LONDON
May 18, 1950
Dear Dean:
You asked me to write a memorandum covering my conversation with Monty and suggesting measures that might be taken after the adjournment of the Council which might be in addition to the decisions taken or reinforcements of them. The attached memorandum marked "No. 1" combines the two subjects.
You asked me to write you a memorandum in regard to shipping. The attached memorandum marked "No. 2" is it.
Ever,
\(L.W. Douglas\)
The Honorable Dean Acheson Secretary of State
LONDON May 18, 1950
MEMORANDUM
To: The Secretary of State
From: L. W. Douglas
In the course of the last six weeks I have met, at his request, on several occasions with Field Marshal Montgomery, Chairman of Western Europe Commanders'-in-Chief Committee. Montgomery was particularly concerned about the organization of a Western European army and feels that without a solid, disciplined and well-equipped French army there could be no adequate defence system for Western Europe. He felt that the infirmities in the French system; including \(1\) the lack of authority of the Chief of Staff and his inadequate rank, \(2\) the lack of any central military command, \(3\) inadequate procedure for the training of troups, \(4\) the twelve-months period for conscripts, generally conceded to be far too short, and \(5\) the necessarily heavy drain caused by the French operations in Indo-China on trained non-commissioned officers and junior French officers, altogether held out little prospect that France would be able to organize and establish the sort of an army necessary for the defence of the West. Montgomery went on to say that the defence of the West was purely on paper.
Because of the seriousness of Montgomery's criticisms and his evident very sincere anxiety that what he considered to be the defects in the French system be cured, as Chairman of the ECC I asked General Handy if he would make a study, not only of the situation in the French army, but also of the other NAT countries that were important in a purely defence sense. In a preliminary way this has been done. The reports were discussed at the last meeting of the ECC merely for information, not however, for transmission to the Department or to Washington. The report on France did not confirm Montgomery's views but Handy informed me later that he felt that the American report was far too favorable. He agrees with Montgomery's criticisms Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5. It is fair to assume, therefore, that there are some real defects in the French military establishment.
Montgomery asked to see you on your visit. I took the liberty of telling him that I would try to arrange it but that I could not make a definite commitment. Accordingly he asked whether he could see me on May 8. I invited General Handy, who had been attending a meeting of ECC on the 6th, if he would remain over to meet Montgomery with me.
At that meeting Montgomery renewed again his criticisms of the French system and discussed the speech which he had delivered at Fontainbleau on May 5 to the General Officers of Western Union countries and the United States who had been invited to observe the exercise which had been held on the 3rd, 4th and 5th. This speech you have read.
Montgomery suggested that an American ought to be placed in a position of command among the Western European Powers and that the United States should be prepared to say to France that unless she, France, erased the defects in her system, military equipment would not be forthcoming. In no other way, Montgomery felt, would the situation be cured.
I hope both General Handy and myself persuaded Monty that the use of persuasion was better than the use of a shillelagh and that whatever the inadequacies in the French system might be, they could be the better removed by friendly suggestion.
Because JCS are very shy of an American assuming any position of command or responsibility under NAT or in the Western European regional group, I ducked the first suggestion completely.
Out of the meeting there emerged the following four points:
First. Montgomery and de Lattre have been engaged in a bitter personal feud. It has become so bitter that only on the rarest occasions in recent months have they been known to speak to one another. Realizing the disastrous consequences of this situation, Monty on May 6 wrote de Lattre inviting him to dinner on May 9, stating that he had been very sorry for his share in the responsibility for creating this situation between them and that if they would meet as friends and act as friends they could together perform a great service for their countries and Western Europe. This was an important step. It has turned out successfully. De Lattre accepted the invitation and, Monty tells me, subsequently, that the hatchet has been buried.
Second. In response to a question Monty admitted that the Western European countries were approaching the problem of defence in purely nationalistic compartments.
In this connection I referred to infrastructural facilities and asked whether, in his opinion, it would be helpful in order to meet the cost of the infrastructural facilities if a common pool, to which the United States might make some contribution, could be established and expended under the authority, not of any one nation, but of either the Western Union group or the Western European regional group under NAT. These infrastructural facilities include communications, air bases, headquarters and a variety of things of this sort. The cost was originally put at some $220,000,000. This has now been whittled down to $84,000,000. Both Montgomery and Handy felt that such a step was of the greatest importance and while the amount of money was not large the establishment of a common fund, to be expended not by any one nation but under the direct supervision and control of Western Union or other collective organization would in itself be good. It would also, they felt, tend to jar loose the compartments that are now sealing off one national effort from another and preventing the establishment of truly balanced forces.
Third. I suggested that there be selected some Englishman like Lord Portal \(Peter Portal, Member of the British Joint Chiefs and of the Combined Chiefs during the war; then Air Marshall, now Lord Portal\) or Pug Ismay, who should be given the authority to expend and who would take on the responsibility of expending the money in the common pool for the common organization. Montgomery thought this was an excellent suggestion, as did General Handy.
Fourth. I suggested that the relationship between Western Union and NAT had not been clarified or identified, that the United States was not a member of WU but that the five WU countries were members of NAT, that WU was much further advanced in its planning and in other respects than NAT, that the WU countries had a more identical attitude toward the problems of the defence of Europe than some of the other members of NAT; therefore at the moment WU in the field of defence should continue on, but the time might come when the purely defence aspects and obligations under the Brussels Treaty might be merged with the defence obligations and operations under NAT. For the present, however, the relations between the WU, the US and NAT should be examined, identified and classified. In this connection , however, every member of WU is obligated to go to war immediately if any one of them is attacked, whereas under NAT the obligation is not so precisely and clearly defined. Both Montgomery and Handy felt that a review of the relationship should be undertaken. Montgomery asked me if I would bring these four steps to your attention so that if you found it convenient and appropriate you could discuss any or all of them with Bevin and Schuman.
In addition to the four points which arose out of the meeting with Montgomery and Handy I should like to advance some of my own ideas.
First. A common pool of funds or equipment for infrastructural facilities.
In connection with the second item that arose out of the meeting, I strongly recommend that in the MDAP legislation authority be given to provide equipment, materiel, etc. to groups of nations, signatories of NAT, engaged in the establishment of balanced forces. The present legislation does not permit shipment of United States equipment to any group of nations. It merely permits the shipment of equipment, etc. to individual nations. We can not, therefore, extend any assistance of any sort to the five WU countries collectively even though all the five countries are signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty. It would be far more effective in furthering, advancing and reinforcing the idea of balanced forces and of a Western European army for the defence of the Atlantic community were the legislation to permit the shipment of equipment, etc. to groups of nations, each one of which is a signatory of the NAT.
Second. Special Relationship of the United States with the five Western Union Countries
As to Item 4 which arose out of the meeting with Montgomery and Handy, my own view is that because it is difficult, if not impossible, among twelve countries to get decisions that are not so watered down by inescapable and extensive compromises as to have little substantive meaning and provide a basis of meager dimensions for action, because there are substantial differences of approach and interest among the twelve NAT signatories, because no matter from what angle one views the problem, the five countries located in or immediately adjacent to the heart of Europe, that is to say France, Britain, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg, represent the military strength, such as it is, that exists in Europe and must be, in the very nature of things, the source of such military strength as can be mustered in the immediate future, and because these five countries, with Germany added, constitute one of the great centers of industrial power in the world, we should develop a special relationship with them.
It may be that for the immediate future it might be wise and appropriate to have unofficial American observers sitting at all levels of the Western Union organization. There are now unofficial American observers who are present with some of the working groups, the Military Committee for example, the Supply Board, etc. I have been given the authority to ask the Consultative Council for WU to sit with it whenever it is considering any questions which are of concern to the United States. This authority I have used twice: On the first occasion for the purpose of giving the Consultative Council friendly advice in regard to their request for military assistance. The second time was in connection with the Consultative Council's consideration of certain financial recommendations which might have prejudiced action by NAT. I am not firm in my opinion that to accept this procedure for the immediate future is adequate, nor do I suggest that if the procedure is adequate I am necessarily the one who should conform to it. In order, however, to avoid giving non-Western Union members the feeling that by some special arrangements within NAT itself we were being partial to Western Union, something along these lines might be worth examining.
The two questions are: Should we, because of the reasons enumerated above, have a special relationship with the five WU countries and, if we should, how may it best be established even on a temporary basis without giving offense to other members of NAT.
Third. Central Authority over Preparation of Military Plans
I suggest that very serious thought be given to the establishment of a central command or authority over the defence planning that is being done by NAT in order that there may be prepared a plan for balanced forces and for the allocation among the member countries of the types and quantities of forces for which each will be held primarily responsible. If I understand the situation correctly, the present military planning for NAT is undertaken by a group which is not directed by the respective governments to devise a plan for balanced forces. I understand, too, that NAT countries have not selected any one person to direct and control the formulation of plans made by this group. I understand, on the contrary, that the military plans dealing with the kind, quality and quantity of the respective types of forces is, in a large measure, merely an addition of the estimates of the required national forces of each participating nation. So long as a plan which is a mere addition of shopping lists is put forward it will be quite impossible to deal with the problem of defence. All the financial implications of such a plan will be as unreal as the military plan from which they are derived. All the calculations and programs for additional military production will necessarily be as faulty as the military plan out of which they arise.
In order that the situation which I have outlined may be corrected I suggest that there be selected one person-I would hope an American, for I doubt that anyone else could do it-who would be vested with the authority to control and direct the planning; that the representatives of other nations on the planning staff be directed by their governments to devise a military plan which is based upon balanced forces for the defence of the North Atlantic area. This does not necessarily mean, as might appear at first blush, a far reaching surrender of sovereignty by any nation, because the plan, which presumably this planning group would form, would have to be agreed to by Defence Ministers who could view it in terms of their requirements for national balanced forces. Moreover, it would require a review by the Defence Finance and Economic Committee, and finally would have to be accepted by either the Council of Deputies, if this is to be established, or by the Council itself. The point is that all the signatory powers should accept the principal that one person would have command of the planning and that his associates on the planning staff of whatever nationality be directed to view the problem in terms of a balanced international force. Until this is done all plans will be unreal.
Fourth. Central Authority over Preparation of Military Plans.
I suggest that after a plan has been accepted and agreed to by the appropriate governments there will be required a great deal of persuasion and influence to assure the carrying out of the plan. It may be that this would be a responsibility of the Chairman of the Deputies, or whatever title he may be given. In some fields members of the staff or of the Council of Deputies would be responsible to him for influencing respective governments to put the plan into effect. In the military field, however, I suggest that, subject of course to the Defence Committee and to the Council or its Deputies, there should be a military man who, while not, at least in the first stages, possessing the authority to command, would at least be selected to see that the military aspects of the plan were carried out, not by giving directions and orders but by constant contact with, and the use of persuasion on, the respective national military groups. If the Council at its present meeting agrees to the establishment of a continuing organization it may be felt that these problems will fall within the orbit of its jurisdiction for discussion. I mention them here because I think that after the Council has adjourned they merit careful examination.
CONCLUSION
The four suggestions that arose out of the meeting with Montgomery and Handy-quite unspectacular and each by itself insignificant-might together constitute a psychological as well as a tangible advance on the fundamental problem of defence, i.e., how to build balanced forces that may operate as a Western European army, not as purely armies of particular nations. These four measures are:
1. The reconciliation of de Lattre and Monty \(This I hope has been done.\)
2. The establishment of a common pool of funds \(or their equivalent in equipment\) to defray the costs of infrastructural expenditures \(Western Union\).
3. The appointment of a man like Peter Portal or Pug Ismay who would have the authority to direct and control the expenditure of the common pool and who would be held accountable for discharging this responsibility.
4. A review of the relations in the military field between Western Union and NAT.
The additional suggestions are as follows:
1. Authorization in MDAP legislation to extend assistance to groups of nations, parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.
2. Establishment of a special relationship with the five Western Union countries.
3. Establishment of a central authority over preparation of military plans and terms of reference to the members of the planning staff which require that they must approach their problem with the idea of producing not only forces to withstand the first shock of aggression but the balanced forces so necessary to carry war through to a successful conclusion.
4. At a later stage a device which will put into effect the plan for balanced forces, including all of its implications, financial, industrial, etc.
London, May 18, 1950
MEMORANDUM
To: The Secretary of State
From: L. W. Douglas
In accordance with your request I am writing you this memorandum in regard to the action we should take under the International Working Group Report on Establishment of a Planning Board for Ocean Shipping in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Council Document No. 11 D.4/11. I have read this paper and the Norwegian memorandum attached to it. I think that the basic paper is very good but to put it into effect will, I think, require American representation, and representation from other countries, of real competence. I don't know whether anybody so far has been appointed to represent the United States. If this step has already been taken my suggestion is obviously out-dated. If it has not been taken then I make the following suggestions: \(a\) The person selected should not be associated with any one of the subsidized lines; \(b\) The person selected should be far more competent than Turni Morse and with a far less favorable bias toward the subsidized lines; \(c\) Specifically if you could persuade Ed Roberts, the President of the Waterman Steamship Company, or Howell Smith, who operates a chartering agency in New York, or John Cushing in San Francisco, to represent the U.S. you would have the sort of competence that I believe is necessary.
I think there are some real defects in the Norwegian paper. One of them is that an Executive Committee as a practical matter can not effectively, promptly and with the sort of speed necessary in time of war allocate tonnage. The second is the supposition that a certain quantity of tonnage is allocated permanently to specific services. This is a most wasteful use of shipping for it freezes tonnages into specific routes and thus destroys the flexibility in the use of vessels and their allocation which is so essential to obtain maximum utility out of the available tonnage. The third is the implication that neutrals will be associated with the allocation of tonnage. Since the allocation of tonnage is of vital information to the enemy, shipping information on the use of tonnage, laying on of vessels, etc. should be guarded with the greatest secrecy. If a neutral is associated with the allocation of ships it will be difficult adequately to maintain security. There are other difficulties in the Norwegian paper but these three above are the principal ones.
The one defect in the basic paper is that it does not, I think, sufficiently lay the foundation for a modification of our own U.S. Merchant Marine Policy. This however may emerge from the work done by the Planning Board.
L.W.D.