Judge Marvin Jones Oral History Interview, May 14, 1970

Notice
This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted for the Harry S. Truman Library. A draft of this transcript was edited by the interviewee but only minor emendations were made; therefore, the reader should remember that this is essentially a transcript of the spoken, rather than the written word.

Numbers appearing in square brackets (ex. [45]) within the transcript indicate the pagination in the original, hardcopy version of the oral history interview.

RESTRICTIONS
This oral history transcript may be read, quoted from, cited, and reproduced for purposes of research. It may not be published in full except by permission of the Harry S. Truman Library.

Opened May, 1971
Harry S. Truman Library
Independence, Missouri

[322]

HESS: All right Judge, when we spoke last week I left Allen Matusow's book with you, Farm Policies and Politics in the Truman Years. After looking over his book, what are your comments?

JONES: Well, I was amazed at his mistaken so-called knowledge of the real facts in connection with this story. The writer indicates that I was for holding down the production, controlling production of food and farm products. The truth is that from the time I went into War Food after Claude Wickard and Chester Davis had served three months apiece, it was a difficult assignment because there were some disagreements in the Department of Agriculture over whether -- what the policy should

[323]

be about all-out production. So, when I first went in I said, "Our problem is to have all-out production, the biggest production we can get, because food is essential to the conduct of this all-out war." The first statement I made after beginning my service June the 29th, 1943, I emphasized the need for all-out production. I never changed this attitude during my entire service.

I had served under Justice Byrnes for a six months period in the East Wing of the White House. As his adviser on Agriculture from early January to June 29, 1943, just prior to becoming War Food Administrator, I said on the broadcast on the Blue Network on August the 9th, 1943, "This goal calls for a tremendous production of food. It calls for a proper distribution and handling of that food." The entire speech emphasized the need for the determination that we are to have an all-out production.

[324]

Then on August 18th, 1943 in spelling out the program for the following year, "This is an all-out war; it calls for all-out production."

I want to quote a sentence from different places. I have the record here. Anyone can read this record. "There will be no restriction on food production. All-out production is needed."

These quotations are from speeches and statements that I made as we went along. And there isn't a line in the record that calls for restriction of production, anywhere in the whole period of my service as U.S. War Food Administrator. And -- well, I've marked a number of places. In fact, I'd just like to send a copy of this book of speeches and statements to the Truman Library.

HESS: That would be very fine.

[325]

JONES: I have marked in the books some statements, but anyone may read all the statements. On September 29th, 1943, 1 said, "I hope the Congress may be willing to increase the funds available to the Commodity Credit Corporation so that the powers of that corporation can be used to the fullest extent in increasing food production."

Along about that time, some were saying, "Well, we still have the law on the statute books that calls for adjustment of production of certain farm commodities."

And I said to our staff, "I have authority during the war period under the Executive order to suspend and control any production during the war period." Some of my staff didn't like it even "Jake" [John B.] Hutson said, "No, I don't think you ought to do that."

[326]

"Well," I said, "I'm going to do it, and I have already issued the order. I have the authority and we're not going to have, from now until the time this war is over, any restriction on production. After that we can't keep them from restoring the control program if they decide to do so. We don't have any authority after the war is over unless we are given an extended authority, or somebody else is given it."

I've marked here several places in this book -- in March 1944 when we had already planned that year's increased production. Then too, you have my report on the food situation. Then I have in my hand -- you see I am holding conference reports in my hand. I want to give you a quote from the December 1944 statement that I made for publication. "For the coming year 1945, production goals call for about the same as have been produced in the year just ending,

[327]

but with a slight increase in planted acreage in 1945, and 1944 has been the greatest food production in the history of the nation." With all the shortage of help and materials we are with the bulk of farmers still measuring production. That was in December of '44 when we had made the plans for '45. And then as late as 1945 I made a public statement dated February the 3rd, 1945: "Our goals for this year call for greater acreage to be planted and more livestock to be raised with particular emphasis on increased production of milk and hogs and cattle. Crop goals call for an increase of nine million acres above last year." I increased the acreage every year.

It must be understood that the original ceiling order didn't cover all foods. These controversies raised the need of adding additional items that had not been included in the original

[328]

freeze order.

Here is what a lot of people didn't understand, and evidently Senator Anderson thought I was holding down the prices in order to control production. I had absolutely suspended any chance for that. OPA wouldn't agree to many of the needed increases in prices. I would have to go to see [Fred] Vinson and he would hold down the prices. I was trying to get increased prices on all these products needed for the war effort.

I said many times that if I had sat in on the original ceiling price legislations or the order pursuant thereto that had authorized a freezing of prices, that I would have said that I didn't think any ceiling ought to have been placed below parity if we were to get full production. During the

[329]

1930s we had rarely been above about 80 or 85, and one time as high as 90 percent of parity on any farm commodity. I would have said if we had any ceiling on essential farm production that should never be below parity.

I was not present when the legislation was enacted and I was out of the city at the Food Conference when the freeze order was planned. The prices had been frozen and naturally some of them were too low because when there had been a big surplus on some of them prior to the war we had a fight with OPA over prices and subsidies and they had a legitimate fight. I got along with Bowles, although naturally we didn't always agree.

HESS: What did Bowles say when you told him you thought the prices should be raised on certain commodities?

JONES: Well, he just said, "We are opposed to it."

[330]

And he -- he said, "If it's necessary there should be a subsidy." But he'd argued that it wasn't necessary. The OPA wanted to put a ceiling on hogs. We had to go to Vinson and then to Byrnes. We could appeal to Byrnes. Vinson said, "We're going to put a ceiling on hogs."

I said to Byrnes, "If there is going to be a ceiling, let's put it at fifteen cents." And Bowles wanted to put it at twelve and one-half cents. And I said, "We won't get the production at that price."

We went to Byrnes and Byrnes said, "Well, why don't you just, you fellows," [Prentis M.] Brown was there as OPA director that was just before Bowles was appointed. And Byrnes said, "Now, we're going to have to compromise this. Why don't you guys agree on fourteen cents?" And he said, "You had better both agree or I may make it worse on one of you."

[331]

And I said, "Well, I'll accept it. I don't like it. I think it had ought to be higher than that." But we agreed.

Later Bowles insisted on a lower price ceiling on hogs. He had [Richard V.] Gilbert over at Byrnes' office arguing that it ought to be kept lower.

The prices of corn and hogs are as mutually linked as the law of supply and demand. They are called the ratio prices. Corn won't move without those related prices. There isn't a line anywhere in my record, and I'll be glad to have anybody examine the notes that the Secretary made on our various War Food morning conferences -- we had a conference every morning for 30 minutes attended by the twenty-one or two division heads we had in War Food.

But some people don't understand that you must have an outlet or refrigeration for perishable

[332]

foods. There was an outlet during the war. We had no trouble with the outlets. I bought five million dollars worth of food per day for lend-lease for two and a half years; six billion dollars worth of food, and loaded it on ships. We had contracts with fifteen hundred warehouses and we had seventy thousand county and community committees. It is all emphasized all through these speeches and statements in this book that I will send the Truman Library. And it even goes back by reference to the time when I was in the House and handled the New Deal legislation. We had the problem then. I said on the floor back in the 1920s, "We have mastered the machinery of production to a far greater degree than we have mastered the machinery of distribution. Let's produce all we can dispose of at home or abroad." That has always been my policy.

[333]

Some would say even then, "It's a scarcity program."

I said, "No it isn't." I said, "I'm in favor of producing everything in this country that we can distribute at home and abroad. And in distributing abroad we are limited by the amount that the Congress is willing to provide for. Otherwise it becomes piled up here and deteriorates." I voted against the original Farm Board for the very reason that they didn't yoke it with distribution. I said -- I made the remark on the floor of the House, "We have mastered the machinery of production to a larger degree than we have the machinery of distribution." And if you don't, if Congress doesn't make the provision for shipment, then the thing piles up on us, and rots in the granaries of the farmers, which it did under the Farm Board.

[334]

Hoover didn't understand these essential facts, nor did the man he designated to draft the Farm Board legislation, understand at all, the problems, the links, the problems that one must meet if he handles both production and distribution.

Bowles and I agreed to take off rationing temporarily certain of the perishable foods. You know certain food is perishable. On those particular items all military, and military and lend-lease needs were fully supplied. All the warehouses were full. That type of food begins to deteriorate the minute it's produced if you don't have an outlet. There was no place to put these items for the time being. The main problem was to get storage space for it, especially at harvest time.

And now this man and [Herbert] Lehman, and Hoover never understood that. When he was

[335]

War Food Administrator during World War I, Hoover only had a limited number of articles in a short war. His problems were not one-tenth as much as ours. That war only lasted about eighteen months and the fighting only six months. He simply wanted to have a ceiling on certain commodities, which ceiling he would fix without having anyone else have a say. He didn't have an appeal to Vinson or Byrnes or the President. He had the final say in fixing the ceiling on the few products he controlled. After the war he distributed some food on relief, mostly to Belgium. He didn't have anything to do with production, he didn't have any authority on that at any time.

He had a great publicity staff. I had only the regular information men in the Department. I gave out only one interview, jointly, with somebody from OPA. And Mr. Hoover got a lot

[336]

of advertising because he loaded one ship with food. I was loading twelve in New York City at one time with food for lend-lease. We had a -- we had so much bigger problems. I said to my staff repeatedly, "Let's not try to solve the production problem for the after the war years. Congress has already, in the early part of the war, guaranteed farm support prices at the wartime level for two years after the war, so I'm going to have, as long as this war lasts, we're going to have all-out production without any restriction at all."

Now evidently Mr. Hoover didn't understand. As a matter of fact, at the time I was appointed War Food Administrator, Hoover gave out a statement and he predicted there would be a collapse on this whole program in six months. And at the end of the year Justice Byrnes wanted

[337]

me to wire him and tell him how wrong he was. And I said, "No, I won't do that. I don't want to embarrass anybody." I only want to do my job.

HESS: Why did he think that there was going to be a collapse?

JONES: Well, he just said, "It was set up all wrong, that it should be left up to one man who should have full Authority to make all the decisions without having to go to various people to end disputes." Sometimes, when we couldn't get quick decisions he may have had a point, but, of course, I had no chance to even consider that. The problem in this long, drawn out, and far ranging war was far beyond the problems he was called upon to face.

Well, he never did have to report to the Congress anything about it. There never was any

[338]

investigation of his expenditures. And he advertised extensively. He had a lot of advertising expense.

He didn't know when he came in as President, much about this country -- the mechanics of this country. He had been in England 20 years. How he agreed, as he did in the Farm Board, to have a flooring -- I mean a minimum price at which the Government would buy without any provision for what to do with it is difficult to understand.

I had opposed on the floor of the House the Farm Board bill in 1930 because it didn't have the proper yoking of the production and distribution and assurance there would be a distribution. I said, "It won't work," and I was one of the thirty-five that voted against it. The Democrats got into power, as you know.

[339]

And I proceeded then, we had, oh, I've forgotten how many millions of bales of cotton stored up, no place to put it. It was stacked up in broken down warehouses, in sheds even upon farms. A drag on the market. We had wheat that they had on hand and couldn't dispose of and Congress wouldn't ship it abroad and the whole thing collapsed and I had to introduce a resolution and it was passed to give to the American Red Cross this cotton to be used to clothe the people that needed to be clothed and the wheat to be used by the Red Cross in any way to dispose of it. They made contracts with the processors and distributed the products on relief. Then I also had in the bill a provision that they could take this wheat and -- I mean take the perishable products -- some people don't consider the difference between perishable products and the other that you are able to store indefinitely.

[340]

Coming now to World War II problems, Congress generally was opposed to subsidies. They preferred raising prices, but we had orders to hold the prices and use subsidies. I don't think Senator Anderson knew this, and he -- and then Hutson -- was one of the two or three people that was usually stirring up trouble. Hutson was the main one.

HESS: How did he do that?

JONES: Well, he would go over and tell Byrnes and Vinson individually that he was being handicapped, fenced in and ignored. The truth was he attended every staff meeting and was in all major decisions. He would go over and make personal reports and contacts.

HESS: What's his first name?

JONES: Jack Hutson, J.B. Hutson. He was chairman

[341]

of the Commodity Credit Corporation, head of it. I'd have him in, before anything came up in the way of checks to be signed by me. He would usually initial them in advance. On any measure he would initial a check because he was responsible for the money that went out from the Commodity Credit Corporation. He came to me and said he just didn't have time to initial all these checks. He told me he had too much to do and he would like to be relieved of having to initial all these checks. And I said, "Well, I don't know, I need some protection on these matters." I added, "Well, I'll be very careful. I'll call the others in, but I think it's unloading too much on them, but we'll try it, I am not sure it will work."

He then went over to Jimmy Byrnes within two days and told him that I didn't give him anything to do -- that's two days afterward. And -- well, Byrnes told me what Jack had said, I

[342]

started to say, "Well, let's send for him. I've been wanting to find out some of his cleverness." But it was toward the end of the war and I simply said nothing to Byrnes. And I told him later I was glad that I didn't face him with it, but I wanted him to know that I knew. I never told Byrnes. That was just one illustration, but it was near the end of the war period and I fixed it up. He was ambitious and was continuously undermining anyone he apparently felt was in his way. He apparently never really criticized me, but he would get after my assistants. There were other intriguers in that big organization. That's one of the problems I had. That is the reason I had to suspend the controls of production. Hutson was one of those who didn't want to suspend the controls. He just wanted to keep them for possible use. He had sold himself somehow to Vinson. He was from

[343]

Kentucky. Vinson listened to him and I had to watch all the time. As a matter of fact, when I went over and was originally sworn in by Chief Justice Richard Whaley, who at that time was Chief Justice of the U.S. Court of Claims, Whaley went over with me and he sat back in the audience and he told me later, "You know two of those fellows sitting together were saying, 'I wonder how long he's going to last."' He said it was clear that those two didn't like to have an outsider come in much anyway.

HESS: That's when you were sworn in as War Food Administrator?

JONES: At War Food. Whaley told me, and that's the reason he wanted me to take Wilson Cowen, who was then a trial commissioner of the court. Whaley said, "I think he had better be over there

[344]

to help you because two or three are going to gang on you. The rest of them seemed friendly and anxious to help. And time after time in Congress I would challenge anybody who said on the floor we were subsidizing the farmer. I'd say, "We are restoring equality because the farmer has borne the burdens of the tariff all these years and we're simply making restitution, bringing him back to the position of equality."

Sometimes opponents would say I was really trying to have a doctrine of scarcity and I would reply, "I'll challenge that any time. I want us to have the greatest production we can have and dispose of at home or abroad."

I made this statement in Congress, "I don't think there has ever been a pound of cotton produced but that somewhere in the world, there was a child that needed the

[345]

warmth that the clothing would furnish. And there's never been a bushel of wheat produced or meat or any other perishable commodity but that somewhere out yonder under the stars is a hungry mouth that needs to be fed." But we must link distribution and have provision because Congress holds the purse strings and if we don't emphasize distribution, we will be in trouble. I added, "The farmers are in the minority and we must keep all programs on a sound basis or we will lose out."

I drafted a bill to pay an export premium to encourage foreign marketing. Some said that is subsidies, but I said, "No, it's restitution." And you can go back to the very beginning and I advocated -- I wrote the Soil Conservation Act myself. The Department sent up a proposal that was wholly insufficient. It dealt only with water erosion, and left wind erosion

[346]

untouched. I wrote and Congress passed a much broader soil erosion and rebuilding act that is still in effect. I said, "The greatest in the world is the area covered food basket by the Mississippi Valley River system." I said, "Really the Missouri River is the Mississippi. It's longer, but they call it the Mississippi, the Ohio, and the...

HESS: It feeds into the Mississippi.

JONES: Yes, both the Mississippi and the Missouri and the two thousand tributaries that constitutes the Mississippi River system. The Ohio and its tributaries, the Missouri and its tributaries, the Mississippi and its tributaries going up into the edge of Canada. That system stretching from the Alleghenies to the Rocky Mountains drains thirty-one states and a part of two provinces of Canada -- there isn't any other such

[347]

breadbasket in the world." I was always fighting on the question of food production. During my career in Congress I had never let up on the subject. We had long been building levees down on the lower Mississippi treating water as a curse. We were working against nature and nature always fights back. She's building up the bed of the stream, above the level of the surrounding area. It did you know, and...

HESS: Sediment.

JONES: Sediment or rather topsoil deposit, and when it broke over I remember Herbert Hoover went down there back in the early twenties when part of eight states were flooded. He recommended relief, but he never suggested the real remedy.

[Willis Grantz] Sears of Nebraska, he was a Republican Congressman. Sears and I talked for years about that subject. I said,

[348]

"Let's, instead of relying wholly on building these levees, let's go up to the headwaters build check-dams and utilize the water where it falls in the tributary streams, contour the land, and work with nature, and utilize the water where it falls and then we will solve most of our problem of -- except in the tremendous floods." Sears and I fought battle for years and finally got that program through. I'm explaining this to show that from the very beginning of my youth all the way I have fought for a program of truly national interest. I was placed on the Agriculture Committee and I studied all those problems. I would hear other members challenge me in the House, but I never did have any of them really answer the question about the other wing of the tariff which Alexander Hamilton was honest enough to concede but which no industrialists and

[349]

tariff claimants ever linked together.

HESS: Which didn't get passed.

JONES: Didn't get passed. I would be glad to have anybody look over my statements right up till the time I ended my service as War Food Administrator. I had a conference with Anderson. He told me that he was making a friendly investigation, and I suppose he was. He thought, he said, "They ought to raise the price on hogs, and it's too low." I have said that since the beginning of my administration.

And I said, "I've been preaching that ever since I have been here." I said, "OPA won't let me do it, and I've had to deal with Vinson, who is sold on holding the price idea. It's his problem to keep it as low as possible."

Under orders from the President in order

[350]

to get the all-out production we were told to arrange to get some subsidies. The farmers didn't like subsidies, and Congress didn't like to give them. They would fuss at me about subsidies and I said, "Well, now I -- as a matter of fact, I wanted the ceiling on a number of these products to be higher, but they have been frozen at a point. The President had said we must hold the line and we must use subsidies rather than break the price line. We had no choice but to abide his instructions. In the war period we used the argument that if we broke price freeze on any commodity, it would start a spiral of inflation that would make the war much more expensive. It was a pretty strong argument, that we are having a hundred billion dollars worth of war contract expenditures, that to break through the ceiling on one, they'll probably be other

[351]

billions that will drive just as hard and say, "We have just as good a case," and there will be trouble.

It was necessary to work as a team. They often declined to make adjustments. The war was being fought. We complied with instructions. Somehow we secured increased production every year. But it was like pulling eyeteeth and Congress would say, "Well, why don't you just raise these prices?" And that's the thing Anderson -- Anderson was mistaken in that. I don't think he meant to be critical, but then he simply didn't understand the plan that was being used under the orders of President Roosevelt. There were certain foods that we had to emphasize production and urged them to do these things. At that time President Roosevelt had died and President Truman had been sworn in. The investigations were being conducted. The war in Europe was nearly

[352]

over.

There are more than a hundred and sixty farm commodities and they are divided into about -- there are about twenty basic, really basic commodities, important commodities, and about half -- more than half of the production is perishable.

Senator Anderson had a lot of trouble because he finally became convinced that he did not have the power to raise prices without approval of Fred Vinson, as well as of Bowles, but he had such problems as we had had during the all-out war. The Senator was quick to learn. He knew about farming, but I am sure he found problems in the food field even though the war was ending. Some, at any rate Senator Anderson knew, and I knew, now that the war was about over, that my service was about ended, that Congress would take a new slant

[353]

since the war in Europe was ending and that when the war was over, there would be many adjustments.

I had only agreed to stay until the war in Europe was over and President Truman was very fine about all that. He said let's wait until the war is over. But Byrnes insisted on action at the end of June, 1945. He told President Truman, "I know he's tired and wants to go back to the Court and all these war contract cases are coming before the Court. They want him back."

Right after President Truman was sworn in, soon after April 12, I went to the new President and tendered my resignation in writing. I told the new President that I felt he should have the privilege of selecting his own officials and I would be pleased to have it accepted at any time he wished. That

[354]

I felt the big wartime food production program was about finished except for finishing up odds and ends, but that I would abide his wishes. It would not be proper for me to quote the President, any President. I think he said in effect that he would like for me to stay on and that he had perfect confidence in me. I'll be glad for you to ask him what he said. At any rate, I appreciated his attitude and I said, "I'll be glad to stay until the war in Europe is over. I really would like to go soon after that."

He replied in substance, "Well, you let me know when you feel like you have to go." I had done what I think everybody should have done in the full Cabinet: Give the new President the chance to have his own group. I didn't think Truman would have raised the question. Bowles and I agreed that we'd

[355]

take, temporarily, the rationing off of certain of the perishables, because there was some danger always of spoilage, especially because of shortage of storage facilities. Chester Bowles announced the taking off of the rationing, temporarily. He made the announcement. Byrnes and Vinson had both agreed to the announcement. That's one of the few things that he agreed on. I told Fred Vinson that anytime he wanted them restored to the ration list I would be glad to restore them.

Then of course, when the war was -- when the Bulge fight came on and war -- we saw it was going to last a good deal longer than many had thought it would. I was in Denver on a food and storage mission when that came up. I phoned the office to tell Vinson I thought the rationing should be immediately restored

[356]

on all food items and he issued the order. In fact, I had told him before I left on the trip that anytime he thought the items temporarily taken from the list should be restored, to simply issue the order.

HESS: The Battle of the Bulge.

JONES: But I never changed my position on all-out production right through to the end of the war.

HESS: Okay, let's pin a couple of those spots down specifically, because in Matusow's book he mentions that to prevent a postwar surplus of food one of the things that was done was the lowering of production goals in 1945.

JONES: That is simply not a fact. We increased the goals for 1945. There might have been somebody in our setup that wanted to do that.

[357]

It was simply not done. I showed you in these few quotations I increased the planting and production goals for 1945. I'll be glad to show quotations right up to the last. I put this 1945 goal higher as shown in this February 2nd statement. And I have some quotations in the book that run up to almost the time that I quit over there. These records were made at the time. To any suggestion I said, "No sir, we're going to have full production and no restriction until the war is entirely over. Then my authority will automatically end. I can't then make any further suspension. But as long as my authority lasts there will be no change and no lowering of production goals."

Then it will be up to Congress and the Secretary of Agriculture to make an estimate of how much they can dispose of at home and abroad. But Congress began to talk, all during

[358]

that time, about cutting expenses. I think that's where the critics got most of this impression, from remarks by some of the members of Congress.

HESS: Who was your main opposition on the Hill?

JONES: Only a few people in Congress and others not in Congress, Lehman and some of the New York people. It didn't seem especially serious. The fact is, I had little opposition in Congress.

HESS: Herbert Lehman.

JONES: Yes. Lehman -- or at least statements were published to that effect, and I saw no denial. Prior to the war, under my authorized war powers, I said until the very last and I think in my final statement I showed we had increased production every year, and far

[359]

above any previous time. And I brought in annually all the way from fifty thousand to eighty thousand farm workers from other countries in order to be able to produce more. I got the 4-H boys clubs to help produce more food. And I emphasized all through these speeches that food is essential as the air we breathe. It is all the more important in a great war.

I am glad Clint Anderson didn't have the problems that I had. Immediately after he came in the war in Europe was over and conditions and problems had changed -- you noticed this from some of these accounts. I didn't follow through what all he had done, but when he looked the situation over in the Department of Agriculture, he asked my chief assistant, Wilson Cowen to stay and help him. Mr. Cowen wanted to go back to the Court at once with me. He said,

[360]

"I'm going back to the Court, back to my old position."

And then Anderson asked me if I objected to his staying with him and helping him. I replied, "It's all right with me. Whatever you talk him into."

Senator Anderson then wanted to know if it was all right if he got the President to write a letter requesting him to stay with him six months. I replied, "Sure, that would be a deserved compliment." President Truman wrote Cowen a letter and asked him to stay for at least six months. Cowen stayed the six months.

HESS: And Matusow's second point about the prevention of a postwar surplus he gives is: "By dropping stockpiling for relief."

JONES: As what?

HESS: "By dropping stockpiling for relief."

[361]

He said this is one of the things that resulted in the shortage.

JONES: Oh no, there wasn't any dropping of stockpiling at all! We had a problem of storage space. There were some storage problems even for wheat, but those were not troublesome except at harvest time. But with the ones that require refrigeration and danger of spoiling, the problem is greater. But there never was any reduction of stockpiling at all as far as the action of the War Food Administrator was concerned. I would hear some talk about cutting down expenses, but there wasn't any reduction in stockpiling.

Even in the 1920s we often had storage facility difficulties even in peacetime. In fact, Congressman [Henderson M.] Jacoway of Arkansas in the earlier years had written and secured an act by the Congress to increase

[362]

storage facilities. That has been a continuing problem. We have a winter wheat of the Southwest which is the finest of the wheat, high protein, clean wheat. Then we get the spring wheat in the central northwest where it grows up with the weeds, and has foreign materials and the grade is much lower. Then they had some good wheat on the Pacific Coast, as well as some macaroni wheat they call it. There are more than sixty different types of wheat grown by farmers two thousand miles apart and we must have programs that induce them to produce.

The farmers like anyone else, want to produce what is most profitable. That was my fight all along the line with all-out production to the end of the war, of the commodities that were needed during the war. That was one reason subsidies were necessary. I said

[363]

that two or three times, "Enough people coming home so that there won't be any surplus problem for a little while anyway." We're having trouble with storage space, that is, in getting enough of it. There was not enough even in prior war-peace times. The war increased the problem. These critics never paid any attention to that. They ignored storage problems and the difficulty of building storage in wartimes.

We didn't reduce any stockpiling. No -- they can't show a line on that from anything that I said that even indicated reducing stockpiling. It didn't occur. There were earnest discussions on different branches of the Government lines and difference of opinion. Sometimes the friction of mind upon mind helps to establish truth. Even QPA had differences of opinion within their organization just like

[364]

we did. That is not a criticism, just a comment.

I would like to tell you a story that one of the officials -- but I don't guess I should tell it here.

HESS: No, that's fine. Go right ahead.

JONES: Well anyhow, one of the officials of the OPA -- they had a great many attorneys over there, several hundred attorneys. If we would try to get an agreement, they would have to go into a huddle and ask these lawyers. So, in order to get any material from the War Production Board, we had to make a showing of the need. This official told this amusing story. A lot of funny things happen in any active organization. If you're going to pick out some little incident you can find something probably where somebody made a slight error or miscalculation on something. This official telling this

[365]

story or incident.

He said, there was a dairy man up in Wisconsin or Minnesota somewhere up in that area, that had a stream running through his dairy farm. His house was on one side of the stream and the dairy barn and cattle and feeding area was on the other side. So he had a footbridge across the stream so he could cross to feed and tend his milk cows. Well, there came an extra flood on that stream and washed out the footbridge. It was wintertime up there and desperately cold at times. This man wanted a pair of rubber boots. He asked OPA to recommend the boots. Well, these people went into a huddle and said, "No, we can't. There's a shortage of rubber. We can't recommend that WPB issue you a pair of rubber boots."

Then the dairyman said, "I'm going to sell my dairy cattle. They will probably be used

[366]

for beef. Dairy products are short too, but I'm not going to catch any pneumonia going across this stream without rubber boots."

And so they went into a huddle, another huddle, and they said, "I'll tell you what we'll do. You make up the list of what you need to rebuild the bridge and we'll give you a recommendation for those materials."

And he said, "Well, that's fine."

They said, "We'll approve of that."

He made up the list and they approved it and it went right through. The inspectors came back in about six months later inspecting to see if he had gone ahead with the bridge, and he still didn't have any bridge. And they said, "What's the matter, you said you ...."

"Well," he said, "in making up my list of what I need to build the bridge, I included a pair of rubber boots and when I got the boots,

[367]

I didn't need the bridge."

He told that as an incident -- I doubt whether it is a made-up story, but strange things happen. In any big organization now many curious things happen, no matter how well an organization is run.

HESS: Speaking of scarcities, there were some shortages of food after the war here in the United States. What caused those shortages?

JONES: Of course there were some shortages with the unusual demand for food. In 1945 there was some shortages, some drought and bad weather. Some slight shortages were partially produced by those unusual weather conditions and they partially were produced by the need abroad. That affects the whole market situation. But I am sure it was only temporary. You realize I wasn't in charge after the war.

[368]

The Banking and Currency wrote into the bill that for two years following the signing of the armistice, the prices for farm products should not be lowered. And that made provision for production. Sometimes there are shortages, and some of them you can't help and that's the reason I wanted special favors under legislation, to keep a reserve supply as a condition. I wrote that provision in the sugar legislation. It went far toward preventing a shortage of sugar. Prior to that legislation, sugar varied from a low of 6¢ retail to a high of 27¢ per pound which carried much dissatisfaction among consumers.

All the offshore areas were required to keep a six months supply in reserve to prevent a shortage. I wrote it into the body of the legislation.

But these critics jump onto one thing and because of any temporary taking off the ration list of a few perishables sometime

[369]

before the bad weather conditions which came after the war was over. And after the war, Congress did enact a provision to ship a lot of food abroad to our enemies as well as our allies. No one knew in advance they would do that, but so far as the provisions for all-out production, right through to the end of the war, and then, of course, a whole picture changed.

You remember a lot of soldiers came home and we had millions of them still abroad. A lot of them came home and they were disbanded. Then this United Nations did make some provision, under the Marshall plan to ship a good deal of this stuff abroad and to feed people all over the world which I think was a good idea. One must remember that the demand for food during the war to produce food for 12 million in our armed services, the lend-lease food, and our

[370]

civilian needs. And I don't know what the items they claim, I didn't go over that. What items did they claim were short?

HESS: Well, meat for one was a little short.

JONES: What?

HESS: Meat.

JONES: There was only a short period when in the heavy marketing season when meat came to market when there was no place to store it. Should we have let it spoil? Bowles and I consulted. Neither Byrnes nor Vinson objected. Bowles made the announcement. I believe I have explained all that.

We never had control of the prices on cattle and never had a support price on cattle. They just didn't want it. And they didn't need it during the war period. Cattle prices

[371]

were high so that our cattlemen produced all they could.

We had twelve million people in the armed services during the war. They were on the move and consumed about twice the average per capita. Because that's a perishable and there was a great demand for meats you know, then I shipped five million dollars worth of food per day for lend-lease for our allies. They'd -- that was a thing that had to be rationed here in order to not to have too much meat consumed in this country. Even during the short period when a few perishables could not be stored, we were still shipping about five million dollars per day of lend-lease food. That policy never changed. The low price of some of these perishables had caused some meats to go into black markets. The OPA couldn't help that. They did the best they could, and so

[372]

did we.

Remember, nearly all perishables are seasonal. The production is greater at ripening, harvesting or marketing periods. Remember, we were producing all we could and urging the cattle be fed but, the marketing period creates a storage problem. It's impossible not to have, occasionally, a shortage in perishables, and at certain times, a storage problem.

HESS: Now there was a worldwide shortage of wheat, was there not?

JONES: There was a worldwide shortage and as I told you in my original session, one of the troubles about wheat was that we were producing all we could in this country, even had all-out production. I repeat, Byrnes' office and high officials called me about six months

[373]

before the D-Day in Europe and said the synthetic rubber program has broken down. That was just after President Jeffers of the Union Pacific, who had charge of the program, announced, "We have solved the synthetic petroleum rubber program. I am resigning and returning to my railway job." Byrnes called me over to the high brass and they said, "We're going to ask you to allot a lot of wheat or sugar -- great quantities of wheat and sugar to make synthetic rubber for the D-Day landing of thousands of soldiers." This came as a shock right after the Jeffers announcement. But that was it. I'd just made up the allocation of the wheat and also of sugar and allotted the portions to the housewives.

We had a shortage of sugar too. But

[374]

I had no choice but to agree to use two hundred million bushels of wheat and a hundred and sixty thousand tons -- I believe it's a hundred and sixty thousand, maybe it was more than that, of sugar to make industrial alcohol.

This upset the entire plan. But they insisted that D-Day would require several hundred thousand landing vehicles that must have rubber tires. And that comes first. But you're not to mention it no matter how much it upsets your program.

We were already getting cattle production up as high as we could. We were having to use wheat for feed to supplement the corn production and there was such a demand for feed of all kinds that we didn't have as much stockpiling as we needed. We had all the -- we had all of the bins filled with wheat again at the beginning of 1945 and one can't forecast that there won't

[375]

be a shortage of some commodity that when we have a normal production of so many millions of bushels and suddenly the drought in different parts of the world make a big world demand for wheat or any other essential commodity.

Some submarine attacks had sent some vessels carrying beef limping back just at heavy beef marketing time. There were no storage facilities. Bowles and I agreed that it would be better to temporarily remove the rationing on meat and a few other articles in supply. Bowles made the announcement as the reports will show. No one objected. I told Fred Vinson at the time that we would restore the rationing as soon as needed. A few weeks later Vinson called me and I said, "I'll put anything back on you say if OPA will agree to it." And OPA apparently wanted to do it. I was leaving for Denver

[376]

the next day, and I told him to issue the order as soon as possible. Vinson went ahead and restored the rationing on these commodities that had been temporarily relieved to keep them from perishing, but never was there a change in the program.

I never have, from the time I first begun to study this program of production and distribution and stockpiling -- you can stockpile a lot of wheat if you have it, but that is just at harvest time. We never did have sufficient wheat, never could get enough wheat during the wartime, that is when the need was greater, and it apparently was always that way. I brought in two hundred million bushels of wheat one year from Canada for feed in the eastern United States. And those problems were tremendous on the overall picture. And that's the reason I said, "Well, they are just going to have all-out production of everything and

[377]

with emphasis on the articles most needed, but you can't get people to put wheat in when -- on a voluntary basis when they can grow something else they can get more money for."

There wasn't any cut in stockpiling -- why do they get the idea there was a cutting down on stockpiling. Now where did they get that information? Somebody dreamed up that, it just wasn't done. That is it wasn't done by Agriculture, or it wasn't done by War Food Administration.

HESS: All right, on another point, we've mentioned former President Hoover this morning. During the time that you were War Food Administrator did you ever speak personally with former President Hoover about the problems of food production and distribution?

JONES: Well, he gave out interviews in New York

[378]

and Chicago, and, as a matter of fact, I had gone to see him when he was War Food Administrator during World War I. I knew him very well, but I wasn't intimate with him. He didn't offer any suggestions. I didn't ever contact him during World War II because he gave out an interview at once that this whole thing, he predicted, would collapse in six months. The whole setup, right or wrong, could be changed in the middle of the war. And at the end of the year I had these wonderful letters from "Barney" Baruch and others about what a fine job I had done and Byrnes wanted me to write Herbert Hoover about his mistaken prediction of a collapse. But I said, "No, I won't do that. I am trying to get a job done. I respect Hoover. I am sure he had problems too."

HESS: But you didn't get one from President Hoover?

[379]

JONES: No, I didn't hear a word from President Hoover. And then towards the end he came out again with a statement about something that he never had studied. He never had studied the problems of production.

That's a much bigger problem than the problem of distribution. Distribution is just a matter of getting enough money to distribute. But we had been compelled to pay major attention to the production end, over a three year period, and then somebody dreams, "Well, these hungry people, why do we let them starve?" I agree, but there are three million employees in the United States Government service (I think I may have mentioned this before), there are just five hundred .and thirty-seven of them elected by the people. And wise or otherwise, the Constitution said no money can go out of the Treasury, not even to pay the President his

[380]

salary, except by the action of the Congress. And when they dream up and say this thing ought to be done, we have grave difficulty in getting the subsidy funds essential to get production, then you're met with the problem of production which has to be planned practically a year ahead, you're met with a danger. If Congress doesn't appropriate the money, we couldn't spend it.

You can go read the speeches in the Record, the Congressional Record, during that period and they often said, "Let's cut this thing down. We're spending too much money." I am not criticizing Congress. I had four years of service in the House. That is the greatest legislative body on earth. But, if we spent all the money the do-gooders and dreamers ask them to spend, the Government would go broke and our nation would be on the

[381]

rocks. It's a free country and people may say what they wish. Perhaps it makes the critics feel better to allow them to blow off steam, and it doesn't hurt the Congress much. They just move along doing their jobs.

Somehow we were able to furnish the extra wheat and sugar for synthetic rubber and somehow we weathered the storm, but that didn't alter the fact that up until that war was over, we had all-out production, and until I left there was no -- there was no change in that program from the time I went in until I finished. And I'll ask anybody to look through the records and they can go through -- we have notes that were made at all our staff meetings, recording what was said during all this period.

I was urging, as shown by these speeches and statements -- well, for the first year I was over there we had 30 minute daily staff

[382]

meetings in order to eliminate duplication in our own organization, and about once or twice thereafter. I never did know why other agencies didn't have the same procedure. The heads of the divisions met and briefly discussed the program and it was very effective. Sometimes two men would be working on the same task. We would decide which was to handle it and we would all understand the different parts of the program. It worked like a charm -- I was preaching all along that it's our job to get all-out production of the essential foods.

We all worked together -- certainly for the war period -- and we produced all we could induce the farmers and livestock people to produce. They did a heroic job with short help, but the demand was great. We were feeding the greater part of the allied world, but that order requiring all that wheat and sugar for industrial

[383]

alcohol for the rubber program, after the plans made for the year and announced, that hit a pretty good jolt you know. But somehow it was done.

Then I had -- when I think maybe I told this the other day, I hope I'm not repeating. When Eisenhower landed in Italy, when his group landed there, I had a wire to ship immediately thirty thousand tons of flour -- flour, I think it was, or thirty thousand barrels. I'd have to check my figures, but I had to wire all over the United States to get that flour because that -- we had a shortage of wheat, but we got it, shipped it, because they came first, and I shipped that flour. Of course they had -- on the move you know they used about twice as much food. They carried it always from location to another under battle conditions. When they moved, that perishable stuff was ditched.

HESS: And they have to feed the civilian populations

[384]

in the area that they take over.

JONES: That's right. It was a wolfish problem. Many of us went back to the office at night and worked on the problems. It was an inspiration to see so many officials and employees worked overtime without complaining. And, of course, most people didn't find anything to complain about.

Really, I don't think Mr. Hoover ever knew the problem of production at all. He didn't have to deal with that. You see, he was only authorized to put a ceiling on commodities and never had anything to do with production. He was authorized to put a ceiling price on food, feed and fuel, but in food only a few commodities were included in the bill. That's the World War I program and the actual fighting lasted only about six months for our soldiers. The fighting in World War II lasted

[385]

nearly four years on a two ocean basis.

I wish I had time to write up my experiences in War Food because I have the records here and I'll be glad to have anybody examine these records. If they can find anything that isn't an all-out production, I'll buy them a good dinner.

HESS: Do you have anything else to add in answer to Mr. Matusow's book?

JONES: Well, I think -- I don't know anything about him. I have no idea where he secured so much misinformation, but he simply didn't have his facts straight. I don't say he was deliberately trying to show something else, but he must have listened to someone who didn't know or didn't want to find the truth. I have no complaint as to Claude Wickard. He was present when I was sworn in. Soon thereafter I invited him

[386]

him to attend the staff meetings, which he did.

HESS: Did he think you were trying to come in and get his job?

JONES: Well, I had heard it intimated. I just didn't want him to think I had any such idea in my mind. As a matter of fact, Brynes and Marvin McIntyre had told me that the President would appoint me as Secretary, if I would accept it. I had repeatedly made it clear that I didn't want the place. I wanted to relieve Claude Wickard of any uneasiness. The facts are, President Roosevelt offered me the position after I became War Food Administrator.

I needed somebody for transportation. We had transportation problems. We had to transport the war food -- lend-lease to the Atlantic, Pacific and Gulf Coast from 1500 warehouses located throughout

[387]

the country. I asked several transportation people who was the best transportation man in industry, and I was told "Mark Upson knows more about it than anybody in the United States outside of the men who run the railroads and maybe more than they do."

And I said, "Call the president of the company, call the president of Proctor & Gamble," I believe his name was Charles Dupuis. I introduced myself. I said, "I am War Food Administrator and I need an expert transportation man and I want Mark Upson."

"Oh," he said, "I couldn't let you have Mark Upson. He's one of the best men I have and the Government's already gotten about," (I think he said), "two or three hundred of my people there working for them and, I'm handicapped;" and he says, "I just can't spare Mark Upson." I am quoting this from memory,

[388]

but I am sure it is substantially accurate.

And I said, "Now listen Mr. Dupuis, I didn't want this job I have. This war is on and Proctor & Gamble have as much at stake as anybody else and I want Mark Upson."

Mr. Dupuis studied a moment and said, "When do you want him?"

I said, "Tomorrow morning."

He replied, "He'll be in your office at 9 o'clock tomorrow morning. I'll let you have him for one year and then I must have him back."

I said, "Well, we'll take him for a year and then we'll talk about it."

At ten minutes before 9 o'clock a.m., Mark Upson walked into my office and reported for work. And Mark Upson at the end of the year wanted to stay a little while longer and did

[389]

a marvelous job. President Dupuis agreed to a brief extension. I have always appreciated the alert action and fine patriotism of Mr. Dupuis.

And then I had Lee Marshall of the Continental Baking Company to handle some of these phases you know that had to do with processing. I secured the best men in the country on that -- on those various things, and men that knew how to organize. And then I used all the active division heads of the Department of Agriculture.

I'm very proud of the record of the War Food Administrator. I worked day and night. I'd get down at the office at 8 o'clock and have an early -- quick lunch frequently on the desk, and I frequently went back at night, took work home with me. I can't understand why people without ever coming to me and asking

[390]

what the facts are, who wasn't there.

I think Clint Anderson -- I never had anything against him -- I don't think he understood when he started out to hunt for some shortages that I was getting all the production I could all along the line. I think he misunderstood that. I gather from -- assuming that this is correct. I want to visit and talk to him in a friendly way sometime. I have always liked him. I believe he rather thought that I was trying to hold down production toward the last. He may have said something early about empty shelves as you call it. Well, he is entirely wrong about that if he said it. I didn't hear his statement. I intended to go see him about that because I never had anything against him.

Senator Anderson was appointed Secretary of Agriculture and Jack Hutson was appointed

[391]

as Under Secretary. Then pretty soon -- or thereafter Hutson went up to United Nations and [Norris E.] Dodd became Under Secretary. I don't know why that was changed, but Anderson kept Wilson Cowen six months and I understand wanted to keep him longer. I went back to the Court. Secretary Anderson didn't have anything like these big problems that I had because the whole thing was about over, but he had some other problems. They were pretty tough. And I think he ran for the Senate, you know, when the first opening came in New Mexico. Naturally he resigned as Secretary of Agriculture.

Anyhow I have a great admiration, I want to repeat, for President Truman. I think he is one of our truly great Presidents. He was very generous to me at all times and he had even told Byrnes when he suggested I'd like to go, he said, "Let's wait until the war is over."

[392]

I mean in -- and Byrnes said, "No, he'd like to go now." But he was -- just suggested -- at least Byrnes told me that. Probably -- if I had known all the others were going to quit at the same time, I probably would have asked to stay even though I was pretty worn out at the time. At any rate, I wrote another letter on May 22, and asked to be relieved as of June 29.

I would like to add that while I felt farm price adjustments should have been made and the other prices adjusted to fit, nevertheless, those in authority had decided otherwise. So I went along with the subsidy plan as decided. Most of the slight criticism of me from the Hill was that I asked them to provide subsidies so that the price line would not be broken and a spiral of inflation started. I knew and he served with many of them. Most of them understood that the plan had been set from the top. They understood

[393]

and always greeted me in friendly fashion and frequently came to see me with their problems.

At this point I want to pay a tribute to the officials and employees of the Department of Agriculture. They had a double obligation; to carry on their regular work and do the War Food work as well. Practically all of them worked overtime without any complaint. They would work at night willingly if we asked them when there was an emergency. There were nearly 12,000 of the regular employees in Washington. Practically all of them were dedicated, loyal and anxious to help on the war effort. Only two or three were troublemakers. One of them I have mentioned would carry stories to both Byrnes and Vinson. Even this didn't prevent a very successful administration of a very

[394]

difficult job. All of the division heads were loyal and efficient.

Then we had about 75,000 county and community committees who worked in the 3,000 farm counties in the United States. This is a broad, big country, and all these people deserve the thanks of the nation for a job well done. I am very proud of them and their work.

A SUGGESTION

Should there be another war, which heaven forbid, for it would be a worldwide tragedy which is unthinkable.

One should learn from experience. If there should be occasion for another War Food, I feel that we shouldn't have so many different people to appeal to before a final decision is made, especially when dealing with perishable foods. I was very fond of both

[395]

Byrnes and Vinson. They were wonderful men. It was much easier when there was only one appeal to Byrnes. He could make quick decisions, but when another intervening appeal was decreed, it became far more complicated.

Fred Vinson had great ability. He was thorough. Frequently when we would go to him with troublesome questions, he could listen and then say, "I will think over this and let you know." I would urge a quick decision when the issue affected perishables. The major portion of food is perishable. I would sometimes say, "I would rather have a wrong decision in some instances than to have it delayed." He would laugh and say, "Better be careful, I might decide against you." I would say, "Please settle it as quickly as possible."

He was an exceedingly busy man with a terribly difficult job. He rarely made a wrong

[396]

decision, but he would get busy and sometimes forget and we would have to remind him. In one instance he waited several months and in that instance never made a decision for the time had passed when any decision was needed. This is not a complaint. He was a very thorough man and did a great overall job.

But, here is my suggestion: Food is basic. It is as essential as the air we breathe. Life cannot be sustained without it. No army can march without it. It has long been accepted that parity is the ideal purchasing power of farm products measured in terms of the price of other commodities.

     1. Have a War Food Administrator, who, for the duration of the war declared by Congress, would be authorized to fix a ceiling price at parity. No more and no less on essential farm commodities, and authority to fix a support price of not less than 90 percent of parity.

[397]

No appeal should be allowed from the ceiling or support prices established by the War Food Administrator.

     2. All other prices of essential articles and services essential to the war effort should be automatically fixed at the level that existed at the time price fixing becomes effective.

     3. If the cost of living increased as much as 3 percent and remained at the increased level for a definite period of, say three months, other articles and services would be increased a similar percentage.

This is very similar to the plan that Canada used throughout the war. They apparently had no difficulty in its operation.

The suggested method would avoid repeated arguments and delayed decisions that make the handling of perishable foods during the wartime

[398]

needs.