DEPARTMENT OF STATE Memorandum of Conversation
DATE: May 5, 1952
SUBJECT: German-Israeli Negotiations at the Hague
PARTICIPAN TS: The Secretary (Mr. Frank Goldman GER- Mr. Lewis (Dr. Israel Goldstein (Mr. Jacob Blaustein (Mr. Moses A. Leavitt (Mr. Adolph Held (Mr. Seymour J. Rubin (Mr. Nahum Goldman
COPIES TO: S/S - (2) GEA- Mr. Baker NEA - Mr. Walker GAI - Mr. Kellerman GER - Mr. Reinstein HICOG GEA - Mr. Margolies
The gentlemen listed above, all members of prominent American-Jewish organizations, came in to see the Secretary at 3:30 this afternoon at their request [May 2] to discuss the situation with respect to the Jewish-Israeli negotiations at The Hague concerning the Israeli and Jewish claims for reparations from Germany.
Dr. Goldman as spokesman explained that the group had come in primarily to discuss the Israeli claim of $1,000,000,000. He noted that the Jewish organizations had a separate claim for $500,000,000 but that they did not wish to go forward with negotiations on their claim if those between Israel and Germany broke down. Dr. Goldman said that the Jewish organizations were very concerned at the German statement that they could not reconvene The Hague negotiations until a month after the London Debt Conference had again resumed its sessions. He dwelt upon political difficulties which would ensue in Israel if the discussions were postponed and if they seemed to have been relegated by the Germans to a position secondary to the London discussions. He realized that the Secretary desired, as did the Jewish organizations and Israel, to see the Hague negotiations come to a satisfactory and prompt conclusion.
He thanked the Secretary most sincerely for asking Mr. McCloy to impress upon Chancellor Adenauer the necessity of reconvening The Hague talks at least as soon as those in London and of avoiding giving any impression that the London Conference held any preference over that in The Hague.
- 2 -
Dr. Goldman knew that the Secretary was planning a trip to Europe shortly and hopes that he would find an opportunity personally to speak with the Chancellor and indicate to him the U.S. interests in the matter.
The Secretary assured the group that the U.S. viewed the objectives of The Hague talks with sympathetic concern and agreed that they should not in any way be entangled with those in London. He had an occasion of a previous meeting with the Chancellor expressed to him the view of the United States that the Germans should be prepared to make a reasonable and prompt settlement of the Israeli and Jewish claims. Mr. Blaustein then said that he gathered the Secretary knew that he, Mr. Blaustein, had asked the President to make a public statement of U.S. interests in seeing the Germans come up with a prompt and satisfactory offer but that the President had felt that such a public statement should not be made. Mr. Blaustein was sorry that the President, and he presumed the Department, took this view because he thought that such a statement would have been welcomed by Adenauer as needed support. In this connection Mr. Blaustein indicated that the Jewish groups were sure that the Chancellor had been sincere in his original offer and was earnestly trying to bring about a satisfactory conclusion to The Hague talks. The difficulty lay with certain circles of the German government who were concerned that the burden might thereby be laid on the German economy.
Mr. Blaustein concluded by asking if the Secretary would consider making such a public statement.
The Secretary said that he would, of course, be glad to consider the proposal, but he felt that it would not be wise for him to do so. He said that he had advised the President not to do so because he considered that such action might give the Chancellor's opponents an opportunity to allege that the Chancellor was being forced by the United States into making an offer against Germany's interests and that he thought that a statement from himself would have the same effect.
Several other members of the group then brought out the following points:
(1) That a prompt and fair offer by the Germans was in Germany's own interest since only in that way could the Germans indicate clearly that they seriously desired partially to compensate for the things Hitler had done to the Jews:
(2) That the apparent German reluctance and delaying tactics were affording excellent ammunition to those elements in Israel and among the Jews elsewhere who had maintained from the beginning that the Germans were unregenerate and that it was useless, therefore, to think of negotiating with them; and
(3) That it was absolutely necessary that the Germans make their offers at London and the Hague simultaneously lest the impression be given that the London talks hold precedence.
- 3 -
Dr. Goldman concluded the meeting by expressing the hope that Mr. McCloy or the Secretary himself, or both, would again find an opportunity to indicate to the Chancellor the necessity of the Germans making a serious and prompt offer. He stressed the serious consequences if the Germans put up too poor an offer saying that, if this should happen, he was afraid that the negotiations would break down entirely and would probably never again be resumed.
R:GWLewis:EMcG