, that was one of real importance.

Second, was the so-called International Oil Cartel case, everybody else was afraid to file it but I filed it.

The third was the suit against International Business Machines Corporation; and finally the case against AT&T, which the Republicans, under Brownell, settled out of court when Brownell was Attorney General.

HESS: How interested was Tom Clark in antitrust matters?

MORISON: He was quite interested in them, he never once "bucked me." The same is true of Howard McGrath. He said, "When I brought both civil and criminal actions for his approval and signature --

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if you say to sign this, I'll sign it, because I trust you." Tom Clark was Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division when he was named Attorney General.

HESS: How about James McGranery?

MORISON: Oh, that's a different story.

HESS: He was not as interested in what was going on?

MORISON: Oh, listen that story is just terrible. And the President told me on this trip I made with him to Washington & Lee University...

HESS: …in 1950.

MORISON: He said, "That was the greatest mistake of my life." Meaning his selection of Jim McGranery to succeed Howard McGrath as Attorney General.

HESS: How did he get that appointment?

MORISON: I'll tell you why, he was Deputy Attorney

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General when I came into the Department. Tom Clark had to keep him on. He'd been a Congressman from Pennsylvania. Roosevelt had promised him, so he said, that he would appoint him to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the -- that embraces Pennsylvania.

HESS: The Third Circuit.

MORISON: The Third Circuit. Jim was not doing his work, he was drinking a lot and he was a thorn in Tom Clark's flesh because McGranery went to President Truman and said, "I want to know if you will honor what Roosevelt promised."

And Truman said, "If you say he did, why, of course, we will."

We went to the Pennsylvania delegation and they said, "We will absolutely not permit him to do that, we will not do it." So he was blocked and Tom Clark offered him a position on the

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United States Court of Appeals here for the District of Columbia and he wouldn't take it. Now he was dominated by his wife Rowena, who was a lawyer. When the President fired Howard McGrath, and I -- boy, I worked with Howard for months saying, "Howard, you've got to move," and this investigation by Newbold Morris was in progress, and I said, "This guy Morris I knew in New York." I said, "He is a pip-squeak and all he wants is headlines."

HESS: Howard McGrath brought him in didn't he?

MORISON: No, he was suggested to the White House and then the White House suggested him to McGrath who had to accept him. Somebody who -- he was an independent. I tried to get Howard to move, I said, "Howard, you've just got to move," and I laid five different plans of action for him to consider and "get on the ball." He was just demoralized and could not move. He had been

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Solicitor General and a good one. He had been chairman of the Democratic National Committee, he had been Senator from Rhode Island and was liked all over, but his idea was to "keep your tail down" and not do much, because he wanted -- expected to be nominated as the Catholic member when the next vacancy occurred on the Supreme Court. But he was being crowded by this and didn't realize it was time to strike. Well, he was fired, and I had a dinner out at my home for him, and all Department officials and it was more like a wake.

But, I found out from Matt Connelly, who was a great friend of Howard McGrath's, they are both Irishers and liked to drink together you know, and this, that, and the other. But, coming back to McGranery before he was nominated, Tom Clark insisted, "Graham, you've got to get him off my back."

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I went down to his office one day and I said, "Jim, I've been thinking about this 'hangup' on this promise given you by President Roosevelt about the Court of Appeals." I said, "You know, I've never wanted judicial office," but I said, "have you ever thought about what kind of life you'd lead?" I said, "It may be an honor, but don't you realize that as a Circuit Court judge on the Court of Appeals, you will be with a bunch of old men, you will not hear the witnesses, you will not hear the argument of counsel on both sides as you would in a District Court, which are the things that to me would be exciting. You would sit there and read transcripts until your eyes give out," and I said, "who can you socialize with? Nobody but these judges," and I said, "For Christ sake Jim, you don't want a life like that, it'll kill you."

HESS: What did he say?

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MORISON: He said, "Well, I hadn't even thought about that."

I said, "Jim, the reason I say that is this, I can get the Attorney General to appoint you to the vacancy on the Federal District Court up there in Philadelphia, and hell, there you'd be in the forum you like."

He said, "Good God, can you do it?"

I said, "Jim, I'll promise you if you'll let me do it, because I don't want you hung up, I know you're hung up."

He said, "Well, boy, go to it," he said, "will the Attorney General do this?"

I said, "Yes sir, I'll go right now." I said, "I hadn't talked to him," I had to lie. I reported this to Tom and we got him confirmed. I got him through the Senate Judiciary Committee.

Well, out of the 28 decisions he rendered, I think, only four were sustained on appeal, those

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that were appealed.

But, Matt said every weekend McGranery and his wife, Rowena, would come to Washington and he'd go over and sit outside of President Truman's office with Matt for a chance to get in and say "hello" to the President and keep this thing going.

When the President got mad, he failed to counsel with others whose judgment he trusted; he often made mistakes, for he lost his sense of values. I think he did the same thing about Lamar Caudle, because he didn't take enough time to seek out all the facts.

HESS: So when he fired McGrath...

MORISON: Why, he called Matt Connelly in and he said, "I've just called Howard McGrath and fired him. Matt, who in hell will I appoint?"

And Matt said, "Well, I should have said to

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the President, 'Why don't you call Graham Morison or let me ask him for his opinion?"' but, "I said, 'Well, Mr. Truman, our old friend is right outside the door here, Jim McGranery."'

"Well, bring him in."

And McGranery -- it was a Republican dominated Congress then, if you'll remember -- he went to Senator McCarran for help and McCarran said, "I will see you through the Judiciary Committee and get you confirmed as Attorney General, but you've got to do the following: You shall dismiss the Dollar Steamship case, you will get four pending antitrust cases dismissed -- the RCA case, the IBM case, and the International Oil Cartel case. If you promise to do this, I'll get you through," and McGranery without hesitation said he would comply to McCarran's demands.

And I found out about this through two friends who were Senior Staff Aides to the Judiciary

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Committee of the Senate.

HESS: Did he try to dismiss those cases when he became Attorney General?

MORISON: Oh, he kept calling me up to his office. "Do this, do that."

And I said, "I won't, Mr. Attorney General, and here's why." I wrote him detailed memorandas explaining that the cases involved were clear cut violations of the law fully supported by facts carefully gathered by a lengthy investigation which were obtained before these actions were filed. It took years of hard work in the Antitrust Division to get these cases filed and they involved monopolization which was brutal and justified criminal action. And then McGranery began to send word around, "Well, I'll get his hide." And who was sitting right next to him? Rowena, telling him who he had to get rid of!

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HESS: Was your name high on that list?

MORISON: Oh yes, because...

HESS: You were not one of Rowena's favorites?

MORISON: Oh, no! I never made up to Jim or his wife, or to anyone else. Back when I filed these criminal suits that he talked about, I had a call from Senator McCarran's "paramour," who was his secretary and a "good Catholic." He, I learned, wanted the Attorney General to appoint her as a municipal judge here in the District. It never got off the ground!

HESS: Wanted his girl friend appointed as judge?

MORISON: Yes. Yes, she was his head secretary. She called me and said, "The Senator wishes me to tell you that he wishes you to dismiss all these cases."

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And I said, "Well, I thank you for your call, but in my official position as head of the Antitrust Division, I cannot talk to an intermediary. If the Senator wants to talk to me about it on the phone have him call me," and hung up.

And then he called back and roared, "Why in the hell didn't you listen to what my secretary told you?"

I said, "Senator, because I wanted to hear it from you. I couldn't believe it:"

"Now," he said, "I tell you. You get these cases dismissed or I'll 'have your hide’."'

And I said, "Well, Senator," -- I tried to keep my temper -- "I very much appreciate the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee's suggestions and ideas about important antitrust matters. But I must tell you, sir, that I am a constitutional officer sworn to uphold the obligations and duties of my office and these

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cases were filed after approval of the Attorney General of the United States, and only he can take the action you demand. You can't impose it upon me."

He said, "I'll have your hide."

I said, "All right. I am ready."

So then I went over to see the President and I told him about this, and he said, "Great heavens above, boy, you've got sand," he said, "You're the first one that ever told that 's.o.b.' off I can remember." He said, "He's the cruddiest old guy in the Congress that's fawned upon by the big boys and he ain't worth a damn." He said, "Just stick to your guns!"

So, after this thing came about, I waited until I knew the President was out of town, because I knew what he would say to me, "I'm not going to let McGranery do anything to you." I didn't want him to do that, I didn't

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want to embarrass him a bit. I waited until he was out of town and I went over to the White House on a Saturday. The only people there were Don Dawson and Marty Friedman, and I told him, "I'm going to resign."

They said, "You can't do this."

I said, "Yes, I can."

Well they said, "You've got to see the President."

I said, "I understand he's out of town."

"Well, can't you wait until he gets back home?"

I said, "No, sir."

And they said, "Well, we will put you on the Court of Appeals."

I said, "I don't want to be a judge, I never have wanted to be one. I like to be in the 'pit,' in the fight, I don't want to be a judge." We spent an hour discussing this. Finally, I said, "Look, if you don't accept this, I'm

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going right down to the press room and put it on the wire."

So, they "hemmed and hawed" and I said, "I'm gone!" I went down to the press room and gave my statement, which I had carefully written out and I left my letter to the President with them...

HESS: Your resignation.

MORISON: Yes, addressed to the President, telling him that it was with regret that I felt that as he had long known I wished to resign after I'd established the Office of Economic Stabilization, but at his request I had accepted appointment as head of the Antitrust Division, because Congress has just enacted a law requiring examination by the Antitrust Division of all sales of plants constructed by the Government in World War II as to its antitrust implications as to those who should bid to buy those plants as

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it related to monopoly of potential purchasers." He said, "You're the only man that's got the competence to handle this."

Well, I couldn't say "no" to him, I couldn't say "no" when he said Economic Stabilization. So...

HESS: Your resignation came in June of '52. McGranery was appointed Attorney General in May of '52, one month before.

MORISON: That's right.

HESS: How much of a bearing on your resignation in June was McGranery's appointment in May?

MORISON: Direct!

HESS: You had all you could take from McGranexy.

MORISON: I knew him too well. I knew he was dominated by his wife. As I previously stated, through my friends on the staff of the Judiciary Committee,

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I was aware of what was going on.

HESS: Did you feel like you were getting pushed out?

MORISON: Well, it wasn't a question of being pushed out. I knew that I would not put the burden on the President to "un-do" actions by McGranery as I have detailed. Happily, after my resignation only the Dollar Steamship case was dismissed -- but not by McGranery. It was accomplished by Senator McCarran!"

What else?

HESS: Oh, we've got a few other subjects to cover. We have for another session. Do you want to cut it off?

MORISON: Well, why don't you cut it off?

HESS: All right, let's cut it off.