67-02_14 - 1950-06-05 | Harry S. Truman

June 05, 1950

OFFICE MEMORANDUM - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Date: June 5, 1950

To: R. G. Barnes

From: R. Love

Subject: Summary of the main points concerning the relationship between US and USSR brought out by Secretary Acheson in his public announcements since Feb. 8, 1950

In his speech on Feb. 8 and again on Feb. 16 Sec. Acheson clarified the policy the U.S. would take in its relations with the Soviet Union. The basis of what Mr. Acheson said was that agreements reached with the Soviet government are useless unless they register facts or the existence of a situation. The Berlin crisis was used as an illustration of this point: there the Russians violated previous agreements with regard to our rights in Berlin until the Western powers took a strong stand through the airlift and it was then no longer advantageous to the Russians to be uncooperative.

This policy is further explained in sentences from his two speeches:

It has been our basic policy to build situations which will extend the area of possible agreement, that is, to create strength instead of the weakness which exists in many quarters.

Where these areas of weakness exist they form an irresistible temptation to the Soviet government to expand into these areas and no workable agreements can be framed with regard to these areas.

The arms program and ERP are illustrations of the way in which we are trying to extend the area of possible agreement with the Soviet Union by creating situations so strong that they can be recognized and out of them can grow agreement.

When we have eliminated all of these areas of weakness we will be able to evolve working agreements with the Russians.

II. - Discussions with USSR

Sec. Acheson made clear our position on possible conferences with USSR in his talk of Feb. 16, in which he stated that no good would come from our taking the initiative in calling for conversations at this point, that public hopes would only be raised in vain, that results could only be achieved by dangerous concessions on our part, in which the Russians alone would benefit. However, he added that we were always ready to discuss with them any outstanding issue.

In his recent talk at Harvard, Sec. Acheson stressed the same point, "Until the Soviet leaders do genuinely accept a 'live and let live' philosophy, then no approach from the free world, however imaginative, and no Trojan dove from the Communist movement, will help to resolve our mutual problems." The Sec. also qualified this by saying, "This does not mean that discussion should not take place, or that every effort should not be made to settle any questions which are possible of settlement."

III. - Threat USSR poses to US

In two speeches, one on March 29 and one on April 22, Sec. Acheson emphasized the threat which the Soviet Union poses to the US and its way of life. He pointed out that we are faced with a system which denies the basis to our modern civilization, the belief in freedom, and that those who hold to the Soviet doctrine have picked out this country as their chief target, since it is the chief obstacle to the spreading of their doctrine that freedom is evil. Aside from direct military aggression Acheson points out that the USSR has tried the following methods to weaken us: to confuse and divide the American people; to pick off members of the free world one by one; to build up the idea that Communism is inevitable and create a sense of hopelessness; and to change the balance of productive power in the world in their favor.

Acheson stated on March 15 that the US was opposed to Soviet Communism because it was the tool by which the USSR was attempting to extend its control over the world.

IV. - Tensions with USSR

In his speech at Berkeley, Calif. Sec. Acheson expressed the view that it was possible for the Soviet and American systems to coexist peacefully, that we had no argument with the Russian people themselves and were not attempting to change the governmental or social structure of the Soviet Union, but that it was up to the Russian leaders to cooperate in seven areas of difference, "which must be reconciled if the two systems are to live togetherâ€¦in reasonable security." What the Soviet leaders could do to cooperate in these areas was outlined by the Sec. as follows: 1\) permit the unification of Germany, Austria, and Korea under a government chosen in free elections; 2\) refrain from the use of force and the threat of force in maintaining regimes in satellite countries which do not command the confidence of the people freely expressed through democratic means; 3\) cease their policy of walk-out and boycott in the UN; 4\) cooperate in seeking realistic and effective control of atomic energy and the limitation of armaments in general; 5\) refrain from using the Communist organization as a tool to submerge established governments; 6\) treat the official representatives of all foreign countries according to accepted codes of diplomacy; and 7\) desist in distorting to the Russian people the picture of the Western world.

V. - Instruments of our foreign policy

Mr. Acheson has continually referred to the instruments by which the US is working to counter the threat of Soviet expansion and which are in line with creating agreements through strength. The Sec. has made it clear, however, that the purpose behind our policies is peaceful, that we are attempting to solve our problems without resort to war, and that we do not consider war inevitable. In two similar speeches on March 29 and April 22 Mr. Acheson presented six lines of action we are now pursuing, which provides a framework in which all of the commonly known instruments of our foreign policy, ECA, Point 4, etc., can be fitted. The Sec. has used various other frameworks in presenting our different foreign policy instruments.

1. The first line of action, which Mr. Acheson lays as the basis for all the others, is that we have a "burning and fighting faith in ourselves and in our institutions, and that means in freedom."

2. We must use every available means to communicate the value of freedom to the whole world, this message to be carried out through the free press, radio, films, and through the exchange of students and teachers with other countries.

3. We must strengthen our defenses. We must supplement our policy of international cooperation abroad with military strength. Mr. Acheson has stressed the importance of MAP and its emphasis on balanced collective forces rather than balanced national forces in our foreign policy program.

4. The fourth line of action presented is in the economic field where we are working "to create a better material life for ourselves and for other people in many parts of the world." One part of this effort is in rebuilding "the great workshops of the free world", in which ERP plays a dominant role. Another part of this effort, Mr. Acheson continues, is developing new workshops and new wealth in underdeveloped areas, where the Point Four program is paramount. The Secretary has stressed the need for supplementing these programs with a system of trade and economic integration to facilitate the exchange of the goods to be produced. The ITO and reciprocal trade agreement must be pushed, along with efforts to break down the trading barriers in Europe. Acheson has made it clear that he expects the US to buy more from abroad than we have been doing in the past.

5. The free world must be brought closer together in the political field; this includes closer ties through the UN, NATO, OEEC, the Council of Europe, and other organizations.

6. Negotiations with the USSR \(similar to II\).

VI. - Total Diplomacy

The meaning of the phrase "total diplomacy" has been emphasized in a great many of Mr. Acheson's talks before public groups. He has described it in these words: "Total diplomacy means that all the problems of the US are related and are part of the problem of preserving its existence as the kind of a country which we know and love." Mr. Acheson stresses the need for considering all questions, foreign and domestic, in the light of our international situation and the need for closer working of the government in the light of this problem. Just as in total war, Mr. Acheson says that all our resources must be concentrated on our struggle, in which effort every citizen should take governmental activities more seriously and try to understand the problems facing us today. Finally, we must realize that the day has passed when America is represented abroad only by her diplomats and that now every one of us in our actions and in our thinking represents America as it is seen abroad.

Suggested briefing for Congressional smoker \(Note: large world map will be at hand.\)

Introductory:

1. Welcome; appreciation of their coming.

2. Department's desire for close cooperation. We share the responsibility for carrying on this nation's foreign affairs. Complex subject. Heavy responsibility. Department has good team - able, hard-working, loyal men and women - well-organized to deal with the job. Hope for closest possible cooperation with the legislative branch; always glad to get ideas, comments; glad to service questions or requests for information

3. Tonight, would like to review briefly some of the main elements in the present situation, just touching on highlights. Afterwards, hope you will feel free to ask any questions, or to make any comments you wish.

Main lines or our foreign policy effort

1. Seeking to protect security of our country and our institutions by helping to build strength of free nations.

2. Chief aim is to prevent further aggressive attacks, by building strength soon as possible.

3. This strength is also needed to make certain we will not be defeated if Soviet Union does, in spite of our best efforts, launch an attack.

4. Meanwhile, seeking to strengthen free nations economically, politically and psychologically against threat of subversion.

5. This is more than the negative job of trying to prevent the spread of Soviet power; it is also the affirmative job of helping to create conditions in the world in which we can enjoy the blessings of peace and freedom with our neighbors.

The threat to our security: Soviet policy

1. Main thrust at Germany and Japan.

2. Brief historical review useful to make clear why these are prime Soviet objectives.

Summary, Soviet history

1. Present Soviet rulers claim sharp break with old Czarist Regime, but they carry forward much of the pattern of behavior of Old Russia. History of Russia holds key to much that is puzzling about Soviet attitudes and conduct today.

2. Russian political history had its real beginning in the 14th century, when the Grand Duchy of Muscovy \(which started 200 years before\) began its expansion at expense of neighbors.

\(Prior to this, chief factors had been:

a. Introduction of Orthodox Christianity - 10th Century. b. Spread of Byzantine culture through trade, religious factors. c. Over-running of areas by Tartars in 13th Century.\)

3. 14th to 18th centuries: continuous external warfare and internal strife. High price of expansion: kept people poor, bound to service of autocratic state. Pushed western frontiers to Baltic on the North, the Vistula on the West, Bessarabia on the Southwest, and Black Sea on the South.

4. Some of present traits go back to this period. Romanov dynasty \(esp. Peter the Great, 1689-1725; and Catherine I, \(1762-1796\) left its imprint; tough autocratic rulers, suspicious of other states, lack of faith in international agreements, hyper-sensitive to threats to their security. Peter tried to reshape Russia along Western lines, but only upper strata of society Europeanized. Influence of Western constitutionalism, of Age of Enlightenment, of Renaissance, did not penetrate.

5. By beginning of 20th century, Russia had pushed out to present frontiers. Contiguous land mass. Colonization of adjacent territories, absorbing into centrally-controlled empire. Kept pushing to the East \(Manchuria\) and to the West \(Turkey, Balkans\) but defeat in Russo-Japanese War \(1905\) and First World War frustrated these drives.

6. In this century, two things happened:

a. One was the Communist revolution, which added an ideological element to this thrust, and with this came the international communist movement.

b. The other was the effect of the Second World War. Basically altered power position of Russia, because it eliminated military power of Germany and Japan, hitherto the great bulwarks against Russian expansion.

Contributing factor: economic and political weakening of Western Europe.

7. Importance of Germany and Japan to Russia. Both are industrial workshops, centers of skilled populations. Bringing these areas under Russian control would spell economic and military predominant power in both Europe and Asia.

8. Soviet post-war policy. Hoped US - only other major power - would voluntarily withdraw to own borders. Sought to undermine US power position, to capitalize on weakness of its neighbors, to prevent free nations from reorganizing their shattered power structure.

9. While Soviet rulers may still hope to achieve their aims through pressure tactics, they doubtless recognize that because of Western counter- measures, the chances of this are beginning to diminish. They are approaching a point where they must choose between modifying their policy toward rest of the world, or apply the ultimate form of pressure: war. We hope they will decide on the former. But we must be prepared for the latter. Speed with which we build strength may affect their decision. In any case, it may be a long haul; we need to be prepared to live with this situation for a long time, if necessary.

Threat is a deeply-rooted one; not subject to daily variations.

1. Although Soviet tactics are subject to quick shifts, their basic aims are not; we need to have a "long haul" defense program, not subject to ups and downs according to whether Gromyko smiles or frowns.

2. Some basic factors in the Soviet threat:

\(a\) Soviet militarization continues. Despite cut in prices of consumers' goods announced early this month, Soviet budget for 1951, just passed by Supreme Soviet, shows highest military appropriations since 1945. May be higher than figures show, too.

\(b\) Satellite forces building up. Soviet officers rebuilding armies in Poland and Czechoslovakia; as well as in former enemy countries of Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria. Economic austerity imposed in satellites: gas rationing in oil-rich Rumania; introduction of worker norms in Czechoslovakia.

\(c\) Soviet political offensive through peace movements. World Peace Council, formed in November, may be rival to UN. Soviet partisans now pressing for Five-Power Peace Pact.

Current situation can best be understood in relation to historic Russian thrust against Germany and Japan.

First, Germany.

1. Soviets seeking to prevent integration of Western Germany in Western European defense system, and seeking to retard defense progress of Western Europe. This is the key to their efforts at Deputies' talks now going on in Paris.

2. Soviets have said they will not permit re-armament of Western Germany, and its participation in Western European defense system. Meanwhile, their propaganda, both direct and indirect, dangles issue of German unity, although Soviets have not given any indication that they would relax their grip on Eastern Germany. 3. Distinction between "neutralization" and "demilitarization" of Germany. West Germany is not now neutralized: its government and people are pro- Western, its economy is making a contribution to Western European defense, territory a base for Western defense forces. But West Germany is "demilitarized"; it has no armed forces.

4. "Neutralization" of West Germany would be a critical blow at defense capabilities of Western Europe. Soviet agents and puppets in East Germany could take over. Defense of rest of Europe, west of Rhine, would be almost impossible job.

5. However, defense of Europe with the inclusion of German manpower and productive capacity becomes a manageable job. Need to be safeguards against creation of German national force. Germans now seeking to make most of the bargaining position this gives them; seeking removal of limitations on sovereignty. Essential there be a sense of responsibility on part of Germany toward common task of European defense.

Breadcrumb

67-02_14 - 1950-06-05