Judge Marvin Jones Oral History Interview, May 8, 1970

Notice
This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted for the Harry S. Truman Library. A draft of this transcript was edited by the interviewee but only minor emendations were made; therefore, the reader should remember that this is essentially a transcript of the spoken, rather than the written word.

Numbers appearing in square brackets (ex. [45]) within the transcript indicate the pagination in the original, hardcopy version of the oral history interview.

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This oral history transcript may be read, quoted from, cited, and reproduced for purposes of research. It may not be published in full except by permission of the Harry S. Truman Library.

Opened May, 1971
Harry S. Truman Library
Independence, Missouri

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HESS: Judge, to begin this morning, let's start with a question that I found in a book by Allen Matusow, and his book is entitled Farm Policies and Politics in the Truman Years. And, according to him, the War Food Administration used a "bare-shelves" policy near the end of the war as an attempt to prevent a postwar surplus of food by lowering production goals and by dropping stockpiling for relief, so that American civilians would eat up food stocks that seemed to threaten future markets. And he thinks that in the face of the worldwide food shortages following the war, that that policy was a mistake.

JONES: Well, I'll tell you. He's mistaken in the first place about our having a "bare-shelves" policy. We never at any time during World War II had any such thing as a "bare-shelves"

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policy. Let me contrast the differences between conditions in the two wars.

I was here in World War I, and when the World War ended, World War I cotton prices were about forty cents per pound, and they remained that for a very short period, and then they dropped first to twenty cents, then to ten cents, and then to six cents per pound. And then Congress was reluctant to appropriate the big sums even though they might be needed for shipments abroad, and they refused to do so. Wheat went from a dollar and a quarter a bushel down to as little as twenty cents a bushel.

HESS: Was that because of oversupply?

JONES: It was because an oversupply developed after World War I. In late 1918 when the war was over, Congress began to tighten up

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on the shipments abroad trying to get back on a pay-as-you-go basis. We had vast expenditures during the war, and we had great problems following World War I, that's when the farm problem got to be so serious, because we had these vast accumulations of various farm commodities and they had gone down in price.

In World War II the problem was different. Congress had guaranteed that farm prices would be supported at the war level for two years after the war -- so there was no danger of major farm price level falling for at least two years, so our problem was different.

We had, at the time during latter part of World War II when this policy came up -- we had some division among our folks about it, but one or two of them who had dealt with the farm problem said we have all these commodities we had in big storage, but I called their

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attention to the law guaranteeing farm prices, so we didn't have any "bare-shelf" policy at all in World War II.

In World War I we had a supply of wheat that was suited to war times. It wasn't certain that we would be able to get Congress to make the provision for sustaining farm prices after the World War I fighting was over.

We had to fight for years. Coolidge vetoed two of the bills intended by its authors to take care of the farm situation that had developed. And all through the twenties the committee was trying to get the farm program, and finally, a program was prepared during the twenties. The details of the two bills vetoed by President Coolidge will be told later.

Mr. Hoover, on advice of his Representative in the House, Franklin Fort of New Jersey,

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then took all of the teeth out of the bill's regulating features. The bill authorized a Farm Board to buy the surplus at a flooring or support price. President Hoover had pulled all of the safeguards out of the original bill, and then McNary-Haugen asked that it be passed as changed. The philosophy of the Farm Board bill was, "We will buy products at a support price above the market and hold them for a higher price."

The thing just collapsed. Mr. Hoover appointed a Board headed by Alexander Legge. It was called the Federal Farm Board. Alexander Legge, in the best of faith, left a fifty thousand dollar job because he thought he could help adjust this farm policy and render a public service.

The Board bought cotton and bought wheat above the market price. I had a talk with Mr.

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Legge afterward, and he said, "I don't understand where all this wheat came from." When we began to buy wheat, it came out from barns, granaries, elevators, and from everywhere. We had put a flooring under the price -- we would buy wheat at a dollar and sixteen cents a bushel when it was selling down to -- all the way from sixty to eighty cents, and we didn't have any storage for it. We were swamped.

As a matter of fact, when the New Deal came in we simply gave away to the American Red Cross several hundred thousand bales of cotton that had been purchased by the Farm Board. In fact, more than a million bales of cotton were held on which the Government took a loss. We gave several hundred million bushels of wheat to the American Red Cross.

None of our group in World War II argued that we wanted to have a "bare-shelves" policy. They all wanted a supply, a sufficient supply,

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to avoid a loss, and then we could go along with full production because we are equipped with the assured price to produce more food, and were producing more food than had ever been produced in this or any other country. One or two had argued that the existing law should be kept as a stand-by, but not one of them argued for anything approximating a bare-shelves or reduction policy.

Mr. Hoover's administration was buying in 1929 and 1930 without any regulation at all, just endlessly without any outlet or market. The Farm Board collapsed in 1930 and the whole country collapsed. The farmers couldn't produce at the low price. The whole economy stalled on dead center; it broke banks, it broke everything else. Millions of hungry people were shuffling in the bread lines, hopeless, helpless, and despairing.

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But the guarantee that Congress had enacted at the time authority was granted to put a ceiling on prices assured farm support prices for a period of two years following the first of January following a declaration of the end of the war. So there was no occasion to have any fear of a price collapse following World War II.

Some of these people have written who don't know about a situation, they didn't understand. I have lived through both World Wars and have seen these problems and have seen the great losses the Government took in trying to get rid of surpluses. Some of our people were talking that when I came into War Food. I immediately said, "We're just going to do away with controls and produce all the food we can as long as this war lasts." And we produced at all times all the food we could possibly produce. No production controls would

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be needed during the war.

HESS: Production control?

JONES: No production control during the war. The law was still in the books, but I had authority to and I did suspend any restrictions during the war. I said, "We are simply going to get all the food production possible until the war ends. At that time my authority will end, but that will be the rule while my authority lasts. I can't repeal a law, but the Congress has authorized suspension during the World War II."

Back in 1937, as chairman of the committee on agriculture, I was asked to handle a proposed sugar bill which proposed a reduction in the tariff on sugar and a processing fee on sugar produced in all the offshore sugar producing areas, as well as this country. The proceeds were to be paid to domestic producers if they would keep within their allotment.

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Senator Robinson called me to his office in the Capitol. Cordell Hull, Rex Tugwell, and several others were present. I knew little about sugar and I so stated. I said, "It belongs to the Ways and Means Committee; it affects the tariff. Besides, I am already busy with other legislation."

"If I handle it," I said, "in the first place, I'm going to make all these offshore areas keep a six month's supply so there never will be a shortage of sugar. We can write that in the bill as a condition to their selling their quota; that is, if we are going to establish quotas at all."

Rex Tugwell said, "Oh, we can't do that."

And I said, "It's damn sure going to be in there if I handle the deal. I'm not going to have a shortage come up when my people are interested in cheap sugar."

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I was assured, "You will be protected since we are going to reduce the tariff and we're not going to have the processing fee any higher than the reduction of the tariff." We're going to have a reduction of $2.12 per hundred pounds on the tariff on imported sugar. Cordell Hull was there and Senator [Joseph Taylor] Robinson and several others, all trying to manhandle me into handling this legislation if it took all morning. But he said, "I am perfectly willing to handle this if the President wants me to even though I think it should be handled by someone else, because I'm already swamped with other things up here." But I said, "I'm going to write into that bill that the processing fee shall never rise above the reduction of the tariff that we're making here at this time."

Again, someone said, "Well, you can't

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write that in the bill."

And I said, "I can write it into the bill."

We adjourned before finally determining the issue. About 1:30 p.m. the President phoned me and said, "I want you to handle the sugar bill." I told him the production belonged to the Ways and Means Committee. The President said, "They're having trouble in Cuba and other places and we just can't wait -- you have a way of getting action up on the Hill, and the Ways and Means Committee will probably take three months in hearings and there may be a revolution in Cuba and other places where the situation is. I am personally asking you to handle the measure."

So, I wrote those two safeguarding provisions. I have had a lot of experience on this farm situation, and I know it can get

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out of hand and cost the Government a tremendous sum, and if you go to solving a farm problem at all you have a -- if I'm talking too much on this, I'll...

HESS: Go right ahead, it's very good.

JONES: As a matter of fact, for a hundred years, more than a hundred years, the surplus producing farmer has paid the burdens of the tariff in which he has no part. He can't get any advantage of the tariff, but he pays a tariff, a higher price behind the tariff wall on everything he buys from a knitting needle to a threshing machine.

I called attention many times on the floor of the House to the fact that Alexander Hamilton who was the patron saint of the tariff and who was the first Secretary of the Treasury, and in the first Treasury report on December 5, 1791, had advocated a tariff to protect our infant

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industries. A lot of them are no longer infants any more.

But he said it would permit them to grow and thus manufacture a lot of our own materials and keep the money in this country. In the report he made this statement: "The farmer can have no benefit of this tariff; therefore, in order to bring them back to the level of equality, the farmer should be given a bonus, or a payment, as an offset to that tariff, either on his production or upon the sales of his commodity abroad."

When those interested in a protective measure adopted the tariff, which they did, they forgot the farmer's end, and for a hundred years, the farmer suffered the burdens of the tariff and didn't have any corresponding benefits.

I didn't believe in the philosophy of

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Alexander Hamilton, but he was at least intellectually honest, and I could read to you his statement on that subject. He admitted that it would be unfair to the farmer who had no benefits from it and he should be brought back to the level of equality. I read that portion of his report many times. If you go back in the Record you may find that. And then I tried to get that situation corrected -- I'll give you a little history here if I may.

HESS: Very good.

JONES: I tried to get that bill through to let the cooperatives, farm cooperatives, the farm organizations ship their products abroad and have a certificate equal to the tariff on similar commodities given to them on which they could use to bring in the products used -- use that certificate in payment of the tariff, or sell the certificate to an

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importer. I had quite a vote on that in the House.

Then in 1935 I hit upon an idea and I introduced a bill. I wrote it myself, about a page, and it's still on the statute books, the only automatic appropriation in the Government today. Nobody has been able to repeal it. The measure sets aside (at that time about 30 percent of the people engaged in farming or dependent on farming directly or indirectly in the little villages, about 30 percent of them), set apart 30 percent of the tariff collections each previous calendar year automatically on the first day of July, to the credit of the Secretary of Agriculture in the Treasury of the United States (amounts to about a hundred and forty million dollars a year), and which should be used in the payment of the loss in distribution of surplus farm

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commodities at home or abroad. And they have used that money every year.

They wouldn’t use it the first year. They raised Cain about it, but I was just invoking the philosophy of Alexander Hamilton on that issue, and you can find it in the statute books now. And every year a hundred and forty million, and it accumulates if not used. At the end of three years, it goes back into the Treasury if they don't use it.

But they used it to start the school lunch program, originally. And then the school lunch program outgrew it. When they would have a drought period in certain sections, it could enable them to ship feed across the country, as well as abroad, at a loss. As a matter of fact, they had at times used part of that on the food stamp program.

Eisenhower came in you remember, we had

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a drought out in the Southwest. He went out to Amarillo, my home town, and he came out -- he gave a statement that he found the area in great need in West Texas, New Mexico, and the Southwest, and that he was going to, as soon as Congress made funds available, he was going to use the funds to relieve the situation.

When I read his statement I called Lyndon Johnson who was leader in the Senate. I called him by phone and said, "Listen, the Secretary of Agriculture (that was Ezra Taft Benton), has three hundred million dollars in his pocket that can be used for this drought right now." I said, "That's an automatic appropriation and I happen to know that there is a considerable sum available in the Treasury to his credit. All he has to do is write a check."

I was just going into Court and Johnson said, "Where is that provision?"

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I said, "It's along about 1935 or '36. It's an automatic appropriation on the first of July, a sum equal to 30 percent of the tariff collections for the previous calendar year are set apart to the credit of the Secretary of Agriculture for these purposes, and," I said, "I'm going into Court right now, but I'll find it as soon as I come out at 12:30. I can get it and phone you within five minutes."

I came back and I called Johnson's office and told Arthur Perry, who was his Administrative Assistant, "I found that article known as Section 32. Mr. Johnson wanted me to look it up for him," and I said, "I'll give you the reference to it."

"Oh," he said, "Mr. Johnson didn't wait for that." He said, "He made us look the thing up and they've got three hundred and fifty million dollars down there, and Johnson's

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over on the floor of the Senate panning Eisenhower and the Secretary of Agriculture for not using their funds."

I don't think Benson knew it was there. He had just come in a little while before.

President Roosevelt didn't understand it when it was first written. [Henry] Morgenthau just raved about an appropriation not having to go through the budget year after year; an automatic appropriation. I had to get points of order waived, I succeeded in doing that to make it go through originally. I could tell you a story on that, but that's too much detail.

But anyhow, Morgenthau called me up and said, "I'm going to request the President to veto it."

And I said, "All right, see if you can get it done." I added, "It is tied up with a whole bunch of other things that the President wants.

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He won't veto the whole bill for this one item."

He was still peeved. Then he induced the President the following session, in his first message, to ask repeal of that provision. [James P.] Buchanan, who is from my state, Chairman of the Appropriations Committee said, "He's recommended a repeal of that provision."

I said, "You might just as well bay at the moon. Congress isn't going to repeal that section."

And he says, "I know that. I don't want it repealed."

I went down to see the President a short time after, and he said to me, "What is this thing you have cooked up to turn over to Secretary Wallace a hundred and forty million dollars a year to spend like he wants to?"

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And I said, "Now, wait a minute, Mr. President." And I told him the background of it.

He says, "That's not a bad idea, is it?"

And I said, "No, it's a good idea."

And he became as enthusiastic about it as I was. So, it's still on the statute books, and the money is available every year. And that's the nearest approach to an offset of the tariff that the surplus farmer has ever known.

HESS: Do you recall if Eisenhower and Benson used that money after it was pointed out to them by Senator Johnson?

JONES: Oh, they used the money. I guess they used it for the same purpose. I don't know. Congress didn't have to appropriate the funds for it, because they had them.

HESS: It was just pointed out that it was available.

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JONES: It was available. They never denied that. But I didn't intend to take all this time...

HESS: Oh, that's all right.

JONES: ...as explanation. But there are a lot of people writing on this that haven't studied the farm problem.

Now, we didn't advocate bare-shelves at all. He's just as wrong as he can be about that. We advocated the keeping of a reserve supply, as well as all-out production at all times.

HESS: Did you think there was going to be a surplus after the war?

JONES: I thought there probably would be at some time, and as a matter of fact, the surpluses did come. They were a little later in coming because we had had four years of war. I felt it would be some time before there would be a

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surplus. It was a little slower coming, and then, besides, they had a provision in the law guaranteeing the wartime prices for more than two years after the war ended. This made a different picture from previous experiences. We had a provision in the measure anyway to induce production.

So the situation had plenty of safeguards. It was so that the Secretary of Agriculture each year after the war could adjust production upward if it was necessary to produce more. He could adjust it under the law that was already written.

After the war it would be his duty to estimate the needs, and in estimating the needs, to include what the budget had made available for furnishing food for people abroad. The Secretary of Agriculture, under the control act, at the beginning of each season, each crop, he would estimate what would

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be needed each year to see that we always had a normal reserve supply on hand before he started to cut down the production.

We had some people who wanted toward the end to be careful about oversupply. I said, "No, we won't do that. We are only responsible during the war period. The Secretary of Agriculture after the war may take such actions as he finds necessary from year to year."

I don't know anything about this man. Does he ever say anything about the danger of spoilage when the warehouses are full and no place to put additional food? I didn't know anything about the background of this man. I've never seen his -- what's his background?

HESS: He has a Ph.D. from Harvard. He's a fairly young man. He is a professor of history now. He was at Rice University in Texas for a

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while. Where he is now, I'm not sure.

JONES: Well, as a matter of fact, I was invited to lecture the Harvard School of Government. I told you about that already, didn't I?

HESS: I think so.

JONES: In 1939 I was asked to lecture at the Graduate School of Government on the processes of enacting legislation. They studied as a text the Farm Act of 1938 which covered everything. I had sponsored that legislation and had written the soil conservation, rate discrimination, and regional research features. They kept me under questions from 4 to 7 p.m. Dr. Froelich told me I had given them much valuable information, that I knew the subject thoroughly. He made me one of the trustees of the Graduate School of Government, the Littauer School, and said they would admit

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any student I recommended. I have this letter to that effect. Of course, that was while I was still in Congress and Chairman of the House Agriculture Committee.

HESS: One other point: In April and June of 1945 a special House committee chaired by Representative Clinton P. Anderson of New Mexico, traveled around the country to investigate the food shortage and to recommend remedial action. Do you feel that Anderson and his investigation was critical of you as the War Food Administrator?

JONES: Well, if he was I didn't know it. He wasn't particularly critical. He came to see me at the beginning and said it was a friendly investigation, and I said, "Well, I am perfectly willing for you to go ahead." And he may have offered some criticism from time to time, but some of them didn't understand

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it, and I don't know where he got his notion or what he found. As a matter of fact, in order to find more storage we had a contract for warehousing over in a cave in Atchison, Kansas.

All the warehousing we had was completely filled. Here is the thing that a lot of people don't understand: Perishable food begins to deteriorate the minute it's produced unless you have storage for it, and we had all the storage places full. And when I came into War Food they had ninety million dollars of butter on hand, and about forty-four million pounds of it was rancid. They didn't have the storage and I had to get rid of about forty million pounds as best we could because no one here would use it. The Russian people were glad to accept it for some use in that country. We looked for additional storage wherever we could get it. And I have told you

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about these fourteen hundred carloads of eggs that were tended to me at one time. I didn't have any place to put them, but I had an order from Congress to support that price, to buy the eggs. I had to do it.

HESS: But no place to put them.

JONES: No place to put them. And then Anderson may have found some little places where he never disclosed any of them to me.

[Chester] Bowles had recommended, in fact, he made the announcement that he was taking off rationing. The announcement had been made taking off rationing temporarily on certain of the commodities. It was this way: There was a big supply of meat and two or three other perishable commodities. We were furnishing all the Army needed, all the lend-lease needed. The storage was all full and just temporarily

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there was no outlet for these items. Bowles and I discussed the situation and he announced that he would take off rationing on commodities for the time being. The newspapers carried his statement that he was taking them off rationing.

I said, "I don't mind that action as to items that are perishable that we can't store, but they should be restored to rationing as soon as needed or as soon as proper storage is available."

Later he suggested restoring the rationing.

I said, "I agree that they should be restored as soon as a place is found for any company excess. I don't want it to perish on my hands." I said, "Give me the facts. I am sure we can agree." We may have both been criticized, as we were from time to time.

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Senator Anderson may have found some little shortages, but with the vast quantities of food we had, you know, I don't know, there might have been a shortage in someplace, but he never mentioned it to me, and I am sure it was not serious because our theme then and all along had been all-out productions. There was no shortage so far as any report that I ever saw him make. He told me it was a friendly investigation.

The great program was over; he did reorganize and appointed some people over there for what was to be practically after the war activities. But that work and the need for it was an entirely different nature.

But, anyhow, I wish I had time to go into all the details of that thing, but I don't. We never had any serious problems of shortage of food.

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HESS: What kind of Secretary of Agriculture did Clinton Anderson make? Was he a success?

JONES: I think he made a good Secretary of Agriculture because the war problems were practically over, you know. He had experience as a dairy farmer and I am sure he had studied the subject of the farm and the ranch. I had felt from the beginning that if the Department of Agriculture officials, employees, and activities were to be used, the Secretary of Agriculture should be the War Food Administrator. And he didn't have the great war problems because they disappeared largely. The problem of maintaining a flooring price was easy after the war was over. He didn't have all these problems of finding extra storage space, but there were still many problems as always, and I think he made -- did a good job as Secretary.

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As a matter of fact, he asked that my right-hand man, Wilson Cowen, who is now the Chief Judge of the Court I left, Anderson asked that he be permitted to stay. He wanted to come right on back with me. Anderson called me and asked if I had any objections to his story or of his asking President Truman to ask him to stay. I said, "Of course, I would think such a request would be a great compliment to him." Truman wrote him a gracious request, and he agreed to stay for six months with Anderson. I think he helped Anderson because he knew that business over there, the way we had handled it. And I had used him and Ashley Sellers, my two right-hand men. Wilson Cowen is an exceedingly capable man. He was a great help for me and I am sure he was of great assistance to Anderson who was taking the position, and any new man in that position

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needs all the help he can get. Chester Davis had brought in some new men. The War Food Administrator was authorized to do that. I think Anderson did a good job, but he only stayed there a few months. He wanted to run for the United States Senate, which he did, and was elected.

HESS: And then he was replaced by Charles Brannan. How successful was Charles Brannan in your view?

JONES: Who was that?

HESS: Charles Brannan.

JONES: Charles Brannan, I am sure, made a good Secretary of Agriculture, although I was busy in the Court when he was Secretary.

HESS: What's your view of the Brannan plan?

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JONES: Well, I think -- I'd rather not comment on that at this time. I think Brannan's plan had some good features, but I think it needed some revamping.

Brannan made a pretty good Secretary of Agriculture though. At that time I was no longer keeping up with the details since our Court had a heavy accumulated docket which kept me very busy. I wouldn't want to compare the two because Brannan had a new plan with which I was not familiar. I think he had a plan that had some impractical features, but in the main, what he did produced rather good results. There was controversy over it and I don't want to get into that because of my unfamiliarity with its details.

HESS: There was a good deal of controversy, wasn't there?

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JONES: There was a good deal of division of sentiment. Charles Brannan was the attorney for the Farmer's Union, and the Farmer's Union and the Farm Bureau Federation and the National Grange didn't agree in national policies. The Farmer's Union was rather liberal at the time. I was not sure how far Brannan would go in completely changing the whole plan of farm program operations. I like Brannan personally, and I have always been especially fond of the president of the Farmer's Union, James Patton. He was a very sincere and earnest man, and he had a vital interest in the farmers of America, but might make changes too rapidly.

When I was War Food Administrator, the Farmer's Union had advocated a plan to have the -- all the farmers in the United States sign written contracts to produce first the amount and kind of food that would be found to be

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essential. He is retired now, a wonderful man and a good friend of mine. He will always have an interest in the individual farmer. He took a great interest in the Bankhead-Jones tenant home purchase which accomplished a great deal with meager funds.

James Patton was the head of the Farmer's Union. He and Ed [Edward Ashley, III] O'Neal of the Farm Bureau and someone else met at the White House. The President asked all of us for suggestions about the food situation. And I think the Farmer's Union had gotten the President interested in a contract provision. He wanted to know if it was practical. The President said to me, "It has been suggested to you that we have a written contract with all the farmers in the United States for the coming year, and what do you think about it?"

And I said, "Well, Mr. President, there

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are six million farmers in the United States (there were at that time). The paper shortage would make it impractical to have an individual contract, and you would have more controversies than you ever heard of if you tried to supervise compliance." And everybody laughed, and that was all that was ever said about it.

As a matter of fact, I was very fond of Jim Patton personally. Before that they had had a man named [John A.] Simpson who was wild as a March hare, and Patton did have more practical views and he advocated some good things, but we can't go all out on extreme views either way. I never was much of an extremist on either side of any of those controversies.

So, I don't want to criticize Charles Brannan as Secretary of Agriculture. The Brannan plan was never adopted. I wondered

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if it didn't lack some practical features, and yet, as Secretary of Agriculture, he went ahead and administered exceedingly well what he had before him in the way of legislation. And I know that Jim Patton was a lot more reasonable than the previous head of the Farmer's Union had been, and I was always glad to have his viewpoint. He was always studying the subject.

HESS: All right, at the end of our last interview we got up to some of your relationships with President Truman after he became President.

JONES: After he became President? Well, I'll tell you, like most people, I was very much interested in what he was doing. He had more problems the first year, I think, than any other President ever had the same length of time. He had that problem of the dropping

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the atomic bomb at Hiroshima. And that was a terrific responsibility.

And then he had trouble with John L. Lewis and many other domestic problems growing out of the ending and aftermath of the war, plus the responsibility of peace settlement, peace treaties, the United Nations organization, the rebuilding, the foreign aid, the conference with Stalin and Winston Churchill. I don't know how he did it all.

I want to compliment him on being able to handle these things as they came up, without fear. He had a sign on his desk that said, "The Buck Stops Here." He had to be alone in making the final decision, and that isn't an easy job, even in normal times. But the vast problems that arose out of the readjustments, all fell on his desk suddenly. He formulated a big foreign

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aid program which was a desirable program. I felt that at least a part of the funds should be allotted to help individual farmers abroad increase their production of food, and at the same time preserve their soils. I called Sam Rayburn, Dick Russell, and others and said that if the authorities will allot 15 percent of that money and turn it over to the Extension Service, with the County and Home Demonstration Agents, boys' and girls' 4-H Clubs, and let them help those people help themselves, sending them only to countries that ask for that help, that 15 percent will do as much in the long run as the other 85 percent. They all agreed that it should be done. I said to them that the Extension Service is the most efficient U.S. Government agency. It doesn't get much publicity, but it has the County Agent, Home Demonstration Agents, and boys' and girls' 4-H Clubs. That

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agency has made over rural America. There isn't any question about that. The funds are turned over directly to the A&M colleges and the other land-grant colleges of each state, some of which are state universities. The Federal Government pays one-third, each state one-third, and each county, if it desires the service, pays one-third of the expense.

The National organization doesn't make any of the policies. It acts as a clearing house of information so that if the experiment stations or farmers discover a new method, it may be distributed over the country. A Mr. Edwards was a county agent from the Southwest, trained at Texas A&M College. He was an exceptionally capable agent.

The original Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia heard about this work or at least found out about it. He asked the Extension Service to

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send Edwards and some other agents to show them about the operation. Edwards went. He showed them how to have these experiment stations, how to organize these things. Old Ibn Saud, the original one, you know, the big man, so fell in love with Edwards and his work that he offered him two times his salary if he would take a leave of absence and come over and take charge of the work.

Edwards came to me and said, "I would like to go, but I don't want to give up my seniority here," and he added, "If you call..."

HESS: He didn't want to move to Arabia?

JONES: "I don't want to move to Arabia permanently, but I'm willing to go over there and spend three years on a leave of absence, without pay, if I can retain my rights."

I called the Under Secretary of Agriculture,

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Mr. Wilson, who had charge of the Extension Service and told him the story, and he said, "Why sure, I don't see any reason why we can't do that."

So he went over there and the old King was very partial to him. He had access to the palace and he played with the King's children -- one of them later became King. He would take them little presents when he'd come back to visit our country. The King wanted him to stay, of course. When I told Dick [Senator Richard B.] Russell of Georgia, he said, "Well, I think that's right the way as you explained it. I think it will help them help themselves." And he said, "I can't give out any interview because they'll think I'm trying to fix things."

So, I went to Paul Hoffman, who had been president of one of the motor companies,

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possibly Studebaker. He was in charge of the program. I called his secretary, but she made various excuses to put me off. I then asked to see the President. I told him about my suggestion. He seemed interested and suggested to talk to Hoffman. The President said, "Well, now that sounds interesting. I wish you would talk to Paul Hoffman about it."

Then I had no trouble seeing Hoffman, and Hoffman said, "We're already doing that."

"Well," I said, "if you're already doing it, that's fine. I didn't know that you were doing that kind of work."

And he said, "You go over and talk to Dr. Fitgerald," who had been with me in War Food and who was working under Mr. Hoffman.

Fitzgerald said, "I'm glad you talked to Hoffman because all we're doing is exchanging a hundred men to visit those countries and the

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United States purely on an experimental basis. We are not doing any of the kind of work you suggest. I wish that could be done."

In fairness to Mr. Hoffman, I don't think he ever understood the suggestion. He was a very busy man.

At any rate, Truman, soon after that, announced the "Point 4" program which helped a great deal along a similar line. I don't think it was as good as the other would have been, but it accomplished a great deal.

Another matter. Several years earlier, I had written President Eisenhower, the papers are continually charging the Army and Navy officials of buying more of some things than they need and even some things they don't need. If one has more than is needed of an article, they won't give each other supplies they have accumulated. It is on their hands and not needed. It has been that they rarely

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turn unexpended funds back into the Treasury. I suggested that a group of experienced civilians be authorized to make purchases and let the Army and Navy requisition what they need as they need it. I'd been trying to get that idea sold, but that's hard to do. I suppose they like to have their own commissary department.

Mr. Truman, time after time, would be faced with disheartening things. Labor issues and then the Taft-Hartley bill, which wasn't what either side particularly wanted, but that was the best Taft could get and the union labor was against it. The President had to act on that. So many controversial things were presented that his popularity to a certain degree went down in the polls anyway. Perhaps we have already discussed his campaign.

HESS: '48?

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JONES: Yes, '48.

HESS: We haven't got into that yet.

JONES: Haven't we gotten into that yet?

HESS: No. That's one of the questions coming up. Tell me about the -- what do you remember about 1948?

JONES: Well, 1948 -- we've discussed the vice-presidential activity, haven't we?

HESS: Yes.

JONES: There's one correction a little later I want to make on that. But as to the campaign in 1948, did I tell you about -- I was going to tell you about what my mother said.

HESS: Yes, how that she said she thought that he came across as a real person.

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JONES: She heard him on television. And then have I already told you about what these newsmen said towards the last there about his coming up so fast?

HESS: I don't recall.

JONES: But anyhow, when my mother made the prediction right after his fighting speech in Philadelphia, I still didn't think he would be elected. I wouldn't say I thought he would be defeated. I wouldn't say that at all, but at the time, I had some doubt about his being elected. I lived at the University Club, and it was more Republican than Democratic all the time and only two of us would stand up for Truman. They just ribbed the life out of us. But we stood on our ground and told them they would be singing a different tune after the election, that is, if they were able to sing after that.

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HESS: Who was the other man?

JONES: Huh?

HESS: Who was the other man?

JONES: The other man was the fellow that had worked for the Interstate Commerce Commission, one of their examiners, and I can't recall his name -- he's a big stout fellow. He and I would just fight them like cats and dogs and have a lot of fun out of them, but they'd offer to bet, and I said, "Well, I wouldn't bet on a cinch." We would take up for him all the way through. As a matter of fact, I would have liked to have been foot-loose to campaign for him because I had done a great deal of campaigning. I suppose I was like the old fire horse when the fire bell rang.

HESS: Did you hear any of his campaign speeches?

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JONES: Oh, I heard a number of his campaign speeches at different times. You know, they would be on radio or television, but I never was present when he made these -- what do they call it, the...

HESS: The "whistlestop" speeches?

JONES: "Whistlestop" speeches, and that is what really elected him as much as anything else. Then Barkley, of course, was helpful. But along about two weeks before the election -- I have a brother in Texas who keeps up with those things, and he wrote me a letter and said, "You know Truman is gaining in a rapid way and he may surprise you."

And then, I was over at the National Press Club, and if I haven't told you about what these newsmen said -- well, anyhow, I was over there having breakfast at what is called the round

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table. I would eat with that group of newsmen who came there. They always know what's going on. And two of them had been on each train, the President's train, and the...

HESS: And [Governor Thomas E.] Dewey's train.

JONES: Dewey's train. And one of them said (this was about ten days before the election), "You know Truman's gaining rapidly, and if this campaign lasted two weeks longer, he would be elected."

And the other one spoke up and said, "Well, he may beat him anyway."

I asked them some questions then and one of them said, "I was on Dewey's train out West through Montana or some of those places, or in the same area. Dewey didn't stop at all of the places, but at many of them, when the train stopped (Dewey's train), there wouldn't be

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anybody come out on the platform for a little while, and then finally some fellow would rather listlessly walk out and take his place. Finally, Dewey would mosey out with his hair done just right and his mustache in place, and they would present him. He would bow gracefully and say a few words to them and there would be a few polite handclaps -- I mean applause -- as they naturally would extend to any man of that prominence. It seemed rather formal and seemed to lack warmth." The newsman added, "When I came back over the same area two or three weeks later riding on Truman's train, when the Truman train stopped he would just bounce out first and begin to talk to them. He looked over at the man with chaps on his ankles, and said, 'You look like a cowboy to me."'

"And he would say, 'Yes, I'm a cowboy,' And then Truman would see somebody else and make

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some comment and then he would say a few words in chatty fashion and he just captivated that crowd."

And he commented, "There's a warmth about it and a folksy manner that appealed to those people." And he said, "That happened everywhere I went with him."

And the other one said, "I had a similar experience except in reverse. I went with Truman first and then followed with the other man along the same area in those states."

And the people who were studying it had a lot more confidence in the possibility of his being elected. They were still, the betting was five and six to one and four to one all the way through, even during the day of the election.

That night I went over to a dinner here where Paul Porter and several others were present. Paul had worked with me

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at the campaign headquarters in Chicago during the '36 campaign. I was in charge of the western headquarters.

HESS: Where was the dinner held?

JONES: I believe that was -- it probably was at Drew Pearson's home. They had a large group over there. But at any rate, some of them were there playing bridge, and I was in listening with Porter and Henderson.

HESS: Leon Henderson?

JONES: Leon Henderson and Paul Porter, and the news began to come in that Truman was leading in these little sparsely -- sparse reports that came in early. The reports would fluctuate a little up and down, but the net gain was always for Truman. Well, they were laughing and having a good time, all of us

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cheering the reports as they came in for Truman. Along about 11 o'clock, Paul Porter said when quite a lump of reports came in with the Truman lead increasing -- practically always a net gain, sometimes more than others, Paul Porter and Henderson both laughed and cheered, "Well, I'm going to cheer while I can. I know this can't last."

I said, "Listen, I've been watching these campaigns for a long time; Truman is elected. I'm going back to the University Club and kid some of these people that have been kidding me."

HESS: Before they go to bed?

JONES: Before they go to bed. "Oh," they said, "you've got to wait, it isn't over yet."

I said, "This campaign's over now. Truman's elected."

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As I went out, I believe it was Drew Pearson's over in Georgetown somewhere -- I thanked him and told him I was going back to the club. I went out to get a taxi. The taxis were in demand. It was there right near Pennsylvania Avenue, however, and we weren't afraid to walk across there in those days -- I knew we couldn't order one. We had to flag one.

HESS: Over on Wisconsin?

JONES: No, over on Penn Avenue or "M" Street before we got to Wisconsin. I think I walked across about a block or two.

HESS: Oh.

JONES: And then it turns into Wisconsin out in Georgetown, doesn't it? In Georgetown?

HESS: I don't remember. It's immaterial.

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JONES: It's about a block over there, and I walked over there and took twenty minutes to find an empty cab. I went straight to the club. And you know, it was the sickest group you ever saw.

They said, "Isn't it awful?"

And I said, "Isn't it wonderful?"

And they were so crestfallen...

HESS: They thought the election was over, too.

JONES: Evidently, I just didn't have the nerve to kid them as much as I wanted to. It wasn't funny to them. They had lost a lot of money. There was considerable money wagered at odds on that campaign.

HESS: Do you remember...

JONES: After that campaign, I saw President Truman several times. I saw him at Mr. Rayburn's dinner at the Capitol. I saw him down at the

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Press Club and at several gatherings here. He had the knack of mixing with people and not looking like -- not doing any strutting. He was open and aboveboard and not afraid to tell his story and stand by it. I have a great admiration for him and it grew during the period.

HESS: Do you recall in 1948 before the convention and the campaign, the problems that were caused when Congress rewrote the charter for the Commodity Credit Corporation and they left out the provision to buy and provide storage bins, and, therefore, the farmers couldn't get their wheat and corn into the storage bins?

JONES: I remember reading about that. As a matter of fact, that was a terrible oversight. It created some real problems I understand. That

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was after I had gone back to the Court about two years before. I think they probably had some losses on that, considerable losses on it.

HESS: Do you think that they played an important part in the rural areas in the Democratic victory that year?

JONES: I suspect it did.

HESS: States like Iowa, which went Democratic, and hardly ever do?

JONES: That's right. And as a matter of fact, the only other time that they had that many was in '36 when we made that thorough campaign in the West. They normally are Republicans, all that area through most of the Midwest, and even the far West. It is largely Republican among the farmers.

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HESS: Why do you think most farmers are Republicans?

JONES: That's hard to say because most of that -- that is, in that particular area -- the farmers normally in that area have fewer problems. But the main reason is that it had nearly always voted Republican. Customs are not changed easily.

HESS: Ever since the Civil War.

JONES: Ever since that war, and the only man that had ever been able to get away from them was Truman -- I mean, was Roosevelt and then Truman. I went down with Mr. Rayburn when he made a speech in North Carolina. He made a good speech in favor of Truman and...

HISS: Was that '48?

JONES: In '48, yes.

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HESS: How was it received?

JONES: It was well received. Down there, sentiment was growing by the time that we went down there at that time. I took no part in the meeting.

HESS: You say North Carolina?

JONES: North Carolina. I am sure it was North Carolina.

HESS: Did you hear anything about Strom Thurmond when you were down there at that time?

JONES: Yes, we heard a lot about Strom Thurmond. It was normally Thurmond territory, but that didn't make any difference. Rayburn had a fine hand on that speech. I don't think he made many speeches, but he made a good one there. There were many Thurmond people in South Carolina, especially the Strom Thurmond

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area. I didn't go down into South Carolina, but Strom Thurmond had a considerable following, you know. That was another location factor that looked like it might defeat Truman. That's another problem he had.

HESS: That, and Wallace, Henry Wallace.

JONES: And Henry Wallace. Well, I never did think he would be a serious factor. He would take votes from both sides. Wallace had quit the party then and was running as an independent.

HESS: He had his own party, the Progressive Party.

JONES: Yes. Well, you know, he made -- he needed somebody with him to keep him from making remarks that would react unfavorably. He was inept in some respects. He was perfectly sincere, a very wonderful man, a very fine

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character, but he had the idea that we could just go along, and he wouldn't give up on Russia. And he would make mistakes -- I heard him say this on TV, "There are some people who think there is more Democracy in Russia than there is in the United States." Now he didn't say that he thought that, but that's a strange statement for a man in a political contest to make.

I didn't think he would be a serious contender. I didn't think he would have much effect in the South. South Carolina is a sort of law unto itself. It started, you know -- it's the first one to...

HESS: It was where this first shot was fired, wasn't it?

JONES: Yes, where the first shot was fired. My mother's folks, the Gastons, came from -- her

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folks from North and South Carolina. My grandparents on my mother's side moved to Tennessee, and my mother was born in Tennessee.

I always was very fond of Justice Byrnes because he worked with me a great deal, but, you know, I wrote an opinion -- I don't know whether you'd like for me to tell this or not -- I wrote an opinion and it's in a book here of human interest opinions.

HESS: Are they all your opinions?

JONES: Yes, they're all mine.

HESS: What's the title of your book?

JONES: The title is Should Uncle Sam Pay - When and Why? I'm a little short on them. I just had them published for my friends, but I've got one here, and if you want to take it along I would like for you to read the one about

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a soldier who was taken prisoner at Corregidor. I told you something about that.

HESS: Off the tape, not on the tape. We haven't got this yet. We might as well get it right now.

JONES: Well, anyhow, I'll show you the book. I'll have to get you to return it because I'm just a little short on them.

HESS: That'll be fine.

JONES: I had stories in it about cats and dogs and about various human things and gambling...

HESS: Cases that would come before the Court?

JONES: That came before the Court, and my law clerks selected them and wanted them published, so I decided to have them published, and they have attracted a lot of attention. One of the

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directors of Journal of the American Bar Association wrote up quite a review of the book.

But, anyhow, when the Americans were in Corregidor, finally driven into Corregidor, and in that couped up place they were having fights in getting there in the first place.

In one of the companies under General [Douglas] MacArthur, every officer in that company was killed or had disappeared. They had this boy, a second lieutenant, who had already proved himself a hero. He'd risked his life in getting a lot of wounded soldiers across the line while he was under fire.

So, a major general promoted him to captain on the field of battle; the man in charge of that division. He fought there for about three months. MacArthur had left and he surrendered with [General Jonathan] Wainwright and became a prisoner of war. He

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died as a prisoner in 1944, and the Department of -- the War Department, refused to recognize the promotion. His folks sued for the difference in the salary as a second lieutenant and a captain for the time he was in prison.

I wrote the opinion giving his parents the difference in pay. The Department of the Army claimed that the major general who promoted him on the field of battle was not competent authority to make such a promotion. We held that since the promotion was made under battle conditions, the major general in charge was competent authority, and even if he were not, since he fought there several months under the watchful eye of General MacArthur and General Wainwright, who succeeded him, if he didn't have authority, it was ratified by those men. And that if they didn't know what was going on in that couped up place,

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they weren't the great military chieftains that most of us thought they were.

Well, somebody sent the opinion to MacArthur. I mean my secretary may have sent it, thought he might like to see it. But he wrote me and invited me to come to see him.

And I didn't go for several months. I was scheduled to go to New York one Sunday to stay until Tuesday. I thought I would just like to go by and make a courtesy call. I had never met him, and -- oh, I had met him informally like you would at some reception.

HESS: This was when he was living at the Waldorf.

JONES: The Waldorf Astoria in the penthouse.

HESS: Roughly what year was this? Now we pinned down the other day that he died on April the 4th of '64.

JONES: It was -- and I had been thinking I would

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find out, but I got this injury and it was sometime -- it was either just before or after the year '61.

HESS: Around 1961.

JONES: It was between '59 and '62, and I'm impressed with the thought it was after '61. When I went up there, he was delighted, apparently. I wrote and told him I would like to come by and pay my respects sometime Monday, if convenient. I wrote him Thursday night knowing he didn't have time to answer the letter. I told him the hotel where I would stay. When I arrived, he had left word to get in touch with so and so and he'd see me at 11 o'clock on Monday. I went to the Waldorf and they sent me right up to his place. He had written me in the earlier letter that he couldn't understand why the Army officials wouldn't let a gallant officer have the benefit

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of an officer promoted under battle conditions. After talking a few minutes complimenting my opinion and about several matters of interest, I started to go, and said, "I just came by to pay my respects, General, and I don't want to impose on your time."

"No," he said, "sit down, I want to talk to you." And he knew that situation in the Orient better than any man with whom I had ever talked.

HESS: The Far East?

JONES: Far East Asia. He knew that as nobody else has known it. As a matter of fact, I didn't bring the subject up, but he did. He brought it up. He seemed to want to talk about it, and I was glad to listen. He said he had gone down to see President Eisenhower and urged him to do certain things.

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And he added, "One could never tell just what he was going to do. He was very pleasant, very cordial," and he liked him, but that Eisenhower sometimes had difficulty making up his mind.

I had told him I had heard his speech when he addressed the Congress.

HESS: At the Joint Session of the Congress after he came back from the Far East in April of '51?

JONES: April of '51. He knew that I was bound to know about all of these things. So I didn't expect him to say anything about Mr. Truman, and I certainly didn't intend to ask about it, but once he talked about men that couldn't make up their minds about issues. To my surprise he said, "I'll have to admit that Mr. Truman surprised me. He has plenty of courage, and he's not afraid to make a decision and

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stand by it." I was shocked. I didn't think he would ever say that, especially after his speech in Congress. But he said, "I'll have to admit that he does, he has plenty of courage, and I like that in a man."

And I didn't say much of anything. I said, "Well, I think that is a very fine thing for you to say, and I agree that Mr. Truman has that quality to a remarkable degree and he has had many difficult problems."

And that's about all the conversation at that phase, but he made me stay there for nearly an hour, and then he said, "Any time you're back in New York, I'd like to have you come and see me."

And I said, "Well, I'll be glad to do it, General. I enjoyed talking to you."

He had some very wonderful furniture in the penthouse; Oriental furniture, the finest I

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had ever seen. It was a palatial place he had there, and he had Oriental boys waiting on him. Of course, he loved to be an important man. But as a matter of fact, I think he finally realized that he had misjudged Mr. Truman and there wasn't any question he had decided that he could just go ahead, and -- I'm going back to the time, you know, when this happened.

And, you know, a man mellows a little as he gets along in years. I'm quite sure -- I know I intended to go back to see him and I think it must have been about 1962, and that's a guess. I thought, "Well, he's so pleasant about everything; he is a distinguished man, and I'll go back to see him." But he just admitted that much, and I don't know there's ever been a record of his saying that to anyone else, but he did to me. Do you know I

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got the impression that he was lonely and wanted to talk to someone.

HESS: Do you think that he should have been replaced in 1951?

JONES: Well, I don't know enough about it to answer that question, but according to all the reports I read, his action must be classed as insubordination. I think -- you know, a man if he's commander in chief, can't have somebody flouting his commander in chief. Much as I admired MacArthur as a great military chieftain, he probably made a mistake in thinking, "Well, here's a man that isn't going to take a drastic action." But the truth finally prevails in nearly anything. I can't help thinking that MacArthur realized that he had undertaken to get away with something. And I was sorry to see it happen. I don't know what Mr. Truman

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thought about it, but he had gone to see him over there. They met over there somewhere in between...

HESS: At Wake Island.

JONES: Wake Island. And I don't know how anybody can criticize Mr. Truman for saying, "Well, I can't have a," -- I don 't know the merits of it, but I just think that there is just one commander in chief. If his orders are not obeyed, he is no commander in chief and the situation becomes confused. I'm a great admirer of General MacArthur as a military officer, and I think he knew that subject. I think that it's too bad that it had to happen. But if an army doesn't have discipline, it ceases to be an army. I don't know how Mr. Truman could avoid taking some action. Now, that's the way I reason it out. I'm not familiar enough with

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all the facts to -- but that's just the impression I have.

HESS: During Mr. Truman's administration, did you ever have any dealing with any of the members of the White House staff: Clark Clifford, Charles Murphy, Sam Rosenman?

JONES: Oh, Sam Rosenman, I had dealings with Sam Rosenman during Roosevelt's administration. You know, he came over to see me about some reports they were making on -- in fact, he helped write a report and it was too long, but I didn't have time enough to revise it, but the President hesitated a long time. Mr. Rosenman said to me, "Well, he won't sign it unless you ask him to sign it." The President said I shouldn't have more than six or eight pages, rather than 100 pages.

I said, "Well, there's nothing wrong

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with the report except people won't read that long a report."

I think I finally told the President -- I said -- I think I said, "I don't have time to revise that report. It is too long." I think he had included what several had told him. I said, "Nobody is going to read it."

And the President said, "It ought to be done in six pages."

I agreed, "It ought to be done in not less than ten pages." But I said, "I just don't have time to do it, and I don't know anybody who has time to condense it. I have no objection to its being signed. I have read it. I don't find anything objectionable in it except its length." The President finally signed it. I don't think many people read it. It was just too extensive, a correct statement, but too long, but Roosevelt did a

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whale of a job in collecting information from various people. Sam Rosenman was an exceptionally good writer. He helped the President on many of his speeches.

I helped Byrnes and some of the other writers in preparing some of the executive speeches. But the President finally made them his own. He would change and make them sound like his own production, which they really were.

I never knew Clark Clifford very well. I knew Tommy [Thomas G.] Corcoran very well. He often came to the University Club. Clark Clifford has a lot of ability. I think he is one of the best men that were connected with any President since I've been here. And Rosenman, now, as a speechwriter, I think Rosenman is very wonderful, or was and still is. I think he's still living, isn't he?

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HESS: In New York City.

JONES: And now, I didn't have occasion to be very close to -- this other man -- who was it that was over there. Who was his date maker?

HESS: Matthew Connelly?

JONES: Yes, I think I talked with him on the phone and maybe met him once or twice, but I wasn't close to Truman's staff. I didn't have occasion to be. I was on the Court and couldn't do much except perhaps make some suggestions and I couldn't do that except as to something that grew out of my experience in government. I told Mr. Truman more than once that I thought he was doing an excellent job, which I think he did. He was one of our truly great Presidents and he had a tough row to hoe.

HESS: Let's turn the tape over.

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All right, Judge, do you recall anything in particular about the transition from the Truman administration to the Eisenhower administration?

JONES: Well, I...

HESS: Were you involved in that at all?

JONES: No, I wasn't involved in that at all. I don't know that there's anything I can add. I followed it and watched the inauguration. I had tickets and went up to observe the ceremonies. I was present at the dinner at which President Truman announced in 1952 that he would not be a candidate for another term. It surprised everyone at our table. I was sorry that he decided not to run again because he would have been a very popular candidate that time. He wouldn't have had the struggle he had in '48.

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HESS: Were you at the National Guard Armory that night that he announced that he was...

JONES: Yes, I was there.

HESS: What do you recall about that?

JONES: Well, I know that everybody at my table -- I was the guest of somebody that had taken me. We had two or three prominent people at our table and they were all surprised. He pulled a surprise on all of them, I think. I never did hear Mr. Rayburn say whether he was surprised. I don't suppose he was, but I was, and everybody at the table, and I thought...

HESS: Who was there? Do you recall who was seated at the table?

JONES: No, I believe I was the guest of Roy Miller, although I am not at all sure. At

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any rate, I was the guest of some Democrat. Most of them I knew. They had about eight or ten at the table. I attended many of these dinners. I expressed surprise as well as the others present. One of them remarked: "Well, he'd be a cinch if he wanted it." And then they all began to say, "Well, we don't blame him if he doesn't want to go through that agony because he's had the roughest road that a man ever had and yet has pulled through in fine shape." Nobody blamed him, and yet, they all regretted his declaration. It came in his speech. He said, "I shall not be a candidate for re-election in 1952," or words to that effect.

HESS: Who did you think, after he announced that he was not going to run, would make the best candidate for the Democrats that year?

JONES: Who all was being considered at that time?

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HESS: Well, Barkley, Sam Rayburn, maybe, a little bit, Fred Vinson and Adlai Stevenson, of course.

JONES: Yes, well, I think Adlai Stevenson would always be a good candidate, and I always think Sam Rayburn would have been. Barkley would have been, if it hadn't been for his age, Barkley would have been a shoe-in for it, I think, if it hadn't been for his age.

HESS: How about Richard Russell?

JONES: Who?

HESS: How about Richard Russell of Georgia?

JONES: Oh, Richard Russell would have been one of my favorites if I had thought he could be nominated.

HESS: And why didn't you think he could be nominated?

JONES: Well, you know, they hadn't gone south so

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much until that time.

HESS: Why?

JONES: Well, there was sort of a feeling, "Well, that's a cinch down there. We want to get a man from some state that can help us carry a doubtful state." That's one thing.

HESS: Do you think his views in segregation might have entered in?

JONES: Well, I don't think that had gotten so vital up to that time. You see that didn't get to be such a close question until after the 1954 decision by the Supreme Court, so that wasn't a serious question. But there's never been much -- up to that time, they'd rather not pick a southern man for some reason. It was a hangover, I guess, of the old feeling, but it was just -- it was just sort of a custom that,

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"Well, anybody can carry the South." I don't know, in '52 -- it seemed to me there was somebody else that was being considered too at that time. It wasn't...

HESS: There were quite a few, quite a few.

JONES: Yes, there were quite a few, but at any rate, I was very fond of Barkley.

HESS: [Estes] Kefauver, for one, was trying very hard.

JONES: I think Dick Russell or Sam Rayburn or Adlai Stevenson, or Alben Barkley or Kefauver would all have been good candidates. Either one of them would have been a good candidate.

Now, you know, there has never been quite the prejudice, or that sectional prejudice against Texas, as there has been against others, for some reason.

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HESS: Why do you think that is, that Texas seems to have an aura of both Southern and Western -- it depends on how you look at it.

JONES: Well, all of West Texas was settled up more from Illinois and Iowa and Nebraska and Tennessee. East Texas was largely settled by people from the old South at an earlier date.

For example, in my home county, when I first went out there as a schoolboy, they had homeseekers from Illinois, Ohio, great many from Iowa, Missouri, and Tennessee who were buying cheap land for homes. There was one time when every county officer in my home county of Potter -- Amarillo was the county seat -- was either from Tennessee or from some other state. There was not a native in the bunch. Not a man from the South proper except Tennessee.

A great many Republicans have always

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been in West Texas. They would always vote Democratic as to county officers, and then they would usually vote Republican in the national election. They had no voice unless they did that. They used to claim that Fort Worth was where the West begins. That's what Amon Carter used to say.

There was always a bantering controversy between Fort Worth and Dallas.

HESS: There would be a little rivalry there.

JONES: And Amon Carter was the self-chosen and acknowledged leader of the western area; that is, Fort Worth was considered western.

One time a big Chamber of Commerce or business group came down from the north and east to visit Texas. They first stopped in Dallas, and Amon Carter was over there. The Dallas people ribbed him good. The rivalry was

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largely in fun rather than any bitterness. Then they came over to Fort Worth, and, of course, a lot of Dallas men came to Fort Worth the following night. It was more a matter of having fun than it was really feeling, although there was some feeling. When they came to Fort Worth, Amon Carter presided, and he started off this way: He said, "Gentlemen, you are now in Fort Worth, Texas. That's where the West begins. Over there in Dallas is where the East peters out." He brought down the house with that statement. It amused all these people. But that whole western area of Texas has been as much western as southern. And yet, they deal with each other just the same.

HESS: Were you surprised in 1952 when Adlai Stevenson was defeated by General Eisenhower?

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JONES: No, I wasn't surprised. Even though Eisenhower didn't know which party he belonged to (he didn't have any party affiliation), he would have been overwhelmingly elected if he had run on the Democratic ticket. It is difficult to beat a great hero right after a successful war...

HESS: The war hero is going to win.

JONES: The war hero usually does. But I think Adlai Stevenson would have made a great President. His acceptance speech was a gem in both language and thought. I think Alben Barkley and all of these men we mentioned would have made good Presidents. But Adlai Stevenson was nominated again in 1956. Well, he was nominated in '56, wasn't he, and in '60, wasn't it? No, in '56, and they tried to nominate him in'60. Mrs. Roosevelt wanted

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to nominate him. I watched that convention on television.

HESS: In Los Angeles?

JONES: I believe so.

HESS: What do you recall about that convention?

JONES: I'll say this. Sam Rayburn was not well. He was Johnson's manager. They had the best organized (the Kennedy's), the best organized campaign I've ever seen. They got the names of every delegation and when the delegates arrived in Los Angeles, they had busses to meet them with beautiful girls on them, with their tags, but they didn't campaign. They would just say, "We'll take you wherever you want to go and anywhere you want to go while you are here -- anyway you call us, we'll show you around."

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Meeting people coming into a strange place and extending courtesies is very effective.

HESS: That impresses people.

JONES: That impresses people and the fact that they didn't try to campaign. That was even more effective.

HESS: Quiet campaigning.

JONES: It was the most effective type. The delegates knew who they were working for. They were doing them this courtesy and not asking them for anything. It was one of the most effective arrangements I've ever witnessed.

That campaign had been worked on for years you know. The Kennedys began to organize right after the campaign in '56 when J.F.K. tried to be the Vice Presidential nominee

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and received a large vote. This is not a criticism -- merely a comment.

HESS: When he came so close to getting the Vice Presidential spot?

JONES: Yes, and they watched the election of delegates. They had someone interested at the county conventions and even some of the precinct conventions, somebody to look after them. Not many people attend a precinct convention. They select delegates to the county conventions. Delegates to the state convention are chosen at the county conventions.

But you know, John F. Kennedy had a tremendous personality. He came to the University Club and lived about two months when he first came to Washington as a member of the House. I got acquainted with him and he was a delightful person. He had a frank,

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easy manner with just enough breeziness about him to be able to meet people without any trouble at all.

HESS: Concerning the events in Los Angeles that year, there is always a big controversy over the question of whether the Kennedy camp really wanted Lyndon Johnson as second on the ticket or not. What is your view?

JONES: Well, it would have to be more or less secondhand. Mr. Rayburn didn't want to take it at first saying, "I don't think it will be wise." But he changed his mind and a lot of them did that. As a matter of fact, that's one thing that hurt Lyndon Johnson in Texas. A lot of people that were strongly for him didn't want him to accept second place.

HESS: They were strong for him as first on the ticket?

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JONES: Didn't want him to take the second place. Nevertheless, I get the impression that it was John F. Kennedy's decision that he would need him and I think he did need him to carry the South. I think that Johnson helped him carry the South and Lady Bird [Mrs. Lyndon Johnson] did a beautiful job down there in campaigning. I wrote her a letter about that. She campaigned through the South. The noisy opposition didn't bother her a minute and I think her courage and skill were of great assistance. I think Kennedy probably would not have been elected if Johnson hadn't been on the ticket. And I think he realized that. I think some of the inner circle probably would have preferred if John F. Kennedy had lived, to ditch Lyndon Johnson in 1964, but John F. Kennedy just nailed that and said, publicly when asked about it, "He'll be on the ticket if he wants to be." There was some considerable talk that they might get somebody

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in his place, but he scotched that talk at once. But that's my impression. It is all secondhanded to me except in talking with people. I didn't know much about it.

HESS: Back to Mr. Truman, what in your opinion were Mr. Truman's major contributions during his career?

JONES: Well, I'd have to study a little while on that. He had so many national and international problems to meet, the natural result of essential readjustments after the war, that it is hard to pinpoint one thing. I think the Hiroshima decision and pulling that 1948 election out of the fire when few people thought it possible were major achievements. As President, he met these various problems head-on. He never tried to deceive anybody, and he carried through with quite a few good measures that were adopted, and I'd have to study a little while. I know he

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did a number of very wonderful things. He really got the foreign affairs situation well in hand, and at the same time people became happy with the legislation that he secured. And, of course, he had a Republican Congress during one two-year period.

HESS: The 80th Congress.

JONES: The 80th Congress, and he...

HESS: '47 and '48.

JONES: And he used that to get people to think.

HESS: He referred to them once or twice during the campaign.

JONES: Yes, I'll say he did! That was a very effective campaign topic. I don't have in mind the various things he did, but he grew on the people and became very popular because of the

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things that he advocated and the things he accomplished in getting out of a -- we'd been in a turmoil and he had cleared the deck on all these problems in the aftermath of the war.

And then -- I followed this a good deal. I talked to Mr. Rayburn a number of times about it. He didn't try to overwhelm the country with legislation. Hurried legislation is often worse than no legislation.

I have had fifty-two years service in the Government. I should have absorbed a little information on the mechanics of Government. If you take legislation in an abnormal time, crowd it through, frequently it just -- well, you know, it's hard to administer. It won't fit in normal times. If you crowd legislation through without thorough consideration, have it written up by somebody who isn't answerable

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to the people at all, it delays the passage of worthwhile legislation. I think several of the pieces of legislation were good, and he got this country back on the track after it was engaged four years in the greatest wars in all history. He won the hearts of people everywhere, and they began to talk of him as one of our outstanding great Presidents. He got the train back on the track. And I think he deserved the title.

HESS: What's your estimation of his place in history?

JONES: I think history will give him more credit than the current comment. Just like they probably will with Johnson as a matter of that fact. History is going to accord him a great place because of those international problems, as well as domestic problems that he had to face

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and which he handled successfully. He didn't have all this trouble of rioting and similar difficulties. None of these came up. If a man in an official position is careful in what he presents, the country will operate far more smoothly. It is better than hurried, ill-prepared legislation. After handling tremendous after the war adjustments, our country was sailing at the end with flying colors. Those things don't just happen at a time like that. Any ship needs a great captain, especially in stormy times, if the ship is to be brought safely into port. And that applies to the Ship of State, as well as to any ship.

I know Mr. Rayburn had a very high regard for him, and he told me just a little before he went away that Truman is going down in history as one of the great Presidents. And

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I share his view.

I'm not going to try to comment on the respective merits of all he accomplished, because I don't recall what they all were; I was busy along other lines. But everybody liked Truman's frank open method. He didn't try to deceive anybody. And in the long run a man's stature grows when he meets those things face to face and doesn't flinch. There are hard questions that arose in government. Some officials begin to back and fill sometimes. It's the very essence of greatness that a man when given a responsibility, a real responsibility, if he meets those responsibilities with his head up and unafraid, the people will always respect him, and history will honor him more and more as the years go by, in my judgment.

HESS: Do you have anything else to add on Mr. Truman

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or the Truman administration?

JONES: Well, no, I believe that's about all that might be of interest. Now, I may have said too much...

HESS: No, we appreciate your cooperation.

JONES: Thank you.