DEPARTMENT OF STATE Memorandum of Conversation
October 12, 1943
SUBJECT:
PARTICIPANTS: Secretary Acheson Prime Minister Nehru
COPIES TO:
The Prime Minister returned to my house with me at 10:30 after dinner and talked with me until 1:00 o'clock. I invited him to express his views on any matter on which he wished to do so and to feel the greatest freedom to tell me about any situation in which he felt that action of the Department had been mistaken or unhelpful.
Wheat Stockpile
The Prime Minister told me of his desire to have a stockpile of one million tons of wheat. This was necessary to assure the food supply and to reduce the price of wheat which he hoped to reduce by approximately 10%. This was a key commodity, the price of which controlled other prices in India. Although the agricultural interests had had a difficult time for many years, he thought in the recent past they had done well and could stand this reduction in price. Other classes of the population were suffering and this price adjustment was essential for their welfare. The matter had been discussed by some of his officials with some of ours. He understood that the matter would require legislation. I said that we were working on it and would be glad to intensify our efforts since I understood that this was a matter of primary importance to them. We would consider legislation to permit sales of Government wheat at reduced prices. We would consider the possibility of legislation permitting us to store wheat in India and sell it as withdrawals were necessary and the combination of these ideas and others might be devised.
Indonesia
He had had a telegram from Hatta at The Hague on the question of assumption of debts. Apparently the Dutch were insisting that the Indonesians should assume a large proportion of the debt, including that incurred for the purpose of fighting them. They thought this unjust. Although the Prime Minister could not remember the exact figures involved, he understood that the Dutch were pressing for a figure which would be expressed as "six". The Indonesians were willing to assume an amount represented by "three" and might be able to approve this. He thought that this was another example of the unwisdom of the Dutch in "dragging their feet" and stubbornly insisting upon demands until they were outmoded by time and until concessions lost all their grace. I said that we had already gotten into trouble with the Dutch through what I regarded as sound efforts of Mr. Cochran to give help in this very situation. However, we would review it again and see if there was anything we might do to help.
Indochina
The Prime Minister said with considerable force and feeling that the thought that the Bao Dai experiment was hopeless and doomed to failure. The French held only the populous centers and certain lines of communication. The rest of the country was in the hands of the Nationalists. Bao Dai did not have the character, the ability or the reputation to make a success of the experiment nor were the French giving it adequate scope. I asked what, in his opinion, was the alternative. He thought that it was the Nationalist movement although he stated that he was convinced that Ho Chi Minh was a Communist.
I asked whether he did not believe that there was great danger in any movement controlled by the Communists even though it appeared to be a coalition since the history of similar movements showed that the Communists liquidated the associates and took over. He thought that this view was a misapplication to the East or European experience although he agreed that this was not the case in China. He thought that in India, Indochina and Burma and, he hoped in Indochina, history would show that the Communists undertook to operate at first as the left Wing of the Nationalist movement and under cover of the Nationalist movement. However, at an early state in the cases mentioned, they undertook to break with the movement and to fight it in an attempt to secure control. In the other cases they had lost. It was his hope and, I think, his judgment that this would be repeated in Indochina. I mentioned the great difficulty that such a course presented for the French, and particularly for Schuman, who, I believed, was attempting to lead the French along the right line in Indochina. The Prime Minister thought that in this case it was not really Mr. Schuman who was in control but the permanent officers in the Foreign Office and elsewhere in the Government, who he believed were perfectly hopeless on this question.
Recognition of China
The Prime Minister expressed the views which he repeated the next day in his conversation with the President that are outlined in that memorandum, and I refer to it here. His talk was clearly slanted toward early recognition. I told him that that was not our view, that we thought it important in this case not to believe that any advantage could be gained for the country in according early recognition, and that our primary concern here was to indicate by our conduct our deep interest and concern for the welfare of the Chinese people. I thought that this might be done by indicating in our handling of the situation that we were concerned - for instance, that the government actually did control all of China and that by early recognition we were sacrificing the interests of some portions of the country which were still attempting to maintain its independence of Communist control. Then, too, we should show our concern that the Government should establish some form of acquiescence by the Chinese people. While this might be something which could not be done, it was important that the Chinese people should know we were thinking in these terms. Finally, the Government should be required to state its international obligations. He asked how we could bring our own attitude to the attention of the Chinese people. I thought that this might be done both through the Voice of America and by printed material which could be circulated. He doubted whether such material could be effectively circulated. His general attitude seemed to be that since recognition was doubtless inevitable, there was little purpose in postponing it by diplomatic maneuvers.
Kashmir
I asked the prime Minister to talk to me fully and frankly on this subject so that I might have a real understanding of his point of view. He gave me a long history of the dispute, the upshot of which was that Kashmir had been invaded by tribesmen through Pakistan and he thought with their consent and assistance, and later by Pakistan troops operating through the thin disguise of being on leave and subsequently, he believed, in regular formation. Pakistan for a long time had denied any such action and only recently had admitted it. He spoke bitterly of Pakistan deception and intrigue. Indian troops had entered Pakistan only upon the invitation and request of the Government after the invasion had taken place and only just in time to prevent the complete occupation of the country. Subsequent military occupation had driven back the invaders although they still occupied part of the country, and several hundred thousand refugees had either abandoned their homes or had been driven out.
He then spoke of the fact that there was in this whole matter a very profound ideological issue. Pakistan wished to create a religious state and wished Kashmir to be a part of their nation because the inhabitants were largely Moslems. This he thought struck at the very basis of stability in the Indian sub-continent. The Indian idea was one of a secular state, in which religion had nothing to do with the participation of the citizen in government. India had in high office many Moslems. There were some thirty-five million Moslems in India. To establish now a religious basis for adherence of provinces would have a profoundly unsettling effect upon all the Moslems in India, and upon the Hindus in Pakistan. A plebiscite campaign based on these principles would be inflammatory and disastrous throughout the sub-continent.
One of his basic ideas seemed to be that preliminary to any solution of the matter was some authoritative statement from the United Nations or its commission that Pakistan was the aggressor and had no claim or interest although he readily admitted that if the people of Kashmir by a free vote wished to adhere to Pakistan, he would offer no objection of any sort. I said that I understood what he had told me but I was not clear as to his idea for getting forward with a peaceful solution of the matter. How was that to be done?
He thought that the primary conception should be mediation of the whole problem. He thought that there was a truce in fact but that what was now needed was direct discussion with the help of a mediator between Pakistan and India as to subsequent steps. In the Indian view the Pakistan troops and the armed tribesmen must withdraw. It would be urged for the sake of apparent balance that the Indian troops should also withdraw. He believed that this would not lead to a peaceful solution because the Pakistani, having much readier access, would at any moment return and upset the situation. He thought therefore that some Indian troops for police purposes should be left. He thought the refugees should be permitted to return to their homes. He thought then that the problem was one of how to consult the wishes of the Kashmir people. This might be done through a plebiscite although the nature of the country and of its population would make this a very lengthy and difficult question. Furthermore, he thought the problem was somewhat too complication to be solved by the individuals in the entire country answering yes or no to a question which might be framed. He thought that it would be preferable to have a constituent assembly of the natural leaders of the people elected to meet and discuss their future. This might lead to a decision to adhere to one or the other of the nations or it might lead to some possible division. At this point he returned to the idea of a finding of fact that Pakistan had been the aggressor.
At this point either due to the lateness of the hour or the complexity of the subject, I found myself becoming confused and suggested that we adjourn the discussion.
I forgot to note that in one point of the historical narrative he told me that Abdullah, I believe the present Prime Minister, although a Moslem had been a member of the Congress Party and had been imprisoned by the Maharajah, a Hindu. Nehru had similarly been by the Maharajah and subsequently had obtained Abdullah's release. He thought that Abdullah shared his views of the non-secular state, and that the decision to adhere to India had been made by Abdullah and the Maharajah after their country had been placed in a precarious situation by the invasion.
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