DEPARTMENT OF STATE Memorandum of Conversation
DATE: September 23, 1952
SUBJECT: Visit of New Netherlands Foreign Minister, Dr. Beyen
PARTICIPANTS: Dr. J. W. Beyen, Netherlands Foreign Minister Dr. J. H. van Roijen, Netherlands Ambassador
The Secretary WE - Mr. Byington WE- Mr. McClelland
COPIES TO: S EUR E (CP) GER RA Amembassy, The Hague
After the opening amenities, I said that I would like to share with the Minister and the Ambassador some good news I had just received. The Department of Agriculture had agreed to a considerable increase in the import quota for Dutch cheese, raising it from 3 to 4.6 million pounds a year. It had also decided not to impose restrictions on whole dried milk imports from the Netherlands.
Ambassador van Roijen reacted somewhat wryly and remarked that although an increase in the quota was, of course, welcome news, the fact that their cheese imports were still under quota at all discouraged the Dutch. Dr. Beyen confirmed that U.S. restrictionist action in this field had had a very bad psychological effect in the Netherlands. The Ambassador added, however, that the State Department had been always very helpful to them in this matter and that they were sincerely grateful.
Dr. Beyen asked about our feeling regarding the recent Mexico City Bank Fund Meeting, and I replied that John Snyder was in general very pleased with the results. The South Africans had caused some excitement, and Percy Spender (the Australian Ambassador to Washington) had got into the act this year in his usual energetic fashion. Beyen observed laughingly that Mr. Spender could always be counted on to provide some fireworks.
Dr. Beyen said that he had often had occasion to be grateful to me for the International Bank articles which had been expeditiously drafted in the short two weeks of the Bretton Woods conference and hence were much more workable and less refractory than the articles of the Fund which were the intensive product of the clash of ideas between Harry White and Lord Keynes.
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After a brief exchange of reminiscences on the differing characters of Mr. White and Lord Keynes, I remarked jokingly that following the exposition last week by the Minister's colleague, Dr. Luns, concerning their contemplated division of duties in the Foreign Office, I was more confused than ever and thought probably the best solution was simply to say that I would be happy to see either of them on any matter. I recalled that reorganizations seemed to be a chronic sport in the Department of State, and that we had gone through several of them since I had been here. We had swung back and forth between the extremes of organization along functional lines and organization along geographic lines. Then something like NATO came into the picture which cut across the board and upset all the best- laid plans.
Dr. Beyen explained that as far as the new arrangement in The Hague was concerned, which he admitted was political in origin, there was to be no division of responsibility, since you can't really split responsibility, he said, but only a division of work. One of the difficulties, of course, was the constant necessity of traveling, and it was impossible to be everywhere and at your desk at the same time. I told Dr. Beyen that I sympathized with his situation, adding that my position in this respect had happily been considerably mitigated since Mr. Bruce had come to the Department as he was most helpful in sharing this burden of traveling with me.
Turning to another field, Ambassador van Roijen asked whether we were generally satisfied with the outcome of our exchange of notes with the Soviets on Germany. I said that considering the damage the Soviets could have done, I thought we had come off extraordinarily well. They could, for example, have agreed to talks, and then once the EDC's momentum had gradually spent itself, could have broken them off, leaving us in a very difficult spot. We had the clear impression, I stated, that the Russians were unwilling to take any chances with respect to Germany which might jeopardize their hold on the Eastern zone. The only things they ever seemed willing to do were those which clearly benefitted their position.
With regard to the Netherlands and the EDC, I said that we had been gratified to note the reference in the Queen's Speech From the Thorne to the Government's intention to seek early ratification of this treaty. Dr. Beyen replied that he expected on his return to the Netherlands to find this matter being "dealt with promptly" and that he did not anticipate any delay.
I remarked that although Chancellor Adenauer counted on German ratification during October, M. Schuman unfortunately did not look forward to ratification in France before January, and that I had been urging upon him the necessity of moving faster. I stressed to Dr. Beyen the importance of getting the EDC matter buckled up by the end of the year, particularly in relation to the internal political situation in the United States. A great deal of ground would be gained if such progress could be reflected in the budget presentation of Congress of the outgoing President.
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In this way you could lessen the impact of the inevitable change of teams which would occur after the elections on the essential continuity of our foreign policy.
Dr. Beyen wondered if we had found the net effect of Schumacher's death in Germany beneficial. I said that we had noticed some lessening of Socialist intransigence, but that I thought the full effect could not be felt for some time to come since the SPD still lived, so to speak, in the shadow of Schumacher's spirit. Dr. Beyen observed that he had met Ollenhauer at the recent Luxembourg CSC Ministerial meeting and that he seemed a much more reasonable man. I said that this was our impression too. Speaking of the general German attitude at Luxembourg, Beyen reported that he had found the Germans very anxious to avoid any mention even of the word "EDC". He went on the characterize the spirit of these Luxembourg meetings as "very near to that of a honeymoon" and "almost frighteningly good". There had been relatively little talk about the Saar, he added, saying that he had the definite feeling that the organization would probably stay where it was in Luxembourg.
I told Dr. Beyen that our reports confirmed his impression that the Schuman- Adenauer talks on the Saar had been cordial, but that this had perhaps been because they had agreed to postpone the most intractable issues. Dr. Beyen remarked in passing that he had had the pleasure of sitting next to our CSC observer, Mr. Tomlinson, at Chanceller Adenauer's dinner, and had been very pleased with the opportunity of making his acquaintance.
As the meeting broke up, Dr. Beyen asked whether I knew what Mr. McCloy was planning to do, adding that he had known him at the IBRD and had rather hoped for the chance of a talk with him on Germany before leaving for the States. I said that I had wondered myself what Jack McCloy was planning to do since I had the highest opinion of his work in Germany. Dr. Beyen agreed that Mr. McCloy's energetic, frank and vigorous manner had certainly served him well in dealing successfully with the Germans.
I told Dr. Beyen, as he was taking his leave, that I hoped to see him at the December NAC meeting in Paris, and he stated that he expected to represent the Netherlands there.
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