DEPARTMENT OF STATE Memorandum of Conversation
June 30, 1950
Subject: Korean Crisis
Participants: The Secretary Wilhelm Munthe de Morgenstierne, Ambassador of Norway Caspar D. Green, BNA
Copies to: S/S, EUR, BNA-Mr. Labouisse, EUR/RA, FE, UNA, American Embassy, Oslo
Ambassador Morgenstierne came in this afternoon at his own request. He began by saying that he brought greetings from Mr. Lange, the Norwegian Foreign Minister. He said he wished to offer congratulations on the great stand taken by President Truman and the American Government. He added that the US action had met with universal approval in Norway in all official groups and among the people. He said he remembered no event which had stirred such unanimous acclaim. The dangers involved in the present course were fully recognized in Norway, but it was believed that the danger of failure to act would have been immeasurably greater. The smaller nations of Europe were much heartened, he said, feeling that if the US is capable of meeting a situation in Korea so firmly, it will certainly not falter in its commitments in the NAT area. The Ambassador said he personally, of course, had never doubted this, but that there have been skeptics in Europe. This action will sweep away the skepticism.
I said it had seemed to us that the dangers of inaction were much greater than the dangers of facing the problem in Korea and that this had, of course, weighed heavily in our decision. I said we faced a difficult situation in Korea and it was hard to foresee how it would develop. He remarked that he was sure we would carry through successfully and that he did not believe the US would accept failure at the hands of the North Koreans or in Korea. He said he supposed it is possible that Manchurian and Chinese troops might be sent in by the Russians. I agreed that we might have to face such a situation.
The Ambassador referred to the Soviet attitude and action as being, of course, crucial. I commented that their pose, so far, was one of "non- intervention" in the domestic affairs of Korea.
Ambassador Morgenstierne said there was some apprehension in Norway that the communist thrust in Korea might be a feint and that there would be another attack somewhere else, perhaps even in Europe. I said that we had thought it might be, perhaps, not precisely a feint, but one of a planned series, designed to get us committed at one point, then to cause trouble elsewhere. The Ambassador asked if there were any evidence that this might be the case. I replied that we were trying to keep a close watch, and that although there were some movements around at various points, they did not seem especially significant.
The Ambassador said the Norwegian Government was more apprehensive of a Soviet movement against Norway from the south than about the possibility of a Soviet attack in the north; they were more concerned about southern Norway than about the Norwegian-Soviet border in the north.
He referred to recent signs of Soviet interest in the Baltic, the shooting down of the US Privateer plane, the assertion of jurisdiction over wider territorial waters, the incidents of unscrupulous arrests and molestation of Swedish and Danish trawlers, and the recent Russian article concerning the Baltic as a closed sea. He wondered if we had any information on this special and aggressive Russian interest in the Baltic now. I replied that we had nothing beyond the items he had mentioned, but that I would request the Joint Chiefs again to give special attention to this subject, to be sure that we are not overlooking anything.
Ambassador Morgenstierne said that if the communists had been allowed to get away with their Korean aggression other areas would certainly have followed-Formosa, Indo-China and others. He remarked that there did not seem to be any serious question in the US as to the correctness of the action with regard to Korea and Formosa. I confirmed this, stating that this situation has pulled us together. I observed that the present situation is completely different from the previous situation in which it had been urged that we intervene in Formosa. I said that the communist intention to take Formosa and Indo-China had been evident; that if they had been allowed to take Formosa, following this thrust in Korea, the effect on the Philippines would have been drastic; there would have been panic in the Philippines since Formosa is the traditional jumping-off place for attack on the Philippines. Ambassador Morgenstierne repeated that if Korea had been allowed to pass, then other areas would have followed. I agreed emphatically, stating that I thought Asia would have fallen apart.
Ambassador Morgenstierne said it was a great moment in history. I said I thought it was a turning-point in world history.
The Ambassador commented that this situation would make settlement of the question of the Chinese UN representation much more difficult. I said I thought it would be quite impossible. I could not see how it would be possible to accept in the UN representatives of a Government which was engaged in active defiance of the UN authority. I read to him the body of Chou en Lai\'s statement of yesterday. Ambassador Morgenstierne signified complete agreement with my attitude. I said our thought had been to get the problem into the General Assembly, which would have to lay down policy. I did not think that a corporal\'s guard could now be found to vote for the Chinese communists. Ambassador Morgenstierne said he had thought that the question was rightly one of a new membership that a country could not fulfill the Charter provisions once and for all; that the specific Government had to do that; and that this was an entirely new and different Government. I said some of our people had advanced this view, but that we had concluded that if each new Government were treated as a new applicant for membership, subject to a Soviet veto, we would soon reduce the organization to a few members. Ambassador Morgenstierne commented that the change involved in China goes far beyond the usual change of government by "revolution" in Latin America.
Dean Acheson Secretary of State
EUR:BNA:CDGreen:tv