May 6, 1952
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH MR. JEAN MONNET
Participants: M. Monnet Mr. Acheson
Mr. Monnet, with whom I had had lunch on his arrival in the United States, called at his request to sum up his impressions of his visit and to give me some indication of his views as to future courses.
He talked first of the signing of the agreements with Germany and the EDC. This morning he had talked over the telephone with Mr. Alphand in Paris. Alphand reported that there was good atmosphere and good spirit in the negotiations and that the agreement should be initialed on Thursday of this week. There would be some matters left for the Ministers to deal with. Mr. Monnet spoke of the question of the German contribution and its division. He said that he was not deeply worried about this. In the first place, he thought that wide margins of error occurred in such figures as the Germans were now getting up relating to their expenses in the first year. In the second place, the so-called "first year" would not be a year and he did not believe that in the six or seven months which might elapse from the coming into effect of the two treaties until June 30, 1953, Germany could possibly spend enough money to raise serious problems about the support of Allied troops. He thought that a little goodwill and give on all sides would work this out.
He felt very optimistic about the signing of the treaties on or about May 20. He was carrying back with him strong convictions that from the point of view of American policy and American attitudes towards Europe it was essential that these two treaties be concluded quickly and that the Schuman Plan should be put into effect at the earliest possible moment, and that further steps should be taken toward political unification of Europe.
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In connection with the Schuman Plan he asked whether we could be of help in impressing on the Italians the importance of ratification at an early date as is possible so the full impact of the agreement with Germany, the EDC and the Schuman Plan could be felt at the same time. I said that Mr. Bruce and I would take this up and see whether we could not make some suggestions to the Italians along these lines.
I also impressed on him the critical importance of having the two treaties signed promptly. I said that if this could be done so that we could lay the German agreement before the Senate and get it ratified at this session of Congress, I thought that American attitudes toward Europe would be solidified and that the danger of any change in American attitudes, by reason of changes in administration next January, would be vastly lessened. He agreed with his and will urge it strongly.
He next spoke of Indochina, saying that he had repeated to Mr. Lovett and Mr. Harriman his view that the present burden there was too much for France to carry and that some solution had to be sought. He readily appreciated the great difficulty, if not impossibility, of withdrawing French troops in the present situation. He thought, and he gathered that Mr. Lovett thought, that a way toward a solution would be found in accelerating and intensifying our efforts toward the creation of a Vietnam army. He thought that we could and should help here materially. His own view would be that in addition to materiel, we could and should help in the training of the forces themselves. The rapid creation of the army would not itself solve the problem, but it would open the way to its solution. He thought undoubtedly that French administrative officers could do more in training and turning over functions to the Indochinese. It was along these lines that we should search for solutions.
He then spoke of the Tunisian problem. He had been impressed in his visit here with the fact that, unless the French moved rapidly and effectively, public opinion in the United States would force the administration to favor discussions in the Security Council, even though these would be unproductive and would cause friction between France and the United States. He thought that the great lack at the present time was a French position. I said that I agreed with this thoroughly and that we had done our best to impress it upon the
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French Foreign Office. Here again, I thought that, while no solution was readily discernible, a way toward a solution was. France, I thought, could greatly improve her position by three steps. The first was to make publicly proposals for reforms so that France's friends would have some reasonable and public position to support. Secondly, I thought that the old Cabinet could be released since I could not believe that they were dangerous and keeping them under arrest made an unnecessarily bad impression. If these two steps were taken, it seems to me that a demand for discussion in the Security Council would greatly weaken. And I thought that if it did not, then France would be very well advised to cease their objections to it and take a much more relaxed view under which the item could be inscribed, the Arab States could say what they chose, other people would be found to support France, and then I thought the entire matter would die out. Mr. Monnet seemed to agree that these were sensible suggestions.
I neglected to mention that earlier in the first part of his remarks, he stated that Mr. Eden had made, he thought, not with ill will but with lack of knowledge, the most dangerous suggestion. This suggestion was to combine in some way the legislative assemblies of the Schuman Plan and the EDC with the Strasbourg assembly. Mr. Monnet thought that nothing could be more harmful than to mix up bodies under the two treaties which had real authority and which could develop toward the parliament of Europe with the Strasbourg Assembly which was a mere debating forum without authority of any sort. He urged me to look into this proposal. He hoped that I would agree with him and said that I would undoubtedly be asked about it by either Mr. Schuman or Mr. Eden, or both. He hoped that I would deprecate it. I said that I would look into this matter.
The last subject he spoke of was the matter of off-shore purchases. He thought that if the defense of Europe was to be developed in a sound and steady way, American off-shore purchases would play a very important part. During his stay here he had tried to discuss methods by which these purchases could be gotten underway in substantial amounts and could be used in accordance with some thought-out plan. He thought that our representatives abroad and those dealing with the situation here in Washington were in a stage with which he was quite familiar in the development of such programs.
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This was the stage of very considerable confusion in procedures, organization, and rather arbitrary requirements which prevented any flexibility of speed of action. He thought that these difficulties would gradually be solved but it was taking an inordinate amount of time and he urged me so far as I could to press for the development of some workable and orderly system. He mentioned that Mr. Frank Nash was going to Europe this week and he hoped that he would give attention to the unsatisfactory state of this program.
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