DEPARTMENT OF STATE Memorandum of Conversation
DATE: January 27, 1951
SUBJECT: Indian Ambassador's Call January 27: Personal Message from Mr. Nehru
PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary Madame Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Ambassador of India Mr. McGhee, Assistant Secretary, NEA Mr. Matthews, SOA Mr. Weil, SOA
COPIES TO: S/S, S/A, G, PE, UNA, CIA, DRN, NEA, SGA Embassies: New Delhi, Karachi, Moscow, London, Taipei
The Indian Ambassador called at 10 o'clock and remained approximately half an hour. She said she brought "warm greetings" from Mr. Nehru and from Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, Secretary-General of External Affairs, who had told her I had been very much in their thoughts as I worked at my "arduous task." She said things had happened since the Prime Minister had given her his message to me in Paris, but he wanted me to know that whatever he had done was inspired by complete sincerity; that he and his government had as their objective the friendship of the United States; and that there was no intention to thwart the US but a genuine belief in the possibility of establishing peace in Korea through negotiations. Madame Pandit said the Prime Minister had sent a personal message to Chou En Lai on January 23 and she had brought along pertinent extracts from this message as well as copies of a "clarification" of certain points included in counter-proposals made by the Chinese Communists to the UN political committee.
The excerpts from Mr. Nehru's message to Chou En Lai which Madame Pandit handed me (copy attached) comprise paragraphs in which Mr. Nehru said he found among all classes of people an overwhelming desire for peace, a widespread fear of war, and contemplation of re-armament-a "vicious circle" from which they wanted to escape by means of a negotiated
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settlement of Far Eastern and other international problems. Mr. Nehru said he was addressing Chou En Lai frankly because he knew he would understand; that he desired a friendly Indo-Chinese relations and cooperation for peace; that it was possible to avert the horrors of war; that the world awaited a lead and would respond to a generous gesture; that no risk was involved and only good could result. He went on to suggest that the Chinese Communists announce a firm desire for peace and that negotiations be held immediately. He said details had already been discussed sufficiently to form an adequate basis for much negotiations and remaining differences need not be stressed. He said further that a gesture at this time would redound to the credit of the Chinese Communists and he earnestly trusted Mao Tse Tung and Chou would appreciate the spirit in which these suggestions had been made.
The "clarification" of certain points in the counter-proposals made by the Chinese Communists to the Political Committee of the UN (copy attached) included three points: 1) Peiping undertook to assume responsibility for the withdrawal of "Chinese volunteers" when agreement regarding the withdrawal of foreign troops was reached and implemented; 2) Peiping agreed to a cease-fire with a time limit to be fixed at the opening session of the proposed conference; 3) the conference would fix the principles under which Korea's internal political problems would be solved.
A footnote to the "clarification" states the Indian Ambassador in Peiping emphasized that the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations could not legitimately be appealed to in the case of Taiwan and rejected in the case of Korea and that since these Declarations placed responsibility on four powers regarding Korean freedom and independence, these powers could not be excluded. The footnote further states that for the first time the Chinese accepted this view and that settlement of the Taiwan issue had now narrowed to "the withdrawal of US forces," including the fleet which the President had said would be withdrawn when the Korean issue was settled. On the subject of China's legal status it is pointed out that the Chinese statement merely said affirmation of China's legal status should be ensured by the conference.
The Indian Ambassador said that because of the points set forth in the papers she had brought me, the UN resolution naming the Chinese Communists as aggressors should be withheld. I remarked I had heard a report that Mr. Nehru had sent a personal message to Chou. Madame Pandit said copies had been given to Messrs. Attlee and Schumann. She went on to say
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that the Government of India felt it had enjoyed some success in curbing the Chinese during the last few weeks; that negotiations should be held, and that while there was a risk, it was not as great as the risk involved in naming the Chinese aggressors.
I said we would study the documents, although it was pretty late to do anything about our UN resolution which might be voted on in the afternoon. Madame Pandit said that regardless of the outcome of the vote on this resolution her brother would continue his efforts to bring about negotiations and would "not sit back." I pointed out that of course our resolution left the way open for negotiations. Madame Pandit said that if the US resolution was passed it did not mean that Mr. Nehru would do anything to increase the area of conflict.
I told Madame Pandit I knew Mr. Nehru was motivated by sincere desires; that it was not so much his objectives as the way in which he said and did things which caused us a lot of trouble.
Madame Pandit said that if war came Communism was bound to spread; that if war were averted Communism might spread in some areas but not as widely as it would after a war. She said the US might not be as deeply convinced as India as to the extent to which Communism would spread at the end of a war. I said I thought the US and the GOI would probably not differ on this point but the main problem was how to meet the attack in Korea. I said it was of the greatest importance to repel this attack and that it was the belief of the US Government that the Chinese Communists knew what they were doing.
I reiterated my view that Mr. Nehru said things in ways that created difficulties. Madame Pandit smiled and said she thought her brother did this deliberately and was aware of the effect of his statements. She added that she hoped, nevertheless, the US and the GOI could "find common ground on which to obtain a foothold."
Attachments:
1. Copy Excerpts Mr. Nehru's Message to Chou En Lai. 2. Copy Clarification certain points Chinese Communist counter-proposals.
NEA:SOA:TEWeil:mkj February 5, 1951