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68-3_53 - 1951-01-24

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: January 24, 1951

SUBJECT: Korea

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary Ambassador Morgenstierne, Norwegian Embassy Mr. G. Hayden Raynor, Director, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs

COPIES TO: EUR BNA UNA USUN Embassy Oslo

The Norwegian Ambassador called on the Secretary this afternoon at his request primarily for the purpose of discussing the Korean-U.N. situation. He said that his Government was now preparing instructions on the matter for the Norwegian Delegation in New York. He said this was not an easy task. On the one hand the Norwegians felt it was necessary for the West to stand together and that they are extremely concerned over the difference of opinion among Western states on this question, especially the attitude of the U.K. On the other hand the Ambassador said it was necessary for his Government to take into account Norwegian public opinion and the attitude of the other Scandinavian states. He said that under the circumstances, he wanted to obtain the Secretary's own views which he would transmit to his Foreign Minister as he felt they would carry considerable weight with Dr. Lange.

The Secretary reviewed the problem in some detail, indicating that the major point involved in his opinion was to resist aggression. The Secretary added that we are successfully doing this and that our Generals now believe we can continue to do so, but that this process was going to be a dreary one for the American people who are shouldering the major part of the burden for resistance. Casualties are high and certain voices are raised in favor of retirement. The Secretary said that under the circumstances the people of this country feel most strongly that they are entitled to at least some moral support from the U.N.

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The Secretary said he realized there have been certain apprehensions as to our intentions, some about the command and so forth, among European governments and peoples. He said he could assure the Ambassador that the command situation was completely satisfactory, and that we have endeavored to make clear our military intention, which was to confine the fighting to Korea. The Secretary explained that, of course, an exception might have to be made in the event that we are confronted by massive air attacks from the enemy threatening our troops and our supply lines. If such a situation arose, it would be very serious. The Secretary said some people feared our acting in an impetuous or precipitous manner. He cited the record in rebuttal of this apprehension, explaining that the Chinese had attached in November and now, at nearly the end of January, firm U.N. action had not been taken, and in the meantime the United States had gone along with one interim proposal after the other. He referred to the modest program which we intend advocating in the Collective Measures Committee if our resolution is passed. The Secretary referred to the strength of public opinion in this country and said that our purpose was to strike a balance between this public opinion on the one hand and the attempt to maintain the maximum degree of unity possible in the U.N. on the other hand.

In conclusion, the Secretary stated that the message which he would like to send to Foreign Minister Lange was that he felt every proposal should be measured against the criterion of its effect on continuing resistance to aggression; that this continued resistance was the all-important factor in the situation.

During the course of the conversation Ambassador Morgenstierne commented at several times personally: (a) to the effect that it would have been better to have acted on the aggression question before Christmas and that if this had been done, we might be further along now, and (b) that he was surprised that the British were reluctant to approve even a study of sanctions though he could understand their opposing the application of certain sanctions. Finally, he said that he was worried over the reaction of the U.S. public towards the U.N. in the event that the U.N. should fail to act.

EUR:BNA:GHRaynor:sjb 1/25/51