Dr. John R. Steelman Oral History Interview, February 29, 1996

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JOHNSON: I should mention that Robert Hart is with us videotaping, and Dr. Steelman's wife Ellen had to leave a little earlier, but she is here much of the time as well.

Dr. Steelman, I don't think that we've focused yet on how you got the capitalized "The Assistant to the President." Was this your idea, or was it President Truman's idea, to emphasize The -- The Assistant to the President?

STEELMAN: They wanted to call me Chief of Staff, and I didn't like that title. I thought it sounded too military, and so from the State Department we got the idea. The State Department had, instead of Assistant Secretaries, what they called Under Secretaries. They had Under Secretary for Asian Affairs, an Under Secretary for African Affairs, an Under Secretary for this, that and the other. Then they had the top one The Under Secretary. And so that's where we got the idea. Instead of calling me Chief of Staff, they called me "The" Assistant to the President, meaning "The" meant number one.

JOHNSON: Okay.

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STEELMAN: The number one assistant to the President.

JOHNSON: But not all papers came through you to get to the President, is that correct?

STEELMAN: I'm not sure that all...

JOHNSON: Memoranda and so on, they didn't all have to come through you?

STEELMAN: No, I don't think so, but most of them did.

JOHNSON: Most did.

STEELMAN: Most of them did. I remember I had thirteen girls writing letters for me to sign, and I'd say, "The President has asked me to thank you for your letter of so and so, and so forth." So, it seems to me like I signed as many as 3,000 letters in a day.

JOHNSON: Is that right.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: Now, you had thirteen girls assisting you with the clerical...

STEELMAN: Writing letters.

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JOHNSON: And then you had about 20 others, I guess, because you said you had a staff of about 35.

STEELMAN: That's right. I inherited a staff of 350 and I cut it down to 35.

JOHNSON: Sam Rosenman, of course, was inherited from President Roosevelt. Do you remember Sam Rosenman?

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: He might have left about the time that you came and then Clark Clifford sort of filled in that post.

Did you feel that you were on the same level with Clark Clifford, or that you were actually on a little higher level?

STEELMAN: I was on a higher level. I was next to the President, "The" Assistant to the President. Clifford was our speech writer.

JOHNSON: Yes.

STEELMAN: And Clifford built himself up with the press because we'd go in a staff meeting and when the staff meeting was over, Clifford, contrary to the President's rules, would tip the press off to different things, and he built himself up with the press. Then later, he

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left the White House and became an influence peddler in Washington.

JOHNSON: But those who wanted to see the President would have to also go through [Matthew] Connelly, wouldn't they, the Appointment's Secretary?

STEELMAN: Matt Connelly, yes.

JOHNSON: And in other cases, you would take people in to see the President?

STEELMAN: Sometimes, yes.

JOHNSON: I think since we're talking about that, maybe we should bring up that incident about General Marshall calling you and said he had a letter from Dwight Eisenhower, General Eisenhower, and he wanted to see you first. The letter from General Eisenhower had to do with his idea, perhaps, of a divorce. Do you remember this?

STEELMAN: I remember vaguely something like that.

JOHNSON: Okay. About divorcing Mamie.

STEELMAN: Mamie, yes.

JOHNSON: Do you want to explain that again. I think it's

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in another interview, but did he call you and say that he wanted you to go with him into the Oval office as a witness?

STEELMAN: I think he did.

JOHNSON: For this event?

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: Do you recall that at all, right now, or maybe we can come back to it later.

STEELMAN: Vaguely.

JOHNSON: And Marshall had written a rather fiery response to that letter, and then Truman, I think, finally told him that he should burn the two letters.

STEELMAN: Yes. Yes. And Marshall said he wasn't going to do it, he was going to put it in the files, because Marshall didn't trust Eisenhower as much as Truman did.

JOHNSON: Well, we'll come back to that.

STEELMAN: I remember when Eisenhower became President, he called me up from New York and wanted me to continue on as The Assistant to the President, and I told him I couldn't do it. I had to leave. And Ike said, "Well,

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now, you owe me." I said, "What do I owe you, General?" He said, "For the last seven years every time I got back to the United States, within a week you cooked up some reason why I had to go back to Europe." He said, "I don't know anybody. I don't know who my Cabinet officers are going to be. I don't know anything about the Government." So he said, "You've got to help me."

Finally I told him I couldn't stay. So he called me up from New York, and said, "Do you know a fellow named Sherman Adams? He's been recommended to take your place." And I said, "Yes, he was Governor of a little state up in the Northeast there about the size of county where I'm from. I had some dealings with him. I got a good impression of him, but I don't really know him." So Sherman came down and he wanted me to tell Sherman how to run the office as The Assistant to the President.

So I told Sherman, "Play it down, down, down." I said, "Everybody exaggerates when you're close to the President; everybody exaggerates what you do and say. Play it down." And Adams didn't, he didn't listen, and so the first thing you know, he was a big shot.

I remember some Senator called me up and said,

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"What's the matter with this fellow that took your place?" He said, "I had to call him about something," I've forgot what, and he said, "He doesn't answer me. Finally his secretary said the Governor will call you back when he has time."

So I helped the Senator out, I got him next to the President for some reason.

JOHNSON: Yes, I think we're going to pick up again on that a little bit later as well. But if we can go back; it was after the election 1946, when John L. Lewis, you know, had taken the miners out on strike, and then you and Clifford and several others met together to decide what they should do about John L. Lewis. There were arguments on both sides and Clifford argued that they should take them to court and have a court injunction filed against the union and also against him, with a fine, for violation of contract. Do you remember that episode when you were meeting, about what to do about John L. Lewis, whether to take him to court or not?

STEELMAN: Yes, Clifford thought it would be good politics to have a fight with Lewis. So we'd have a staff

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meeting, and when the rest of the staff would leave, I'd remain with the President to see if he had any last words. The President would say, "I wish Clark would learn how to tend to his own business of speech writing and let you and me run the Government."

JOHNSON: Well, according to Clark Clifford, after this meeting you were angry, and so you did not go to Key West. In November of '46, the rest of them went to Key West and you went hunting. I guess what I need to know is do you remember being angry enough that you decided not to go to key West with the other people, with the other staff people, and instead went on a hunting vacation? Do you recall that at all?

STEELMAN: No, I don't. I can't imagine not going to Key West. In fact, I always did. So I don't know what this is.

JOHNSON: This is in his autobiography, Clifford's autobiography, that he mentions this.* Do you recall the first time you did go to Key West, or what year that would have been? Did you go there say in 1946, your first year in the White House or full year?

*Clark Clifford, with Richard Holbrooke, Counsel to the President (New York: Random House, 1991), p. 93.

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STEELMAN: I guess we did. We'd go to Key West and Clifford didn't want to go to Key West with us. Admiral [William] Leahy and I stayed in the Little White House with the President. And that's all they had room for. So, the rest of the staff had to sleep down on the waterfront in different places, and Clifford didn't like that, so he didn't go to Key West with us.

JOHNSON: But we do have pictures of all of you down there in Key West, and maybe we ought to get those out where we can trigger some recollections.

STEELMAN: Well, Clifford didn't like going to Key West because he had to stay with the rest of the staff. He couldn't get preference.

JOHNSON: But he was down there, I think, several times was he not ?*

*The President's first vacation trip to Key West occurred on November 17-23, 1946. The President's party included both Dr. Steelman and Mr. Clifford, and they also were with the President on a submarine that dived to a depth of 450 feet. According to the trip log, both assistants were housed with the President in the Commandant's House, that subsequently gained the nickname, "The Little White House." Both men also accompanied the President on his second and third trips to Key West in March and December 1947. On the latter visit, Dr. Steelman and Matthew Connelly occupied the south bedroom and Charles Ross and Clark Clifford occupied the south center bedroom, both rooms on the second floor. Logs of later trips indicate that Clifford was on both trips in 1948, but not on the March 1949 visit. Steelman appears to have been in the President's party on all visits to Key West until the end of Truman's administration. Clifford resigned from the White House staff at the end of January 1950.

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STEELMAN: I don't think he went several times.

JOHNSON: Okay, maybe I can show you these pictures. This is kind of a layout of the first floor right here. Here we have an 8 x 10 black and white, on April 5th 1950, apparently this was. This was in April 1950, and here you are, seated next to Bess. This is when Bess and Margaret were there.

STEELMAN: I was going to say, in all the pictures I was always placed at the right of the President, but when Bess was there, I had to move over a notch.

JOHNSON: And Margaret's on President Truman's left. I was going to say that was Charlie Ross, but...

HART: It is Charlie Ross.

JOHNSON: Yes, we've got identification on the back. Seated is [William] Hassett I think. Then there's Stephen Spingarn, General [Robert] Landry, Admiral [Robert] Dennison, Stanley Woodward, Charlie Ross, General [Harry] Vaughan, General [Wallace] Graham, and [David] Niles. No, we don't see Clifford in this picture do we?

STEELMAN: No, he's not there.

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JOHNSON: Yes, here's Charlie Ross right behind President Truman. Do you remember where this was taken, or what side of the building. Where did you usually sit, do you remember? Was this the side facing the ocean, do you think?

STEELMAN: I think so. I think it was.

JOHNSON: Okay, so we're on the west side of the Little White House here.

STEELMAN: I think so, yes. I remember when Bess was around I had to move over a notch.

JOHNSON: Of course. All right, this is August 1948. Now this is a little earlier, of course, a couple of years before the one we just talked about. Here you're standing with the group around the President. I think here you are on the Williamsburg, aren't you? Yes, August 1948. Well, I don't see Clark Clifford there either, but I know I've seen him in pictures down there.

Well, I don't see him here either. Here's a photograph, March 26th, 1952, the President and his staff at Key West.

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STEELMAN: Like I say, Clifford didn't go to Key West because he had to sleep down at the waterfront with the boys. Admiral Leahy and I had a room in the Little White House.

JOHNSON: Yes, but there are several bedrooms; there are some up on the second floor as well. Do you remember which room you stayed in when you were at the Little White House?

STEELMAN: No, I don't remember. It seems to me like it was on the first floor though.

JOHNSON: Which end do you think, north, on the north end here?

STEELMAN: I'm just not sure.

JOHNSON: Okay, here's the living room. There was a little kitchen there back here. There was a bathroom here to the north, another bedroom, and you say you stayed here on the first floor. Who else had their bedroom here on the first floor? Who did you share with, do you remember?

STEELMAN: Admiral Leahy.

JOHNSON: You think Admiral Leahy?

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STEELMAN: The President's Naval Aide.

HART: They showed us Admiral Leahy's bedroom upstairs, didn't they? Wasn't it upstairs, or not. It's been a couple of years ago, but they showed us where Admiral Leahy's room was, and I had thought he told me that they stayed together. But maybe not.

JOHNSON: Mr. Hal Walsh [the director of the "Little White House" at Key West], when we were down there a couple of days ago, thought that he was in this bedroom on the north side, either in the middle north side, or on the northwest, on that first floor. You know, if it comes to him just where this was, where he stayed, we'll get that on the record.

Yes, here's an interesting picture here, of David Lloyd, General Vaughan, Matt Connelly, the whole bunch except for Clark Clifford.

STEELMAN: Where was that taken? In Key West?

JOHNSON: Yes, March 26th, 1952, when you were at Key West with the President. Now you're sitting on his left in this picture. Well, we can get back to that.

Oh, there was an incident at Key West about President Truman and you sitting on the bench and a

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coconut falling...

STEELMAN: Yes, a coconut fell and hit right by the side and sounded like a canon going off. The Secret Service came running up and said, "Mr. President, you can't sit here anymore." And Truman said, "What'd you say?" They said, "You can't sit here anymore, this is dangerous." The President said, "Well now, let's see, what are your duties?" The Secret Service said, "It's to protect the President." And so Truman said, "Well, now, suppose we have this understanding. You do your job and I'll sit wherever I please."

So, the next morning at breakfast, we looked out and we saw one of the little Filipino sailors off of Truman's yacht climbing up the trees and testing all the coconuts to see if one might fall that day.

JOHNSON: I think you told us yesterday about sitting and watching the water, the tide, and the President said, "If you were to walk out there and drown, why the world would...

STEELMAN: Yes, we were talking about somebody who was taking himself too seriously. I've forgotten who it was now. So we were talking about some guy who was taking himself too seriously and Truman said, "John, do

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you realize, if you and I walked out there and we drowned, this great country would go right on without us."

JOHNSON: We might talk a little more about Key West later on. Since we mentioned Clark Clifford, do you remember him being the subject of a cover story in Time magazine? In 1948 during the election year, Clark Clifford appeared on the cover of Time magazine, and there was a cover story on him in the magazine. This was in March 1948, and the writer of the story claimed that Truman had made some mistakes, and he said that others on the staff were blaming Clark Clifford for any of the mistakes that Truman was making. Did you talk to the reporters of Time magazine at all. Do you recall talking to any Time magazine reporters about Clark Clifford, who were doing a story on Clark Clifford?

STEELMAN: I don't recall.

JOHNSON: You don't recall talking to any...

STEELMAN: I don't recall talking to anybody, no.

JOHNSON: To any reporters from Time magazine about Clark Clifford.

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Clark Clifford felt may have that some of the negative things in that article might have come from you.

STEELMAN: I see. Well, anyhow, Clifford took himself too seriously. At staff meetings, I remember I'd come in and say, "Mr. President, this is the way we've decided to handle this problem, and all," and Clifford would say, "That doesn't sound like good politics." And Truman said, "Politics? Who's running for office? You only play politics every four years. Now, we're just running the Government, so we'll do it John's way."

JOHNSON: At Cabinet meetings, were you the last one to be called on at Cabinet meetings?

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: Okay.

STEELMAN: Yes, I was the newest member; therefore the President would call on me last. I remember some advisors of the President advised me that I had better resign and get back to New York, because sooner or later each Cabinet officer would get mad at me and the President would have to fire all of them or me and he'd fire me.

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So, it worried me and I thought it over, so I told the President the next morning, "Here's what I thought I'd do. I'm the last one you call on at Cabinet meetings, and I'll make some favorable comment on one of the Cabinet officers, how he and his staff are operating, and I'll go right around the table." And Truman said, "Don't you think I know what I'm doing?" He said, "You're the number one mediator in America; you'll have all the Cabinet officers eating out of your hand."

And sure enough, a little later I remember Truman asked me, "John, I haven't heard from a Cabinet officer in a month. Do you keep in touch with them?" And I said, "My God, Mr. President, they keep me up until midnight every night." So they started calling on me instead of the President.

JOHNSON: Did Clark Clifford attend those Cabinet meetings as you recall? Was he always there at a Cabinet meeting?

STEELMAN: No. No, he never was a member of the Cabinet.

JOHNSON: And you don't recall him attending Cabinet meetings?

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STEELMAN: No, he did not.

JOHNSON: Well, how about the staff meetings in the White House? I think they were 9 o'clock in the morning. Did you attend those staff meetings?

STEELMAN: Oh, yes.

JOHNSON: Were you regular in your attendance?

STEELMAN: Yes. Oh yes.

JOHNSON: At those staff meetings.

STEELMAN: Sure.

JOHNSON: And then you held your own staff meetings in your own office, I suppose.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: Is that correct?

STEELMAN: Yes. Over in the East building, yes.

JOHNSON: Who did you depend on mainly to help you in your job over there in the East Wing?

STEELMAN: I think David Stowe probably was my best...

JOHNSON: Your best helper.

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STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: Well, since we've brought up some of those names, how about Robert Turner, do you remember Robert Turner?

STEELMAN: Vaguely.

JOHNSON: Donald Kingsley.

STEELMAN: Yes, vaguely, I don't remember what they did.

JOHNSON: Harold Stein?

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: Anthony Hyde?

STEELMAN: Yes. I vaguely remember all of them, but I don't remember what they did.

JOHNSON: Did they help write memoranda, press releases and that sort of thing?

STEELMAN: Maybe.

JOHNSON: And, of course, Elmer Staats.

STEELMAN: I remember him.

JOHNSON: You remember Elmer from Budget Bureau?

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STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: In fact, I think he says that he wrote up your chart or job description, so to speak, and that you had added the capital T -- to "The" Assistant to the President.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: And it went through all right. Did you have much of a relationship with Elmer Staats?

STEELMAN: Yes, as I recall we had quite a few meetings and dealings and all.

JOHNSON: Was he sort of your link to the Bureau of the Budget? Was he the one that you dealt with over at the Bureau of the Budget?

STEELMAN: Yes, I think that's right, yes.

JOHNSON: Harold Enarson.

STEELMAN: Harold Enarson, yes.

JOHNSON: Do you remember his role at all?

STEELMAN: No, he was a member of my staff. I don't remember exactly what his function was.

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JOHNSON: Russell Andrews.

STEELMAN: Yes, he was a member of my staff.

JOHNSON: Do you remember them being helpful to you?

STEELMAN: Yes, yes they were.

JOHNSON: Okay. Let's talk about J. Edgar Hoover.

STEELMAN: Oh, yes.

JOHNSON: When did you first meet J. Edgar Hoover?

STEELMAN: I met Edgar Hoover when I was a mediator, when I was out settling the strike. The way I first got acquainted with Edgar, I was out in the wheat fields in Kansas. We had a vacancy after a fellow fainted and fell off of the wheat machine and we poured some cold water on him. After he came to we kicked him said, "Get the hell out of here, we don't allow weaklings."

So a fellow came walking up. He was badly dressed, unshaven; he looked like a bum if I ever saw one, and he came up and asked for a job. He looked at me and said, "Kid, would you sign my name? I can't write." And something, I think it was his eyes, something told me he was fibbing. So I signed for him.

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He worked with us a few days, and one night he said, "Where do you sleep at night?" I said, "I sleep up here on the back of that wheat stack because if the wind comes up it's not quite so cold." He said, "I'd like to go up and talk to you."

So we went up, and he and I were lying on the ground looking up into the sky, on a beautiful moonlight night, and he said, "You've been a little suspicious of me ever since I came here, haven't you?" I said, "Yes, to tell you the truth, I have because I thought you were lying when you asked me to sign your name." He said, "Well, I'm with the FBI," and he said, "I track down criminals who are itinerant workers." He said, "I usually just stay at a place two or three days, but," he said, "I stayed here this long because it looked like the man who runs your chuck wagon here is a man I've been looking for, for three years." He said, "I go up and down from Washington and Oregon, to Texas back and forth, back and forth, but, I've got to leave you, since he's not my man." He said, "I'll show you his picture I've got in the morning, looks just like him." I said, "He's not." So he said, "I've got to leave."

So, when I went to Washington I called up Edgar

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Hoover and told him the story. He and I became great friends.

JOHNSON: Did J. Edgar Hoover ever help you on your mediation projects, or assignments?

STEELMAN: Sometimes if I needed information. I remember once, one time down in Biloxi, Mississippi the Longshoremen were refusing to load some wheat. We sold a million bushels of wheat to Russia and they were supposed to be loaded in Biloxi, and the Longshoremen were on strike.

Some shrimp fishermen came in, and the Department of Agriculture started certifying that shrimp were not spoiled, that they were sound. So there was a ship that came in with some shrimp that were yellow and the Government inspector had read a book on shrimp and he thought they were bad. The inspector said, "We'll throw them overboard." And the Scandinavian fishermen said, "We'll throw you overboard; we don't throw the shrimp overboard."

So, I go down and as I say, these Government inspectors said, "These shrimp have been caught too long; they're bad, throw them over." But these people swore that they caught them yesterday. There was a

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priest there and these Scandinavian fishermen would come in to see the priest when they ended up a trip. So I went to see the priest and I said, "What about it?" He said, "Well, I'll tell you, these fishermen are telling you the truth. I don't understand it, but if they said they caught them yesterday, they did catch them yesterday. And being yellow has got nothing to do with it."

So, I found out from the editor of the newspaper there, there was a guy who roamed up and down the Gulf Coast and knew all about shrimp. You could catch a shrimp and show it to him and he'd tell you where you caught it. So, I called up Edgar Hoover and told him I wish he'd find this guy, and get him to come. I wanted to see him.

So, Edgar called me back in a while and said, "One of my men has found him over in New Orleans and my man has instructions to bring him to you immediately." Edgar said, "You can look out for them; they'll be there by tomorrow morning."

So, the guy comes in and this fellow said, "The Government inspectors are wrong. I know where they caught them. They caught them up where the Mississippi runs into the Gulf and it brings in some clay. That's

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why they were yellow." And so Edgar and I became friends.

As I say, when I was working out in the wheat fields this guy and I became friends. So when I went to Washington I told Edgar about it, and so Edgar and I were friends after that.

I remember one time Truman got mad at Edgar about something and told me to fire him. I said, "Mr. President we can't have a vacancy in that position. I'll have to find somebody to take his place." And Truman said, "Okay, let me know who you get." So I waited a week and I said, "Mr. President, I just can't find anybody to take Edgar's place."

And then Truman got mad at General [Lewis] Hershey, the Selective Service man, and he told me to fire him. So I waited a week and I said, "Mr. President, I've just looked the world over and can't find any." Truman knew I was fibbing and he said, "Okay, John, it's a good thing I have you around to keep things in order when I fly off the handle."

JOHNSON: Do you remember what he was angry with Hoover about?

STEELMAN: No, I don't. I remember only that he got mad at

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Edgar about something.

JOHNSON: Did J. Edgar Hoover ever talk to you about Truman or comment about Truman that you recall? Do you remember any opinions?

STEELMAN: Not specifically, but I know Edgar had a good opinion of him.

JOHNSON: He did?

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: Well, Truman relied on J. Edgar Hoover to do these investigations of accused Communists.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: And so he used the FBI to kind of blunt the radical tactics of the House Un-American Activities Committee.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: Did you ever get involved at all with that problem of civil liberties and people being accused of being sympathizers, Communist sympathizers or "Pinks" or whatever? Did you ever get involved in that problem or that issue?

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STEELMAN: Yes. Yes, I had a bit of it. As a matter of fact, when I went into the White House, I inherited a staff, as I told you once I think, of 350, and I fired all but 35. And some Communists there had infiltrated into the staff. I had Edgar go through them with a fine comb and fired them.

JOHNSON: Was this a fellow that had been a member, or was a member at that time, of the Communist Party?

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: He was still a member so far as you know?

STEELMAN: Some of them were, yes. Some of them were Communists.

JOHNSON: But now a lot of charges were thrown out there against people who were really not that bad.

STEELMAN: Well, sometimes, yes.

JOHNSON: You know, I was a member of the UEFE. Do you remember the UEFE union, United Electrical Farm Equipment Workers Union? They got into trouble and the Watkins case went to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court ruled that he did not have to tell about

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Communists that he had once known or been associated with?

I worked in a factory one summer and was persuaded to join the union there. Well, it happened to be the UEFE, which then was taken over by the CIO UAW and purged, more or less.

You were dealing with union leaders. Did you deal with them on the issue of Communist sympathies or Communist orientation? Did you ever have to deal with that issue involving the labor unions?

STEELMAN: Yes I did, sometimes.

JOHNSON: Sometimes.

STEELMAN: Yes, I remember I was having a conference once and one of the committee had a derby hat on and he came in and sat down at my table, so I pointed to him, and said, "Stand up." And he stood up, and I said, "I'll throw you out this third story window. Go over there and hang your damn hat up and come back here and sit down." And it was a steel lined derby hat. He had been hit over the head by the police so often he wore that hat.

JOHNSON: Of course, people like Walter Reuther got hit over

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the head by company goons too. Do you remember that in the Ford Motor Company?

STEELMAN: Oh yes.

JOHNSON: They had this guard force I guess that got the reputation of being goons.

Anything else about J. Edgar Hoover? Did he give you information about people in management or unions that you were dealing with that you could use when you were a conciliator to help? I think you mentioned an episode in one of the interviews that he had some embarrassing information about a company president who didn't want to settle with the union and you got information that he had, I guess, a girlfriend on the other side of town.

STEELMAN: Oh, yes. I know what you're talking about now. This was in West Virginia. The Stove Mounters Union was on strike, and I got all of them settled except one, and one fellow [owner] kept holding out. So I got Ed to dig me up some dirt on him so I could use it and I found out he had a beautiful home over on the west side of town and he had a girlfriend over on the east side of town. He had an Indian who took food to her and took care of her and all. So I got all that

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together. Then I called this guy in and I told him, "I have some information," and I told him what it was, and so he caved in right away and did what I asked him to. Later on he said, "I'm glad you made me do what I should have done in the first place."

JOHNSON: Is that right?

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: When you were getting management and labor to settle these disputes, your tactic was to, let's say, take the soft approach until things got kind of difficult. Then you would strong-arm -- do you feel that you had to use a kind of strong-arm tactic when it came down to the final issue in the settlement?

STEELMAN: Well, sometimes.

JOHNSON: But you would try to avoid taking sides.

STEELMAN: That's right. I remember once some fellows came down from Little Rock; they came down to the swamps and got a job, so they sawed down a Cypress tree and then they quit. The boss came around, and they found the axe and the sledge hammer over here on this side of the tree where it fell. They can't find the saw. He said, "I'll give you $10 if you can find that saw for me."

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Well, sir, I remembered Mutt and Jeff and so I walked down there to where the tree fell and I said to myself, "Where would I have gone with this saw, because the man on the right takes the saw." So, he would go this way. So I walked and I looked where there was a tree that could kick back if the limbs hit him, and kill you. So I walked straight out to where I would have gone if I had had this saw, and I walked right to it, as if I had put it there myself. So I never forgot that. It meant a lot to me.

JOHNSON: Put yourself in other people's shoes.

STEELMAN: That's right.

JOHNSON: You had to use a little imagination then too, didn't you? We've talked about Clark Clifford and J. Edgar Hoover. How about Leon Keyserling? We'll kind of lead into him. The draft of the first report to the President, economic report by the Council of Economic Advisors, was sent over to your department, to your office, and then you, apparently, or your people rewrote it.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: Do you remember that at all?

STEELMAN: Vaguely, yes.

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JOHNSON: And do you remember Keyserling's reaction to that?

STEELMAN: I don't...

JOHNSON: Well, he used the word "mangled".

STEELMAN: That we "mangled" his report.

JOHNSON: Yes. Do you remember that?

STEELMAN: Vaguely.

JOHNSON: And then they rewrote it again, more like the original. He said that was the only time that your people rewrote their report, or tried to redo what they had already done. What kind of relationship did you have with the Council of Economic Advisors? Did they report to the President through you?

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: They did report to you.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: Instead of directly to the President?

STEELMAN: Yes, that's right.

JOHNSON: So what would you do if you got a report from the

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Council of Economic Advisors? Who did you deal with ordinarily?

STEELMAN: I was trying to think who was chairman of that.

JOHNSON: Well, I think Nourse was first.

STEELMAN: Oh, yes, Dr. Nourse. He and I got along fine. I liked him.

JOHNSON: He was considered kind of a conservative economist. When he retired or resigned, Leon Keyserling expected to be immediately appointed to take his place. But it took seven or eight months for Keyserling to be appointed as Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: Do you have any idea why it took Truman that long to decide to appoint him as chairman?

STEELMAN: No, I don't. I don't remember why it dragged out that long.

JOHNSON: Did you ever talk to President Truman about Leon Keyserling and whether you favored or disfavored his role?

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STEELMAN: I'm sure I did, but I don't recall the specifics.

JOHNSON: You don't remember expressing your opinions about Keyserling to the President?

STEELMAN: I'm sure I did.

JOHNSON: Do you think they were positive or negative opinions?

STEELMAN: Somewhat negative, as I recall.

JOHNSON: Why did you have negative opinions of Keyserling?

STEELMAN: I forget. I didn't agree with some of his ideas. I don't remember what they were now.

JOHNSON: Well, he considered himself, I think, to be something of a Keynesian economist, more willing to appropriate money for Government programs than you were.

STEELMAN: I think maybe that was the trouble.

JOHNSON: Yet he was concerned about deficit spending or deficit financing as you were. Were you concerned about running deficits?

STEELMAN: Yes, I remember I was.

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JOHNSON: What did you feel was necessary to prevent deficits? What was your advice to the President?

STEELMAN: I don't remember specifically, but I remember I thought some of the departments were spending too much money for different things.

JOHNSON: How about the Republicans? The budget had a surplus I believe in 1947, the fiscal year ending in June of 1947. The Republican Congress decided they wanted to cut taxes.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: Truman vetoed their tax cut twice. The third time it passed over his veto in early 1948. Do you remember what your position was on cutting the Federal income tax rates?

STEELMAN: I don't recall just now.

JOHNSON: You don't remember if you favored the Republican tax cut or not?

STEELMAN: I don't remember.

JOHNSON: You see, Truman referred to that as the "rich man's tax cut."

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STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: Do you recall if you felt that way about it?

STEELMAN: I'm not sure, but I probably did agree with the President.

JOHNSON: Did you usually agree with Harry Truman?

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: But he was against cutting those taxes, especially on high incomes. Did you feel that the tax rate on high incomes was fair, or unfair?

STEELMAN: I think I had an idea that it was unfair.

JOHNSON: The high rate?

STEELMAN: Yes

JOHNSON: The marginal rate?

STEELMAN: I think I did.

JOHNSON: But you also wanted a balanced budget.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: How do you balance a budget if you cut taxes?

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STEELMAN: I don't remember the details now.

JOHNSON: Harry Truman did not think we were spending too much money on non-defense programs. Do you recall if you felt that there was too much money being spent on non-defense programs?

STEELMAN: I think I did. I think I thought we had too many government spending programs.

JOHNSON: How about defense spending? What was your position on defense spending, do you remember? This was before the Korean war started, like in 1948-49. Did you feel that the spending on Defense Department was too much or too little?

STEELMAN: I think at one time I thought it was too much. I thought they were wasting money and...

JOHNSON: Remember there was a dispute about building aircraft carriers or B-36 bombers.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: And the Admirals got really disgusted with Louis Johnson because he decided to cut spending on the aircraft carriers. Did you ever get involved in that?

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It was called the "Revolt of the Admirals." Did you ever get involved in that dispute?

STEELMAN: I think I probably did. I think I did.

JOHNSON: Which would you have sided with, the Air Force and the B-36 bombers, or the aircraft carriers? Do you recall whether you favored one or the other?

STEELMAN: I don't recall at the present time.

JOHNSON: You see, both of them cost an awful lot of money. We couldn't afford to build both in large numbers, so the President and Congress had to make a choice.

STEELMAN: I don't remember the details.

JOHNSON: This is sort of going back maybe on what we have already covered, but how did you see your duties in the White House? You know, some writers have said they're not clear about just what your role was in the White House. I think that was because you were not publicized as much; you were more behind the scenes. How would you define or explain what you saw as your job, or your role in the White House as The Assistant to the President?

Do you recall how you viewed your duties?

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STEELMAN: Yes. I considered my duties to keep as much as I possibly could from getting to the President, to handle it short of bothering the President with it. I remember Truman saying to me once he was glad he had me around to make life a little easier for him.

JOHNSON: But now if someone insisted on seeing the President with a problem or an issue, or question, what was your response to that?

STEELMAN: Well, it depends on what it was and who it was, whether I'd agree to let them. I would call up Matt Connelly and I'd say, "Matt, I think this Senator ought to see the President, so let him in."

JOHNSON: But if you didn't want him to see the President how would you kind of diplomatically change his mind?

STEELMAN: Well, I might call up and talk to Matt Connelly, and then tell the person that the President's schedule is full; we can't bother him any more and so forth. We have to leave the President alone.

JOHNSON: But if it was a problem that you felt the President needed to know about directly...

STEELMAN: Well, I'd say, "Let him in."

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JOHNSON: Do you recall how you made that decision whether it was important enough for the President to be "bothered" or not?

STEELMAN: Well, it depended on what it was and how important it seemed to be.

JOHNSON: At the time.

STEELMAN: At the time.

JOHNSON: Kind of a case by case...

STEELMAN: Yes, I'd call up Matt Connelly and say, "Matt, let him in."

JOHNSON: It is said that your job was to handle current operations and not to help initiate new policies. Did you see it that way?

STEELMAN: Pretty much so, yes.

JOHNSON: Did you feel that you had the duty, or the opportunity, to suggest new directions, or new policies for the President or did you keep those to yourself?

STEELMAN: Most of the time I'd keep them to myself I think. I considered my job as I say, keeping things away from

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the President, making life easier for him.

I don’t know whether I told you this or not. One time Truman and I were talking and I think we were flying back from Key West, and Truman said, “You know, I don’t like being President.” He said, “ I won’t run again.” He said “I’d like to go out to Independence, Missouri and take life easy, and let you go back to New York to your office and make some money.”

Then we heard that Charlie Wilson, head of General Motors, had introduced Dewey to make a speech out in Detroit and he said a lot of nice things about Dewey. So Truman said, “That changes everything.” He said, “Dewey’s smart, but he’s a hothead,” and we had a lot of international problems at the time. I’ve forgot exactly what, but he said, “Dewey’ll get us in a war.” Truman said, “I’m the only one that can beat him, so I’ll have to run.” Truman said, “The President is supposed to be giving all his time and attention all the time to the welfare of all the people, but, if he decides to run for reelection, he has to step down and neglect his duties and be a cheap politician out seeking votes.” Truman said, “That’s the way it is. I’ll appoint you; you know as much about this place as I do. You be President for the next three months and

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I'll be the politician."

So I tell people, "I've been President for three months."

JOHNSON: Did you get any hot potatoes to handle during those three months?

STEELMAN: Oh, Lord yes, all kinds of fried ones.

JOHNSON: But you contacted President Truman how many times when he was on the train campaigning? Do you recall how many times?

STEELMAN: Not very often.

JOHNSON: There were only two or three times, is that right?

STEELMAN: I didn't bother him, I kept things away from him.

JOHNSON: While he was out there campaigning, doing the WhistleStop.

STEELMAN: Yes. I tell people this President we have now is from Arkansas; he's the only Arkansan elected to be President, but he's not the first Arkansan to be President. I was appointed by Truman to be President for three months.

JOHNSON: That's kind of an interesting analogy, all right.

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Did you ever hear Truman say that if Eisenhower wanted to run in 1948, as a Democrat, that he would support him?

STEELMAN: No, I don't recall.

JOHNSON: You don't recall him ever saying that he would support Eisenhower if he ran as a Democrat?

STEELMAN: No, I don't recall. Eisenhower didn't know anything about the Government; he hadn't been in this country.

JOHNSON: Early in 1948 Jimmy Roosevelt, one of Franklin Roosevelt's sons, was part of a movement to draft Eisenhower to run in place of Truman. They decided Truman couldn't win and he was incompetent, so they started a Democrats for Eisenhower for President movement, which, of course, angered Harry Truman. Did he ever talk to you about President Roosevelt's sons, with Jimmy Roosevelt in particular, and about how some of the people in the ADA, Americans for Democratic Action, were promoting the idea of running Eisenhower in 1948? Did he ever talk to you about that?

STEELMAN: I don't remember. I don't remember anything like that.

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JOHNSON: Now, on another question, around 1950, I think, Truman wrote a memo to you in which he said, "We have tried Cabinet committees with small success." Apparently there was a kind of an experiment to set up what were called Cabinet committees, and it didn't work very well. Do you recall anything about these so-called Cabinet committees?

STEELMAN: No I don't.

JOHNSON: Committees within the Cabinet in 1950.

STEELMAN: No, I don't. I don't remember any of that.

JOHNSON: You don't recall if you were a part of the planning for that kind of reorganization in the Cabinet.

STEELMAN: No. I'm sure I was. I was a part of anything like that that came up, but I just don't remember the details.

JOHNSON: Well, okay, if that comes to mind, let me know and we'll put it on record. But that apparently was a kind of an interesting experiment that didn't quite work.

STEELMAN: Yes.

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JOHNSON: Okay, let's go back to '46 when the railroad strike was threatening to tie up the whole country.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: And Johnston and Whitney were the two union leaders.

STEELMAN: That's right.

JOHNSON: Do you remember that?

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: And you were with them over at the Statler Hotel. Do you remember meeting with them?

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: The President had already talked to the country the previous evening, and then that afternoon at 4 o'clock he was giving a speech to the Congress.

STEELMAN: To the Congress, yes.

JOHNSON: And part of his speech was that if they didn't go back to work he threatened to draft them.

STEELMAN: To seize the railroad, yes.

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JOHNSON: Conscript these workers into the Army.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: Do you remember that episode?

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: And you were there with Whitney and Johnston trying to get them to end this strike. Clifford was over at the Capitol waiting for you to give him a call that this had been settled. And there was this real squeeze, you know, to try to get it settled before he began his speech, but they hadn't done it yet, so he was giving his speech. He was down toward the end, at the point where he said that he was going to ask Congress to enact a law that he could draft them into the Army, force them to work.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: And about 3:57 you called Clifford over at the Capitol. Do you remember that episode and how you -- you apparently were pressuring Johnston and Whitney to get this settled or there would be awfully tough legislation?

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STEELMAN: Yes. I got them into an agreement and sent word to the President right while he was making his speech.

JOHNSON: Clifford copied it down and said, "Word has been received that the strike has ended on terms proposed by the President."

STEELMAN: That's right.

JOHNSON: He read that to the Congress and they said he got the biggest applause he ever got...

STEELMAN: That's right.

JOHNSON: ...while he was President.

STEELMAN: That's right.

JOHNSON: Then, of course, they still wanted to pass some pretty strong legislation regulating the unions. Do you recall any of the advice that you might have given Johnston and Whitney to get them to agree to this settlement?

STEELMAN: Well, we had a board, I've forgotten the name of it. We had an organization that in any dispute in the railroads, this organization would make recommendations.

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JOHNSON: It was an emergency board, or perhaps the Railway Labor Board.

STEELMAN: And so they did and the unions refused to go along. In fact, we did, we seized the railroads. And the President told me to run them. So I sent for the presidents of the railroads and I said, "Gentlemen, I find myself in possession of some properties that I don't know how to operate and I want to appoint each one of you as my assistants to go back and run the railroads." They said, "We'll do it, but under what terms?" And I said, "Under the terms that you were going with before the negotiations started."

Well then, I'll never forget, Whitney and Johnson said, "John, can't we at least have the raise that they had promised us before the strike?" I said, "No, as long as I operate the railroads, you'll operate them under the original wage."

So they said, "Damned if we ever go to the White House again."

JOHNSON: Well, in this particular instance, May 1946, eighteen of the unions had settled. It was only two that were holding out.

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STEELMAN: That's right.

JOHNSON: That was Johnston and Whitney. So they already had most of the unions settled. What kind of pressure could you, or did you, put on these two? How did you handle that in those last hours there in May of 1946. Did you meet with them separately, or meet with them together, or just how dial you...

STEELMAN: Most of the time together, as I recall.

JOHNSON: You just sat there in a room to listen to what they had to tell you? And you just kind of held your ground?

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: You didn't give any ground on that.

STEELMAN: As I say, I told them we're running the railroads under the conditions that existed before the dispute started. They said, "We'll never go to the White House again."

JOHNSON: Well, in 1948 the same thing happened. The railroads went out, and the government took them over. It took about two months I think to settle. Then in 1950 the railroads again had to be seized by the

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Government to keep them running, even after the Korean War had started. So you're in the railroad business quite a bit.

STEELMAN: That's right, quite a bit.

JOHNSON: When there was an opening at the top, the President appointed you temporary chairman, didn't he, of the National Security Resources Board?

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: He had Arthur Hill at one point as chairman. I believe he was Republican.

STEELMAN: Yes. Well, any time there was a vacancy in a high spot like that, Truman would just say, "John, I'm going to appoint you as chairman so as to take the heat off from me." He said, "I don't want people bothering me about it, so you be chairman until you find somebody to take it over."

JOHNSON: Well, there was a Jack Gorey, I don't know if you remember him. He was head for a while.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: And then there was an opening again, and Stu

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Symington was appointed for a while.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: But I think it is said that David Stowe tended to be the one who did the work, when you served as chairperson.

STEELMAN: That's right.

JOHNSON: Did you delegate David Stowe to sit in and help chair that board, the National Security Resources Board?

STEELMAN: Yes. David was my top assistant.

JOHNSON: Because of these strikes in 1946, and all this labor-management conflict that was going on, the Republican Congress in 1947 felt the unions had gone too far.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: So they wanted a new law to kind of replace the Wagner Act. Do you remember the Wagner Act of 1936, the New Deal legislation which made it a lot easier for unions to organize and to defend themselves against management?

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STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: All right, in 1947 the Taft-Hartley Law is passed by the Congress and that allowed for injunctions against unions, and required an 80 day cooling off period. It required a non-Communist oath from the union leaders, and required the unions to open their books to the Government inspectors, and perhaps some other things as well. I guess the managers could sue the unions for breach of contract.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: Instead of just the other way around. So, it was a law that leaned in the direction of management. It was to help the businessman. Truman vetoed it, but it was passed over his veto. There was this long veto message. Do you recall if you had input? Did you contribute to the language of that veto message, the Taft-Hartley veto?

STEELMAN: I don't think so.

JOHNSON: Were you called in to help write up or draft that veto speech?

STEELMAN: I don't think so. Clifford was our speech

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writer.

JOHNSON: So Clifford was the main one on doing that veto message?

STEELMAN: I think so, yes.

JOHNSON: Do you recall if you supported President Truman in his veto?

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: You did support him.

STEELMAN: I did, yes.

JOHNSON: And why did you do that?

STEELMAN: Well, I don't remember the details.

JOHNSON: Did you feel it leaned over too much the other way, against unions?

STEELMAN: I guess I must have. I must have, yes.

JOHNSON: Would you say you were friendly to the organized labor, to unions?

STEELMAN: Oh, yes.

JOHNSON: Were you friendly to the business side, the

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businessman, the owners, managers.

STEELMAN: Yes, I was. I was a friend of both sides.

JOHNSON: You tried to be even-handed.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: But there were times when a choice had to be made.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: You know, yes or no, or either/or.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: But you didn't necessarily have to be the one to make that decision?

STEELMAN: That's right.

JOHNSON: If it was a controversial problem, did you try to avoid involvement in controversies where you might be perceived as supporting one side or the other? I mean did you ever advise Harry Truman, the President, about whether he should or should not make decisions like vetoing the Taft-Hartley Bill.

STEELMAN: Yes, I'm sure I did.

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JOHNSON: Once in a while you would say that you felt that he should do this?

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: Or do that?

STEELMAN: And I would tell him what I thought and why.

JOHNSON: And did you leave it at that, or did you press -- did you ever press him on anything, kind of push him at all?

STEELMAN: I don't think so. I don't think so.

JOHNSON: When you talked to Harry Truman, the President, would he commit himself to you? How would he react to your advice? How would he respond when you advised him to make one choice or the other? Do you remember how he responded to your advice?

STEELMAN: No, I don't know. Anyhow he and I were both very frank with each other back and forth. So he would tell me how he felt and so forth.

JOHNSON: And you'd tell him how you felt.

STEELMAN: Yes.

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JOHNSON: But were you usually in agreement?

STEELMAN: Usually we were.

JOHNSON: But you were not in agreement on how to handle John L. Lewis, I think. Remember the President said, "We're going to take him to court, we're going to" -- I forget exactly his term -- but you advised him to be a little less harsh with John L. Lewis.

STEELMAN: Yes. I remember, Clifford thought it would be good politics to sue Lewis and to crack down on him, and I didn't agree with that. So, I was more friendly with Lewis.

JOHNSON: But it was popular with the public wasn't it, when the President cracked down on John L. Lewis?

STEELMAN: Yes

JOHNSON: When he got the court to rule against Lewis, I guess they finally ended up with a $10,000 fine on Lewis personally, and something like a $2 million fine on the United Mine Workers.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: That proved to be popular with the public, didn't

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it.

STEELMAN: Oh, yes. Yes, the public didn't like the Mine Workers.

JOHNSON: Did you change your mind at all about your feelings toward John L. Lewis? Did you ever feel that you were mistaken about taking an easier stance on John L. Lewis?

STEELMAN: No, I don't think so.

JOHNSON: You thought he was a pretty fair fellow?

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: You say you did not establish a friendship with John L. Lewis after you left the White House, that you never became friends.

STEELMAN: No, I don't remember having any dealings with him.

JOHNSON: Let's go back to Key West. We'll go down to Key West, not too far from here. Do you remember what you did at Key West ordinarily? What would be a typical day when you were with Truman and the rest of the staff at Key West? What might be a typical day when you were

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down there?

STEELMAN: I think we played poker most of the time; that was a typical day.

JOHNSON: I read somewhere that you weren't the best poker player. How do you respond to that?

STEELMAN: No, I never was as interested in it as some of them were.

JOHNSON: You did win once in a while though?

STEELMAN: Oh, yes, occasionally. I remember winning once and I'm raking in the chips and Truman said, "John, what was your title when you left Washington day before yesterday?" I said, "Mr. President, you ought to know, you're the one that gave it to me. I am The Assistant to the President of the United States." And Truman said, "That's what you think. From now on you're chief file clerk." So, all the rest of that trip when it came my time to deal, Truman would say, "Deal, file clerk." So, he said it so often I wondered if it was going to stick.

Well, we got back to Washington and Truman called me in and he said, "John, I'm going to have to reinstate you to your former position." He said,

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"Something's come up that a file clerk couldn't handle." He said, "The government of Italy is about to fall to the Communists, and if that happens we're going to have trouble all over the world." So he said, "You're hereby reappointed, and I'll give you a small job. You see that Italy does not fall."

JOHNSON: Do you recall what we did to help Italy?

STEELMAN: I had to get them back to work, and the steel mills weren't operating. They needed scrap iron, and I said, "Can't you go but in the battlefield and pick up some?" They said, "No, it's not that simple." So, I had to send some from here, and I'll never forget. I sent for Ben Fairless, the head of the U.S. Steel Corporation, I said, "Ben, I've got to do something you aren't going to like. You criticize me publicly all you have to, but let's still be friends." He said, "What is it, John." I said, "I've got to send some scrap iron to Italy." Ben said, "Well, if you have to, you have to. I won't criticize you," and he never did.

So, I finally got the Italians back to work and I saved the government, and Italy bestowed a gold medal of honor upon me. Sent me a gold medal of honor. I remember. And as long as I was in the Government I

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wasn't allowed to accept it, so the State Department had to hold it for me until I left the Government.

So, when I left the Government I called up the State Department and the Secretary of State said, "Lord, I found this medal here when I took the job, and I was afraid my predecessor forgot to give it to you and I didn't know what to do." So I finally got my medal. It's a Medal of Honor from Italy.

JOHNSON: Great. You were involved with the National Security Resources Board at the time, I suppose.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: And you were concerned about stockpiling materials, especially critical materials.

STEELMAN: Right.

JOHNSON: Rubber, tin...

STEELMAN: Steel.

JOHNSON: Steel. And those had to be stockpiled for American defense purposes.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: But we also had to try under the Marshall Plan to

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get basic materials to Europe, I suppose.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: Do you recall any other incident, like this one with Italy where you were involved in helping a European economy to recover?

STEELMAN: I can't remember the details now. I remember one time I had to do something for Holland. I've forgot what it was now.

JOHNSON: For the Dutch.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: For their economy.

STEELMAN: Yes. I've forgotten the details.

JOHNSON: Well, one of the problems they had, I guess, was they were flooded; the Germans flooded part of Holland during the war, so they had to get that water pumped out from the land there.

STEELMAN: That's right.

JOHNSON: You know, there are a couple of people, Joe Feeney and Charles Maylon, who served as liaison between the

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President and the Congress. They apparently dealt with the Congress on certain issues. If the President wanted to get word to Congressmen about his legislative ideas, Joe Feeney and Charles Maylon were two that were used in that capacity.

STEELMAN: I see.

JOHNSON: Do you remember those two people at all?

STEELMAN: Just vaguely. I don't remember much about them.

JOHNSON: But you didn't have much to do with them?

STEELMAN: No, Truman came from the Congress, and he said I had more influence with the Congress of the United States than anybody since President Roosevelt. If Truman had sent a bill up to Congress and there's something that he really wanted passed, Truman would say, "John, I wish you'd get in touch with the Congress and tell them that you personally want that done and they'll do it." I built it [Congressional relations] for ten years. When I'd settle a strike in a certain place, I'd know that the Senator was getting mail about it and telephone calls about the strike, so I'd tell the Senator's secretary how to answer the questions; tell them you've been in touch with the director of the

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U.S. Conciliation Service, and he assured the Senator that he has a man on the way to settle it and get production back and so forth. So, for ten years I built that up, and Truman said I had more influence with the Congress than anybody since Roosevelt.

JOHNSON: Did you ever go to the Congress, to the Hill as they say? Did you ever go up there to represent the interests of the White House while you were Special Assistant?

STEELMAN: I don't recall going up. I'd just call up. I'd call up the chairman of whatever committee was concerned and I remember I'd tell the Senator that "This bill Truman sent up there yesterday, Senator; I wrote that bill, we need that done, so will you see that it's passed?" And he'd say, "Okay, John."

So, as I say, I had more influence than anybody since Roosevelt.

JOHNSON: Was it part of your agreement that you would not personally go to the Congress and testify, or be part of any of the hearings?

STEELMAN: Yes. I never went up the Hill but once. One time old Congressman [Malcolm] Tarver of Georgia got

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mad at me and he cut $30,000 off of my appropriation. That had never happened to me before, so it made me mad. I went up to the Hill and testified before the Congress and I told them that I needed this money.

Most of the departments would pad their requests for money, because they knew the Senators or the Congress would like to cut it. But I'd always send up exactly what I needed to pay my men. So, I went up the Hill and I told them. I said, "Congressman Tarver got mad at me after somebody told him about an arbitration that happened in their state and they thought I did it, but I had nothing to do with it." So, I got Tarver overruled; they gave me back what he cut and they added $30, 000 to it.

JOHNSON: Is that right?

Well, that was while you were director of the Conciliation Service, before you went to the White House.

STEELMAN: That's right. Then I decided to get Tarver fired. He'd been in the Congress for 30 years. So I called up old George Goode, head of the American Federation of Labor in Atlanta, and I said, "George, you're always asking me if there's anything you can do

[183]

for me. At last I've found something." And while we were talking he said, "Okay, a million dollars has already been appropriated and if necessary we'll add another million." So we beat the hell out of Tarver. I got him fired out of the Congress because he was unfair to me.

JOHNSON: Was he a reactionary type of legislator would you say, reactionary?

STEELMAN: Yes, yes he was.

JOHNSON: There were a few of those all right.

STEELMAN: But he was the first one, the only one that ever tried to cut my appropriation, because I only asked for what I really needed.

JOHNSON: You were on the Williamsburg a number of times too. Did you ride on the Williamsburg down to Key West or did you fly down there when you went down?

STEELMAN: Most of the time we'd fly, but sometimes we went on the boat.

JOHNSON: Do you recall, let's say, a typical day on the Williamsburg? How did you spend your time when you were on the Williamsburg?

[184]

STEELMAN: Oh, I think we'd play poker most of the time.

I remember one time old Fred Vinson visited us out at the White House, down at Key West, and he quoted some Greek or Latin phrase, and Truman said, "What did you say?" And he told him, and Truman said, "That's not what the man said." And so he said, "Why, Mr. President, I've been using that in speeches for 30 years." "Well," Truman said, "that's worse than I thought. I thought you just had a slip of the tongue. You've been wrong for 30 years."

Truman had a perfect visual memory, he was one of two people I ever found out that had that, and he told Matt Connelly, "Go down to the yacht and look on the shelf, go in the library, and look on the bottom shelf, two feet to the right, and there's this book, and turn to page so and so." So, he said, "On second thought, you better bring it up and let me show Vinson."

So, he goes down, he brings the book up and sure enough, so the President was right. Vinson said, "Damned if I ever argue with you again."

JOHNSON: Was it a working vacation for the President? Did he do work too while he was on the Williamsburg?

STEELMAN: Oh yes.

[185]

JOHNSON: There was work and play.

STEELMAN: Work, work, work all the time and play too.

JOHNSON: Well, did you have some work to do when you were on the Williamsburg?

STEELMAN: Oh yes. Yes.

JOHNSON: Discuss issues, prepare memos, that sort of thing?

STEELMAN: Yes. Cabinet officers would get in touch with me and say, "We need so and so; can you see that we get it."

JOHNSON: You mean they would phone you on the yacht.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: I guess you had the Signal Corps to send memos, by wireless.

STEELMAN: That's right. I was on duty all the time.

JOHNSON: You know they're restoring the Williamsburg. I think by the end of this year they may have it back here in the United States.

STEELMAN: Oh, good.

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JOHNSON: It's being restored over in Italy.

STEELMAN: Is that right?

JOHNSON: And they're going to put it on the Potomac River.

STEELMAN: Oh, that's good.

JOHNSON: Won't that be something to be able to revisit that?

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: Since we're talking about the Williamsburg and Key West again, you know they have that poker table down there, and they have this top they can put on it so when Bess would be there she could see this nice round table, without the...

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: Here's a photograph of you on the Williamsburg, in August 1948. That's Wally Graham to your right, and then Charlie Ross, I recognize them.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: But you did do work.

Do you remember when Jimmy Byrnes came back from

[187]

Europe, meeting with the Soviets, and he wanted to report to the American people on his trip, on this conference. And he was going to do it without even going over the speech with the President.

STEELMAN: That's right. He was going to talk...

JOHNSON: Do you remember that?

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: And the President found out about it. He got hold of Jimmy Byrnes and he said, "Come down and see me," and the President was on the Williamsburg. I think that Byrnes had to fly in a Catalina flying boat, land by the Williamsburg...

STEELMAN: He said, "I don't know how I'm going to get there." And Truman said, "Well, you come even if you have to wade."

JOHNSON: Is that right.

STEELMAN: Yes. And Truman ate him out good.

JOHNSON: He came onboard while you were out there in the sea.

STEELMAN: Yes, he was going to report to the public before

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he reported to the President, so Truman really ate him out.

JOHNSON: Did you hear any of the conversation between Truman and Byrnes on that occasion?

STEELMAN: Yes, I'm sure.

JOHNSON: Did you hear some of the tone of the conversation?

STEELMAN: Yes. Truman really ate him out.

JOHNSON: You're sure of that.

STEELMAN: Yes, he really tore him apart.

JOHNSON: Byrnes finally resigned under pressure.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: Well, why do you think Byrnes acted like that? Why did he behave that way?

STEELMAN: He got what we call Potomac fever. He got the big head, and he got too big for his britches.

JOHNSON: Did you get the impression that Byrnes felt that he should have been President?

STEELMAN: Yes. Yes, I think he always thought he was

[189]

superior to Truman.

JOHNSON: Well, he had been sort of doing for Roosevelt what you were doing for Truman.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: He was head of the Office of War Mobilization, I believe it was called. Was he kind of like Chief of Staff to Roosevelt during World War II?

STEELMAN: Yes, I guess he was.

JOHNSON: During the war.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: Did you ever have occasion to deal with Jimmy Byrnes?

STEELMAN: Yes, I'm sure I did. I don't remember any details but I'm sure I had dealings with him.

JOHNSON: Do you remember any of the impressions that you had of Jimmy Byrnes, his personality?

STEELMAN: Well, I always thought Jimmy had a feeling that he should be President instead of Truman. He'd had Potomac fever as we called it.

[190]

JOHNSON: Yes, that was Truman's feeling certainly.

There was a conference at the Truman Library in May 1977 on the administration. It was a conference about the administration of the Truman White House, and a number of staff people were there, including Murphy, Keyserling and David Stowe, Robert Turner and so on. Do you remember being invited to that conference at the Truman Library in 1977?

STEELMAN: Yes. I don't remember why, but I couldn't go.

JOHNSON: You couldn't go.

STEELMAN: I had a meeting or something.

JOHNSON: Well, the commentaries were printed up. Did you get a copy of that book by Francis Heller, that Francis Heller edited?*

STEELMAN: I don't recall. I must have, but I don't remember it now.

JOHNSON: Do you know Francis Heller?

STEELMAN: No.

*Francis Heller, ed., The Truman White House: The Administration of the Presidency. 1945-1953 (Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1980).

[191]

JOHNSON: Well, he helped Truman write his memoirs after he left the White House. But it said in that book, in the proceedings of that conference, that you handled a large share of the workload that came over the desk, for Truman. And it said that Harold Enerson helped out on the labor relations side. Do you recall it that way? Harold Enerson?

STEELMAN: Harold was one of my assistants, yes.

JOHNSON: August 22, 1996 you remember him working with the labor people?

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: Russell Andrews helped with the general stream of visitors and correspondence.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: Was he the one sitting in front of your door of your office?

STEELMAN: I think so, yes.

JOHNSON: Was he sort of your Matt Connelly?

STEELMAN: Yes.

[192]

JOHNSON: Did he handle appointments and so on?

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: But neither was a deputy. Did you have a deputy?

STEELMAN: I don't think so.

JOHNSON: You had no deputies.

STEELMAN: I don't think so.

JOHNSON: Also until the end of 1951 it says that you had occasional assistance on the consulting basis of a former staff member, Robert Turner, and the full time help of Turner's "girl Friday" Marjorie Belcher. Do you remember Marjorie Belcher.

STEELMAN: I vaguely remember, yes.

JOHNSON: And she helped complete Turner's involvement in winding up work on commodities, materials and stockpiling questions. She also processed Tariff Commission recommendations under the injury provisions of the Reciprocal Trade Act. It says that you, John Steelman, "was his own man, and kept his own counsel." Did you get involved in any of the trade issues, tariffs, and that sort of thing?

[193]

STEELMAN: Yes, I'm sure I did. I don't remember the details.

JOHNSON: Do you remember offering any advice about trade policy, about whether to eliminate tariffs, reduce tariffs, or to increase them? What was your position on trade? Were you a free trader?

STEELMAN: More or less, as I recall I was, yes.

JOHNSON: Were you for eliminating tariffs on trade?

STEELMAN: I just don't remember.

JOHNSON: Of course, we had these reciprocal trade agreements, which Roosevelt I think had started, and we were still using those. That's still a big issue now.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: Eliminating tariffs. In Heller's book, it says also that Murphy and you and Short, Joe Short, this would have been after Charlie Ross died at his desk of a heart attack, that you managed to see the President "almost as often as he might have wished and usually with relatively little delay."

STEELMAN: Yes.

[194]

JOHNSON: Was that true?

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: So you, Murphy, and Joe Short who was the Press Secretary, were you the only ones that could almost have an open door with the President, that you could come at any time to see him?

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: You know, generally the President tried to set up these 15 minute segments. Fifteen minutes for each visitor. Did you get a daily record of his agenda for that day? Did you have an agenda -- it's called a daily sheet -- I believe?

STEELMAN: Yes, I think I did.

JOHNSON: So you knew each day who the President was going to see, was scheduled to see.

STEELMAN: I knew who he was going to see and when.

JOHNSON: Of course, there were some visitors that came in that were off-the-record.

STEELMAN: Yes.

[195]

JOHNSON: Did you help get some people into the Oval Office off-the-record, that is those who were not scheduled to…

STEELMAN: I might have a few times if it was something very important, but not often.

JOHNSON: So each day you knew who the President was supposed to see, and if there was a gap in there somewhere you might be able to go in? Did you ever feel you had to go in and interrupt a session or a meeting that he had with somebody?

STEELMAN: I don't recall any instance of that.

JOHNSON: If you were going to go see President Truman in the Oval Office, how would you arrange that?

STEELMAN: Oh, well, I guess I'd call Matt Connelly and say "I've got to see the Boss, how soon can I get in." And he'd look at his calendar and so forth.

JOHNSON: He'd give you a time and then they'd probably tell the President that you wanted to see him at that time.

STEELMAN: That's right.

JOHNSON: Did he ever put you off? Did you ever find out

[196]

that you couldn't meet the President that day, or that you had to wait several days?

STEELMAN: I don't think so.

JOHNSON: You never had to wait more than a few hours, right?

STEELMAN: Right.

JOHNSON: And did he always seem, well, if not happy, at least pleased to see you?

STEELMAN: Oh, yes. Yes.

JOHNSON: Was he always in good humor when you came into his Oval Office?

STEELMAN: Yes. Yes, he always was.

JOHNSON: He was always in good humor?

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: Would he sometimes talk to you about somebody that he had had problems with or doubts about?

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: He would? Well, you mentioned Clifford, but were

[197]

there any other people that he would comment to you about in a kind of opinionated way?

STEELMAN: Well, yes, some Senator would come in to see him and he'd comment on it.

JOHNSON: Did he ever comment about [J. William] Fulbright, a fellow Arkansan?

STEELMAN: I don't remember. I don't remember him commenting on Fulbright.

JOHNSON: In 1946 Fulbright was first elected to the Senate.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: But the Republicans, of course, took over. And so Fulbright felt that was a reflection on the President, that the President was the one who lost the election.

So, reportedly Fulbright suggested, and it apparently got into the press, that President Truman appoint Arthur Vandenberg as Secretary of State, and then the President should resign, because at that point, the Constitution said the Secretary of State was next in line to be President.

STEELMAN: Yes.

[198]

JOHNSON: So then we'd have a Republican President to work with a Republican Congress. And the President after he heard about this, do you remember how he referred to Senator Fulbright? That he wasn't all that bright.

STEELMAN: I'd forgotten now what it was.

JOHNSON: Senator "Halfbright," do you remember that?

STEELMAN: Senator Halfbright, yes.

JOHNSON: Do you remember Truman referring to him as Senator Halfbright?

STEELMAN: Yes. Senator Halfbright, yes.

JOHNSON: Do you remember him ever using that terminology?

STEELMAN: Yes, he didn't like Fulbright.

JOHNSON: Well, when he commented about people, was he usually critical because they were conceited? Was it because he felt they were conceited or arrogant?

STEELMAN: Yes, he'd say they had Potomac fever.

JOHNSON: He liked to use that term.

STEELMAN: Yes.

[199]

JOHNSON: Did President Truman feel that Clark Clifford had gotten Potomac fever?

STEELMAN: Yes. I don't remember him using that term, but he'd say, "I wish Clifford would learn to tend to his business of speech writing and let us run the Government." He didn't like Clifford's suggestions, because Clifford always made some smart aleck suggestion, that so and so would be smart politics. Truman would say, "Politics -- we're not running for office, we're running the country."

JOHNSON: Well, we've talked about Jimmy Byrnes who you say had Potomac fever. How about Harold Ickes, did you ever meet Harold Ickes?

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: Secretary of the Interior.

STEELMAN: Yes, I knew Harold.

JOHNSON: What kind of relationship did you have with Harold Ickes? What did you think of him?

STEELMAN: Well, he and I got along. We got along. I'll never forget; one time I was at a party in the Mayflower Hotel in Washington and there was a woman

[200]

there who was an Ambassador to some country, and Tom Dewey came walking down the way there, and she said, "Dewey looks like the little man on the wedding cake." And Ickes said, "I'm going to ruin him with that. I'm going to plaster him with it, I'm going to mention it to the press, and I'm going to have cartoons running."

So, sure enough, Ickes didn't like Dewey and he called him the "little man on the wedding cake." I remember that ruined Dewey.

One time I was out in Billings, Montana and Dewey was running for office. I remember Dewey going down with the laundry, and nobody applauded. Everybody there was thinking, "He does look like the little man on the wedding cake." And that ruined him. Ickes really, really got him with that.

JOHNSON: I think it was Alice Roosevelt Longworth, who was a daughter of Teddy Roosevelt, who originated that term.

STEELMAN: Yes, that's who it was, yes. Yes, she said, "He looks like the little man on the wedding cake."

JOHNSON: Did you ever meet Tom Dewey?

STEELMAN: Oh yes.

[201]

JOHNSON: How did he impress you?

STEELMAN: I remember one time the Government had loaned a fellow a million dollars to build a wonderful hotel out in Billings, Montana, and I was out in Denver. I had settled a strike on the telephone with the manager of that new hotel. So, I decided to go out there; I wanted to see that hotel. I went out there and I got in a cab and said, "Take me to the Great Northern Hotel." He said, "You can't get in there. Mr. Dewey's campaign train is coming in and all the rooms are taken." He said, "I better take you to so and so," and I said, "Take me to the Great Northern."

So we went in. He went in with me, took my bag; we went in, and the manager said, "Oh, Commissioner Steelman, we've been looking for you all day." And this guy was disgusted; he said, "You must be Dewey's campaign manager."

JOHNSON: Now, let's see. Edwin Pauley. Do you remember one of the reasons that Harold Ickes left the Cabinet was that he testified against Edwin Pauley. Truman tried to appoint Pauley as Under Secretary of the Navy. And Pauley, I think, favored state ownership of the tidelands oil, instead of Federal ownership.

[202]

STEELMAN: Oh, yes.

JOHNSON: Tidelands oil was one of the issues. Did you get involved in that issue about who owns, or who should keep ownership of the tidelands oil, you know, the oil pools in the tidelands?

STEELMAN: I don't remember..

JOHNSON: Pauley had also helped bail out the Democrat Party. He was the Treasurer of the Democrat National Committee at one time and helped them monetarily, and he was probably about the only millionaire oil man who was really, strong in support of Truman. But the Congress turned down that appointment, and Pauley withdrew. So he did not become Assistant-Secretary of the Navy. Did you ever have any dealings with Edwin Pauley?

STEELMAN: I don't recall any. I might have, but I don't recall any.

JOHNSON: Who were some of the other Cabinet people now that we haven't mentioned? I have mentioned General George Marshall. According to one of the interviews in your papers, General Marshall called you one day and said he

[203]

wanted you to go with him into the Oval Office to see the President. And he had this letter from General Eisenhower in Europe. This would have been, I suppose, right after the war ended, maybe late 1945 or maybe in '46.

STEELMAN: I don't remember.

JOHNSON: And it had to do with his relationship with his chauffeur over there, Kay Summersby. Do you remember that issue?

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: Do you remember being in the Oval Office with General Marshall and that issue being discussed with the President?

STEELMAN: Yes. Yes, I remember. Marshall said he wanted me to be a witness.

JOHNSON: What do you remember? What happened?

STEELMAN: Anyhow he wanted...

JOHNSON: He wanted you to be a witness.

STEELMAN: He was critical of Eisenhower I remember that. I can't remember his chauffeur's name now.

[204]

JOHNSON: It's Kay Summersby.

STEELMAN: Kay Summersby, yes.

JOHNSON: Was that what the issue was about when you were with Marshall?

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: In the Oval Office.

STEELMAN: That's right.

JOHNSON: What do you remember about that?

STEELMAN: Marshall wanted to criticize Eisenhower and he was afraid that Truman was too prejudiced in favor of Eisenhower and so he wanted me as a witness that...

JOHNSON: But was it a letter? Did he have two letters with him, one letter from Eisenhower to him and then a letter that he was going to send Eisenhower?

STEELMAN: That's right. Yes, he was going to burn Eisenhower up, you know.

JOHNSON: Because of what?

STEELMAN: Oh, Eisenhower had said he was going to divorce

[205]

Mamie and marry Kay, and Marshall told him, "If you do that, I'll bust you out of the Army, so help me. Don't you dare do that."

JOHNSON: And what did Truman say?

STEELMAN: I don't remember now.

JOHNSON: Did he say he agreed with Marshall, but that he should do something with the letters? What did he advise Marshall to do with those two letters, to burn them or to save them?

STEELMAN: Oh, yes. Truman said, "Take the letters over and burn them." And so on the way out, Marshall said to me, "This is one time I'm going to defy the President. I ain't going to burn them; I'm going to file them. I'm going to leave them in the record." And then he did.

JOHNSON: Have those letters ever been found since then, though? Have you ever heard of those letters being found?

STEELMAN: Those letters came up missing and nobody knows -- somebody stole them out of the files, and nobody knows what became of them. They've never been found.

[206]

JOHNSON: So, did you agree with Harry Truman that General Marshall was one of the greatest men of his generation?

STEELMAN: Yes, that's right.

JOHNSON: What impressed you about General Marshall?

STEELMAN: I don't know. He knew what he was talking about and yet he was a humble sort of a guy; he wasn't a smart aleck, or anything of the sort. He was just a great guy.

JOHNSON: Do you remember when Harry Truman and Winston Churchill went to Fulton, Missouri to Westminster College and Winston Churchill was going to give a speech there? That's where he used the term, "Iron Curtain." The Iron Curtain speech.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: They went by train; Clifford and Vaughan and others played poker with Winston Churchill. He was not a great poker player; maybe he would have been fun for you to play poker with.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: You stayed in the White House apparently while the

[207]

President was out here in Missouri.

STEELMAN: Yes.

STEELMAN: Giving that Iron Curtain speech. When the President was gone from the White House and Clifford was gone from the White House, and Charlie Ross probably was with the President out there, what was your job? What did they tell you when they all left the White House?

STEELMAN: Well, I was more or less in charge.

JOHNSON: Did they usually tell you that?

STEELMAN: If the Cabinet had any problems they'd take them up with me.

JOHNSON: Well, do you recall them saying to you that we're going to Missouri and we want you to be more or less in charge of the White House while we're gone?

STEELMAN: Yes, that's right. When Truman would leave, he would say, "You take over."

JOHNSON : He wanted you to stay in the White House while they were gone.

STEELMAN: Yes.

[208]

JOHNSON: Was that generally the rule except, of course, when you were in Key West with the President. Well, who was in charge of the White House then? What kind of monitoring was going on in the White House when you were in Key West with the President and most of the staff?

STEELMAN: I don't recall now who.

JOHNSON: You said Clifford oftentimes was not at Key West. Does that mean that he would sort of be the key person at the White House?

STEELMAN: No. No, he never was any key person there, but I've forgotten who would be more or less in charge when we were away.

JOHNSON: You're not sure who on the staff?

STEELMAN: No, I'm not sure who it was now.

JOHNSON: Well, it was important for Connelly maybe to be there. I guess Connelly would be with the President down there, and maybe if Ross was with him, you wonder who was there at the White House to oversee things.

STEELMAN: I just don't recall now who we had in charge

[209]

there.

JOHNSON: Well, when you were gone from your office traveling or whatever, who did you rely on to sort of handle things when you were out of your office?

STEELMAN: I think it was David Stowe.

JOHNSON: David Stowe, if he was available.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: If he wasn't available do you know who else you might have depended on?

STEELMAN: Oh, I had another fellow who's now in Seattle, Washington, H.D. Kreager [Executive Officer, Office of Defense Mobilization in 1952-53].

JOHNSON: He's still living?

STEELMAN: H. Dewayne Kreager.

JOHNSON: And was he sort of a right-hand man for you?

STEELMAN: Yes, of mine.

JOHNSON: If you didn't have David Stowe to handle things, you would ask Kreager?

[210]

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: Did he have a specialty? Was he an expert in any particular field?

STEELMAN: No, not that I recall.

JOHNSON: Had he ever been a conciliator? I suppose you hired him, didn't you?

STEELMAN: Yes. Let me see. Oh, I know. The Office of Defense Mobilization -- the chairman was fired; Truman fired him for some reason. I've forgotten what it was now. So Truman appointed me. Truman, any time he had a vacancy, he'd appoint me so nobody would be putting pressure on him, and so in the National Security Resources Board I found Kreager. I abolished that board and I went back to the White House, and took Kreager with me. So that's the way we got acquainted.

JOHNSON: Did he stay, with you then until you finished your work at the White House?

STEELMAN: Yes. Yes, he did. H.D. Kreager, he's now back in Seattle.

JOHNSON: Have you visited with him in the recent years?

[211]

STEELMAN: No, I haven't.

[In World War II] certain civilian jobs were important enough that we weren't allowed to go into the military, and my job was one of them. I was the Director of the United States Conciliation Service, so I was forbidden by law to quit and join the Navy, so the farthest I got was corporal in World War I, along with Hitler.

JOHNSON: Yes, well, unfortunately Hitler went in the wrong direction.

STEELMAN: Schickelgruber.

JOHNSON: Just to pick up, I think we lost a little bit here. We're talking about reconversion and getting industry to really produce again so you could take controls off, but you were really worried about inflation. I know Truman was constantly worried about inflation at that point. And if they hadn't produced as rapidly as possible, you weren't sure what you could do to get them to. But you did realize that the OPA had to be maintained, you had to continue some price controls, didn't you?

STEELMAN: For a time, yes.

[212]

JOHNSON: At the end of World War I they just took them off didn't they suddenly? And then we had that rapid deflation and then recession, and was that the lesson that you didn't want to repeat?

STEELMAN: Didn't want to repeat.

I remember Truman showed me a memo that the Cabinet had been to a meeting down in Hot Springs, Virginia, with the corporation presidents, and they said, "After every war there's a depression. And this is the greatest war, therefore, look out for the greatest depression in history." And Truman had me read it and said, "What do you think of that?" I said, "Well, historically that's the truth, but," I said, "it doesn't necessarily mean that. What we need to do is get to work." And Truman said, "Well, I'm always looking for something easy to give you to do; you see that we don't have a depression."

So, I called in these same presidents that were the basis of that memo. I said, "I understand you fellows are expecting a big depression." They said, "Yes, we always have one after a war." I said, "You don't want one, do you?" They said, "No." I said, "Well, you may be interested to know I have

[213]

instructions from the President to see that we don't have one."

JOHNSON: Did you talk to them about the unions? Did you say…

STEELMAN: What you need to do is to get work. And they said, "It's going to cost us." I think they said three billion dollars to transfer from war production to peacetime, and the Federal Reserve won't loosen up on money, and so I remember the Federal Reserve is under the Congress, not under the Executive. But I had enough influence with the Congress to fire Marriner Eccles of Salt Lake City, who was head of the Federal Reserve. I asked him three times to loosen up on money and he didn't do it, so I fired him.

I remember going in one morning and telling the President, "Mr. President, I just did a terrible thing you may hear about; I thought I better tell you." He said, "What's that." I said, "I fired Marriner Eccles, head of the Federal Reserve." Truman said, "My God, what did you do a thing like that for." I said, "Well, he won't cooperate with me on a job you told me to do." "Oh," Truman said, "in that case leave him fired."

JOHNSON: That's a good story.

[214]

But now, did you talk to him about the unions? Did you talk about how to deal with the unions, because you needed the cooperation of the labor unions too?

STEELMAN: That's right.

JOHNSON: After World War I, I think management tried its best to break the unions.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: Were you concerned that they were going to try to break the unions after World War II?

STEELMAN: No, not particularly.

JOHNSON: Did you talk to them about cooperating with the labor unions?

STEELMAN: I said, "You cooperate and I'll try to see that the unions cooperate." So I had mediators out in the field and we tried to talk some sense into them.

JOHNSON: So now you're talking partnership between labor and management?

STEELMAN: That's right.

JOHNSON: Rather than being adversaries.

[215]

STEELMAN: That's right.

JOHNSON: Traditionally they had been adversaries.

STEELMAN: Yes, don't be fighting all the time, cooperate.

JOHNSON: Okay, so that was your message.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: Instead of this old business of always trying to be against each other, try to work together.

STEELMAN: That's right.

JOHNSON: And yet even though you had quite a lot of strikes in 1946, you were able to settle them in a way that satisfied both sides.

STEELMAN: Yes

JOHNSON: Would you characterize it as moderate wage increases and moderate price increases?

STEELMAN: That's right.

JOHNSON: Truman said sometimes, you know, that management could stand a wage increase without raising prices. Did you always agree that the big businesses could give

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a wage increase without raising their prices?

STEELMAN: No, I don't know that I did.

JOHNSON: You generally went along with the idea that a modest, or a proportionate price increase was justified?

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: You don't think they ever had excess profits from war production, or whatever?

STEELMAN: Not particularly. Sometimes they did.

JOHNSON: There was an excess profits tax during World War II and it was reintroduced during the Korean War. Did you support the excess profits tax during the Korean War?

STEELMAN: I don't recall.

JOHNSON: Because now you were in charge of the Office of Defense Management.

STEELMAN: Defense Mobilization.

JOHNSON: Do you remember Charlie Wilson, "Electric Charlie."

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STEELMAN: Yes, "Electric Charlie" we called him.

JOHNSON: To distinguish him from what, the president of General Motors. They both had the same middle initial, both of them were Charles E. Wilson.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: So, they had to distinguish one from the other by calling the head of General Electric, "Electric Charlie."

STEELMAN: Electric Charlie and "Auto Charlie."

JOHNSON: Auto Charlie?

STEELMAN: Yes, Auto Charlie.

JOHNSON: "Electric Charlie" was brought in. Truman had felt that he was a kind of a liberal corporation president, didn't he?

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: So after the Korean War started, Congress set up this Office of Defense Mobilization.

STEELMAN: Yes.

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JOHNSON: And Charlie, Electric Charlie Wilson, was appointed to head that. I think in early '51 they got into an argument over a wage increase. The Wage Stabilization Board advised a certain wage increase and Charlie Wilson apparently did not agree with that. He felt that the wages were going up too fast in this instance, and he was overruled, so he decided to resign. Do you remember that? He resigned over wage issues.

STEELMAN: I remember Truman appointed me head of the Office of Defense Mobilization. And so finally the time came that I recommended to the President that we abolish it. And we did, but while I was head of that I had power over the President's Cabinet.

JOHNSON: Well, you were there until Henry Fowler took your place?

STEELMAN: I guess, yes.

JOHNSON: The last few months.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: I think it probably ended under Eisenhower. In fact, Eisenhower ended a number of things. He ended

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the Point 4 program too, didn't he? Did you have any input into the Point 4? Do you remember in the 1949 inauguration speech Truman came up with the idea of Point 4 which was kind of like a Marshall Plan for the under developed, or third world countries. Did he ever talk to you about the Point 4 program?

STEELMAN: I'm sure he did, but I don't remember the details.

JOHNSON: And then they cut funding on it because of the Korean War. It sort of fizzled out during the Eisenhower administration. But that was another important foreign issue.

How about the housing problem? Wilson Wyatt, do you remember him?

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: He was the first of what was called the Housing Expeditor.

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: And he got involved with the Lustron Corporation. Do you remember the Lustron Corporation had this plan for a kind of aluminum home and mass production? It

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was sort of like a bulb in shape, and the Government loaned them quite a bit of money. Wilson Wyatt apparently got involved with that. Do you remember anything about the housing problem and how they tried to solve it after World War II?

STEELMAN: I don't remember any of the details.

JOHNSON: You don't remember how the Government went about trying to get housing for...

STEELMAN: No, I don't recall.

JOHNSON: Well, you had millions of veterans, of course, coming back and they want to set up housekeeping, and that's when it got into these mass produced homes, sort of like the Levit homes.

STEELMAN: I remember Levit.

JOHNSON: Sort of like a liberty ship, you know; he could put up a house in a few days, I suppose, and build by the thousands. Do you recall much about the housing situation?

STEELMAN: No, I don't.

JOHNSON: But you know it was a problem.

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STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: But you had housing. Where did you live, in fact, when you were there working for the White House? What was your address in Washington?

STEELMAN: Let's see, I lived up on Mass [Massachusetts] Avenue at the Kennedy-Warren Apartments.

JOHNSON: At Kennedy-Warren on Massachusetts.

STEELMAN: Yes

JOHNSON: Was that where you lived almost all the time you were working at the White House?

STEELMAN: I think so, yes.

JOHNSON: You know Truman had lived up on Connecticut Avenue when he was Senator. You had a chauffeur then to drive you back and forth from the White House to your home?

STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: When did you start cutting back on your hours, to like a ten hour day instead of twelve?

STEELMAN: Oh, I don't remember. I don't remember when, but…

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JOHNSON: Did you ever let up?

STEELMAN: I don't think I ever did let up, as long as I was in the Government.

JOHNSON: But you let your staff leave at what, 6 o'clock?

STEELMAN: Yes, I'd let them leave and I'd keep working, sometimes all night.

JOHNSON: Did some of them stay behind to help you?

STEELMAN: I usually would tell them to go home.

JOHNSON: I think Truman was concerned about overwork, wasn't he, among some of his staff people?

STEELMAN: Yes. He said, "Don't kill yourself."

JOHNSON: Did he feel that Charlie Ross maybe had worked himself too hard?

STEELMAN: Yes, I think so with Charlie.

JOHNSON: Because he was a chain smoker and that no doubt contributed to...

STEELMAN: That's right, yes.

JOHNSON: ...his heart attack.

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STEELMAN: Yes.

JOHNSON: Okay, I think it's about time to give you a break for today, and so we'll do that.