DEPARTMENT OF STATE Memorandum of Conversation
DATE: May 6, 1952
PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary M. Paul Reynaud Ambassador Bonnet Mr. McBride- WE
COPIES TO: EUR - Mr. Perkins PSA - Mr. Lacy Amembassy, Paris Mr. Bonbright Mr. Bigson Amlegation, Saigon WE - Mr. Byington NEA -Mr. Berry AmConGen, Tunis Mr. Knight AF - Mr. Bourgerie AmConsul, Rabat RA - Mr. Martin Mr. Richey Mr. Parsons FE - Mr. Allison
M. Raynaud stated that the Indochinese burden was becoming increasingly difficult for France to carry, and that over four hundred billion francs had been appropriated for the war in Indochina this year, and that as much as another one hundred billion might be required before the end of the year. He noted that the effect on the French reconstruction program had been considerable, and that much wartime destruction still had not been repaired. He said that prior to his departure from Parish, Foreign Minister Schuman had told him that a majority existed in the cabinet at that time in favor of withdrawal from Indochina. He added hastily that the cabinet of course did not vote like the Assembly, but reiterated that such a feeling existed in that body.
The Secretary said that we were of course aware of the heavy burden which France was bearing in Indochina and were sympathetic thereto.
Passing to the subject of North Africa, M. Raynaud stated one could not speak of a purely Tunisian problem but only of a general North African one, because any measures taken in Tunisia had repercussions at once in Algeria and Morocco. He stressed that the French problem there was entirely different from, for example, the British position in Kenya or the Gold Coast, because there were 1,500,000 Frenchmen in North Africa. He said the problem was more like that of South Africa where there was a white minority of twenty per cent. He added he had visited Morocco last month and had been told again by people there that if the French left North Africa, there would be breakdowns in utilities with a matter of days and that a collapse of the transportation system, etc., would follow shortly. He brought out the point that the active
- 2 -
nationalists represent a minority but that it is always the minority that is heard. We hear nothing, he concluded, from the majority of the people in North Africa who are satisfied. He concluded with a reference to the strategic importance of North Africa not only to Europe but to South America, and expressed the hope that this whole problem could be examined in detail with us, in order that a satisfactory evolutionary program could be worked out.
Passing to the Pinay Program for saving the Franc, M. Reynaud gave us his entirely personal viewpoint the thought that it was not certain this could succeed. He said he could not say this publicly because he would not want to hurt the chances for success of his friend Pinay, but concluded that the French position was somewhat weak because the level of both imports and exports was low at present. He reverted to the Indochina situation again as the source of the main budgetary woes of France. In conclusion on this point he stressed that every effort would, however, be made to make Pinay's program work, since if it failed the consequences were hard to envisage.
The Secretary inquired as to the present French thinking on the European Defense Force. M. Reynaud said that the British failure to participate in the EDF had had serious consequences in France because it meant that the European Army would be basically French and German, and that French troops must necessarily be outnumbered soon as long as such large forces were tied down in Indochina. British participation was, therefore, thought of primary importance. He added that he still favored the EDC in accordance with the speeches he had given at Strasburg, but was not overly optimistic of its chances of being ratified. He noted that during the February debate on the principle of the European Army, a favorable vote was gained by a narrow margin but only when important amendments had been inserted by the Socialists. He said the Socialist position remained critical because the Communists and Gaullists were opposed. The Secretary asked if the latter unanimously opposed, and W. Reynaud replied he thought they were but was not categoric on this point.
Here, M. Reynaud inserted that General De Gaulle was continuing to act as a military leader and not as a statesman. He said when President Auriol asked him to form a government following the fall of the Faure Government, he had sought Gaullist participation therein in order to neutralize this very policy of opposition which they had followed in regard to the Schuman Plan and the European Army.
The question of the signature of the EDC and the contractual agreements with Germany was raised. The Secretary made it clear why we were anxious to have these events occur as soon as possible, and outlined the Congressional timetable. Ambassador Bonnet stated he was already aware of this problem. M. Reynaud said that Foreign Minister Schuman has indicated we wanted signature by May 10, but that was impossible. The hope was expressed that a later date in May would be possible, and the Secretary pointed out that if action were deferred until next month, it would not seem possible to obtain Congressional action thereon until the next session.
EUR:WE:RHMcBride:y