Oscar L. Chapman Oral History Interview, January 12, 1973

Notice
This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted for the Harry S. Truman Library. A draft of this transcript was edited by the interviewee but only minor emendations were made; therefore, the reader should remember that this is essentially a transcript of the spoken, rather than the written word.

Numbers appearing in square brackets (ex. [45]) within the transcript indicate the pagination in the original, hardcopy version of the oral history interview.

RESTRICTIONS
This oral history transcript may be read, quoted from, cited, and reproduced for purposes of research. It may not be published in full except by permission of the Harry S. Truman Library.

Opened 1980
Harry S. Truman Library
Independence, Missouri

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HESS: To begin this morning, Mr. Chapman, Mr. Truman has passed away since our last interview, his death occurring on December the 26th. And a week ago today at Washington Cathedral, you and I were both present at the memorial service held for him. Let's spend a few moments this morning with reminiscences. What went through your mind during Mr. Truman's last few days, and when you heard of his death, and perhaps what are your favorite memories of Mr. Truman?

CHAPMAN: Naturally, when the news came to me of his death I was very shocked and very grieved, more so than for any public official I ever had the privilege of being associated with. Mr. Truman, as he has passed on, and the reminiscence by the news media and the press and the other publications have all, practically all, have given him a better setting in his place in history than anyone ever dreamed

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that he would have--at least his enemies certainly thought he would never have it. But there's never been a man in public life that has gained recognition so fast in the last couple of years of his life, and has gained such stature in the minds of the people of America and the people of the world. You combine the two together. I've never seen a man that had a public career so interlinked with his foreign policies. That was the continuing growth and strength of the man's work and his character and everything.

You could see it develop in your mind's eye as you sat there and listened to that sermon, to the comments by the dean. And I was naturally very touched by these things, because they brought to my memory many of the fine things that Mr. Truman did for which he never got credit at the time of the action that he took on certain subjects. And one particular one that I have to clarify in my thinking on this, is his help in pushing through the civil rights program that

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was so wide and extensive, so much greater than--people who were working on it didn't realize how far-reaching that program carried the whole principle of human rights, and the care and attention that he had given to that subject, and to which he had given so much thought. He knew the subject so well. The problems that were encompassed in this whole subject were so far greater than, really, many of his people who worked close with him realized. Some who worked close to him never did catch the significance of the far-reaching effect of what he had done. Most of them had, but there were a few who didn't quite catch the strong significance of his efforts, of what he was doing. They got it and they got it in a fine way; they got it through contact, of visiting with Mr. Truman, just as we are visiting here this morning, and talking.

Mr. Truman was a man that wasted no words. When he had a conference with you about something that he wanted to talk about, that he had

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on his mind, like the civil rights issue, of the whole human rights problem as we think of it today, he had so expanded that and studied it and had it so well briefed in his mind that he could talk with a man about it in the most minute detail, of where the injustices had begun, and where they continued, and where they were still continuing as of today.

To bring that point to a head, he was a man that when he made a decision he didn't worry about it. He had done the best he could to get the best information he could on the subject matter before he made his decision. There's where most people didn't understand him. He did that. He made a very cautious study of the subject matter before he made a decision on something that was very vital and important. Something comparable to the recognition of Israel as a state was so well thought out by him that he caught the reactions of the different ones of us who talked with him; he knew those who were brought to the forefront in this fight in many ways. Some came by way of--

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if I were putting it in religious terms, I would say by expression of faith and a new development of the relationship between ourselves. Putting it in the phraseology of the man on the street we would say that we learn to live together, and we had to learn to live together or we will not survive.

That is true, not only of the Jewish people, it's true in several other areas of the world; that's still ahead of us to be worked out. Mr. Truman was working on that phase of his problem, of that kind of a problem arising from another group of ethnic people, of how they lived, and how they worked with their fellow man.

The Jewish thing was close at hand to him; he knew the Jewish people so well, and he had worked closely with them. He had always been sympathetic to the fact that the Jewish people had been persecuted so many times during the course of history, that they had taken such a terrific abuse in their daily living, that he saw what they had gone through, and he had a

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very deep sympathy for them and the problems that they had faced.

Now, I try to bring this together to tell you that is one of the reasons why Truman was so recognized in his later years, differentiating from his early years while he was in active duty; and they didn't give him the recognition, the press, the other media for public communications, never gave him a proper place in history in their comments and in their thinking about Mr. Truman. And that is why they missed it. They missed this phase of Mr. Truman in their thinking about him, because Mr. Truman, as I said, wasted no words or time, or anything, but he would go straight to the point in his conference, whatever the subject was, and discuss the subject immediately from the heart and the core of the subject, and discuss it with you in a very quick manner like that; he'd do it in a very quick manner.

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Now, he's a man that had a very deep sympathy for people. That was not known generally to the public as a whole until in the latter years they began to recognize his greatness. I began to see that they were recognizing it in his latter years, his last two or three years in office. He was beginning to be recognized then as a man of great stature, as a man that made a decision, and that he had made it on such solid grounds. It was based upon solid information so he didn't have to change his position or make any changes in his position during the course of that time, because he had done so much more studying of this subject than people ever dreamed that he had done.

I know that you know these things, because of your fine relationship with the President's family, and I appreciate your knowledge of them that you would easily catch how what I'm saying is connected with the facts, life as it developed during those eight years, almost eight, that he had in office.

Another thing he did to go through and support

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his particular position that he was taking on a special issue--I'll use the Israel subject as an example that will bring us closer to the point. In that case there were many differences among people close to him; they didn't agree entirely with the question of how the Israel thing was handled. Some didn't think that we ought to recognize them. Those who didn't want to recognize them were not motivated by any prejudice against the Jewish people. Their feeling about it was thought out and based upon other reasons involving their desire to protect the interests of the United States and the American people.

HESS: In a recent interview we were discussing Dean Acheson; what was Mr. Acheson's views on this matter?

CHAPMAN: I'm just coming to that.

HESS: Good.

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CHAPMAN: I'm just coming to that now, because he was so important in this and being such a thoughtful man in return; he was a brilliant man, and when he gave you a position on something, a statement on an issue of this importance, he had given some careful study and thinking about what and how this ought to be done.

I never had a chance to discuss this very much with Mr. Acheson, for which I was very sorry. I wanted to and the opportunity just didn't get around to where we could spend some time on it. Mr. Acheson worked out in his own mind, and for his own reasons which he supported, why the United States should not recognize Israel at this time. First, he had an approach that I think was a little bit unsound. From the long range point of view, it was a little unsound, where he really believed that we had had the habit of following the English people so much that we would be following them in this case instead of leading, and he felt we shouldn't appear to the world that we were following England

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because she was doing this; and that we ought to steer our own course, map our own course, and state it to the world as to our position, and not to recognize Israel per se as a state. And he felt very deeply about it--it wasn't just a casual passing with him--he felt rather deeply about it, I think, and I give him credit as being a man of deep sincerity and honesty. He felt this was wrong for the American people and its future to continue the course we had been apparently following. According to his thinking at least, we had been following the British policy trends for a long time. Certainly he was thinking it out in that direction far more than was actually true. I don't think it was actually as clear as that, or as factual as he put it, in those terms, to them. I don't think it ever met that test, that we followed the English in that sense.

HESS: Do you think that the fact that the oil producing lands in the area were mostly controlled and owned by the Arabs had any influence on Mr.

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Acheson’s views on the non-recognition of the new State of Israel?

CHAPMAN: Well, now when you mention the oil you bring up another subject, that is so powerful in its influence of the American position in the Middle East, and what we did or did not do in that area. Dean felt, based upon his knowledge, that the supply of the oil to the world was so heavily bearing in the hands of the Arab people, that it could cause us unnecessary trouble in the future, and one that would be extremely damaging to us in our relationship with the rest of the Arab world, all the rest of it, and their friends.

I did not think that the oil situation had as much influence on the world picture as our oil boys over here thought, or as a lot of American people thought. I don't think it had the influence that they thought it had, because since that time we have made many discoveries that have brought in

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new oil fields that will help us for a hundred years or more.

HESS: We still rely quite heavily on the oil producing nations though, do we not, the Arab nations?

CHAPMAN: We do, but that's a very well thought out plan; let's use their oil first, as long as we can.

HESS: And then use our own resources.

CHAPMAN: And then use ours when we have to. You see...

HESS: Was that thought articulated during the Truman administration?

CHAPMAN: Not too much, not too much. It was not articulated too much. However, I had one good discussion on it.

HESS: With whom?

CHAPMAN: With the President.

HESS: With the President. What did he say?

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CHAPMAN: He agreed with me part of the way on that. He thought that I was probably leaning too far on the--putting too much hope, putting too much...

HESS: Emphasis...

CHAPMAN: Let's say that I was putting too much stress in my discussions about their power that they would have in relation to this whole thing, if they had done this. Otherwise, he didn't agree exactly 100 percent with my position on what we would do and what would happen if we did it, you see; and he didn't agree with Dean's position on the precedent, because Dean was being right out openly opposed to the program of recognizing Israel, and Dean was a very cautious man. He was a typically trained and developed State Department man.

HESS: Did he think that if we did recognize Israel that it might shut off the oil flow from some of the Arab nations?

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CHAPMAN: He did; he did very definitely. He felt that could happen in a very short time after the action was taken. He didn't allow any time element to evolve there; he thought it would be taken immediately by the Arab nations and the friends of the Arabs.

HESS: What did Mr. Truman say when Mr. Acheson would give those views?

CHAPMAN: As I told you in the beginning, he never wasted any words in a conference, and when he had his views made up on an issue that touched upon human rights and the needs of human beings to have and need certain things in life, he didn't hesitate to speak very quickly and very frankly, and he told Dean--I wouldn't say he did this in my presence, because what he did, he talked to Dean on the telephone out at his farm between 4 and 4:30 in the afternoon, as we got...

HESS: On the day of recognition?

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CHAPMAN: Yes, on the day of recognition, and as we had come in on the train trip, the Western trip, the 10th of May we got in here I think; at least that date of recognition would give you the day that we got back into the city from the Western trip.

HESS: From the Western trip in June of '48.

CHAPMAN: That's right.

HESS: But he phoned Mr. Acheson at Mr. Acheson's farm, is that right?

CHAPMAN: He phoned him out at his house and said, "Dean"--now, the President tells me this...

HESS: Had you also heard the same thing from Mr. Acheson?

CHAPMAN: Not all of it, but parts of it. Parts of it; Dean was very cautious about ever quoting what he was saying. He was probably more cautious than I am about quoting the President.

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HESS: So, you learned more of this from the President than you did from Mr. Acheson?

CHAPMAN: I did.

HESS: What did the President tell you?

CHAPMAN: Well, he related to me his conversation with Dean that he had over the telephone, which was more revealing than anything else that I had had anyplace.

HESS: What did he say?

CHAPMAN: Remember in my last interview--I think it was the last or next to it--I told you of the conference that Clark Clifford and I had had with the President on the train, and it was done so quietly and so--nobody knew a thing about it because we didn't discuss it, neither of us discussed that to anyone. Now, there was a reception; I think the Democratic Women's Club was giving a reception for Mrs. Truman and the

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President over at the Mayflower Hotel at 6 o'clock that night, and as I said, we were getting off of the train at 4 or 4:30 and he drove straight to the White House and right to the phone and called Dean. When he got over to the reception all of us were mixing around. So, he walked up to me and with a good big smile on his face--"Well," he said, "you ought to be happy." He said, "I signed it within fifteen minutes after they declared the State of Israel. I have signed the appropriate communications, to the officials of the State of Israel."

And I said, "You're going to have some problems with my friend, I'm afraid, on that."

"No," he said, "that fellow even works with your friend; he knew we had an honest difference of opinion about this. Having that honest difference of opinion he recognized my right to my opinion as he did his, and in this case I didn't agree with him."

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HESS: He had phoned Mr. Acheson, though, before signing the recognition.

CHAPMAN: He phoned him to say to him--Dean says, "I'll come right in." Now the President tells me all this. He says, "Mr. President, I'll be right in to prepare the wire right away."

He said, "Oh, don't go to all that trouble." He said, "The boys here know enough about that to do it." He said, "I'll get some of the boys to draft it here and we'll send it out." And he had Charlie Murphy and Clark Clifford in mind to help draft it, I know. From the way he talked that's what he had in mind. And he said, "No, Dean, don't bother with coming in; it's a long way in here and it's late," and he said, "You shouldn't bother about doing it and I don't want you to go to that trouble." And he said, "You won't like my position on that anyhow, and maybe it's just as well you don't bother with it, just let it go."

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Dean said, "Well, I'll be very glad to come in and do it for you the way you want it, just what you want. I know Mr. President I don't agree with you; as to the future I'm afraid that we will pay for it during my lifetime."

The President told him, "I don’t agree with you, Dean, that this will happen. I don’t believe it will happen that way you think it will, and I don’t put the same emphasis of power in the hands of the Arab people because of the oil that you do."

Now, I caught that in my talks with Mr. Truman that Dean didn't quite put the power in their hands that they thought they had; he didn't presume they had that much power, or would have, because of the production of oil.

Now, you see, when you open up a big oil field, and you strike a big field, and you got a fabulous flow of oil, you bring that oil up very fast; it comes out very fast, and it produces from that field clear out of proportion to the amount of oil that's being used to the amount of

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oil that's being produced. It's out of proportion to it, and if you're a small country and you hit a pool of oil, before you know it that pool of oil has sunk to a very low production level. In going through the reviews of all these fields, you've got the most conservative minds and you've got very liberal minds among the geologists. Describing the difference between a liberal point of view in a geologist and a conservative one may be simply illustrated. Mr. DeGolyer is, I think, one of the greatest geologists in the world, on oil and gas. I think he was absolutely the leading man in his field. Mr. DeGolyer was a conservative thinker in making his reports and in commenting upon his finding of fact on this particular field that he has surveyed. You will find that he has made a more conservative evaluation of that field than some people have ever thought that he would do. But I had

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known Mr. DeGolyer almost as long as his son-in-law, George McGhee, had known him. I had known Mr. DeGolyer for many years, and I saw his work. I saw how he translated his evaluation of a field, on a given field; how he gave the evaluation of that field differently from what another man over here would. For instance, Bob Nathan--he's not a geologist in that sense that Mr. DeGolyer was at all; he wasn't at all.

Now, Mr. DeGolyer did try to support our Government position on this; actually I turned his support and his endorsement of the oil companies' position 180° around, because if he was correct in saying that we would use up all the oil that we've got, entirely out of proportion to our consumption and our production, then he was saying that we would be out of oil. That raises my question of using the foreign oil first.

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Now, there are two schools of thought on that question clear across the board, on using foreign goods whenever you can, where it's a natural product, and where it's a removable product, and shall I say, a very limited product that will be destroyed...

HESS: Depletion, I believe is the word they use isn't it?

CHAPMAN: That's a very bad word; I don't use it. I testified once before the Congress and I used that word, and I created quite a conference on that word. An entirely new set of questions was raised immediately; they came up from the source that I would expect, and I was expecting it when I gave it. I knew that this was raised when I...

HESS: Who raised it?

CHAPMAN: Well, in the first place, a liberal from Texas raised it. [Ralph W.] Yarborough was quite a liberal from Texas. When you speak of a man as to

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whether he was a liberal or not, you've got to take into consideration his environment, the atmosphere that he was raised in and so on.

HESS: Did he oppose the oil depletion allowance?

CHAPMAN: No, he supported it.

HESS: He supported it?

CHAPMAN: He supported it. He later changed; he later changed, but at that time he supported it. That surprised me, because I thought he was just on the other side.

HESS: The Secretary of State in 1948 at the first recognition of Israel was not Acheson, but it was Marshall.

CHAPMAN: No.

HESS: What do you recall about George Marshall's view on the recognition of Israel as he was the man who was Secretary of State in 1948?

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CHAPMAN: That was Dean.

HESS: Well, I believe he was out of Government at that time. He had been Assistant Secretary a little earlier, but I believe he was out of Government at this time. He was back in in January of 1949, at the time of the de jure recognition.

CHAPMAN: Yes. Yes, that's right, that's right.

HESS: But I believe that the de facto recognition came first

CHAPMAN: That came...

HESS: In June of '48.

CHAPMAN: ...in June of '48.

HESS: Yes, and I don't think Mr. Acheson was in Government at that time; he later came in of course, the day after inauguration day of '49, January the 21st of 1949.

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CHAPMAN: Yes.

HESS: I believe he had been out of Government for a couple of years.

CHAPMAN: He had been out for awhile. Wasn't he in the Treasury Department for a while?

HESS: He certainly was.

CHAPMAN: He was in the Treasury for a while.

HESS: I think Assistant Secretary or something like that.

CHAPMAN: Yes.

HESS: And then he came back. Do you recall what George Marshall's views were on the recognition of Israel?

CHAPMAN: I don't know it well enough to be certain about it. What I would give you would have to be purely a guess job and I would be simply guessing on what he had done. I got the impression; I

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had the impression, and I don't know whether I'm correct or not, because I never sat down with Marshall and had a chance to talk with him like I did Dean, as I had with Dean, and as I had with some other members of the group.

HESS: You had a better working relationship with Mr. Acheson, is that right?

CHAPMAN: Much better. Much better.

HESS: How did Mr. Marshall's relationship stack up with the other members of the Cabinet. Was he a little distant from them, too?

CHAPMAN: Well, let's put it this way: You first put it in the terms that he was a little distant to his colleagues, but you soon, after you worked with him for a while, you soon learned that that bore no inference whatever towards an issue for or against an issue. He liked the man and trusted him or he didn't, and he worked pretty much on that level.

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HESS: Well, those were my words. I probably should have expressed it a different way, "What were his relationships with the other members of the Cabinet," instead of slanting it one way or the other as I did.

CHAPMAN: Well, your slant that I got out of it really supported what I was somewhat uncertain about, but had the belief, that Marshall at first was not favorable to this, but he later became--well, it was this way--Marshall was trained as a military man and he...

HESS: He was a VMI graduate.

CHAPMAN: He was very definitely a VMI graduate, and he had grounded into him the absolute belief and the idea that you had to support the Chief. The President's office was entitled to your support and if you couldn't give it you should quit. And he felt that very keenly, and we had almost a whole evening's conversation on that subject one night.

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HESS: With General Marshall?

CHAPMAN: Yes.

HESS: At his house?

CHAPMAN: Yes. Just he and I.

HESS: What did he have to say about it? What was the occasion?

CHAPMAN: Well, the occasion came up because we both were from Virginia, and he was a little surprised to learn that.

HESS: To hear that you were from Virginia?

CHAPMAN: Yes, he was surprised to hear that I was from Virginia, and then we got to reminiscing about some of the old-timers where they--passing of a generation, was passing. I was just coming into this new generation and Marshall was going out. Time is going in that direction, see.

Now, I said to him, "Well, Virginia is

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changing and I believe that the attitude of the people of Virginia is changing a great deal, and I believe in another ten years you will have a different Virginia than you have now in the expressions of their public officials on social issues, particularly about their expressions on social matters, such as the civil rights issue, the question of social security, and matters of that kind.

HESS: What did he say?

CHAPMAN: He said, "Well, I think you're partly right, but I don't think it's going as fast as you think it will. But," he said, "I think the ultimate end will be--change will be what you are reaching for, and I think you will get it in time; you will get it."

"Now, of course, it's a question of timing; it will be a question of how energetic and how successful you are in working your relationships with Congress, to a degree of successful relationships

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with Congress, and if you do that," he said, "I think you can bring your question to the front, and get it discussed in an atmosphere that's much more favorable."

HESS: In your opinion, what were General Marshall's views on civil rights, and here I mean mainly black citizens’ civil rights.

CHAPMAN: That's right. For Marshall, it was a personal matter with him. If he didn't like a fellow, he didn't like him; then he just wouldn't have anything to do with him. But whether he was a Negro or not, he wouldn't let that influence him as to what he did.

HESS: Did you ever hear him make any comments on civil rights matters or on the aspirations of the blacks?

CHAPMAN: I never heard him make a derogatory remark about the Negroes in any respect whatsoever. I've heard him comment upon the rights of the Negroes.

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He said, "The trouble you and I are in--of course, you're just coming in, I'm going out;" he put it that way. And I said, "The energy that you show around here betrays your words. You would never make me or anybody else from Virginia think that you are going out, anyway. You're going to be right here helping us carry through these programs; and it's going to be men like you that are going to bring around these other fellows who are leaning towards the support of the civil rights issue and the rights of the Negro."

And I said, "I think you are far enough along in your thinking about the Negro's rights that in the end you are going to be more help than a lot of these hot liberals that are now shouting, 'We shall learn now,' and so on."

HESS: We shall overcome.

CHAPMAN: We shall overcome. I said, "You are going to be there; you will be at the gate right when we come."

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He chuckled a little bit and said, "Well, I don't know about that;" he said, "let me put it this way, I'll be at the second gate if I'm not at the first."

Now, what he meant by that in the terms of our conversation, was that he was leaning that way and if Truman got the thought and wanted to do it, he was going to support him. He was going to do it on the basis of two principles. First, you should do it or resign from your office, if you can't support him. The other was, the time has come for some change, and how we handle that change will determine how fast we will be able to accomplish the rights we are trying to obtain for them. He says, "I don't agree with them on their methods of trying to get what they think is coming to them; however, if I had waited a hundred and fifty years for my rights to be recognized, I guess I'd be just as hot about it as they are."

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HESS: He made that statement?

CHAPMAN: Yes, he made that statement to me. Now, it didn't mean to me that he was out and out for the civil rights issue and its people, and all they stood for; I didn't get it that he meant all of that. But I got it to mean to me that here's a man that at the right time, his reputation is so established, that he can support the civil rights issue with President Truman without getting hurt. He's not in politics, so he wouldn't be hurt politically, in that respect; so, he would be one of the first types of man, the kind of men that would be real valuable to Truman to help put this program across. He would be worth more to Truman than any man he had on his Cabinet in regard to the question of civil rights when it got down to the end, because he never wasted any shots; he always saved his ammunition until it counted, and that's what he did, and that's the way he was handling the civil rights thing. He was going to support the

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President's position. I'm convinced that he was going to support the President's position. Now, I don't know what he has written about it and I don't know what he said about it or what anybody else has said about him.

I would like to go back to say that Secretary Marshall was not a man given to a lot of public speeches to attract attention, and to try to attract attention on that basis; but he did try, on a conversational basis, to get with a man that was of some importance and to try to talk with that man. If he was trying to win him over to his side, he would take the opportunity, that kind of an opportunity, to talk with him about it.

On the other hand, he'd let that opportunity also be used to convince himself of the other fellow's position, let him convince him. He was the type of fellow who'd want you to support your position. If you said so and so, what do you back it up with? That's a very good, really a very good policy to follow, to learn the habit of

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supporting your statements that you make that are sometimes shocking to some people, probably not to others. And he was that kind, and he wanted you to support your position on it.

I had the highest regard for Marshall; I had a very high regard for him. I felt he never once attempted to use his friendship with Mr. Truman to promote himself or his interests whatsoever, not in any respect.

Now there are people who will attempt to use their friendship with Truman , and sometimes they push--when a man is doing that he usually overplays his hand and...

HESS: Who do you have in mind?

CHAPMAN: Well, a few friends of mine who were in that Cabinet I liked very much, but they overplayed their hand a little bit in trying to

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impress people of their closeness to the President and their power with the President. I don't like to use people's name in a way that's not complimentary when the man has passed away though.

I'll speak freely with you about Louis Johnson who is a very active, hard working man, tough as a mule, and he'd do anything to gain his point and win a position. And he'd make you think that he just slept with the President and that's the reason he was late for breakfast with the Vice President. He did that to a degree that was revolting to those of us that really knew the picture, and Johnson and myself had worked together very closely in the American Legion.

HESS: He had been national commander, had he not?

CHAPMAN: Johnson wanted to be.

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HESS: What's that?

CHAPMAN: Wanted to be national commander.

HESS: Wasn't he one year?

CHAPMAN: No, he missed it.

HESS: Oh.

CHAPMAN: I don't think he got it. I know he wanted it; I know he wanted it, and I'd traded with him. I was in that convention and I traded a little bit with him, because I was the one who really got the child welfare program resolution through the convention, to support child welfare, a child welfare program set up under a format that I had given to him for this resolution.

HESS: At an American Legion convention?

CHAPMAN: At an American Legion convention.

HESS: Roughly what year was that, do you recall?

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CHAPMAN: That's back in--should be around, somewhere around between '28 and '32, somewhere within that period.

HESS: You were representing Colorado at that time?

CHAPMAN: Yes, I was a delegate that year.

HESS: Did you hold a state office?

CHAPMAN: No, I never did. I never held a state office politically, or that way either. I never held a state office.

HESS: And Johnson had come up through West Virginia's

CHAPMAN: That's right.

HESS: ...American Legion.

CHAPMAN: He had, and he had gone quite strong among the Legionaires throughout the country, and...

HESS: Well, we can check on that, but I'm pretty sure that he was national commander one year.

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CHAPMAN: Let's see if he was; he might have been.

HESS: We will check it.

CHAPMAN: He might have been commander. If he was a commander it makes a real good story in relation to the child welfare program.

HESS: What was that?

CHAPMAN: Because he was opposed to the child welfare program in the Legion. You see, I had put in a resolution, I had put in a resolution and I put it a lot of times, to set up a child welfare division in the headquarters of the American Legion, working directly under the national commander, an experienced professional worker who had had experience. So, he got this woman, and she was an experienced woman, and she knew how to handle those men like a charm, she was really marvelous at it, at handling these men. Johnson was opposed to the welfare program, and the reason I was thinking that he, while he ran for it, he missed it.

[795]

HESS: It could have been another year that he was commander.

CHAPMAN: Yes, it could have been another year.

HESS: Because I'm not sure what year he was commander.

CHAPMAN: I'm not either, I'm not either, but he might have been, because he was very active.

HESS: He opposed your idea?

CHAPMAN: He opposed this idea and here's what I did. You can check this timing with Paul McNutt. Now, Paul McNutt was running that year against Johnson; those two were pitted against each other, and this is what I did. I had the resolution with a certain number of copies all put together, and in my room that morning, Paul McNutt came to my room first, they found that I had four states of the West committed to me, that they would support whomever I supported for national commander,

[796]

if they would agree to support the resolution on the child welfare program.

So, I had Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico and Nevada; I had four states. I think those were the four. I had five states, I had five states. I had one more state in there. And they were committed to me, not for me as commander, but committed to support whomever I supported for national commander on the basis that they had agreed to support the child welfare amendment--resolution.

So, Paul McNutt came into my room that morning before I got dressed and I went ahead and was dressing while we were talking. He said, "Oscar," he said, "can you support me?" He said, "Now, I haven't got the chance to know you very well, but," he said, "I think you and I could get along well together, and I'd be delighted to have you in my setup in some way; things that you are interested in, I think I'd be interested in."

[797]

"Well," I said, "that could be settled in a very few minutes. Are you interested in this child welfare resolution and have you read it?"

He said, "I read it last night." He said, "Some woman came to me last night and asked me if I had read it and said if I hadn't read it I ought to see you." This is the woman he finally got put in there to run it later, because she was an expert, really an expert on the thing."

Paul McNutt said, "I read it and I see nothing wrong with it." He said, "What you're doing, you're not limiting the future conventions. You're committing the present convention to put aside 25 cents of every dollar that came in, that came in for dues; 25 cents out of every dollar that came in for dues would be set aside for the child welfare program and be spent solely for that and nothing else."

I said, "That's exactly what it does, and that's what I want, unless you think we can get 50 cents."

[798]

He said, "I don't think you can get 50 cents, but," he says, "I believe you can get 25 cents."

"Well," I said, "if it didn't, you'll give us enough money to really set up a skeleton organization to really run a one-man show, as this would have to be by the nature of the thing, a one-man show." He said, "And that's what this looks like you're doing; you are trying to get it started and later on try to get some more."

I said, "That's exactly my position there. Later on I'm going to ask for another 25 cents." And I said, "Now, I'm going to double this as long as I can and keep on chiseling on the fees and dues until I've got enough in that fund to really get some woman that would be a person interested in child welfare."

"Well," he said, "now, you're interested in child welfare because you've worked with the Juvenile Court of Colorado."

I said, "Yes, I did."

"Well," he said, "you've got some friends in

[799]

your delegation; they think the world of you, they will do whatever you want, because not that they think you are such a strong Legionaire, but that you are strong on the human issues that you are interested in." And he said, "I'm interested in that." He said, "When I was Governor I got a good record to show you that I supported those things as much as I possibly could and still be re-elected."

"Well," I said, "all right, Paul, if that's your word, I'll give you my word and I will support you and will do my best to get the five states signed up; and, now, I've got to work fast, because we vote today."

He said, "Yes."

We voted that afternoon. Johnson in the meantime came in to see me. At noon I still hadn't had breakfast, and he came in around before noon and wanted to talk with me and I said, "Fine, sit down and have a talk." I said, "Lou, I don't want to waste your time or mine; right now time

[800]

is of the essence here on my votes, you've got a long time to keep fighting for yours." And I said, "If you are for that resolution, I'd like to get your ideas on that, and then I'll have to make up my mind between you and Paul," and I said, "Paul has given me a pretty good endorsement."

"Oh, he won't keep his word about it anyway, so it don't make any difference because he ain't going to keep his word," said Johnson.

"Well," I said, "I have never had that about Paul; I've never had that experience about him. And I have the feeling that he did keep his word, although you may not always agree with him."

Well, we kept on; we were haggling for a few minutes and I said, "I've got to go down and meet some fellows for lunch and breakfast," and I said, "I've got to go down, so you let me know what you'll do about it right now."

[801]

"Well," he said, "I can't support that resolution. I read it and everything; I can defeat that resolution easily." He was as dogmatic as he could be and he was just that way.

I said, "Well, maybe you can, but I'm not too sure you can. I've got more support for that than I thought I had when I first got here. I have whipped up the welfare organizations in the country and got them interested as a kind of a silent partner, being able to help them in their states on legislation that they needed for welfare work, and I'd get the Legion to support them if we had your support, too." And it was a good starting point, helpful, legislative trading; it is just like what goes on every day, and I traded. I said, "Well, all right, Lou, we will just consider then that you are not going to be for the resolution and I appreciate your honesty in telling me about it."

[802]

"Well," he said, "that's the way I do business, Oscar. I do business right over the table, nowhere else; therefore, I have to tell you that I can't support your resolution."

He, of course, thought that he had it licked, and he didn't. I knew he didn't, but I knew it was close, and when Paul got up--I had done a lot of traveling around that hall during the next three or four hours. Along sometime in the afternoon we got to nominating our candidates for national commander--and when the ballot got to Paul McNutt, Paul got up and made a speech and he did a pretty good job. He did a pretty good job of it and in it he took this welfare thing and wrapped himself all around it like the American flag, and I got a little nervous; wondered if he hadn't made a deal some way or another. I got a little bit nervous about it, and he kept on selling it in the speech and he kept telling them about it; and he talked welfare and he discussed how it would be of help to their own people.

[803]

And that speech so moved that convention; and Paul was surprised at the support he got from that. Then, of course, he went to work hard when he saw that was coming up and then Lou was on the other side, so far. They both caught it as a hot issue, all of a sudden; nobody had hardly heard of it, and it hadn't been an issue at all. They had made it an issue in the way it was brought out. But the thing went to the point where Paul was elected, and Lou always blamed me for defeating him, and he said...

HESS: How did you get along during the time that you were both on the Cabinet?

CHAPMAN: We got along perfectly fine. Well, as a matter of fact, we got along all right because of the fact Ickes hated him. Ickes had no use for him at all, and didn't have much respect for his word or his ability, and he'd give him a swat every chance he got because he just...

[804]

HESS: In newspaper columns that Ickes was writing at the time?

CHAPMAN: When he was in the Cabinet.

HESS: I don't believe that they were in the Cabinet at the same time were they; wasn't Ickes in them earlier?

CHAPMAN: Weren't they in there for a very brief period?

HESS: Well, when he was Harry Woodring's assistant?

CHAPMAN: Assistant, yeah. He was in there...

HESS: Just before the Second World War.

CHAPMAN: That's right, and he was...

HESS: But that is the time that Ickes and Johnson did not get along.

CHAPMAN: That's right. They didn't get along at all. Of course, Woodring, and Johnson didn't...

[805]

HESS: Didn't get along either.

What is your opinion as to why Louis Johnson was selected to replace James Forrestal in March of 1949?

CHAPMAN: I could never understand that myself, thoroughly, as to why that was done, because I didn't think that Johnson had done enough to be in a position at the time to the President and his close associates to justify his being awarded with that kind of an appointment, to build himself up. I don't know how to interpret that, how to work it out, because I couldn't see where Johnson had really made many particular contributions any more than quite a lot of people had.

HESS: But he had been financial director, or what was the term, what was the...

CHAPMAN: Chairman of the Finance Committee.

HESS: Chairman of the Finance Committee of the Democratic National Committee.

[806]

CHAPMAN: That's right.

HESS: Did you work closely with him during the 1948...

CHAPMAN: Yes, we worked quite closely.

HESS: What is your opinion of the job that he did as chairman of the Finance Committee?

CHAPMAN: Very lukewarm.

HESS: Could have been much better, is that right?

CHAPMAN: Obviously we could have got a lots more money if they had got somebody else.

HESS: Anyone in particular that you have in mind?

CHAPMAN: Well, no, I think Forrestal himself would have gotten more money. I didn't realize that Forrestal was pushing for it very much, anyway; but I think Forrestal would have gotten more money than Lou did. No, I know Lou well, and we worked together in an official capacity pretty good there.

[807]

HESS: According to my recollection, Mr. Forrestal was criticized in some areas because of an almost total lack of activity during this campaign.

CHAPMAN: That's right. Now, I mean some of that was justified, sitting from my position.

HESS: Wasn't his help requested?

CHAPMAN: I don't think it was. Now, to tell you the truth, I don't think it was.

HESS: Why wasn't it?

CHAPMAN: I don't know. I don't know why it wasn't.

HESS: Because there are those that say that his lack of activity in the campaign of '48 played a role in the fact that he left in March of 1949.

CHAPMAN: Well, I don't have any firsthand conversation with anybody about that that I could depend on about it. I don't really know, but I had a feeling that he had not been asked to. For instance, I

[808]

knew that Ickes was not a supporter of Jim Forrestal, because Ickes was trying to get Tommy Corcoran appointed as Under Secretary of Navy, and Forrestal was Secretary; he wanted him to appoint him, and he…

HESS: But he wouldn't appoint him.

CHAPMAN: He wouldn't appoint him, because Ickes never forgave you for anything like that, and he thought he should have had it, and he wanted to get it for Tommy; but I don't think that Tommy had very much support at the White House.

HESS: What type of a job did Louis Johnson do as Secretary of Defense? He went in in March of 1949; he was there during the beginning of the Korean conflict and he left in September of 1950. So he was there about a year and a half through a very interesting time, but what type of a job did he do?

CHAPMAN: Very interesting. Frankly, I don't know too

[809]

much about the military phase of our operation during that period.

HESS: Well, let me jog your memory on just a point or two; one of his first actions after he became Secretary of Defense was to cancel the aircraft carrier, the U.S.S. United States...

CHAPMAN: That's right.

HESS: ...and John L. Sullivan, who was Secretary of the Navy at that time, resigned because of that action.

CHAPMAN: That's right.

HESS: Which gives rise to the very big subject of the reduction of the armed forces and the Department of Defense at this time. Why was it reduced; whose idea was it to reduce our armed forces; was Mr. Truman trying to balance the budget at that time? I've also read that to try to gain money for domestic programs and domestic spending, that foreign programs and the Department

[810]

of Defense were cut back to try to channel more money into domestic spending. But anyway, it's a long and involved subject.

CHAPMAN: It's a very involved story, one that you have to have some close association of work with to really get the truth of that story.

HESS: Did you feel that Louis Johnson was cutting back the armed forces and was reducing the armed forces perhaps more than Mr. Truman and the Bureau of the Budget was calling for him to do, or was he just following orders?

CHAPMAN: No, I think he was doing that on his own.

HESS: Carrying orders further than what had been...

CHAPMAN: Yes.

HESS: ...the President's wishes.

CHAPMAN: I felt that he was.

HESS: Because at the beginning of the Korean war, in

[811]

June of 1950, our armed forces were down and Mr. Johnson received sort of a bad press at the time...

CHAPMAN: That's right.

HESS: ...because we were not ready to meet the situation that arose, because we had been cutting back the armed forces at the time. So, you think that he cut back the armed forces somewhat more than Mr. Truman had ordered him to.

CHAPMAN: That was my impression at the time, but as I said, I didn't have any close working relationship with Johnson as I did with some of the other Cabinet members like Secretary of Agriculture and even John Snyder, the Secretary of the Treasury; and there were other Cabinet members that I was closer to than I ever was to Johnson.

HESS: Okay, fine, that is a very important topic, and I think we might as well get on that right now. You mentioned John Snyder at Treasury; you mentioned

[812]

Agriculture, which was of course, Clinton P. Anderson, and then later Charles Brannan.

CHAPMAN: That's right.

HESS: But what Cabinet members did you have the best working relationships with?

CHAPMAN: I had the best relationships with the Cabinet members--first now let's take them with the Roosevelt administration.

HESS: Yes.

CHAPMAN: A few minutes with that, and I had a good relationship with Henry Wallace.

HESS: At Commerce.

CHAPMAN: Well, no, it was Agriculture.

HESS: That's right, it was Agriculture.

CHAPMAN: I had very good relationships with him, and I had very good relationship with Charles Sawyer, and Sawyer, in fact, didn't agree on a lot of

[813]

the public issues with me.

HESS: That was at the time when Mr. Sawyer was Secretary of Commerce, right?

CHAPMAN: That's right, Secretary of Commerce.

HESS: All right, tell me a little bit about Mr. Sawyer; what kind of a man is he and what were the issues that you disagreed on?

CHAPMAN: He and I disagreed on the civil rights issue. He was not very helpful in that.

HESS: And he came in in May of 1948.

CHAPMAN: That's right.

HESS: And he stayed there until the end of the Administration. The three Secretaries of Commerce were Henry Wallace, who was appointed in '45, in March of '45, and he left, of course, when he went up to Madison Square Garden and made his speech...

[814]

CHAPMAN: That silly speech.

HESS: ...in September of '46, and then Averell Harriman was there from--also from '47; he was nominated and confirmed--he was not sworn in until October of '46, it says here, and...

CHAPMAN: There's something wrong with that date.

HESS: Well, there's something wrong someplace isn't there? Because we've got a couple of '47s in here which I don't understand.

CHAPMAN: Well, probably what happened, he was nominated in...

HESS: Oh, certainly.

CHAPMAN: ...and wasn't sworn in for quite a little while.

HESS: Congress was probably not in session during that period of time.

CHAPMAN: Well, I think that was what happened.

[815]

HESS: But why they have this date here I don't know. What we're looking at here are dates on all of our Cabinet members. But, anyway, Harriman was there until April of 1948 and then Charles Sawyer.

CHAPMAN: And I had a very good relationship with Averell Harriman. Averell himself was strange in a way; Averell came from a background totally different from mine, he...

HESS: Totally different from most, shall we say?

CHAPMAN: Yeah. That's true, and yet I got along swell with Averell and got help from him. When I say I'm getting along with a fellow if I'm working on a crusade, and I'm really working on something and I want it, and I go to those fellows and sit down and talk with them and try to get their support, and I don't get it, I just consider myself not in their picture, consider myself not on their team. I just forget it and go on to the next fellow.

[816]

Well, in this case with Harriman, at first I thought, "Oh, I don't know about this fellow; we're not going to agree on anything," and I kept my mouth shut, didn't say anything, kept very quiet; and he soon showed his hands though on two or three issues, and I was quite surprised and pleased at the position he'd shown on two or three things. Yet, on one of the things he went to Russia for, I thought he overplayed that a little bit, for his own good and for the good of the Administration; I thought that he had overplayed it.

HESS: What did he do wrong?

CHAPMAN: Well, I think what he did wrong there, he came back here, and then, in ways that I wouldn't have handled it. He didn't give any credit to the right place at the right time to the President. I didn't think he was giving him the credit for certain things that had been done that I knew the President had done and had worked

[817]

on. But later I got to liking Averell; later when we got a better working relationship, we got along together very well, later on. So, highly with that I rated Averell quite liberal in most things, not everything; in most things, in the latter part of our administration there, and…

HESS: What would he not be rated liberal on? What was he conservative on?

CHAPMAN: Well, I guess you could put it that way; it's awfully difficult to classify him. He's awful hard to classify in simple terms, but he's...

HESS: Is Mr. Sawyer somewhat easier to classify?

CHAPMAN: Yes. He was very definitely conservative.

HESS: Very definitely conservative?

CHAPMAN: Right down the line.

HESS: Well, he even titled his book, Concerns of a Conservative Democrat, and in his book, which

[818]

I reread the other day, he mentions that one of the reasons why he accepted Mr. Truman's proposal to join the Cabinet was so that he could represent business, the leaders of business, and to try to change the views of the Democratic administration from being one of total anti-business attitudes.

CHAPMAN: Yes. Yes.

HESS: Does that sound like what Mr. Sawyer was doing?

CHAPMAN: Yes, that's exactly what he tried to do. He really tried to do just that very thing.

HESS: He was businesses' representative?

CHAPMAN: He was, and he really tried it in an honest way. I think...

HESS: Was that normal for the Secretary of Commerce to be a business representative on the Cabinet?

CHAPMAN: That's just what he does; he represents the opinions of the businessman in most cases. I felt that John Snyder pretty much represented

[819]

that position, to a certain extent, more than Morgenthau. I thought that Snyder represented--when I say represent them, I don't mean that he was representing them, but what he was doing...

HESS: Fred Vinson was in there, too.

CHAPMAN: Yes, and Fred was in the same position in my mind as Snyder was; they both could be classified as semi-conservatives, both Snyder and Fred Vinson. Now, I think John somehow had a better knowledge of the technical side of money than Fred did.

HESS: Mr. Snyder had been in the banking business for a good many years.

CHAPMAN: Exactly. Well, he knew the mechanics of money, you see; if you don't know the mechanics of money--I don't. I'd make the worst Treasurer in the world, because I'd be the--Roosevelt offered me a judgeship, if I'd take a judgeship.

HESS: In Colorado?

[820]

CHAPMAN: No, here in Washington…

HESS: Here in Washington.

CHAPMAN: ...the District, there was one open here.

HESS: About what time was that?

CHAPMAN: That was about, let's see...

HESS: First or second administration?

CHAPMAN: It was in the second, it was in the second administration.

HESS: In the second term, the second term.

CHAPMAN: Yes, and he…

HESS: Why didn't you take it?

CHAPMAN: Well, in the first place, I wouldn't make a good judge, and I didn't like that kind of work.

HESS: Why don't you think you'd make a good judge...

[821]

CHAPMAN: I haven't got the patience; I like to keep moving, I like to keep working. I like to keep working on things with people. I like to keep working with people.

HESS: Well, that's maybe the kind of judges we need, to cut down on some of the backlog.

CHAPMAN: I think probably that is true. But I told the President; I said, "Mr. President, frankly I don't want a judgeship." I said, "I'm too much of an active person to want to get shelved, and that's what I'd feel like."

"Oh," he said, "you'd make a good judge." He said, "You'd scare the hell out of them, but," he said, "you would make a good judge. If you made any errors up here," he said, "the circuit court will correct you."

I said, "Well, that's a good way to put it, and that's what I have learned my lesson in the conservation field. I was interested in conservation before I took the job as Assistant

[822]

Secretary," and I said, "in spite of the fact that Harold Ickes is the hardest man in the world to work with, I don't want this. I have honestly tried, and tried hard to get along with him and work with him because I wanted to work there. I liked the work; I like that kind of work;" and, I said, "I'm dealing now with people where the rights of an individual, the rights of corporations--that's why I like Interior. I don't know; I know probably the Secretary doesn't like me and I don't know of anybody that he does like, particularly, but one person; Tommy Corcoran is the only person he likes.

HESS: I have a question about Charlie Sawyer; you mentioned him a while ago.

CHAPMAN: Yes.

HESS: He was the representative of business. Let's see if we can find an example where you may have been on one side and he may have been on the other, and what I have in mind is the Columbia Valley

[823]

Administration.

CHAPMAN: Oh, yes.

HESS: Mr. Truman had asked that a CVA be set up much as TVA had, and some of the major opponents of that were the power interests of the West.

CHAPMAN: That's right.

HESS: Were the power interests of the West actively represented in that matter by Charles Sawyer?

CHAPMAN: Well, I would say he was as active as he could be and not get thrown out on his ear.

HESS: All right, CVA was not established.

CHAPMAN: No.

HESS: What degree of credit, or blame, could be given Charles Sawyer in the fact that CVA was not established even though Mr. Truman wanted it established?

CHAPMAN: I think it was not because Mr. Sawyer

[824]

had so much power that he could do that. It was the fact that the local people in the co-op districts were very much disturbed about these co-ops being set up, and these dams being built, whether they were losing a part of their power and losing anything that they had.

HESS: I think we had better shut off here.