DEPARTMENT OF STATE Memorandum of Conversation
DATE: January 9, 1951
SUBJECT: Report of Senators Green and Ferguson on their Round-the-World Trip
PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary Senator Theodore F. Green, Democrat, Rhode Island Senator Homer Ferguson, Republican, Michigan
PRESENT: Assistant Secretary George C. McGhee Deputy Assistant Secretary Livingston T. Merchant Escort Officer, Thomas B. Wenner Senate Liaison Officer, Horace H. Smith
COPIES TO: The Secretary U - Under Secretary Webb G - Deputy Under Secretary Matthews NEA - Assistant Secretary McGhee FE - Assistant Secretary Rusk EUR - Assistant Secretary Perkins H - Assistant Secretary McFall
After expressing to the Senators my concern over the strenuous trip they had taken and my interest in their conclusions concerning the several areas they visited following their conversations with local officials and our American representatives, I asked the Senators how they wished to handle the discussion. They wished to report to me orally several of the more important items, but, with my approval, they planned to submit two reports: (1) a very confidential report to me giving all of the details of their conversations with foreign government officials and others that might be helpful to the Executive Branch of the Government; and (2) a report to the Senate on the manner in which they had carried out their responsibilities as its specially appointed representatives to the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Meeting held in Canberra, including also comments on the remainder of their journey in so far as this information can be divulged in unclassified form.
Senator Green stated that his most important observation was that throughout South Asia the urge was toward independence, towards getting rid of the foreigner and a preference toward even bad rule by natives rather than better rule by a foreigner. He said it was unfortunate to give the impression that we were helping maintain a vestige of French, British or Dutch control. The reports of our having given 30 additional planes to the French Forces in Indo-China - 2 -
had been received as another instance of bolstering up the remnants of hated colonial regimes in this area.
Senator Ferguson agreed with the importance that Senator Green placed upon this point and said that Communism had managed to place itself on the side of Nationalist sentiment and Nationalist movement in Southeast Asia.
I pointed out that it had really been only in Indo-China that their efforts to take over the leadership of Nationalist movement had been making serious headway.
Senator Ferguson replied that that was true but that they were still active in the other Nationalist movements throughout Southeast Asia. He remarked that he and Senator Green had a slight disagreement over our support of Bao Dai. Senator Green thought that it was bad but Senator Ferguson thought that there had been no more satisfactory alternative.
Senator Green said that his second major observation was that anything happening in any of the countries of Southern and Southeastern Asia affects them all, even those areas that are not already independent such as Malaya.
I remarked that there were some 40,000 troops operating in Malaya at the present time against what seemed to be a constant number of 5,000 Communists.
Senator Ferguson said that he had been impressed with the fact that in Southeast Asia the movement toward Nationalism and Autonomy was a total movement and that for the first time he had gained the impression that each of these Asiatic countries was interested in the independence of each of the others.
Senator Ferguson then remarked that one of the most important factors in the Southeast Asia situation was the large Chinese population-a population which had developed from outcast, itinerant gypsy traders and plantation workers into the communities containing the largest merchants, bankers and landowners in most of these countries.
I agreed with the remark that this was a strange source of support for Communism, but I knew of at least one instance in Indo-China where one of the richest Chinese in the country was supplying a large part of the funds for the Communist movement in the country. I said that it is strange if these rich Chinese do not see that they are working directly against their own economic interests. The factors of racial pride and pressure due to families in Communist controlled areas of China appear, however, to outweigh the economic factor in the minds of these men.
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Senator Green remarked that almost every Asiatic he met told him about how bad the British were and how good the Americans were, but explained that it was frequently impossible for the ordinary Southeast Asian to tell them apart.
Senator Ferguson quoted Lord Alexander as being confident that Hong Kong would not be taken over by the Chinese because as a British run city it had done so much good for them and that by the same token Singapore would not be taken over by the Malays.
Senator Green, however, remarked that that was the story of the British in Hong Kong, but that the Chinese in Hong Kong said that the Chinese had done the work and the British had reaped the profit. (Senator Green quoted from his conversations in Hong Kong on his trip last year.)
Both Senators agreed that the basic attitude in the Conference on Foreign Policy and Defense of the Commonwealth and Dominion countries in Canberra had at the beginning been almost one of surrender, that they would have welcomed our being pushed off of Korea. It was more than defeatism, it was a policy of surrender, and it was only after very pointed speeches and a series of very frank conversations between the Senators and members of the British, Indian and other delegations that there was some relaxation of this defeatist attitude..
Lord Alexander had been the leader of the movement toward appeasement and the New Zealanders had been the most enthusiastic about cooperation in a Pacific Pact guaranteed by the United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, but excluding the rather shabby so-called "Nationalist" democracies of the mainland. Prime Minister Menzies had been forceful and effective but had indicated that there would be no conscription in Australia at this time and stressed the need for assurances if Australian troops were to be used in other areas.
The Senators remarked that conditions were really difficult in Australia and New Zealand on the labor front. Senator Ferguson had been very much impressed by our Labor Attaché's statement that the labor unions were becoming more and more subject to Communist infiltration and that a Communist had been elected President of the Coal Mines during the days that the Senators were there. They remarked that conditions were so bad that it took 54 days to turn a ship around in New Zealand and 30 days in Australia. There were many problems in both Australia and New Zealand which will be mentioned more fully in the report.
Passing reference was made by Senator Green to the severe Moslem riots in Singapore which both Senators described as being more a case of 'Malay- Moslem' sensitivity and pride than Nationalist in character. This was one riot which the Communists were not accused of fomenting although they had been quick to take advantage of the situation after the rioting started.
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The Senators said that the Conference in Bangkok had been most interesting and that a somewhat detailed report would be included in their report to the Secretary.
I asked about the impressions they had gained during their conversation with Prime Minister Nehru.
Senator Green remarked that he felt that Nehru was surprisingly naïve and Senator Ferguson thought that he was attempting to carry water on both shoulders, between the practical kind of world in which Mr. Nehru lived and had to act as Prime Minister for the defense of India and the spiritual world of the doctrine of Gandhi on non-violence.
Senator Green explained that he felt that Nehru had seemed to be surprisingly naïve in his belief that Soviet imperialism did not really threaten India. Nehru had stressed the importance of distinguishing between non-aggressive Communism and Russian imperialism. He said things had greatly changed since Lenin's time.
Mr. Nehru felt that the person to sit down with was not Mr. Stalin but Mao. Also, he felt Mao had only a desire to take control of the territory legitimately belonging to China and needed time to consolidate his power. He thought that Mr. Stalin in his old age was not really aggressive in his aims and didn't want to sacrifice what Lenin and he had achieved by risking war. He even thought Mr. Mao had an historic claim to Tibet. Finally, he thought that Mao-ism would be a greater force for Asia than Stalinism.
Senator Ferguson said the Parliamentarian of the Congress Party had explained that in his opinion the reason for the apparent inconsistencies in Nehru's position could be found in his frustration due to failure to become a world leader and enhance India's position through his mediation proposals in the present world crisis. Mr. Nehru now had no camp in which to stand, either in the West or in the East; he had naïvely misinterpreted the intentions of aggressive Communism, even risking invasion from Tibet; and the treat against Burma was serious. He had not been the successful mediator between East and West and was apparently rationalizing his defeat by thinking that neither Mr. Stalin nor Mr. Mao had any further aggressive aims.
It was pointed out that in order to get time for the job in India which faced him of consolidating his power, Nehru was apparently willing to make a deal with Mao over Korea, possibly Indo-China, possibly even Burma. Mr. Nehru would not say that he would enter into such a bargain, but he pled for agreement with Mao out of an apparent desire to keep aggression away from India's frontier at all cost. He would not want to incite Mr. Mao and he was afraid that precipitous action on the part of Western countries might plunge India into total war.
Senator Ferguson believed that Nehru had no intention of settling the Kashmir dispute. Senator Green felt that the Kashmir question was
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one of face and that it hinged on the question of the river boundary. Senator Ferguson said "yes" to this, but felt it was much more than that, essentially being a question of the old feud between Moslems and Hindus; that in fact the population of Kashmir is roughly 70-80 percent Moslem. Both Senators agreed that Pakistan wished us to lead in negotiations to aid settlement, but not Nehru. Senator Ferguson told us that he was convinced that Dixon had been double-crossed.
I commented that we had had Dixon out there and that for some time both he and we had been led to believe he was on the verge of a settlement.
Senator Ferguson commented that Nehru was obviously handling foreign policy personally and that his reactions were largely directed toward insuring that he received personal credit as a leader for everything that was done although his purpose may have also been to add luster to India's name.
I commented that in the course of long conversations with Nehru I had come to the conclusion that there was a fundamental difference in values that was responsible for the great gap between the thinking of our leaders and the thinking of Nehru. He regards Ho Chi Minh as a Communist, but considers the fact that he is an Indo-Chinese as being of greater significance. He would prefer to see a purely Indo-Chinese regime in control of Indo-China even if Communist. He appeared to have the same feeling about Burma, but felt that Communism could not come into control in India, emphasizing that the Indians were fundamentally religious and that Communism was too clearly atheistic. Senator Ferguson remarked that this fact had been pointed out by other Indian leaders to the Senator.
I commented that in my talks with Mr. Nehru, I had asked him whether out in India the danger of Communism was appreciated and Mr. Nehru had said that they understood it better out there and were prepared to deal with it more effectively than we did in the West. He had really been tough with the Communists, clamping them into jail, even shooting some of them. Nehru had explained that there was no Bill of Rights in India and that there was no matter of debating in Congress and the press or going before the courts for months before taking action against them.
Senator Ferguson seemed very much interested in this, saying that he did not know that Mr. Nehru had gone as far as shooting anyone but it was very interesting.
Senator Green said that he had been invited to address Parliament in India but that on arrival had been informed that due to the death of Sardar Patel, the Vice Premier, the arrangements had to be cancelled.
Senator Ferguson then expressed the opinion that India would not come to the aid of Burma in the event of Chinese attack although Nehru
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had refused to comment on the possibility of such an attack. He remarked, however, that he felt that Pakistanis felt that when the United States blew hot over possible Kashmir settlement, the British blew cold and that when the British blew hot, the United States blew cold, and that we had not taken the leadership in the settlement of this issue that we should.
Senator Green asked me at this point whether in view of the urgency of the whole matter something couldn't be done to effect a settlement of this most troublesome and dangerous situation at an early date.
I said that if the Senators had any suggestion as to how we could reach a solution we should be most happy to hear of it. In reference to the Senators' suggestion that we undertake the assumption of more leadership in what had previously been regarded as primarily a Commonwealth problem, Mr. McGhee remarked that this would be borne in mind in future discussions.
Both Senators Green and Ferguson felt that the Indian officials concerned had lied to them with regard to the controversy over the purchase price of wheat from Pakistan.
I remarked that our intelligence reports appeared to confirm the story that the Pakistan Government had told them about this wheat deal.
Senator Green said that the party had stopped briefly in Istanbul and Ambassador Wadsworth had come to talk to them at the airfield and had urged that the United States Government arrange to pay to bring into the field 50,000 additional Turkish troops. Senator Ferguson said that what Ambassador Wadsworth felt was needed was money actually to pay the salary of troops. The Senator did not see how this was possible without seriously disrupting the internal economy of the country.
I commented that at this time I did not see any technique through which this could be managed.
Senator Green then said that the party's last stop had been in Brussels and that he had been shocked by evidence of prosperity in Brussels and by the careless blazing of lights. They had expected to be told that use of power there was very inexpensive, but had found it quite the contrary. I remarked that England today is frequently blacking out to save power.
Senator Ferguson said that they had had some discussions with Socialist opposition leader Spaak and that Spaak didn't think that we were going to fight until there was some evidence of American troop strength in Europe and that Mr. Van Zeeland, the Foreign
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Minister, had emphasized the same point. Also the opposition leader in Parliament wanted General Eisenhower to come over and say what was needed. He said that it was admitted that General Eisenhower was not coming as a Commander of troops but as a salesman whose first job would be to rally the European Governments to get conscription underway.
I said that I thought that was probably not exactly correct, that Spaak was naturally talking as a member of the opposition because it was my understanding that the Belgians were already moving to provide troops. I said that Spaak was coming over here next week and that maybe we could find out about this but that I would be a bit doubtful about taking all of Mr. Spaak's views exactly at face value because there is no man that he hates more than Minister Van Zeeland.
I asked about Palestine refugees and learned that Minister Blandford told the Senators that we can reasonable expect some break in the situation within six months. The key to the situation is Syria where conversations were held with the Prime Minister in Damascus. It was pointed out that while the Prime Minister is sympathetic to the needs of 83,000 Arab refugees in Syria and would not necessarily be opposed to the settlement of even larger contingents, nonetheless, for him to say so probably at this time would be political suicide. Our Minister pointed out that the Syrian Government wants three conditions satisfied before proceeding with refugee settlement:
1. More evidence from the refugees themselves that they desire to settle in Syria;
2. An official request by the United Nations that Syria undertake this task; and
3. Fulfillment by Israel of promises to compensate for their losses the refugees who elect not to return to Palestine.
Finally in this connection, it was pointed out that the Relief and Works Agency, appointed by the UN is asking for 50 million dollars for this and the succeeding five years and hopes that an expenditure of around 300 million dollars will take care eventually of most of the resettlement. But it is necessary that monies be allotted over and above the cost of daily relief which is only one phase of the problem. Equally important are overall reconstruction plans under Point IV which will make it possible for the receiving countries to resettle refugees without depressing seriously their own living standards. Senator Green noted that Minister Blandford is very anxious that the resettlement countries should not be high pressured and that we do not lower standards of living in those countries as the result of refugee settlement.
H:HHSmith/TBWenner:hm 1/18/51