Numbers appearing in square brackets (ex. [45]) within the transcript indicate the pagination in the original, hardcopy version of the oral history interview..
Washington, D. C.
December 7, 1973
by Richard D. McKinzie
[1]
MCKINZIE: Mr. Ambassador, in the previous interviews you granted to the Truman Library, you talked some about the evacuation of American civilians from Seoul on Sunday, June the 25th and the next day on the 26th. There had been an account of that written by T.R. Fehrenbach in a book called This Kind of War. The subtitle of that book is "A Study in Unpreparedness." Would you indulge me and allow me to read a page out of that book and then would you react to what this man says, because there may be some points which you'd like to
[2]
correct. He says that:
At four o'clock on Sunday afternoon Ambassador John J. Muccio went on the air over embassy radio station, WVTP, to reassure the American colony. He stated that there was no reason for anyone to be afraid and that the ROK Army had already contained the Communist offensive. There was to be no evacuation. But KMAG officers, who were getting frantic reports by telephone from the length of the 38th parallel, were hardly so sanguine. They began to argue with the ambassador, who was still in command. At least the women and children should be flown out, many of them said.
All afternoon and far into the night, an argument raged. Ambassador Muccio cannot be blamed for his attitude. A diplomat, he was suddenly in command during a military disaster, with no instructions from home, no clear-cut policy, no idea of the course the United States should follow. Muccio felt he must continue to show confidence, and at the same time he sincerely believed that the United States would not become involved, at least not directly.
At midnight, Muccio suddenly yielded to the pleading for evacuation. But he would not listen to a plan for removal of American civilians by air; Communist planes were in the air, and if one of them should shoot down a plane loaded with refugees it would become an international incident.
There was a small Norwegian ship at Inch'on, and all the 682 women and children would have
[3]
- to sail for Japan aboard this. The Norwegian ship carried a full load of fertilizer, and it had accommodations for only twelve passengers.
On this point Ambassador Muccio, a tall, dark, bespectacled man, given to wearing bow ties, was adamant. Generally, too, he was set against any evacuation, since he felt that even if the Inmun Gun should by some miracle capture Seoul, the Americans there would be granted diplomatic immunity by the Communists. The British, who had recognized Red China, also planned to keep their diplomatic staff in Seoul.
The British, some of whom would not live to see England again, also did not fully understand the nature of the Communist foe.
Radio station WVTP ordered all dependent American women and children to assemble at certain designated locations to be picked up by embassy buses for the trip to Inch'on. From there the tiny, freighter Reinholt would take them to Kokura, Japan.
Three days later, when the Reinholt docked, fifty of its passengers had to be removed to hospitals by stretcher. Exposure, lack of food, crowding, and the horrible odor of commercial fertilizer had prostrated the majority. But at that the women and children were lucky.
That's a lot to read, but I wonder if you might care to comment on any parts of that, particularly
[4]
the business about arguments raging between you and your staff on the subject of evacuation.
MUCCIO: One thing, we had an evacuation plan which had been coordinated and drawn up jointly by the Embassy, and CINCFE. There was never any question in my mind about evacuating. It was a question of the timing of the evacuation and the best method of getting the Americans and other non-Koreans, out.
Sunday night it was decided to assemble the women and children at Ascom City, which was an Army installation about two-thirds of the way between Seoul and Inchon and at the same time quite close to the road leading south through Suwon, Taejon and Taegu. So it was a good place to have the women and children, because they would be close to Kimpo in case we used air. It would be close to the road to Pusan if it was
[5]
decided to go out through Pusan. And it was very close, right next door, to Inchon.
MCKINZIE: You were not, then, opposed to the use of air?
MUCCIO: Not opposed to any of the various means that we had discussed and had in our plans for evacuation. It was just a question of timing. If we started running, as pointed out earlier, if we had moved too early, there would have been no resistance whatsoever on the part of the South Koreans. It was a question of staying there and encouraging the entire Korean military forces to face up to the Communists onslaught without, at the same time, our being caught.
I was baffled when I got a telegram out of Washington indicating that they thought I had already decided to stay on in Seoul, which was never my intention, never. But I couldn't go
[6]
around saying we were about to evacuate, but approved plans. The thing I was particularly proud of was that we evacuated all the American civilians and military plus the United Nations personnel, all diplomatic personnel who wanted to leave; all of whom left without a bloody nose in the whole operation.
I was particularly relieved when I found that the women and children had been placed on board this Norwegian freighter. Now, it was not luxury accommodations. It wasn't a cruise ship, but it was the best available. When I got word back that all the women and children were on board that freighter and that the freighter had pulled out that same night, I was very, very relieved to know that they were on their way.
Later that same evening we sent word to CINCFE that we wanted an airlift in the morning to take all the remaining female members of the staff of
[7]
the mission and of AID and USIA and KMAG, who to a man (or to a woman), all decided to stay on. They didn't want to leave. I had previously given them the opportunity to volunteer and had told them I would feel relieved if as many as possible would go.
Towards midnight that night we got word that the Communists were approaching Seoul. I thereupon ordered the evacuation of all females and wired Tokyo to have a sufficient number of planes available to remove all the women--I've forgotten the exact number. Three or four hours later, as the situation worsened, we increased the number of planes requested to include all men in addition to the females, except for four that were to stay behind with my deputy, Drumright, and four that stayed behind with me. We had decided that we would make our way down south through the interior to maintain contact with the Korean Government and
[8]
the Korean military. Let me repeat, there was never any intention on my part of staying on in Seoul when the Communists got there.
MCKINZIE: Is Fehrenbach correct in his statement that you did not expect the United States to become involved?
MUCCIO: U.S. policy since 1947 was against getting involved militarily.
MCKINZIE: I wonder if you could amplify what you previously said about the effect of President [Syngman] Rhee's evacuation on Seoul? You have indicated that he left on the night of the 26th; that he had two trains which were used.
MUCCIO: Well, it was Tuesday morning, the 27th around 4 o'clock in the morning that I received word that Rhee and most of the Korean Government had already left.
MCKINZIE: Did you notice any appreciable affect upon
[9]
the morale of the South Korean troops when the government left Seoul?
MUCCIO: Oh, by that time the Communists were, on one side, right at the gates of Seoul.
MCKINZIE: I guess the bluntest way I can ask the question is: When the government withdrew from Seoul, did that cause the South Koreans to flee in disarray?
MUCCIO: Now we're getting involved in matters that are inexplicable unless you spend months. There was considerable fighting still going on in the Haeju Peninsula, there was fighting around Changnyong, Kaeson was overwhelmed, but the fact is that some elements of the Communist forces were right at the gates of Seoul when he finally left, but we had everything in readiness to get out of the way.
MCKINZIE: Maybe this isn't a fair question. Did you feel that once Rhee left Seoul that he had any
[10]
real control over his own military forces?
MUCCIO: Well, you have to bear in mind that the United States during military government days devoted no time at all towards developing the ROK militarily. They did concentrate on a police force aimed towards maintaining internal security, but very little was done in training and organizing military; an army or navy. It wasn't until the evacuation of the last U.S. military fighting unit on June 29, 1949, that the Koreans took seriously the need to develop an armed force. And they had only a year in which they could train the men how to use a rifle. It's one thing to train men to right turn, left turn, etc. in small units, but to handle a regiment or a division requires long-range leadership training. That's what the South Korean forces lacked at the time. They had a few that had had experience with the Chinese Nationalists, they had a few that had had some training with the Japanese, but as you know,
[11]
the Japanese wouldn't allow Koreans in their armed forces. There were very few trained South Koreans. So you had really just an organizing, a still organizing ROK army. When you bear that in mind, I think they did remarkably well and they gave us time to come in when it was finally decided to come in. Not a single South Korean unit turned over to the Communists.
MCKINZIE: The reason I asked the question so bluntly, was that some survey accounts state that the South Koreans retreated in no order whatever, that there seemed to be no leadership anyplace.
MUCCIO: Well, something held up the Communist forces, because they took off at 4 o'clock on Sunday morning the 25th of June. They should have taken Seoul that afternoon. They didn't get into Seoul until Wednesday the 28th.
MCKINZIE: You have mentioned in a previous conversation
[12]
you had with Jerry Hess that you had seen President Rhee a number of times on the 25th and that you had a very special relationship with him. I wonder if you could amplify on that--how you negotiated, what the art of diplomacy was with President Rhee. You've indicated that he was an old guerrilla fighter; you've indicated that his ideas were formed in the early days of his life and didn't get any more flexible; you have indicated that you had a way of working with Mrs. Rhee. Could you talk about that a little, not only on that day, the 25th, but in subsequent weeks and months?
MUCCIO: Well, when we left Seoul, we spent the first night in Suwon. Rhee and the Korean Government had already gone on to Taejon. We were all living in a very simple and mobile manner. We soon realized that the formality which you normally have between a chief of state and the representative of another
[13]
country could not be maintained. I didn't hesitate to walk in on him at any hour of the day and he was pleased that I kept him informed as far as I could on what was going on.
Rhee, and particularly Madame Rhee, I'm sure were astounded that we came in and that we came in in time. They were appreciative of the fact that we did come in to support what was going on there. They must have known of our eagerness to get out of Korea that had been decided in '47. It was that decision, prompted by General Eisenhower and General MacArthur, that lead to the review of our basic policy, in July and August of 1947. The change in the policy was incorporated in NSC-7. This called for a renewed gesture to Russia towards settling the Korean question. NSC further provided that if we couldn't agree on what to do, we would throw it into the hopper of the United Nations. The gesture towards Moscow and submitting it to
[14]
the United Nations was almost simultaneous. Putting it bluntly, the plan was to turn the problem over to the U.N. and to get out of the way in case of trouble. In the course of time Rhee, undoubtedly, had that; he may not have had the details of it, but he knew that we were not interested in making a stand at that particular place.
MCKINZIE: You know it is possible, thinking in his terms, that he might have had some resentment over the fact that postwar assistance had been rather meager, in terms of arms at least, for South Korea. You mentioned that we just formed a constabulary and did not provide anything that could be construed as offensive weapons.
MUCCIO: We were in a very difficult position, a very subtle position, because if we gave Rhee and his cohorts what they wanted, they could have started to move north the same as the North started to move
[15]
south. And the onus would have been on us and we would not have had the support of the 34 United Nations members, countries of the Western world that did take a stand supporting our position in Korea. Sixteen of those countries furnished military help.
MCKINZIE: Rhee never did say anything like, "If you had given me more weapons to begin with, it would have been . . .
MUCCIO: Oh, sure, we had that problem before us all the time. There had been prodding and probing along the 38th parallel continously, that's what made it so difficult to determine what was going on on the 38th parallel the morning of the 25th. That prodding and probing and posturing was not exclusively from the North south; there was a considerable amount of it from the South north. I've mentioned this in the previous discussion.
[16]
MCKINZIE: What was your response when you learned of those kinds of incidents so far as President Rhee was concerned? Did you make an official protest against it?
MUCCIO: Well, I was able to make it clear to him that we knew that this came from the South and not from the North. In other words, not have him pull the wool over our eyes. Beyond that I don't know what could be done unless you could hit him over the head with a baseball bat.
MCKINZIE: Could you talk a bit, then, about the role of Madame Rhee in the conduct of South Korean affairs? She was obviously a very powerful woman.
MUCCIO: Very powerful woman, and a very shrewd woman. She was a tremendous help to him because he had reached the age where it was difficult for him to read any amount and paperwork was alien to his way of life. She was scared, because the Korean
[17]
women never quite accepted her, and here she was alone, white, Austrian, living in the midst of this holocaust. She did a great deal to keep up the relations between her husband, the President, and the American civilian and military authorities in Korea at the time of the fighting, particularly during those very critical Pusan perimeter days and the next six or seven months after that before the military situation stabilized, and there was no longer any question of the U.N. forces being kicked off the peninsula.
She quite frequently telephoned just to tip me off that he was about to do something that she thought I should know about. There was a very helpful attitude on her part. I'd just drop in on the old man and if I sat there long enough whatever he had in mind would eventually come out.
[18]
MCKINZIE: But you never felt that she was in a position to determine policy?
MUCCIO: No. No, no. She was in a position where she could influence him. She also had a great deal to say as to what non-Koreans got in to see him. As far as Koreans are concerned that was beyond her. Rhee really trusted no one--not even his wife.
MCKINZIE: So, it was essential for you to have good relationships with Madame Rhee?
MUCCIO: Oh, yes. And even before the fight broke out she was well disposed. For instance, Mrs. Rhee was basically a Catholic--and very close to the Bishop (apostolic Delegate Byrne, of Washington). There is no doubt that she regularly told him certain things which she was satisfied he would pass on to me.
[19]
MCKINZIE: She was with the President, then, in all of those moves?
MUCCIO: Oh, always, she was by his side all the time.
MCKINZIE: You mentioned in the previous conversation that Truman and Acheson should be commended for giving as much U.N. flavor as possible to the operation that was underway in Korea. And I wonder if I could get you to expound a bit on the use of the United Nations in Korea? You obviously are a great believer in that organization.
MUCCIO: You have to bear in mind that the United Nations was only two years old when we threw the Korean problem into its lap, '45 to '47. The United Nations Commission was sent out to Korea, arrived there early in '48 and up to this year (1973) has been there continuously. And the influence of those seven representatives of seven different countries on the developments in Korea was very significant.
[20]
Sir James Plimsoll was representative from Australia-you know, he's now the Australian ambassador here-and he was a tower of strength in the questions of treatment of prisoners of war and all of such humanitarian facets of military operations. The reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, were discussed each year in the General Assembly, and got worldwide attention thereby.
MCKINZIE: But, then, once hostilities broke out you still felt that the U.N. was an appropriate agency for resolving this kind of problem, some people in the military did not.
MUCCIO: Well, it was so new to the military . . .
MCKINZIE: Is it fair to say that in many military minds this constituted a dilution of their authority?
MUCCIO: Yes, I think very much so. I think that was
[21]
a very important facet.
MCKINZIE: May I ask you a question which constantly comes up in academic circles about whether you perceived at the time a Russian initiated activity, the crossing of the 38th parallel, and that the subsequent commitment of troops was in support of the policy of containment. Quite often historians rather glibly say that here was a case where you had to put up or shut up, if you believed in containment of Soviet expansive tendencies. That this is where the U.S. finally made its stand.
MUCCIO: Well, there's no doubt in my mind that President Truman and certain key advisers were very preoccupied as to just what the world Communists were up to, whether this was an isolated incident or whether it was part of a more widespread plan; and that came out very clearly at the Wake meeting. [Omar] Bradley and the rest of them were preoccupied
[22]
with the situation in Europe and other areas of the world and weren't going to devote all of our tremendous capabilities in that one isolated area. While MacArthur wanted everything thrown in there, and I think that was a very fundamental, very basic problem affecting American policy.
MCKINZIE: What was your own view at the time, if I might ask?
MUCCIO: Well, I was so overwhelmed with the situation in Korea that I didn't have very much time to keep up with developments elsewhere. On Korea, I was 100 percent with Truman who showed great wisdom and courage.
MCKINZIE: In a previous conversation, you didn't say very much about the relationship between the 8th Army and President Rhee. He was in a difficult position in having his own troops directed by an American commander, and did you function as a
[23]
buffer or as a liaison between the two?
MUCCIO: No, I went to Rhee under instructions, and he readily accepted the idea of placing all of his--not only military but paramilitary-forces under United Nations command, initially the U.S. command? Rhee collaborated wholeheartedly during the crucial perimeter period--later and especially after MacArthur left--it was very difficult to keep Rhee from issuing orders to his boys through nonmilitary channels.
MCKINZIE: Was that your responsibility to keep him from doing that?
MUCCIO: Well, we tried to. We tried our best. But Koreans dealing with Koreans understand one another a hell of a lot better than any outsider ever could.
MCKINZIE: I understand that General Walker did not, then, deal with President Rhee?
[24]
MUCCIO: Well, I wanted to bring out that if General Walker had anything that he wanted Rhee's cooperation, or consent to, he would never go to Rhee direct. He would always come to me and say, "Can you sell this idea to Rhee?"
MCKINZIE: And that was because he himself didn't think he had the diplomatic skill to do it, or . . .
MUCCIO: Well, he had a classic military attitude that you do things only on orders. Anything beyond your own field of operation is up to the other man. I learned that concept the hard way in Panama. One thing I learned there was know your sphere of authority, and stay within that, and if anyone else tries to step in just kick him in the shins. The military respect that.
[General James] Van Fleet was a problem, because Van Fleet had been in Greece and the Queen there had made a big fuss over him and he responded
[25]
readily; and he arrives in Korea and Rhee and Madame Rhee made a big fuss over Van Fleet and they had him eating out of their hands in no time at all. Rhee would say, "Well, when are you going to the Yalu?"
And Van Fleet would say, "Well, I am just dying to." Walker would never let out such a remark.
The attitude of those two men was markedly distinct. Both were top-notch fighting men. Van Fleet was a demon for taking care of his men and giving them good leadership, but he didn't have that refinement in demarkation of field of authority that Walker had. Walker probably had it a little too much so.
MCKINZIE: Yes, I would agree.
In October-November of 1950, before the Chinese Communists came in in large numbers, it appeared that we were involved in a mop up operation. I think you said General MacArthur told
[26]
you it was a mop up operation.
MUCCIO: Yes, that there was no organized resistance left in the area north of Pyongyang; only a mop up operation remained. He had made a similar statement at the Wake conference.
MCKINZIE: Were you then involved with President Rhee in plans for administration of a unified Korea?
MUCCIO: Not with Rhee. Matters did come up, for instance, as to what currency the United Nations forces should use in North Korea. Should they use ROK currency, or what currency? This is only one of the practical issues that we faced as the U.N. forces move north. Rhee thought he had more real control over his forces once they were in North Korea than in South Korea, at least he tried to establish that. There were a lot of practical functional issues that had to be faced.
MCKINZIE: This leads, then, naturally to the question
[27]
of reconstruction after the military phase, and you indicated that you, in fact, were called back to Washington to discuss such matters.
MUCCIO: I came back, under orders, to discuss post hostilities issues in the North. I have mentioned MacArthur's statement at Wake Island that there was no organized resistance left, just a mop up operation. After that meeting, Dean Rusk turned to me and said, "John, you had better come back to Washington with us."
I said, "Dean, I don't think it's that immediate, I have the following matters before me with Rhee, I think it would be better for me to go back to Korea, and then I'll wait for you to signal me and I can be back in 36 hours." And I was actually signaled about two weeks later, and I spent five days in Washington and five days up at Lake Success at the United Nations. But by that time the question of post hostilities set-up
[28]
had become more and more academic. Before I left on this trip we had already picked up individual Chinese Communist soldiers. We had not yet identified any unit and it was very hard to decide just what was underway up there.
MCKINZIE: But in the academic sense did you think that the post hostilities plans for reconstruction and rehabilitation was a sensible one, that the State Department was talking about?
MUCCIO: Well, they were thinking of it, which they should be doing, but before they started putting anything down in black and white it had already become academic.
MCKINZIE: What about President Rhee on that subject before it became academic? Had you discussed post hostilities administration and U.S. aid to Korea?
[29]
MUCCIO: No, not with Rhee. Rhee had a very genuine awe of MacArthur, and we had little difficulty with him so long as MacArthur remained in command. As an aside, the similarities and the relationships between MacArthur, Chiang Kai-shek, and Syngman Rhee, intrigued and baffled me. I think they were all of the same school. Egomaniacs, if you want to use that term.
MCKINZIE: In 1952 I understand that you had been called back to the State Department for consultations of one sort or another, and while you were away there was an approach made to members of your staff about a possible coup or--maybe that's too strong a word--or a change in government which would require a position of non-intervention on the part of the United States? I wonder if I might ask you to talk about that?
MUCCIO: Well, that was a long and complex movement . . .
[30]
MCKINZIE: Well, if you don't mind, I think it's very historically significant.
MUCCIO: There was an influential group that in March, April, May 152 gathered, with Dr. Chough Pyong Ok as key ringleader planning to replace Rhee. They felt that they had enough influence within the ROK military to have young ROK officers go along with them. They made it pretty clear that they were determined to go ahead and do something about Rhee, get him out of the way. MCKINZIE: This was a young group in the military?
MUCCIO: Military and civilian. Chough Pyong Ok had been Minister of the Interior, and had worked with Rhee in several other capacities. He was one of the few Koreans that Rhee really respected, but at the same time feared, feared for Chough had guts and intelligence. So, Rhee was very cautious and careful in his dealings with Chough Pyong Ok.
[31]
It was while I was away, there's no doubt in my mind that the--well, it's hard to give you the feel, or picture, of the situation because it was so complex. I came home, must have been the 25th of May 1952. President Truman had already appointed me as the U.S. Delegate to the U.N. Trustee Council.
MCKINZIE: Was this when you went to the U.N. delegation in New York?
MUCCIO: No, that was later. When appointed to the Trusteeship Council I sent word not to mention my appointment, otherwise, my influence with Rhee would be nil. Rhee had been toying with the idea of arresting some 11 members of the National Assembly as Communists. He felt that I should go along with this idea and he broached it time and again; that these were all bad people; that they were in relation with the Communists, etc.,
[32]
etc. I took the position that, "Dr. Rhee, this is a matter for you and your own judicial and legal authorities, --'It's not up to me, this is internal."
But he was very insistent that I indicate assent to his move to arrest these men. He even sent a couple of footlockers full of brand new U.S. 50 dollars bills to impress me. He said they were intercepted enroute from the north to Hong Kong to these South Korean Communists. I kept the position that, "Why do you send this to me? Why don't you present it to your own authorities?" He never lifted a finger while I was there. By gosh, the day after I left, on the 25th of May, 1952, he arrested the 11.
When I got to Washington the Secretary wanted to know what the hell Rhee was up to; and after we discussed the matter he said, "Will you be prepared to go back there and see if you can't pull
[33]
Rhee back on the tracks?"
So, I went up to Brown, received an honorary LL.D. at the commencement exercises there, and came back to Washington. We had a last minute meeting in the Department and I flew back to Korea arriving there just a few days before the 4th of July.
I heard about the Chough move and the question of whether we should have the 4th of July reception or not came up, and I said, "Well, we may as well go through with it, the situation has cooled off enough. Let's just give the Koreans a chance to come by and say hello." And Chough Pyong Ok and two of his cohorts came by at 4:30 saying we are not with the authorities here, you know, but we want to pay our respects, so we came a little early. We had a drink together, and Chough Pyong Ok soon pulled me aside and said, "That statement that the General made this morning,
[34]
this morning, does that mean that you are dis-enchanted with the President?"
I knew what the hell he was leading up to and said, "Dr. Chough, if the United States of America has any declaration to make, we'll make it clear enough so that there will be no need for surmising."
Then he said, "Oh, all right," and that was it.
But they had very definitely had in mind . . .
MCKINZIE: Well, some of them, I gather, had been in touch with someone on your staff?
MUCCIO: Yes. It was just the time when Mark Clark had taken over from Ridgway as CINCFE and CINCUNC. When the matter of Rhee arresting the 11 National Assembly men was discussed in the Department of State, the Secretary approved that it would be a good thing for Mark Clark to go in to see Rhee
[35]
prior to my return and say that the military situation looks good, but still not good enough to have disturbances behind our front lines.
Mark Clark made a special trip over to Chin-hae with specific instructions. He did not get the Charge to go with him, which reflected a lack of tact.
Also, Mark Clark seems to have left with Rhee the idea that it was all right to do anything he wanted as long as he didn't disturb the boys up in front. In other words, our action was really counter-productive. Our failure to dissuade Rhee and his successful defiance must have been encouraging to Chough Pyong Ok and his group in thinking the U.S. would at least condone their move towards replacing Rhee.
MCKINZIE: That's very good, thank you very much.
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List of Subjects Discussed
Acheson, Dean, 19
Agency for International Development, Korea, 7
Ascom City, South Korea, 4
Australia, 20
Bradley, Omar, 21
Brown University, 33
Changnyong, South Korea, 9
Chiang Kai-shek, 29
China (People’s Republic), 3, 25, 28
Chin-hae, South Korea, 35
CINCFE, 4, 6, 34
Clark, Mark, 34, 35
8th Army, U.S., 22
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 13
Fehrenbach, T. R. 1, 8
Great Britain, 3
Greece, 24
Hae Ju, Peninsula, South Korea, 9
Inchon, South Korea, 2, 3, 4, 5
Inmun Gun, 3
Japan, 3, 10, 11
Kaesong, South Korea, 9
Kimpo Airfield, Seoul, South Korea, 4
Korean Military Advisory Group, 2, 7
MacArthur, Douglas, 13, 22, 25, 26, 27, 29
National Assembly, South Korea, 31, 32, 34
NSC-7, 13
Ok, Chough, Pyong, 30, 33, 34, 35
Plinsoll, Sir James, 20
Pusan, South Korea, 4, 5, 17
Pyongyang, North Korea, 26
Rhee, Syngman, 8-10, 12-19, 22-25
Rhee, Madame Syngman, 12, 13, 16-19, 25
ROK military forces, 10, 11, 14, 30
Rusk, Dean, 27
South Korea:
Soviet Union,
13,
21
S.S.
Reinholt,
2,
3,
6
Suwon, South Korea,
4,
12
Taegu, South Korea, 4
Taejon, South Korea, 4, 12
38th parallel, Korea, 15, 21
This Kind of War, 1-3
Truman, Harry S., 19, 21, 22, 31
United Nations, 6, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 23, 26, 27, 31
UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, 19, 20
United States Information Agency, South Korea, 7
Van Fleet, James A., 24, 25
Wake Island Conference, 21, 26, 27
Walker, Walton H., 23, 24, 25
-
government, proposed coup against,
29,
30,
35
Seoul, evacuation of, 1950,
1-5,
8,
9,
11,
12
US military evacuation of, 1949,
13
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