DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation
June 9, 1950
Subject: Miscellaneous Matters of Interest to the Netherlands Foreign Office
Participants: The Secretary Mr. van Kleffens, The Netherlands Ambassador Mr. Joseph Scott, EUR
Copies to: S/S, EUR, WE, BNA, GER, UNA, USUN
Ambassador van Kleffens, who is leaving Washington on June 15 for another post, called to say goodbye.
After a friendly exchange, the Ambassador raised the question of his Government's interest in succeeding to Norway's seat on the United Nations Security Council. He said he had mentioned this briefly to Mr. Hickerson yesterday at lunch and that Otto Reuchlin, Minister of the Netherlands Embassy, would shortly be calling on various officers of the Department to discuss the details. He added that he understood informally that Denmark was a possible candidate for Norway's seat. I said I was a little surprised to hear that Denmark was interested in a seat on the Security Council since I had gathered from a conversation I had had with Foreign Minister Rasmussen recently in London that Denmark was not at this time looking for increased responsibilities of the type called for by representation on the Security Council. I told Mr. van Kleffens that the Department would give the Netherlands candidacy the most careful consideration.
Mr. van Kleffens next mentioned that he had heard that Mr. Hoffman was interested in Dr. Stikker's coming to the United States to make a number of speeches across the country in his OEEC capacity. I said that I had discussed this with Mr. Hoffman and that I agreed with Mr. Hoffman that it would be helpful if Dr. Stikker could make a number of talks in this country in the near future on OEC's progress.
Mr. van Kleffens asked what the latest news was on the attitude of the United Kingdom toward the Schuman proposal, explaining that he had seen nothing on this for the past two days. I said that I had received a number of cables from Ambassador Douglas analyzing the British reaction and it appeared that the Government's position was one of caution rather than opposition. I added that in my own talks recently with people in London I had gathered the impression that the Conservatives were a little warmer toward the plan than was the Government. I agreed with Ambassador van Kleffens that some of the Conservatives' warmth should probably be attributed to the fact of their being the Government's opposition.
Mr. van Kleffens referred to a paper he had written back in April 1943 in which he had suggested that nitrogen as well as coal be subjected to some sort of international control. He said he hoped the Schuman plan could soon be extended to cover nitrogen since there would be great psychological and propaganda advantages in being able to demonstrate that the West was determined to subject the basic elements of munitions to international control. I agreed that there was a distinct need to develop the West's psychological and propaganda opportunities and added that I believed we should concentrate on this more than we have heretofore.
The Ambassador next turned to the matter of negotiations with the Germans, expressing the view that the interests of the Benelux countries should be taken into account before any final decisions were reached. He explained that some aspects of the German problem which might be of small concern to London, Paris and Washington could be of vital concern to one or more of the Benelux countries. I replied that we thought it only fair that the interests of the Benelux countries be taken into account each time before decisions were reached on important German problems. I recalled that the tripartite conversations with the Benelux Ministers last November had been entirely satisfactory on this score. Last month in London, however, the talks with the Benelux Ministers had not been as satisfactory as they might have been, principally because of Mr. Bevin's illness.
Toward the end of the conversation, I asked Mr. van Kleffens how he thought the Belgian royal question would turn out. The Ambassador replied that he considered Leopold a very stubborn man, that he simply couldn't understand Leopold's apparent willingness to return to Brussels with the knowledge that at least two out of every five Belgians he would see there would be opposed to him. He added that if he did return under present circumstances that he would be very much a king of a particular political party \(the PSC\) and that this, of course, would be bad for the monarchy as an institution. He did not know who had been principally responsible for Leopold's stand thus far; he suggested it might be his wife.
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